Since this has been such an issue for more than two months now, I’ve decided the time has come to delve into the continuing malarkey surrounding Japan’s Sumo Association and the fallout from Harumafuji’s decision to resign from his position of Yokozuna.

On Thursday, Takanohana Koji, himself a former Yokozuna and director within the JSA, and in charge of the stable that oversaw Harumafuji, was booted off the board of directors and demoted two places for his apparent reluctance to report to the JSA on the incident involving Harumafuji. The board found that despite Takanohana’s admission that he went to the police to report on the incident soon after it occurred, his failure to inform the JSA board immediately after the event and his refusal to attend a meeting of the JSA crisis management panel until December 25 were grounds for removing Takanohana from his post.

As has been widely reported, it is the first time that the JSA executive has removed a director from its ranks, itself a fairly newsworthy event. However further details have come to light which reveal more details about Takanohana’s attitude towards the JSA board and why he behaved in the manner he did.

Takanohana was admitted to the JSA executive in 2014 by former JSA chairman Kitanoumi at the relatively young age of 41 (Takanohana, along with his brother Wakanohana, were revered as Yokozuna throughout the 90s and early 2000s). Kitanoumi made Takanohana general operations manager, which was a sign of the confidence he had in Takanohana’s abilities. However in November 2015 Kitanoumi suddenly died, thereby leaving a vacancy for the position of JSA chairman.

In March 2016 elections for the chairman’s position took place pitting Takanohana against another former Yokozuna, Hakkaku Nobuyoshi. Hakkaku won the election, and appointed Takanohana as the chief of the tourism department of the JSA, a position that effectively removed Takanohana from the executive. To add injury to insult, Hakkaku then appointed one of his own stable’s members, Oguruma Oyakata, to the position of managing director of the JSA, effectively making him Hakkaku’s deputy. 

Takanohana appears to have something of an axe to grind against Hakkaku, and that might make its presence felt at the next chairman’s election. Takanohana has around 8 close allies on the board, and with another 10 supporters would have more than enough votes to clinch the top position in the organization.  The main problem here, however, would be whether the existing executive would acknowledge the result of the election, given that they had previously removed Takanohana from his position for acting in contempt of their authority.  If Takanohana was elected, and then proceeded to implement his own plan of reform, quite a few executives might object and seek to block Takanohana from exercising his authority.

So far, Takanohana has not spoken in public in relation to the controversy surrounding him, so his intentions are only known to a close circle of allies. It is highly likely that he will put himself forward as a candidate for chairman at the next election (scheduled for this year), if anything to ensure the prompt removal of Hakkaku from any position of authority. This, of course, will only perpetuate the degree of hostility between the two, and could split the JSA which would affect sumo operations and ultimately the public’s enjoyment of tournaments.  Takanohana will accept his punishment for now, but he is biding his time, and the issue will flare up again either next month or in March when electoral matters bring it to a head.  

With the last post for this year, it is time to delve into something of a touchy subject vis-à-vis bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea (particularly this week), that being the issue of “comfort women.

Why, some will ask, have you put that term in inverted commas? Do you not think it is a legitimate term, invoking some of the tragic history that has impacted so greatly on Japan-South Korea relations?

Far from it.  It is simply to illustrate how this subject raises raw emotions; emotions that continue to influence the issue of reconciliation and whether both countries can ever find common cause with one another.  

Among certain sections of the right wing of Japan’s media and political elite, there is no such thing as “comfort women”. The term is ahistorical, and no records exist proving that the involuntary prostitution of Korean women was either 1) institutionalized, or 2) involuntary, or 3) ever condoned by the military government of Japan during the colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula.   

Yet the issue is an open wound to the people of South (and one presumes North) Korea, given the level of references made to it in South Korean media and literature, and the existence of memorials within South Korea (including one located across the road from the front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul) to the girls (as many of them were) taken to serve as prostitutes to the Imperial Japanese military are a physical reminder of the degree of anger and humiliation felt by the Korean people.

The fact that both countries signed an agreement in 2015 that, ostensibly, was meant to resolve the issue of “comfort women” was never going to succeed in bringing the issue to a close. The agreement was too convenient, too cased in bureaucratic language meant to lessen any emotional reaction to it, and too distant to the events of more than 75 years ago to last any longer than a change in government.

