The subject of violence in the context of Japanese politics has received renewed attention with the publication of “Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists: The Violent Politics of Modern Japan, 1860-1960” by Eiko Maruko Siniawer.  This book, which details the exploits of shishi, bakuto and sōshi gangs of “violence specialists” that were a feature of Japanese political life during the early years of the modern state, is a fascinating glimpse into a world that has always been lingering near the surface of historical memory but which has not yet (at least in English) received a great deal of attention. 

Starting with the closing years of the Edo period, Siniawer outlines how younger, and often poorer, members of the jizamurai class provided their muscle in support of the restoration of and resistance to Imperial rule (i.e., think the Shinsengumi, along with the Imperial supporters from Satsuma and Chōshū). It then details how these protagonists eventually faded away, to be replaced by a different sort of political activist - one that initially acted on behalf of individual patrons (often providing personal protection services to politicians against their political enemies), but which in time joined groups that supported political parties, fought against rival gangs (from both the left and right wing of the political spectrum) and contributed to the spread of Japanese imperialism.

Although the book does not include any breakdown of the number of incidents of political violence per year, which would be useful to determine if during the course of a century there was a remarkable upswing in violence for political purposes, it illustrates in vivid detail many of the more famous incidents of mayhem that punctuated political life during the nascent years of Japanese parliamentary democracy, and how political violence transformed from an instrument of democratic expression to a tool of imperialism and the rise of the fascist state.

It does seem, from the evidence provided, that to enter politics during the period of 1870 – 1930 was to take your life in your hands, and that serious injury or death could result from an inopportune meeting with ‘ruffians’ supporting your rivals or who simply took a disliking to you and whatever political platform you espoused.

What makes this book even more remarkable is the amount of detail it provides about the protagonists of this violence. While I am aware of Japan’s violent political past (and present, if the activities of Diet MPs during debate on the Abe cabinet secrecy laws are any indication), I was not sure of the extent to which it was applied and who practiced it.  Ruffians provides that background and more, down to details on the type of clothing worn by these practitioners of political violence.

Siniawer also makes the important point that political violence was not unique to Japan, and that similar incidents of groups of young men using their physical strength to impose their views on others was a feature in US and UK politics during the same period.   What is interesting is the way in which political violence was encouraged in Japan, and how it became so entwined with the public conscience regarding political action that it would distort and undermine the very democracy that had allowed that conscience to emerge in the first place. 

It is an excellent resource for those seeking to understand how political ideals were strongly contested in Japan during the century following the Meiji Restoration, and I can’t recommend it highly enough.  

The response to Malcolm Turnbull’s visit to Tokyo on Thursday last week is in, and it is, in the best (or worst) traditions of foreign policy analysis, ambiguous. While there was certainly plenty of praise for Turnbull and Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s advocacy for the continuation of talks on the future of the TPP-11, with the possibility of an agreement being concluded in March, the real focus of the media on the visit was what it might portend for the future of Japan-Australia security relations. In the end, it didn’t amount to much – essentially an announcement that discussions on the conclusion of a reciprocal access agreement (which the Australian press insists on calling a ‘visiting forces agreement’) would continue, with another vague timeframe of ‘as early as feasible’ being put forward for the possible conclusion of the agreement.

As a result of the lowering of expectations (what one commentator called ‘noteworthy but not newsworthy’), foreign policy analysis has chosen to view this visit as a ‘missed opportunity’, or at the very least evidence that Japan and Australia still have some way to go before they become truly close security partners. 

However one curious aspect of media commentary on PM Turnbull’s visit was the prevalent use of the term “alliance” to describe the relationship between Japan and Australia, despite it being obvious that Japan and Australia are not allies in the strict legal sense of the term. If “ally” somehow corresponds to “partner, colleague, or like-minded practitioner”, then Australia certainly has a lot of “allies” (to be fair, Australian politicians themselves sometimes use this term apparently without too much thought when they wish to describe close relations with another country, irrespective of whether an actual alliance exists with the country in question. Japanese commentators are more precise, preferring the term ‘quasi-ally’ and its ambiguity rather than any direct reference to an ‘ally’). 

