On Tuesday night, I attended this lecture given by former DPJ PM Kan Naoto at the ANU Centre on China in the World. According to the background information given before the event, Kan was visiting Australia as an invitee of the Conservation Society in order to relay his experience of dealing with the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March, 2011, and his thoughts about nuclear energy in general.  Kan himself, while looking somewhat weary (one feels that he has been giving a similar if not the same talk across the globe since the DPJ was removed from power), did speak from his conviction that Japan had made a grave mistake in relying on nuclear power for its energy needs, and that the future for Japan lay in investing in renewable energies.

From his description of the events that took place after the earthquake, tsunami, and power plant meltdown of 3.11, Kan emphasised that although he was in the most powerful position of any one citizen in the country, Tōden (re: Tepco)’s intransience, coupled with the government’s own handling of the crisis, made it almost impossible for him to make pre-emptive decisions. Although Kan did not admit to any failings on his part (which is not unusual, given his status as a politician), he did admit that the government, his government, and those before him had erred in putting far too much trust in the regulation of the nuclear industry, and was something that he regretted.

In the Q&A that followed, one particularly interesting question was raised regarding NHK’s coverage of the disaster as it unfolded. While international news organisations were able to obtain live feed of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, which was crucial when an internal hydrogen explosion blew the roof off Reactor No.2, NHK continued to rely on delayed feed. Moreover, commercial networks in Japan continued to reiterate the government’s message that evacuations were only necessary for a radius 80km around the damaged power plant, despite International Atomic Energy Agency advice that an evacuation zone double that of the Japanese zone was necessary. On these points, Kan was more evasive, only reiterating that he had first become aware of the explosion in Reactor No.2 when the footage was broadcast on commercial television. As to whether the government itself instructed NHK not to broadcast live feed lest it spark uncontrolled panic, this remains a mystery.

Kan reiterated his frustration at the activities of pro-nuclear power politicians in the Diet who, in conjunction with the nuclear power industry, have been manoeuvring to ensure that only pro-nuclear candidates are elected to the federal stage. While it might have been beneficial for the audience to learn the identity of these politicians and which party they represent, Kan did not delve any further into this area, only bringing it to the audience’s attention before moving on to discuss the benefits of renewable energies. This was an opportunity missed, I think, and perhaps Kan could have also brought up the question of whether Japan could in fact sustain itself on renewable energies and whether the crisis in energy supply was exaggerated following the 3.11 disaster to justify arguments in favour of restarting nuclear power plants.

While Kan did reveal the extent of the government’s concern over the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, he did not question the role of his cabinet in the crisis, merely describing how information was (or wasn’t) received in the cabinet room. Before the Q&A, the audience was told to limit its questions to those of Fukushima and renewable energies, hence clearly Kan was not going to question his DPJ colleagues over their judgment nor provide any further details about how he would resist the Abe government’s move to restore nuclear power to Japan. This was disappointing, for with the benefit of distance Kan could have opened up further about the nuclear debate in the Diet and the tactics being employed by either side.

While certainly not revealing anything new about the state of nuclear energy in Japan, the lecture was at least a way to bring the subject of nuclear power to the attention of an Australian audience. Really, the only message that the lecture conveyed was that Australia should refrain from providing uranium to other states. As the audience appeared to mostly be made up of students, retirees, academics, with the odd public servant or two, it is safe to say that Kan’s message won’t influence the current Australian government’s position towards uranium exports (which should become even more topical after PM Tony Abbott’s visit to India next week) but it provided a stark reminder of the consequences of complacency and hubris.

In a week in which Japan has been doing it tough against Mother Nature once again, Kyodo Press released this gem of an article on Tuesday in which PM Shinzo Abe is now giving serious consideration, ahead of a planned cabinet reshuffle on September 4th, to handing the portfolio of Minister for Security Legislation to Ishiba Shigeru, current LDP Secretary General and one-time defence minister under the previous Abe government.  The report itself states that Ishiba was vetted for the role during conversations between Abe and Ishiba last month, and although he has not yet said yes, he is (reportedly) seriously considering the offer.