It appears as though South Korea will believe the issue resolved if Japan, in addition to providing compensation to those “comfort women” still alive and the families of those who have passed away, produces an apology that unequivocally admits to the existence of the systematic sexual enslavement of Korean women, and uses the term “comfort women”. This would need to be supported by a public education program in Japan, of open, official acknowledgment that this system existed in Imperial Japan, and that it was perpetrated with the approval of the Japanese government and military at the time.  This might then be accompanied by a public gesture, such as the establishment of a memorial to those who perished under this system, to be dedicated by a senior Japanese official – presumably meaning the prime minister. 

There would also need to be a pledge, a solemn promise by the Japanese government, to honour the memory of the victims of this system, to never again perpetrate such a system, and compel all public officials to uphold this promise. 

Yet these measures will never be taken by Japan.  To admit that Japan utilized a system of forced prostitution would be to admit that the state acted immorally, that those who perished in war fought to perpetrate a system of institutionalized cruelty, and that successive governments have sought to obfuscate the issue rather than deal with it directly.  It would mean sacrificing reputation, accepting that past policies were gravely mistaken in their intent, and that those who created such policies and carried them out were utterly wrong in purpose and execution.  It would be dishonorable, humiliating even, to make such concessions, and so they will not be made. 

So there will be no resolution of the issue of “comfort women” so long as it remains a very real, very painful episode that neither side will concede ground in interpreting.   And so the cycle of suspicion and doubt will continue until all living memory of the “comfort women” fades into the dark recesses of history.   

Over the past two weeks, a number of reports have emerged from Japan of wooden vessels (mainly fishing boats) of North Korean origin landing on the shores of prefectures facing towards the Sea of Japan, with the crews of these vessels hungry, emaciated or dead (according to this report, by the end of November there were 28 such incidents – and 64 overall this year). Those crews found alive state that they have often been forced to take shelter because of bad weather, or because of a lack of provisions they have made their way to shore to try and find food, or have sought out electrical equipment (such as TVs and fridges). This phenomenon, which has escalated dramatically over the last month, points to the dire situation facing North Korean citizens in areas outside of Pyongyang as winter closes in on North Korea.

Poor weather in the Sea of Japan, coupled with the continuing effect of sanctions applied against North Korea, has meant that many residents of coastal towns and villages in North Korea who have taken to the sea in what North Korea refers to the ‘winter fishing onslaught’ have been carried out to sea by strong winds and high waves only to end up on uninhabited islands in the Sea of Japan, or else in Japan’s EEZ and territorial shoreline. They have then either been picked up by the Japan Coast Guard or spotted by Japanese fishermen.  Some, however, have not been as fortunate, and have apparently died at sea before the boats carrying their corpses have landed on Japanese territory.

This harrowing state of affairs is set to become more dreadful as the month progresses, with expectations that there will be another spike in sightings before the year has ended. The combined effects of the above factors, coupled with the deterioration in the state of North Korea’s fishing fleet, will force more North Korean vessels to either seek shelter on Japan’s shores or risk trying to haul in a catch and return to North Korea in the face of bad weather.  The more episodes of ‘ghost ships’ turning up on Japan’s shorelines will, however, focus attention on the plight of the North Korean people, whose fate has been somewhat consumed by the larger issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

In a week dominated by news that Yokozuna-ranked Sumo wrestler Harumafuji Kōhei had resigned from competition in the wake of a scandal that arose following his attack on fellow wrestler (and fellow Mongolian) Takanoiwa Yoshimori, another issue arose in the world of Japanese politics that is of greater consequence to society as a whole but which has not garnered that much attention. On the 22nd of November, Kumamoto City councilor Ogata Yuka brought her 7 month year old son with her into the city council chamber in order to highlight the difficulties of raising a child while also being a working mother. Far from eliciting any sympathy for her situation or the message she was trying to convey, the council chamber office declared that the presence of a “spectator” during council business was a violation of council rules and tried to have councilor Ogata leave the chamber so that business could continue “as scheduled”.

This particular attitude in Japan is no surprise, given that the country still has woefully low levels of female participation in senior levels of government and business (coming in at 114th in gender equality rankings issued by the World Economic Forum), and the traditional image of adult female roles in society have not undergone any substantial changes in over 50 years. Recently this image was reflected in commentary by former Diet Upper House Deputy Speaker Santo Akiko (LDP), who said that the Ministry of Health and Welfare should consider bestowing an award on any women who give birth to more than 4 children. Santo allegedly claimed that while women’s working role in society was being recognized, not enough recognition was being given to housewives, and an award would rectify that imbalance.

