The visit over the weekend by Minister for Okinawan Affairs Yamamoto to Ginowan for the latest round of discussions with the prefectural government over the question of relocation of the Futenma Marine Base pretty much concluded in the manner that all sides expected that it would – i.e., the Abe government would press ahead with an application to the Okinawan government to permit construction of a new Marine base at Henoko (in the north of Okinawa island). This desire to start the construction process appears to have followed the US and Japan reaching an understanding during PM Abe’s visit to the US in February (J), whereby the Maki-Minato area (currently part of the Marine base of Camp Kinser that lies to the south of Kadena Marine Air Base) will be returned to Okinawan control before beginning construction on  the foundations for the Henoko base.

On Friday Minister Yamamoto presented the government’s plan to Okinawa Prefecture Governor Nakaima, before following this up with a meeting with members of the Henoko City Council on Saturday to (in a long worn out phrase) gain the “understanding” of council members in relation to what the government was planning (J). Given the fact that the government has proposed an exchange in territory in order to reduce the burden on Ginowan City imposed by the Futenma base, while simultaneously offering the US an alternative venue to continue the US Marine presence in Okinawa, one would think that this might garner the support of the prefectural government. Yet it hasn’t.

In response to the proposal (which is expected to be subject to 8 to 10 months of analysis before any verdict is reached), Governor Nakaima again reiterated Okinawa’s preference for any new base to be located outside of Okinawa (J). In return, Defence Minister Onodera expressed the government’s preference for a decision on construction to be made before the Nago City (in which Henoko is located) mayoral election goes ahead in January next year (J).

So what does all this mean? Firstly, it means that the Abe government is not going to deviate from its predecessors in wanting to re-organise the base distribution system in Okinawa. This issue has been tossed around by successive governments since the late 1990s, and given the fact that Okinawa is now located smack bang in the middle of a potentially volatile strategic region means that neither the Japanese nor the US governments are going to change their minds about placing a new base in Okinawa. The Okinawan prefectural government is well aware of this, as for years it has been calling on both Tokyo and Washington to find an alternative venue only for each successive administration to back the construction of a new base in Okinawa.

Secondly, if the Okinawan prefectural government does not approve the relocation of the base to Henoko, there is every chance that Tokyo will simply force the construction to go ahead regardless. When the future of the alliance with the US depends on cooperation on security issues, the Abe government is not likely to yield to the wishes of Okinawans given the threats present in the region and the need to have a joint US-Japan military presence to offset any moves by China or North Korea to upset the status quo.

This blog has previously voiced concern at what might happen should Tokyo ignore local voices that oppose the moving of Futenma base to Henoko, and whether this might lead in turn to civil unrest and the possibility of urban terrorism directed against both central government institutions and the US Marines themselves. The fact that the Marines have had a presence in Okinawa for the past 68 years with relatively little animosity directed at them by Okinawans themselves does not guarantee that animosity won’t turn into outright violent hostility, a hostility that could be exploited by states such as China.

Consider for a moment the possibility of Chinese intelligence officers infiltrating local Okinawan residential groups, linking up with members radicalised by Tokyo’s indifference to local concerns. They could then provide such groups with explosives and arms training and tell them to target US and SDF defence facilities and personnel, including SDF patriot missile batteries and early warning radar systems.

Clearly this situation would not be in either Tokyo’s, Washington’s, nor Naha’s interests, as any civilian terrorist groups would inflict collateral damage against their fellow Okinawans, ruin the Okinawan tourism trade, sew hostility in the Marines against the local population (leading to further incidents), and undermine Okinawa’s key place in regional security networks. Since the issue of Okinawan bases has occupied policy minds for over 20 years, and that a shift has occurred in the strategic environment of Northeast Asia, it seems that the only chance of a breakthrough will be for one side to declare that it will accept the needs of the other and try to accommodate those needs as best it can.

As neither Tokyo nor Washington can afford the expense involved in shifting the entire Futenma base to Guam nor another part of Japan (which is an entirely different post in itself), it does seem that the key to a resolution lies in Okinawa and its prefectural government. If Tokyo is prepared to absorb the entire cost of base relocation (which it is), provide employment to Okinawans involved in construction, transport, logistics, hospitality, and more beside, work with the US to ensure local Okinawans have opportunities for continuing employment (such as the redevelopment of the Futenma base area), while the US has agreed to relocate parts of the Marines to other bases in the Pacific, really the onus does come down on the Okinawan prefectural government to accept the need for cooperation with Tokyo and promote this view to Okinawans.