While it is certainly true that Ishiba has the experience in the defence portfolio, and has been a long-time advocate for collective self-defence (as revealed in his 2011 book Kokubō, or ‘National Defence’), for a potential future prime minister to acquiesce to PM Abe’s wish and take a cabinet post would be unusual, to say the least. Readers would remember that Ishiba stood against Abe during the LDP party leader election in September 2012, where he was given the Secretary General role as a sort of consolation prize after being narrowly defeated by Abe’s factional supporters. Since 2012 Ishiba has kept a comparatively low profile, only emerging periodically to comment on party and other matters (including his infamous suggestion that those opposed to Japan`s new security privacy laws were themselves terrorists) (J). Members of his non-factional support group have pointed out (J) that should Ishiba accept a cabinet post, he would effectively lose his voice and would be forced to tow Abe’s line on security matters, thereby lessening his own influence over the defence debate (and ultimately influencing his political fortunes).

While the offer is tempting, Ishiba would know that to accept it would mean stifling his ambitions yet again for the sake of Abe. If Ishiba refuses the position, he might end up with no portfolio at all, reduced to a mere party member. But that would be a particularly damaging route for PM Abe to take, given that support within the LDP for Ishiba is high among regional LDP members and they would not look kindly upon a PM seeking to silence such a prominent member of the LDP. Ishiba himself has said that he would accept any position should it be offered to him, but that seems more like an attempt to force Abe to reveal his intentions early, and Abe won`t fall for it.   

This week there is an issue that I would like to address. It concerns this article ($) which appeared in the Australian Financial Review on Monday, 11th of August (pg.7). According to defence sources, Australia is now actively seeking Japanese advice on the possibility of having Japan build Australia’s next generation of submarines, and that discussions are “far more advanced” than has been publicly acknowledged. This has been an issue of great interest to defence analysts for some time, and the announcement by the Abbott government that it was considering having BAE Industries take over responsibility for completion of the AWD (Air Warfare Destroyer) project has boosted speculation that the government is about to downgrade Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry to ‘repair and maintain’ status rather than rely on it to build new ships including submarines.

If Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is in the running for the next submarine project, and if the submarines are constructed in Japan, this does not necessarily mean the end of the Australian naval shipbuilding industry. Far from it. It is more likely that the naval shipbuilding industry will resemble virtually every other major part of Australia’s defence industry – i.e., that it will be dominated by foreign companies with the expertise and funds to complete the projects needed by the Australian government. In the process of creating submarines using foreign expertise, Australia will have an opportunity to “go back to the drawing board”, as it were, to examine where its strengths are and where improvements can be made.

One area that has been sorely lacking is a trainee program for marine transport engineers. While AUSCAT maintains its own in-house training program, which has proven a great success in diversifying its workforce and project lines, the ASC, because it was focused purely on building ships for the navy, relied on pre-skilled engineers to fill in the gaps once projects were completed. That itself illustrates what one of the main problems of Australian naval shipbuilding has been – too much ‘exclusivity’, or an overreliance on building warships when other ships could have supplemented during the down time between major naval projects. As any observer of the Japanese method will tell you, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries kept their defence business operations going for more than 30 years by diversifying their build schedules between civilian and defence, which made them far more efficient at shipbuilding while raising engineers with a talent for designing advanced vessels.

If the Abbott government does want to make a difference to Australia’s naval shipbuilding industry, it would certainly be worthwhile having engineers (and other workers) undergo training in private industry such as that maintained by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.  This might mean establishing a school in Adelaide, or establishing a dormitory in Japan for trainees for the Australian program. If Japan is involved in the future submarine project, it will certainly need facilities in Adelaide to run tests on its vessels for Australian conditions (as well as provide a venue for integrating US defence systems on the submarine, if this is the path that the government ultimately takes).