Other points raised in commentary wondered that if Australia was planning on becoming a major defence exporter, why didn’t it send Christopher Pyne to Japan along with PM Turnbull in order to further promote Australian defence exports? While timing issues and the fact that Pyne was already slated to visit India for talks with India’s Defence Minister ahead of the Raisina Dialogue might have played some role in diverting Pyne to the subcontinent, the fact that PM Turnbull visited Narashino base and was talking about the SDF use of the Bushmaster seemed like an opportunity missed for Australia’s defence industry, especially given the fact that Pyne has been very active in zipping about to other countries in the region selling the merits of Australia’s defence technology – but not Japan. 

Nevertheless, the visit produced some significant outcomes showing how far the defence relationship has come between Japan and Australia.  For starters, this year will see the first RAAF-JASDF exercise conducted in Japan (might it also be possible for Japan to participate in EX Pitch Black? Possibly, but two air force exercises in one year might be a bit much for both sides).  Furthermore, in a first for an Australian PM, PM Turnbull was invited to visit the Narashino base, which is the principal base for Japan’s special forces units, and he sat in on a meeting of Japan’s NSC.  As the press noted, these are privileges that are not bestowed on too many foreign leaders when they visit Japan, so clearly PM Abe wanted to make it clear to the Australians that he is prepared to actively include an Australian aspect to Japan’s defence apparatus at the highest levels.

The question now is whether Australia reciprocates this enthusiasm. Ever mindful of the watchful eye of China, PM Turnbull was very forthcoming in praise for China’s efforts vis-à-vis North Korea, and did not seek to portray China’s efforts in the South China Sea in a negative light, even suggesting that the situation there might be resolved (which sounds a tad over-optimistic). Meanwhile Turnbull and Abe were scathing in their comments towards North Korea, even suggesting that the world must not take the sudden thawing in North Korea’s attitude towards South Korea as an indication of a willingness by the North to discuss nuclear weapons. On this aspect of regional relations, at least Japan and Australia are seemingly in lock step.

Still, Turnbull’s presence at the Narashino base is a portent for what PM Abe might expect when he visits Australia next year – perhaps a visit to Victoria Barracks in Sydney will be in order to speak to the commando regiment there, or perhaps RAAF Base Glenbrook, or Garden Island to view Australia’s next generation naval fleet? At any rate, hopefully before then the RAA will be in place in order to facilitate a broader range of exercises between both countries, and who knows, both leaders might have a concluded TPP to spruik as they seek another avenue for cooperation.

This Thursday PM Turnbull will be paying a lightning visit to Tokyo to meet with PM Abe and (ostensibly) reach an agreement on the content of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between Japan and Australia – the first of its kind between Japan and any country other than the US. It will give a legal basis for the presence of the defence forces of either country when undertaking reciprocal training exercises with each other, as well as outlining how each side is to provide fuel, medical assistance, legal aid, legal culpability, and a whole host of other issues that may emerge when defence forces train and operate together. 

It is the culmination of at least a decade of negotiations and agreements made between Japan and Australia that stretch back to the security cooperation agreement reached between PM Abe (in his first crack at that position) and PM Howard in 2007.  It is also in keeping with the growing defence arrangements that both countries have set in place as a hedging policy against uncertainty.  As of now, Australia has an annual prime ministerial meeting with Japan, an annual 2+2 meeting between the Japanese and Australian foreign and defence ministers, an acquisition and cross servicing agreement with Japan (updated during last year’s visit to Sydney by PM Abe), and an information sharing agreement with Japan (not to mention the annual defence exercises of Southern Jackaroo and Nichigo Trident). 