That this came from a senior member of the LDP in itself speaks to the level of the problem facing Japanese women who wish to raise a family but want the opportunity to pursue a career. The traditional role of women dictates that once they have children, they should resign from their current role and attend to their children, and that any aspirations they might have had to develop their skills have to be sacrificed in order to ensure their children are well cared for while the husband fulfils the role of the main salary earner. While this might have been true 40 years ago, the situation is very different for young families in Japan today. Cost of living pressures, coupled with a lack of permanent, steady employment, mean that both parents must work if the family is to reach a minimum level of comfort, but since the number of full-time jobs available to women with children are few, and given the dire lack of early childhood facilities across Japan, women are forced into child rearing while their husbands must bear the burden for most, if not all, of the household costs.   

This dilemma has been addressed in part by PM Abe’s push to have more women involved in the workforce and contributing to the Japanese economy, knowing full well that the lack of greater female representation in the workforce is a drain on Japan’s productivity and threatens Japan’s continued prosperity.  To address this, the LDP’s election promises during the October Lower House campaign included making nursery and kindergarten free to children aged from 2 to 5, as well as making higher education (namely high school) free to lower income households. 

Whether or not this can be realized, given the ever decreasing number of taxpayers from whom the government can draw the additional 10% increase to income tax to pay for the scheme, is debatable, but it at least shows that the LDP are seriously examining the issue of under-representation by women in Japanese society as a whole. Having said that, the decision by PM Abe to pledge a donation of 5.7 billion yen (US$ 50m) to Ivanka Trump’s support program for third world female entrepreneurship raised a few eyebrows, with criticism focused on the idea that if the PM was serious about supporting Japanese women’s social position, then surely such funds would be better off being spent in Japan than going overseas. 

That the presence of a child in a city council chambers should raise such a fuss is difficult to comprehend for many in Western nations, especially given the advances in women’s societal roles in those nations in the past decade or more (particularly here in Australia, where Greens Senator Larissa Waters made headlines after she breastfed her new-born daughter while engaging in Senate business in the Australian Parliament). It highlights just how far women, even those in positions of power, must go in Japan to achieve even the minimum level of recognition of the circumstances that working women face and how society must adapt to those changes.  To her great credit, councilor Ogata has expressed no remorse for her actions, and has used the incident to highlight the degree of bias that still exists to women playing a broader role in Japanese society. In that sense she is a pioneer, and should be commended for her actions.

It’s not going out on a limb here to suggest that with the release of the Australian government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper on Thursday, the need for Australia to start working in closer concert with Japan has become more urgent as Australia heads into what could be a fairly rough political year in 2018. While the white paper itself did not include anything that would otherwise be regarded as unusual or unique in relation to bilateral relations with Japan, it did emphasize that Japan would be consider one of five key regional partners with which Australia would need to work to ensure the “rules-based international order” that has underpinned much of the economic growth of the Indo-Pacific (another term that has been embraced by more conservative members of the foreign policy community, primarily because it has a broader scope of application, and because it doesn’t overly focus on Asia, aka China).

The comments on Japan did include this particular line, though – “As close partners, each country is invested in the success of the other”. This is probably the clearest expression on where Australia sees its relationship with Japan going in quite some time. In an era where the established international order is being re-shaped by power rather than law, and where the greatest champion of the liberal international order is steadily retreating from that role, Australia has begun to cast its eye over the region to find nations that at least share its sense of values and which it believes will be able to best assist Australia in keeping something of the pre-existing order in the region intact. 

Australia has already made overtures towards Japan to keep this momentum going by enthusiastically joining in the quadrilateral strategic dialogue, while fully aware that just by talking with the three other major democracies of the Indo-Pacific region it might incur the wrath of a suspicious Beijing. The question looming over this participation is, however, whether this enthusiasm for cooperation can be sustained if Australia undergoes a change in government. While the Labor Party has not dismissed the idea of participating in a quadrilateral dialogue, neither is it overly supportive of the idea, instead suggesting that it will observe whether the “Quad” actually improves the regional security situation before committing to remain a member of it.