Whether this can occur under Governor Nakaima is debatable, considering he has nailed himself to the cause of closing down Futenma base (and ensuring that no subsequent bases are built within Okinawa).  As Governor Nakaima was re-elected in November 2010, and given that no subsequent elections will be held until November 2014, that might stall any possibility of progressive negotiations, especially since analysis of the government’s proposal will not finish until January 2014. Even if Governor Nakaima does not choose to run again, his successor will most certainly pursue the same course, as may other parties in Okinawa. And so the debate will continue ad infinitum when what is needed is compromise.

This week I wanted to return to an issue that was raised in the lead-up to the House of Representatives election in the Japanese Diet in December last year, and which might, if judged to be valid, bring into question the entire legitimacy of the current Abe government. As may be recalled, before the election, the DPJ, LDP and New Komeito reached an agreement in November to reduce the number of single-seat electoral districts by five with no subsequent increase in districts (J). This agreement was based on a ruling by the Supreme Court in 2009 which declared that the difference in the value of votes between districts was unconstitutional and that the Diet had to resolve this problem.  

Again, on three separate occasions during 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the Diet take action on the issue, yet nothing was done to resolve the disparity before former Prime Minister Noda announced the election date. With no time for consultations with regional party affiliates,  all three major parties attempted to rectify the imbalance in vote value (using proposed legislation that was questionable in intent) yet were unsuccessful (as time ran out for the legislation to pass through the Diet and be signed into law before the House of Representatives was dissolved).  Hence the election of December 2012 took place while there was a (maximum) 2.52% difference in vote value in 97 single-seat electoral districts across Japan (as noted here – J).

Various legal groups, aware that the election was taking place in violation of the precepts of the constitution which declares that each voter district shall have equal weight in vote value, attempted to have the election declared invalid. Yet they were thwarted by a ruling of the Supreme Court which stated that even though the election was unconstitutional, it had to proceed has there was no legal mechanism in place to outline what the Supreme Court should do should an election be declared null and void. This was not an unprecedented situation, as the general Diet election of 1983 was also unconstitutional, yet the fact that the Diet had more than a year’s notice before the December election to actually do something about the disparity yet failed to act until the last minute did not sit well with constitutional scholars or lawyers (or the Supreme Court, for that matter) (J).    

Hence at the beginning of this month, lawyers across Japan launched legal actions in regional courts seeking to have the election declared unconstitutional and (more importantly) the result declared invalid. So far, six courts located in Tokyo, Sapporo, Sendai, Nagoya (J), Fukuoka, and Kanazawa have all made rulings on the election, with four declaring the election to have been “unconstitutional”, while two have ruled that the election was “unconstitutional in nature”.  Another ten courts are scheduled to making rulings on the election before the 27th, after which it is expected to be once again presented as an issue to the Supreme Court.

This is where things get interesting. Expectations are that the Supreme Court will again rule that the election was “unconstitutional” (given the precedents set and the rulings of regional courts), but what will really set tongues wagging is if any of the regional courts, followed by the Supreme Court, declares the election invalid. If it does, it will be the first time this has occurred under the post-war electoral system. However there is no time frame for when the Supreme Court must reach a ruling on the matter, and it may choose to postpone indefinitely making a ruling that could potentially destabilise the state.

Hence what is likely to happen is that each court will rule the election unconstitutional, but will refrain from upping the ante by declaring the result invalid. Then at least each court can go on record as stating its objections to the legal ambiguity that Japan’s politicians seem so reluctant to fix.  As long as the current disparity is allowed to continue, questions will be raised about the commitment of Japan’s politicians to the rule of law, specifically the highest law in the land from which all others are derived. My cynicism prevents me from being more hopeful for a definite resolution to the problem, but if the issue draws enough media coverage both in Japan and abroad it might bring enough pressure to force the adoption of a more equal voting system.

Today (Friday 15 March), the Abe Cabinet is expected to announce Japan’s involvement in negotiations for the creation of a trade bloc spanning the Asia-Pacific, unencumbered by tariffs or other protectionist measures, and focused on improving trade flow between each of the participating countries (J). Given the fact that Japan has taken nearly four years to reach this point, one can understand Osaka Mayor Hashimoto Toru’s comment (J) during the week that this really isn’t the time for the LDP to suddenly be making a host of conditions for Japan’s involvement, especially since negotiations have reached the sixteenth stage and are getting closer to being finalised (with some reports stating that October this year would see the end of negotiations).

One gets the impression that Abe’s statements about “sacred grounds” exempt from TPP conditions and negotiations with the US for other possible exemptions are merely an attempt to distract the agricultural lobby, giving them the hope that some of their industries will not be affected by the TPP and thus prompt their acceptance of the agreement. However, it doesn’t seem to have worked. Over the weekend an “agribusiness flash mob” of sorts met in Tokyo to again voice dissent with Japan having anything to do with the TPP and calling on the government to scrap any plans to enter into the agreement. Amidst the usual showing of JCP and SPJ delegates (anything that hints of US influence immediately sparks voices of protest from these, the most useless of opposition parties), the appearance of Ishiba Shigeru (LDP) raised an eyebrow or two.  From his comments (J), Ishiba apparently does believe that agricultural reform is necessary, but joining the TPP is not the best way to go about it, and that the TPP should not be some sort of litmus test for the LDP in its commitment to reform. 