The addition of a VFA to these measures will expand the scope of cooperation between both sides and ultimately define the manner by which the SDF and ADF will operate with one another in the future. It will reinforce the idea in Japanese defence circles of Australia as a ‘quasi-ally’, for no other country apart from the US has developed such progressive, broad-reaching ties with the SDF. For Japan, the possibility of undertaking more extensive military exercises with Australia is an attractive prospect for a country that lacks the space to be able to conduct exercises on the scale of those in Australia. It will increase the level of awareness in the defence forces of either country of the operating procedures and military culture of their Japanese and Australian counterparts, and add to the value of both to the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The gradual implementation of the VFA will inevitably lead to criticism that it is provocative towards China, that Australia is hostile to China’s presence in the region and that it is seeking to exploit this with Japan in order to contain China’s “rise”.  Yet the agreement, rather than being a knee-jerk reaction to China’s increased belligerence, has been in the works for years, and is more the culmination of a gradual move towards inter-regional defence support than a straight out backlash against Chinese military expansion.

The next step in the progress of Japan-Australia defence ties will be defence technology sharing, which has a precedent in the recent agreement Japan made with the UK to undertake joint research on a missile project.  Whether Australia reaches the same level of cooperation depends on what we have to offer, although Australia’s use of upgraded CEA phased array radar systems on its new AWDs and its decision to install the Aegis system on its (soon to be announced) future frigates are certainly of interest to Japan and two areas that both countries could jointly explore. 

In the meantime both PMs will be devoting their attention to how to get momentum on the TPP moving forward after the hiccup of last year’s APEC meeting in Vietnam.  Both countries poured their diplomatic resources into getting a TPP 11 agreement confirmed, only to be disrupted at the last hurdle by a disgruntled Canada. With Davos coming up shortly, PM Turnbull will be keen to know what PM Abe believes will be achieved at this year’s trade meeting, and where he sees the course of trade relations going in the Indo-Pacific.

So it will be a short visit, but one of much promise for bilateral relations for the remainder of 2018.  At the very least, it will occur at a time of relatively low domestic political activity in both countries, so it should garner some interest from the press.  Only time will tell when the agreement will finally be signed, but all indications are that both governments want this document in place ASAP, and so expect another announcement at some point in the very near distant future.      

This year marks the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, a pivotal moment in the history of Japan when the feudal policy of isolation was abandoned and Japan itself became a ‘nation state’, united under a central government and with the Emperor at the apex of a power structure divided between parliamentary rule and the military. The lead-up to this period was one of great upheaval, with many sacrificed during the course of founding a modern nation. 

One of the tragic figures to emerge during the decade leading up to the eventual restoration of Imperial rule was Saigo Takamori, principal negotiator of the Satsuma (Shimazu) clan, whose dedication to the overthrow of Tokugawa rule and the installation of Imperial rule would sow the seeds of his own destruction.

Given this is the centenary and a half of the events of 1868, NHK has launched its new ‘Taiga’ drama. For those who don’t know what these are, every year, starting in January, NHK (Japan’s national broadcaster) launches a drama series based on the life of some famous historical figure in Japanese history.  These dramas are known as “Taiga” (大河) (literally ‘great river’, as in the flow of time) and have for decades been a staple of Japanese television.

However, in this age of internet TV and satellite broadcasting, the popularity of Taiga drama has steadily been declining as audiences find other programs to watch which don’t take an entire year of dedicated viewing in order to find out how they end.  Aware of this dilemma, NHK have tried to offset the rather staid, stiff image of Taiga dramas by putting pop culture figures (namely young actors and singers) in the title roles, with very mixed results. 

I myself have been a fan of Taiga drama since watching ‘Aoi’, the drama outlining the lives of the first three Tokugawa shoguns, way back in 1999.  Others I have enjoyed since then have been ‘Shinsengumi!’ in 2005, ‘Furin Kazan’ (about the life of Yamamoto Kansuke) in 2007 (if I remember correctly), ‘Aohime’ in 2009, and ‘Taira no Kiyomori’ in  2012.  This last drama was notable in that it broke with tradition in depicting 12th century Japan with more gritty realism instead of relying on actors in pristine clothing and with flawless skin pretending to be commoners in the otherwise grimy conditions of medieval Japan (this series wasn’t very popular with the general viewing public, who apparently objected to the level of ‘accuracy’ that the drama was attempting to achieve).