The thing is, if the impetus is on the “Quad” to demonstrate that it contributes to regional security, on what basis will Labor decide that it is worth the effort? For example, if the “Quad” issues a statement expressing concern about China’s island building in the South China Sea and Beijing then issues a rebuke of that criticism, will that be proof to Labor that the “Quad” is disruptive and thus grounds for once again jettisoning Australia’s participation in the dialogue? And what will it say to the other members of the “Quad”? That they, and not China, are responsible for upsetting the regional order? That they are acting against the interests of stability? If Labor adopted that stance vis-à-vis the three other members of the “Quad”, then Australia might as well give up its place at all international forums. It will be obvious that it prefers to meekly back down rather than defend its values and so is unreliable as an international partner. 

So much can be achieved by building relations with Japan that extend beyond economics, but if Australia balks every time it is faced with the prospect of incurring China’s wrath by cooperating with Japan (and India, and South Korea) on regional security issues, then it will have effectively surrendered its sovereign interests to Beijing and further damaged the cause of the international liberal democratic order for no real benefit.  With Japan committed to expanding its role in the region, Australia must do all in its power to facilitate this, and that means actually pro-actively taking part in initiatives that Japan believes is important to regional stability.

While the Coalition remains in power this dedication will remain intact, but what happens should they lose the next federal election is anybody’s guess.  Uncertainty breeds suspicion in the world of diplomacy, and suspicion is no basis for regional stability.   

I’m coming to a slow realization here.  For all of the summits and conferences that have gone on for the past two weeks, what, pray tell, has been the sum result of all that activity? Have there been any substantial breakthroughs in international relations, a reduction in tensions from existential threats, resolutions in territorial disputes, or agreements on regional trade issues? In a word, no.  Diplomacy is a tedious but malleable entity, for it requires that the interests of a number of nations be hammered, squashed or stretched into shape to suit a common purpose. The APEC, ASEAN, and EAS summits might aspire to lofty goals of regional unity and shared destinies, but reality and a strong dose of nationalism tends to interfere in the process of forming consensus on the most pressing matters of the day. That makes them exercises in frustration, briefly punctuated with moments of hilarity.   

It is clear that the last few days of regional leaders’ meetings have not produced anything by way of hard-hitting, dramatic substance, certainly not in relation to regional order.  But in a quiet, unassuming way, the four nations of India, Japan, the US and Australia have agreed to adopt a common stance to deal with the security challenges of the immediate future. China has made its objections to this ‘quadrilateral dialogue’ clear, not least of which because it has not been invited to participate, but must know that its actions over the past year are to a large degree responsible for this dialogue being resurrected after a decade of lying dormant. 

On the other hand, ASEAN has started to talk to China about an officially legally binding code of conduct for the South China Sea, 15 years after the proposal was first raised. This development is either positive or concerning depending on where one sits in the regional order. While China is a signatory to UNCLOS, it has categorically ignored its implications when conducting artificial island building in the South China Sea. Since no other state (bar the US, and its intermittent FONOPs) has risen to challenge China’s claims, the region now has a fait accompli whereby China can effectively dictate the norms of commercial traffic in its vicinity while also expanding its military capabilities just that much closer to Southeast Asian states and to Australia. ASEAN realizes this, which is why it has decided to return to negotiations on a legally binding document than spend more years in uncertainty about China’s intentions and questioning US commitment to the region.

Meanwhile Australia and Japan, over the course of these past two weeks, have been unified in the messages they have conveyed regarding the need for co-operation, closer ties, and consultation. In the bilateral meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe on the side of the EAS, they essentially agreed on the same points they touched upon during their meeting in January – namely the strategic partnership, shared interests and values, freedom of the seas (which in this case was referred to as the “Indo-Pacific” - インド太平洋地域) , and an early resolution to finalization of the details of the TPP11 (of which so much was expected for this year’s summit season, only to have those hopes dashed by a rampant Canada and its concerns for a re-negotiated NAFTA and an FTA with China).

For the first time in 3 years, the leaders of the US, Japan, and Australia all met in the same room before the start of the ASEAN session on Monday, where the topic of conversation was, quite understandably, North Korea and how to contain its nuclear ambitions. This meeting itself was unusual because it was originally meant to be a bilateral between the US and Australia, and it was only at the last minute that an offer was put out (presumably by the US, as a meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe was already scheduled to take place the same day) for Japan to join in discussions.  The bilateral between Australia and the US was then re-scheduled as a dinner, which was then re-scheduled to a short official meeting. In all fairness, Turnbull had already informally spoken to President Trump at APEC in Da Nang, so neither leader really had anything else to add to their previous conversations.