The involvement of Japanese ship builders in the future submarine project could thus be a spark that rejuvenates Australia’s own naval shipbuilding industry rather than destroying it. If efficiency and cost-effectiveness are the government’s main concerns, tutelage under Japanese instruction could go a long way to addressing the deficiencies that have plagued Australia’s naval shipbuilding program. Would it be opposed? Almost certainly, with critics stating that Japan has no record of cooperation with other countries in shipbuilding, and that given Japan is not part of any formal Australian alliance network, entrusting future generations of shipbuilders to Japan may be a risky undertaking.

Yet Australia’s entire defence network is in the hands of foreign countries (or more accurately, foreign companies). Virtually every aspect of defence uses technologies and equipment garnered from either the US, Canada, Europe, or Israel.  With defence cooperation with Asia a more pressing matter than ever, having Japanese involvement in Australia’s naval shipbuilding could help address the shortfall in Australia’s own domestic industry while providing it with the training for the future. It would, in fact, be a reverse of the experience of Japan in the early Meiji period. Japanese experts could provide the knowledge, and Australia could then use that knowledge to build its own capabilities. This could be a symbiotic relationship, providing each side with the benefits of cooperation and increasing the potential for expansion into other areas. 

At this nascent stage in the development of Australia-Japan defence cooperation, Japan’s active involvement in the planning and construction of the next generation of submarines could be the litmus test for other countries interested in working with the Japanese and well as the Australian Defence Force.

The 1980s, the Gulf War and SDF Peace-keeping Operations

By the late 1980s, Japan’s economic power had translated into a desire to increase its global activities while also promoting understanding of Japan and its people. In order to advocate Japan’s culture, the Japan Foundation, a cultural institute created by the Japanese government in 1972, began to open institutes in a number of cities across the globe[1], while in 1987 the Ministry of Education and other government institutions launched the JET program which promoted grass-roots exchanges between youth in Japan and overseas[2].

On the economic front, the late 1980s saw Japan, in co-operation with Australia, establish the APEC forum in 1989[3].  JICA, or the Japan International Cooperation Agency, continued to send technical experts and volunteers to participate in ODA projects in 166 developing countries across the globe[4].

Yet just as Japan’s confidence in its diplomatic and economic position began to grow, two events occurred that forced Japan to re-think its foreign policy agenda and redefine its role on the international stage.

The first was the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990.  Japan, as a leading global economic power and an ally of the US, came under significant external pressure to become involved in the allied effort. While the LDP favoured sending Japan’s Self Defence Forces[5], opposition parties, particularly the Socialist and Communist parties, objected to sending any form of material support as this would be a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution[6].

Ultimately a compromise was reached and US$13 billion in total was donated to Operation Desert Storm, which was later followed up in 1991 with the dispatch of a minesweeper vessel to the Persian Gulf. However criticism of this response both domestically and abroad in turn led to legislation that would allow the Self Defence Forces to be dispatched overseas on peace-keeping missions[7].    

The second dilemma to face Japan’s diplomacy was the onset in the early 1990s of an economic downturn and the end of what was known as the “Bubble” period. As much of Japan’s post war diplomacy was founded on economic rather than ideological grounds, the stagnation of the Japanese economy led to a reduction in overseas investment and the degree of Japanese involvement in fiscal measures aimed at stabilising global markets (a point that became particularly noticeable during the Asian financial crisis of 1997)[8]. Although Japan had a definite interest in wanting to influence global economic policy, growing levels of national debt brought any further attempt at broader economic diplomacy to a halt[9].

At the same time, the break-up of the Soviet Union and creation of new global paradigms, especially the threat posed by international terrorism, nuclear weapons and rogue states, created opportunities for Japan to look beyond its pre-existing security role and expand its involvement in international operations.

Following the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, Japan dispatched Self Defence Force engineering units to Cambodia, the first such instance of Japanese troops participating in a UN peacekeeping mission. Thereafter SDF personnel were dispatched to the Golan Heights, Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and continue to serve in the Sudan, Nepal, off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (and more recently in Pakistan and the Philippines)[10]. 