So I have taken interest in the fact that this year’s series, titled “Sego don” (mimicking the Satsuma dialect pronunciation of “Saigo dono”) has not exactly gotten off to a stellar start. The first episode only secured 15.4% of viewers, the lowest number of viewers in recent years, and certainly the lowest since “Hana mou” in 2015 (which only grabbed 16.7% of viewers’ attention). As for why “Sego don” might not have sparked much viewer interest, this may be because the cast are relatively unknown, or might stem from the fact that while Saigo Takamori is a famous person from Japanese history, he is one of those tragic figures who perished in a lost cause, and thus not likely to gain much interest from a public looking for inspirational leaders.

Yet another reason might lie in the fact that the producers of the series, in their desire to stick closely to the source material (the 1963 novel “Sego don” written by Hayashi Mariko), have chosen to pepper the lead characters’ dialogue with words and phrases taken from the Satsuma dialect. This is understandable from a historical point of view, but for the average viewer looking for some entertainment on a Sunday evening, it’s a bit arduous to read subtitles in Japanese while watching a Japanese drama (one imagines that this has gone over very well in Kagoshima Prefecture, however).  Given that the Satsuma dialect is difficult for most Japanese people to understand, having the dialogue of a major drama conducted in what almost sounds like a foreign language is probably not going to lead to ratings success.

Nevertheless, it’s still early days in the series, and viewers might start to tune in more once the more dramatic side of Saigo’s life (namely the period between 1860-1868) gets underway.  For those who can’t wait, and can read English, I’d recommend “The Last Samurai” by Mark Ravina for some background on the Saigo’s life and achievements.

Since this has been such an issue for more than two months now, I’ve decided the time has come to delve into the continuing malarkey surrounding Japan’s Sumo Association and the fallout from Harumafuji’s decision to resign from his position of Yokozuna.

On Thursday, Takanohana Koji, himself a former Yokozuna and director within the JSA, and in charge of the stable that oversaw Harumafuji, was booted off the board of directors and demoted two places for his apparent reluctance to report to the JSA on the incident involving Harumafuji. The board found that despite Takanohana’s admission that he went to the police to report on the incident soon after it occurred, his failure to inform the JSA board immediately after the event and his refusal to attend a meeting of the JSA crisis management panel until December 25 were grounds for removing Takanohana from his post.

As has been widely reported, it is the first time that the JSA executive has removed a director from its ranks, itself a fairly newsworthy event. However further details have come to light which reveal more details about Takanohana’s attitude towards the JSA board and why he behaved in the manner he did.

Takanohana was admitted to the JSA executive in 2014 by former JSA chairman Kitanoumi at the relatively young age of 41 (Takanohana, along with his brother Wakanohana, were revered as Yokozuna throughout the 90s and early 2000s). Kitanoumi made Takanohana general operations manager, which was a sign of the confidence he had in Takanohana’s abilities. However in November 2015 Kitanoumi suddenly died, thereby leaving a vacancy for the position of JSA chairman.

In March 2016 elections for the chairman’s position took place pitting Takanohana against another former Yokozuna, Hakkaku Nobuyoshi. Hakkaku won the election, and appointed Takanohana as the chief of the tourism department of the JSA, a position that effectively removed Takanohana from the executive. To add injury to insult, Hakkaku then appointed one of his own stable’s members, Oguruma Oyakata, to the position of managing director of the JSA, effectively making him Hakkaku’s deputy. 

Takanohana appears to have something of an axe to grind against Hakkaku, and that might make its presence felt at the next chairman’s election. Takanohana has around 8 close allies on the board, and with another 10 supporters would have more than enough votes to clinch the top position in the organization.  The main problem here, however, would be whether the existing executive would acknowledge the result of the election, given that they had previously removed Takanohana from his position for acting in contempt of their authority.  If Takanohana was elected, and then proceeded to implement his own plan of reform, quite a few executives might object and seek to block Takanohana from exercising his authority.