So bar the fallout from the TPP (which is still alive, although it will undergo further revisions in the coming months), those messages that were espoused throughout the year have been aired once again, albeit in different venues.  One should be happy with that result, as at the very least it confirms that everyone (which in this sense, means the liberal democratic order) is on the same page regarding regional security priorities (and less so economic ones). Yet the fact that so much time and effort was put into events that produced little of substance makes you wonder if everything couldn’t have been sorted out at the ministerial level, or by a really well thought out tele-conference.       

Over the past two days, there have been a number of incidents at venues in both the Kansai and Kanto regions that point towards a concerted effort by unknown elements to disrupt public transport and educational institutions in Japan. In the first instance, a number of bomb threats were made via telephone on the 5th of November and concerned train stations, department stores, and ferries in the Kyoto, Osaka, and Hiroshima regions. On Tuesday, news came via the Sankei Shimbun that a bomb threat had been made against Waseda University in Tokyo, although the method of correspondence was via a web-based enquiry form (both of these threats follow on from a threat made against the Tōden coal-fired power station in Chiba Prefecture in late September, which was made via email).

The fact that no devices have yet been found also suggests that the purpose of the threats was to create disruption rather than casualties.

Terrorism in Japan is a phenomenon that has a long and storied history, but one element that has been constant in each incident is that the perpetrators have all been Japanese citizens. From the exploits of the prewar Genyōsha, to the activities of the Japanese Red Army in the 70s and 80s, right through to the Sarin gas attack on the Kasumigaseki station in 1995 by Aum Shinrikyō, all of these organizations have been formed and attacks carried out by Japanese nationals, although the targets have not always been Japanese citizens or institutions.  In this instance, since the threats have been limited to specific targets, and given that warnings have been issued beforehand, suggests that they have been done for nuisance value, distracting law enforcement agencies from other tasks and irritating commuters and tourists but not really intended to cause destruction.

Until the perpetrators are caught and their motives revealed, we can only speculate as to why these threats have been issued. They may be related to President Trump’s visit, they may be related to the recent election victory by the LDP/Komeito coalition, they may be an act of a left or right wing activist group intent on sending a message to authorities, they may be the work of a disgruntled citizen or group of citizens who object to some development in their local community, or they might be a case of simple harassment. It is unlikely to be terrorism inspired by religious teachings, and certainly not extremist terrorism, although the targets do have common characteristics with incident sites in other states. The use of a bomb threat alone distinguishes these threats from those made by extremists in other countries, although we do not yet know the details of the threats. What we do know is that they were made in Japanese, directly to Japanese institutions, and so point towards the standard pattern for terrorist threats in Japan.

In an interview with Nikkei Shinbun last week following the LDP/Komeito electoral victory, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono raised the prospect of a four-way dialogue between Japan, the US, Australia, and India. This comment was in response to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s advocacy of greater US involvement in the Asia-Pacific with its regional allies and in response to the growing reach of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Abe government has a long history of advocacy of dialogues with other regionally based democracies, with the initial proposal for a “quadrilateral security dialogue” being made early in April 2007 by none other than PM Abe himself. This proposal was met with a favourable response from each of the capitals of the invitees at the time, and so officials from each of the four countries (US, Japan, Australia, India) met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Meeting in May 2007 to thrash out some of the details of what a quadrilateral dialogue would look like and what it would hope to achieve.  However, Beijing caught wind of this discussion before it took place and sent urgent letters of protest to Washington, Canberra, Tokyo, and New Delhi, warning each of the potential participants that any moves to create a regional dialogue that excluded China would be interpreted as an attempt to contain Chinese ambitions and hostile to Chinese interests.

The warning had the desired effect. In July of 2007 then Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson, on a visit to New Delhi immediately following one to Beijing, said during a press conference that Australia had no wish to enter into a quadrilateral dialogue and was satisfied with the trilateral arrangement that already existed between Australia, Japan, and the US.  Following the removal of the Howard government and the accession of the Rudd government in November 2007, Australia became more reluctant to pursue any further discussion of a quadrilateral arrangement. In February 2008 this was spelled out in plain language by then Foreign Minister Stephen Smith during a visit to Australia by then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, thereby removing Australia from any further participation in the “quad”. 