 The involvement of Japan in UN-led operations, while initially met with reservation both domestically and among Japan’s neighbours, has served to raise the profile of Japan abroad and reinforced confidence in Japan’s ability to contribute to global security.

Given Japan’s historical aversion to nuclear weapons, during the 1990s and early 2000s Japan played an active part in introducing initiatives to the UN to reinforce the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and bring an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty[11].   In recent years Japan, together with Australia, took a prominent role in the 2010 NPT Review Conference and continues to work with Australia in pursuit of nuclear disarmament[12]. 

From the start of the new millennium, Japan also sought to build upon its economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region and embarked on negotiations with a number of countries for the creation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), realising that for Japan’s export driven industries to survive they needed to promote a much greater degree of trade flow to compensate for the increasingly shrinking domestic goods market and the challenge posed by Chinese and other Asian manufacturers.

This indeed became an impetus for Japan to join negotiations regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (or TPP), although domestic concern about the impact that this might have on Japan’s agricultural sector has tempered political enthusiasm both for and against the agreement[13].  Given the greater regional uncertainty that has accompanied the rise of China, Japan has sought out increased security relations with nations such as South Korea, Australia, and India in what it sees as a natural extension of its alliance with the United States, the “main cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy and security”[14]. 

This particular concern with regional security marks what has been a gradual process of moving beyond purely economic diplomacy into the realm of what could be described as strategic realism and an awareness that economic power can be combined with political and security objectives in order to ensure stability[15]. Although questions on whether Japan can undertake a much broader, far more active role in regional security operations remain (particularly given regional suspicion of any resurgent role for the Japanese military), indications are that Japan is re-examining its predominantly defensive, limited security role in order to address such concerns.

Japanese Diplomacy over 60 years

The past 60 years of Japanese diplomatic relations have thus been marked by an almost unbroken continuation of the principles that were first laid out in 1957.  Although Japan has on rare occasions disagreed with its predominant diplomatic partner, the bilateral ties that Japan has shared with the United States has helped to preserve a stable North Asian environment and helped to contribute to the prosperity of neighbouring countries and region.

Through the institution of the UN, Japan has sought to increase its presence across the globe in accordance with the ideals outlined in the UN Charter and through its numerous appearances as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council[16]. With global focus now centred quite firmly on the Asia-Pacific region, the manner in which Japan’s relations with a number of regional partners develops will have significant repercussions in both the short and long term.


[1] Japan Foundation website, http://www.jpf.go.jp/e/about/president/index.html, accessed March 8 2012

[2] The JET Programme, website: http://www.jetprogramme.org/e/introduction/history.html, accessed March 8 2012

[3] Michael Green, op.cit, p.26

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue Book 2006, Tokyo, 2006, pp.4-5

[5] Yutaka Kawashima, op.cit, p.27

[6] Yoichi Funabashi, “Japan and the New World Order”, Foreign Affairs, Winter, Vol.70 No.5, 1991, p.63

[7] Michael Green, op.cit, p.18 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit, p.3

[8] Yoichi Funabashi, op.cit, p.27

[9] Michael Green, op.cit, pp.29,230

[10] Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011, Public Affairs Division, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2011, pp.350-351, & Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue Book 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press, Tokyo, 2011, website:http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2011/html/h3/h3_01.html, accessed March 8 2012, & Ministry of Defense, “What Japan Can Do Now” (Pamphlet), Public Affairs Division, Ministry of Defense, 2011

[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit, p.5 and Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Kobayashi Kenichi, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Future of Japan: From the Perspective of Japan’s Reconstruction”, Quarterly Journal of Public Policy and Management, Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting, Vol.3, Tokyo, 2011, pp.87-88 & Bernard K Gordon, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Rise of China: What Japan joining the TPP means for the region”, Foreign Affairs, November 2011, website: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136647/bernard-k-gordon/the-trans-pacific-partnership-and-the-rise-of-china?page=show, accessed March 9 2012

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, loc.cit.

[15] Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1996, p.162

[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Japan in the UN Security Council – Our Viewpoint” (Pamphlet), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press, 2008, pp.2-3