So far, Takanohana has not spoken in public in relation to the controversy surrounding him, so his intentions are only known to a close circle of allies. It is highly likely that he will put himself forward as a candidate for chairman at the next election (scheduled for this year), if anything to ensure the prompt removal of Hakkaku from any position of authority. This, of course, will only perpetuate the degree of hostility between the two, and could split the JSA which would affect sumo operations and ultimately the public’s enjoyment of tournaments.  Takanohana will accept his punishment for now, but he is biding his time, and the issue will flare up again either next month or in March when electoral matters bring it to a head.  

With the last post for this year, it is time to delve into something of a touchy subject vis-à-vis bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea (particularly this week), that being the issue of “comfort women.

Why, some will ask, have you put that term in inverted commas? Do you not think it is a legitimate term, invoking some of the tragic history that has impacted so greatly on Japan-South Korea relations?

Far from it.  It is simply to illustrate how this subject raises raw emotions; emotions that continue to influence the issue of reconciliation and whether both countries can ever find common cause with one another.  

Among certain sections of the right wing of Japan’s media and political elite, there is no such thing as “comfort women”. The term is ahistorical, and no records exist proving that the involuntary prostitution of Korean women was either 1) institutionalized, or 2) involuntary, or 3) ever condoned by the military government of Japan during the colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula.   

Yet the issue is an open wound to the people of South (and one presumes North) Korea, given the level of references made to it in South Korean media and literature, and the existence of memorials within South Korea (including one located across the road from the front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul) to the girls (as many of them were) taken to serve as prostitutes to the Imperial Japanese military are a physical reminder of the degree of anger and humiliation felt by the Korean people.

The fact that both countries signed an agreement in 2015 that, ostensibly, was meant to resolve the issue of “comfort women” was never going to succeed in bringing the issue to a close. The agreement was too convenient, too cased in bureaucratic language meant to lessen any emotional reaction to it, and too distant to the events of more than 75 years ago to last any longer than a change in government.

It appears as though South Korea will believe the issue resolved if Japan, in addition to providing compensation to those “comfort women” still alive and the families of those who have passed away, produces an apology that unequivocally admits to the existence of the systematic sexual enslavement of Korean women, and uses the term “comfort women”. This would need to be supported by a public education program in Japan, of open, official acknowledgment that this system existed in Imperial Japan, and that it was perpetrated with the approval of the Japanese government and military at the time.  This might then be accompanied by a public gesture, such as the establishment of a memorial to those who perished under this system, to be dedicated by a senior Japanese official – presumably meaning the prime minister. 

There would also need to be a pledge, a solemn promise by the Japanese government, to honour the memory of the victims of this system, to never again perpetrate such a system, and compel all public officials to uphold this promise. 

Yet these measures will never be taken by Japan.  To admit that Japan utilized a system of forced prostitution would be to admit that the state acted immorally, that those who perished in war fought to perpetrate a system of institutionalized cruelty, and that successive governments have sought to obfuscate the issue rather than deal with it directly.  It would mean sacrificing reputation, accepting that past policies were gravely mistaken in their intent, and that those who created such policies and carried them out were utterly wrong in purpose and execution.  It would be dishonorable, humiliating even, to make such concessions, and so they will not be made. 

So there will be no resolution of the issue of “comfort women” so long as it remains a very real, very painful episode that neither side will concede ground in interpreting.   And so the cycle of suspicion and doubt will continue until all living memory of the “comfort women” fades into the dark recesses of history.   

Over the past two weeks, a number of reports have emerged from Japan of wooden vessels (mainly fishing boats) of North Korean origin landing on the shores of prefectures facing towards the Sea of Japan, with the crews of these vessels hungry, emaciated or dead (according to this report, by the end of November there were 28 such incidents – and 64 overall this year). Those crews found alive state that they have often been forced to take shelter because of bad weather, or because of a lack of provisions they have made their way to shore to try and find food, or have sought out electrical equipment (such as TVs and fridges). This phenomenon, which has escalated dramatically over the last month, points to the dire situation facing North Korean citizens in areas outside of Pyongyang as winter closes in on North Korea.