Yet a lot has changed over the course of 10 years. Australia has witnessed the growing infiltration of Chinese state owned enterprise and private investment into its private sector, its educational sector, and its political class. It has seen China seek influence in the Pacific through loans, thus turning Pacific Islands away from their traditional relationship with Australia, while Australia’s security and sovereignty has been threatened by cyber-based espionage launched from China.  It has also seen China move to break up ASEAN by turning member states against one another,  militarize the South China Sea to turn it into a Chinese controlled enclave, threaten an open border war with India, openly collaborate with Russia to oppose US and EU interests, and ignore international opinion and law in pursuit of unilateral goals.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Australia has voiced far more support for the idea of a “quad” in the past two weeks than in the past 10 years. In the age of uncertainty, or more accurately the age of Trump, Australia needs to ensure that it has the support of fellow democratic governments in the region so that its security won’t be compromised by being left alone to deal with China’s encroaching power.    
Australia has always relied on having a major power to back up its security posture, and the combination of the US, Japan, and India as security partners would ensure that enough authority is there to cause China to pause before attempting to put pressure on Australia to adopt positions at odds with Australia’s interests (and/or its values). If a revived quadrilateral dialogue proves useful, this could then lead to other democracies, namely New Zealand and Singapore, wanting to join the framework, moves that Australia would definitely support and which would further strengthen the cause of democratic government in the region.

There will be those in the Australian community who will voice objections to any move to join the “quad”, but their views will not be those of the majority, particularly the majority in power. The real question though is whether the Australian Labor Party has moved on from its position in the late 2000s.  Recent commentary from Opposition defence spokesman Richard Marles indicates that Labor has begun to appreciate that regional relations will be crucial to handling overall relations with China and that being involved in a dialogue with partners is preferable to being left outside this grouping and attempting to deal with China on our own.  Opposition foreign affairs spokeswoman Penny Wong has also said words to this effect, although she has also said that China relations should not be seen through what she calls the “lens of risk management”.  With the Labor left faction in the ascendancy on policy formulation, it will be interesting to see whether Labor does indeed agree to follow on with any quadrilateral dialogue with other regional democracies (albeit conservative democratic governments), or, in the event it wins the next federal election, it once again sees fit to pull Australia out of any such arrangement and thus leave Australia in a vulnerable position during the “age of uncertainty”. 

So PM Abe has retained his position as PM and the LDP/Komeito has a super-majority in the Diet (313 seats) which, theoretically, gives them the numbers to push ahead with constitutional re-writing to legally establish the legitimacy of the SDF as an armed force and its role in the protection of the Japanese state. For PM Abe the gamble of going to the polls in the wake of scandal and the emergence of a potential rival in the Party of Hope was balanced by the positive economic data on the Japanese economy released earlier this month combined with the both real and existential threat posed by North Korea. These factors, combined with the appearance over the weekend of an intense typhoon that kept many voters from venturing outdoors, brought about a victory that had been expected to return the LDP/Komeito to power, but far greater in numbers than anticipated (the rate of voter turnout was the second lowest in postwar Japanese history, however).

While PM Abe himself has lost popularity in recent months, it appears that the disarray in the opposition parties, the lack of a truly viable centre or centre-left alternative to the LDP/Komeito coalition, and sheer voter apathy have returned the incumbent government to power for a fourth term. Abe is set to become the longest ever serving Japanese prime minister, surpassing both his grandfather and great uncle, and may also be the first Japanese prime minister in the post-war era to successfully re-write the constitution. Both of these will certainly cement Abe’s legacy in history, but whether they are in the best interests of the nation remains to be seen.  From the numerous polls conducted during the election campaign, it is clear that voters were looking for something to rejuvenate Japan’s political environment, but the lack of choice in realistic, or at least promising alternatives meant that voters faced the choice of either merely returning the current government or not bothering to vote at all. 

So the question that is now being banded around social and traditional media is whether Abe has the ability to go ahead with constitutional reform. All of the legal measures are in place to allow it occur, but the next step may be the toughest of all – convincing a skeptical Japanese public that revisionism is in fact necessary, and that by re-writing the constitution Japan will be better protected against external threats from neighboring states.  The Japanese public is split on the issue, and only an overwhelming majority in favour can lead the way to approval to re-word the constitution. Then again, if North Korea continues to keep shooting missiles in the direction of Japan then the public just might see the logic of changing the constitution, although it would do little to assuage the belief that the North Korean issue is a useful expedient for changing the constitution along the lines of the central-right ideology of the LDP.