Poor weather in the Sea of Japan, coupled with the continuing effect of sanctions applied against North Korea, has meant that many residents of coastal towns and villages in North Korea who have taken to the sea in what North Korea refers to the ‘winter fishing onslaught’ have been carried out to sea by strong winds and high waves only to end up on uninhabited islands in the Sea of Japan, or else in Japan’s EEZ and territorial shoreline. They have then either been picked up by the Japan Coast Guard or spotted by Japanese fishermen.  Some, however, have not been as fortunate, and have apparently died at sea before the boats carrying their corpses have landed on Japanese territory.

This harrowing state of affairs is set to become more dreadful as the month progresses, with expectations that there will be another spike in sightings before the year has ended. The combined effects of the above factors, coupled with the deterioration in the state of North Korea’s fishing fleet, will force more North Korean vessels to either seek shelter on Japan’s shores or risk trying to haul in a catch and return to North Korea in the face of bad weather.  The more episodes of ‘ghost ships’ turning up on Japan’s shorelines will, however, focus attention on the plight of the North Korean people, whose fate has been somewhat consumed by the larger issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

In a week dominated by news that Yokozuna-ranked Sumo wrestler Harumafuji Kōhei had resigned from competition in the wake of a scandal that arose following his attack on fellow wrestler (and fellow Mongolian) Takanoiwa Yoshimori, another issue arose in the world of Japanese politics that is of greater consequence to society as a whole but which has not garnered that much attention. On the 22nd of November, Kumamoto City councilor Ogata Yuka brought her 7 month year old son with her into the city council chamber in order to highlight the difficulties of raising a child while also being a working mother. Far from eliciting any sympathy for her situation or the message she was trying to convey, the council chamber office declared that the presence of a “spectator” during council business was a violation of council rules and tried to have councilor Ogata leave the chamber so that business could continue “as scheduled”.

This particular attitude in Japan is no surprise, given that the country still has woefully low levels of female participation in senior levels of government and business (coming in at 114th in gender equality rankings issued by the World Economic Forum), and the traditional image of adult female roles in society have not undergone any substantial changes in over 50 years. Recently this image was reflected in commentary by former Diet Upper House Deputy Speaker Santo Akiko (LDP), who said that the Ministry of Health and Welfare should consider bestowing an award on any women who give birth to more than 4 children. Santo allegedly claimed that while women’s working role in society was being recognized, not enough recognition was being given to housewives, and an award would rectify that imbalance.

That this came from a senior member of the LDP in itself speaks to the level of the problem facing Japanese women who wish to raise a family but want the opportunity to pursue a career. The traditional role of women dictates that once they have children, they should resign from their current role and attend to their children, and that any aspirations they might have had to develop their skills have to be sacrificed in order to ensure their children are well cared for while the husband fulfils the role of the main salary earner. While this might have been true 40 years ago, the situation is very different for young families in Japan today. Cost of living pressures, coupled with a lack of permanent, steady employment, mean that both parents must work if the family is to reach a minimum level of comfort, but since the number of full-time jobs available to women with children are few, and given the dire lack of early childhood facilities across Japan, women are forced into child rearing while their husbands must bear the burden for most, if not all, of the household costs.   

This dilemma has been addressed in part by PM Abe’s push to have more women involved in the workforce and contributing to the Japanese economy, knowing full well that the lack of greater female representation in the workforce is a drain on Japan’s productivity and threatens Japan’s continued prosperity.  To address this, the LDP’s election promises during the October Lower House campaign included making nursery and kindergarten free to children aged from 2 to 5, as well as making higher education (namely high school) free to lower income households. 