In the meantime the issue of disproportionate representation has once again emerged in the wake of the 2017 election in the same manner that it did following the 2009, 2012, and 2014 elections. The Supreme Court ruled in each occasion that the election had occurred in an ‘unconstitutional’ manner because of the disparity in weighting for votes. A group of constitutional lawyers have again submitted writs to courts across the country in an attempt to have the election declared void, however this activity usually results in the Supreme Court ruling that while the result is unconstitutional in nature, it is still valid. The reasoning behind this says that declaring the result invalid and void would result in administrative chaos and have a negative effect on markets, thereby harming the state. So the result will stand, and the issue will continue to plague every federal election until it is resolved, one way or another.

From the point of view of bilateral relations, the re-election of PM Abe doesn’t change the dynamic between Australia and Japan. It will continue as per usual, although it might see more activity such as joint exercises between the armed forces of both countries, and possible co-ordination on ensuring the TPP is approved by the remaining 11 (possibly 10, depending on how New Zealand goes under the Ardern government) participating nations. The real question for bilateral relations is the longevity of the Turnbull government, but that is a question better addressed by other blogs.   

Over the past few years, as certainly since the mid-2000s, Yamamoto Taro has been making a name for himself as an actor, television personality and a politician with strong convictions. Personally, I first became of aware of Yamamoto through his performance in NHK’s 2004 historical drama “Shinsengumi!”(as Harada Sanosuke), however since 2011 it has been his political activism which has garnered the most public attention . Yamamoto was very publicly vocal in his opposition to Japan restarting its nuclear power plants in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, so much so that in the 2012 House of Representatives election he stood as an independent under the banner of his own party, the curiously named “New Party of One”, which took the abolition of nuclear power stations and transferal to renewable energies as its main platform. While he didn’t succeed on this occasion, his subsequent candidacy for the 2013 House of Councilors election (where he again ran as an independent) garnered enough votes to see him elected as a representative for the Tokyo metropolitan area.    

While Yamamoto is currently a representative of the Liberal Party (together with party leader Ozawa Ichiro), he has formed numerous  alliances over the past five years with the DPJ, Unity Party, New Socialist Party of Japan, and the Greens Japan, to name just a few. Yamamoto has primarily set himself against what he perceives to be the vested interests in Japan that ignore the general welfare of the people, particularly the right-wing, conservative agenda of the ruling LDP and Komeito parties. Yamamoto has voiced his opposition to the Abe government’s attempts at constitutional revision, its endorsement of the TPP, and its moves to restrict access to public information and strengthen national security laws. Furthermore, in 2013 Yamamoto made a name for himself by presenting a letter in person to Emperor Akihito at the Enyukai, an annual formal reception hosted by the Emperor, in which he advocated that Japan cease relying on nuclear energy by detailing the damage inflicted on Fukushima Prefecture and that under conservative governments the country was in danger of receding to a pre-war state of ignorance (an act for which he was reprimanded by the House of Councilors).

Yamamoto is unapologetic about his anti-conservative (or more correctly, anti-right wing) stance, going so far as to ridicule PM Shinzo Abe’s wife Akie Abe’s involvement in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal by referring to it as the “Ak-heed Scandal”, a reference to the Lockheed scandal of the mid 1970s that brought down then sitting PM Tanaka Kakuei (which elicited a sharp rebuke from PM Abe).  He has previously criticized NHK for being far too lenient towards the LDP in its questioning of the Kakei and Moritomo scandals (and called for viewers to boycott paying compulsory subscription fees to the national broadcaster), and has also criticized the continuation of whaling, the forced removal of homeless from Olympic venue sites, the Abe government’s decision not to enact (i.e., bring into force) the Paris Climate Agreement,  and is against PM Abe or members of his government paying visits to Yasukuni Shrine.

Yamamoto’s role seems to be one of, to use an Australian vernacular expression, “keeping the bastards honest”, pursuing the government on issues of social inclusion and the role of the state as well as reminding the government of its responsibility to its citizenry. This has made him a favourite target for right wing pundits and nationalist commentators, but it hasn’t dampened his enthusiasm for tackling subjects that might otherwise never see the light of day, and Japan politics is all the better for it.