Whether or not this can be realized, given the ever decreasing number of taxpayers from whom the government can draw the additional 10% increase to income tax to pay for the scheme, is debatable, but it at least shows that the LDP are seriously examining the issue of under-representation by women in Japanese society as a whole. Having said that, the decision by PM Abe to pledge a donation of 5.7 billion yen (US$ 50m) to Ivanka Trump’s support program for third world female entrepreneurship raised a few eyebrows, with criticism focused on the idea that if the PM was serious about supporting Japanese women’s social position, then surely such funds would be better off being spent in Japan than going overseas. 

That the presence of a child in a city council chambers should raise such a fuss is difficult to comprehend for many in Western nations, especially given the advances in women’s societal roles in those nations in the past decade or more (particularly here in Australia, where Greens Senator Larissa Waters made headlines after she breastfed her new-born daughter while engaging in Senate business in the Australian Parliament). It highlights just how far women, even those in positions of power, must go in Japan to achieve even the minimum level of recognition of the circumstances that working women face and how society must adapt to those changes.  To her great credit, councilor Ogata has expressed no remorse for her actions, and has used the incident to highlight the degree of bias that still exists to women playing a broader role in Japanese society. In that sense she is a pioneer, and should be commended for her actions.

It’s not going out on a limb here to suggest that with the release of the Australian government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper on Thursday, the need for Australia to start working in closer concert with Japan has become more urgent as Australia heads into what could be a fairly rough political year in 2018. While the white paper itself did not include anything that would otherwise be regarded as unusual or unique in relation to bilateral relations with Japan, it did emphasize that Japan would be consider one of five key regional partners with which Australia would need to work to ensure the “rules-based international order” that has underpinned much of the economic growth of the Indo-Pacific (another term that has been embraced by more conservative members of the foreign policy community, primarily because it has a broader scope of application, and because it doesn’t overly focus on Asia, aka China).

The comments on Japan did include this particular line, though – “As close partners, each country is invested in the success of the other”. This is probably the clearest expression on where Australia sees its relationship with Japan going in quite some time. In an era where the established international order is being re-shaped by power rather than law, and where the greatest champion of the liberal international order is steadily retreating from that role, Australia has begun to cast its eye over the region to find nations that at least share its sense of values and which it believes will be able to best assist Australia in keeping something of the pre-existing order in the region intact. 

Australia has already made overtures towards Japan to keep this momentum going by enthusiastically joining in the quadrilateral strategic dialogue, while fully aware that just by talking with the three other major democracies of the Indo-Pacific region it might incur the wrath of a suspicious Beijing. The question looming over this participation is, however, whether this enthusiasm for cooperation can be sustained if Australia undergoes a change in government. While the Labor Party has not dismissed the idea of participating in a quadrilateral dialogue, neither is it overly supportive of the idea, instead suggesting that it will observe whether the “Quad” actually improves the regional security situation before committing to remain a member of it.

The thing is, if the impetus is on the “Quad” to demonstrate that it contributes to regional security, on what basis will Labor decide that it is worth the effort? For example, if the “Quad” issues a statement expressing concern about China’s island building in the South China Sea and Beijing then issues a rebuke of that criticism, will that be proof to Labor that the “Quad” is disruptive and thus grounds for once again jettisoning Australia’s participation in the dialogue? And what will it say to the other members of the “Quad”? That they, and not China, are responsible for upsetting the regional order? That they are acting against the interests of stability? If Labor adopted that stance vis-à-vis the three other members of the “Quad”, then Australia might as well give up its place at all international forums. It will be obvious that it prefers to meekly back down rather than defend its values and so is unreliable as an international partner. 

So much can be achieved by building relations with Japan that extend beyond economics, but if Australia balks every time it is faced with the prospect of incurring China’s wrath by cooperating with Japan (and India, and South Korea) on regional security issues, then it will have effectively surrendered its sovereign interests to Beijing and further damaged the cause of the international liberal democratic order for no real benefit.  With Japan committed to expanding its role in the region, Australia must do all in its power to facilitate this, and that means actually pro-actively taking part in initiatives that Japan believes is important to regional stability.

While the Coalition remains in power this dedication will remain intact, but what happens should they lose the next federal election is anybody’s guess.  Uncertainty breeds suspicion in the world of diplomacy, and suspicion is no basis for regional stability.   

I’m coming to a slow realization here.  For all of the summits and conferences that have gone on for the past two weeks, what, pray tell, has been the sum result of all that activity? Have there been any substantial breakthroughs in international relations, a reduction in tensions from existential threats, resolutions in territorial disputes, or agreements on regional trade issues? In a word, no.  Diplomacy is a tedious but malleable entity, for it requires that the interests of a number of nations be hammered, squashed or stretched into shape to suit a common purpose. The APEC, ASEAN, and EAS summits might aspire to lofty goals of regional unity and shared destinies, but reality and a strong dose of nationalism tends to interfere in the process of forming consensus on the most pressing matters of the day. That makes them exercises in frustration, briefly punctuated with moments of hilarity.   

It is clear that the last few days of regional leaders’ meetings have not produced anything by way of hard-hitting, dramatic substance, certainly not in relation to regional order.  But in a quiet, unassuming way, the four nations of India, Japan, the US and Australia have agreed to adopt a common stance to deal with the security challenges of the immediate future. China has made its objections to this ‘quadrilateral dialogue’ clear, not least of which because it has not been invited to participate, but must know that its actions over the past year are to a large degree responsible for this dialogue being resurrected after a decade of lying dormant. 

On the other hand, ASEAN has started to talk to China about an officially legally binding code of conduct for the South China Sea, 15 years after the proposal was first raised. This development is either positive or concerning depending on where one sits in the regional order. While China is a signatory to UNCLOS, it has categorically ignored its implications when conducting artificial island building in the South China Sea. Since no other state (bar the US, and its intermittent FONOPs) has risen to challenge China’s claims, the region now has a fait accompli whereby China can effectively dictate the norms of commercial traffic in its vicinity while also expanding its military capabilities just that much closer to Southeast Asian states and to Australia. ASEAN realizes this, which is why it has decided to return to negotiations on a legally binding document than spend more years in uncertainty about China’s intentions and questioning US commitment to the region.

Meanwhile Australia and Japan, over the course of these past two weeks, have been unified in the messages they have conveyed regarding the need for co-operation, closer ties, and consultation. In the bilateral meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe on the side of the EAS, they essentially agreed on the same points they touched upon during their meeting in January – namely the strategic partnership, shared interests and values, freedom of the seas (which in this case was referred to as the “Indo-Pacific” - インド太平洋地域) , and an early resolution to finalization of the details of the TPP11 (of which so much was expected for this year’s summit season, only to have those hopes dashed by a rampant Canada and its concerns for a re-negotiated NAFTA and an FTA with China).

For the first time in 3 years, the leaders of the US, Japan, and Australia all met in the same room before the start of the ASEAN session on Monday, where the topic of conversation was, quite understandably, North Korea and how to contain its nuclear ambitions. This meeting itself was unusual because it was originally meant to be a bilateral between the US and Australia, and it was only at the last minute that an offer was put out (presumably by the US, as a meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe was already scheduled to take place the same day) for Japan to join in discussions.  The bilateral between Australia and the US was then re-scheduled as a dinner, which was then re-scheduled to a short official meeting. In all fairness, Turnbull had already informally spoken to President Trump at APEC in Da Nang, so neither leader really had anything else to add to their previous conversations.

So bar the fallout from the TPP (which is still alive, although it will undergo further revisions in the coming months), those messages that were espoused throughout the year have been aired once again, albeit in different venues.  One should be happy with that result, as at the very least it confirms that everyone (which in this sense, means the liberal democratic order) is on the same page regarding regional security priorities (and less so economic ones). Yet the fact that so much time and effort was put into events that produced little of substance makes you wonder if everything couldn’t have been sorted out at the ministerial level, or by a really well thought out tele-conference.