That may be so, but since the LDP doesn’t have any other plans for revitalise the agricultural sector other than to throw money at it and hope for the best, Japan doesn’t really have a choice. It’s a case of biting the bullet and accepting the removal of tariffs, or keeping tariffs in place, paying out huge sums in subsidies to a dying industry, and ultimately placing Japan at a trade disadvantage. If Abe does make the break with tradition and push Japan into negotiations, he could (as William Pesek has suggested) then follow this up by creating a more effective regulator for businesses (the Olympus scandal was only one example of a more prevalent problem),  end the collusion between government and business (good luck with that), and open the domestic market up to foreign competition – in other words, truly transform Japan’s business environment. If he baulks at this, and merely satisfies himself with massive levels of public spending, then this will be LDP politics up to its old tricks and unlikely to inspire confidence in Japan’s fiscal future.

To use a somewhat unusual metaphor, the current course of Abenomics is like flying a jet with one engine on fire only to increase speed so that you land before the engine explodes. Pretty risky, and potentially fatal. Japan’s entry into the TPP might help to mitigate some of this risk, giving Japanese businesses greater market penetration across the Asia-Pacific, but the real problem lies at home. Let’s hope Abe is a capable pilot. 

At the risk of seeming disinterested in the topic, I want to direct the attention of readers to an article on Australia’s objections to Japan’s whaling program and the legal reasoning behind it by the ANU’s Professor of International Law Don Rothwell. It’s worth reading not only for the arguments put forward by Prof. Rothwell on why is has been virtually impossible for Australia to keep Japan out of its whale sanctuaries (short summary: Japan doesn’t recognise them, as the Antarctic is pretty much a claim-free zone), but (and this must be a first) for the comments by readers that follow.  If you wanted to know what each side thinks of the arguments of the other, those comments pretty much say it all. Clearly this is an issue which arouses strong emotions in Australia, a position that the Japanese find quite baffling considering the legal basis for their whaling program (the IWC has not ruled it illegal, neither has any other international environmental regulatory body) and the fact that it is not a sustained whale hunt but a seasonal event that concentrates on Antarctic minke whales (which are not an endangered whale species, and are classified by the IWC as being ‘abundant’).

I could spend the rest of this post putting forward the arguments of both sides and trying to debate their merits and flaws, but given that this issue has existed since 1992 there is little worth in re-hashing at length what is already well-known. Japan, with concerns about its food security and right to secure its own meat protein supplies, wishes to resume commercial whaling but on a sustainable basis. Australia (and other anti-whaling nations) does not see the point of hunting whales when other food sources are available, and object to Japan targeting a species whose numbers aren’t readily quantifiable and doing so using methods it believes are “inhumane”. Whether it is pure commercialism, ethnocentrism, or strategic concerns that are driving the debate, clearly the governments of both sides don’t want to aggravate the situation and have been fairly restrained in their responses. Not so Sea Shepherd – it has declared that its only interest is to save the whales at whatever cost, be it in lives or property. Attacking the whaling fleet directly is probably not the best way to convince Japan that its interests lie elsewhere though, and begets nothing but resentment.   

Meanwhile Richard Marles, Australia’s Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, has been attending the 8th Japan-Australia Conference in Tokyo over the weekend, and made a speech to mark the occasion. It was, admittedly, a fairly bland affair, merely running down a list of bilateral success stories, avoiding any mention of China, and emphasising the importance of economic ties. What would have been more welcome would be the announcement of an initiative by the current Australian government to improve bilateral ties, rather than a recital of what the government hopes to achieve. Stating that the government plans to invest in language education does not make it so, and given past experience in language education in Australia there is little anticipation that things are about to improve. For their part, Japan may be forgiven for being a bit bemused by Australia’s sudden declaration of its linguistic aspirations, for Australia’s presence is thin on the ground in Japan. If pressed, the average Japanese citizen might be able to point to one or two Australian agricultural imports, but Australian products are not readily identifiable and Japanese consumers have a wide variety of imports from which to choose.

Still, there may be some sense in the Coalition’s plan to increase Australian participation in universities across the Asian region (Link – firewalled). Sending 10,000 Australian students a year to study regional languages in their ‘native’ environment may be the only way to expose Australian society as a whole to the potential that lies to the north. Ultimately there is great worth in encouraging Australian students to take up studies in Asian universities, as they will absorb both linguistic, cultural, and scholastic abilities beyond those they can find in Australia (well, I certainly did). It may be that Australians will eventually prioritise entry into Asian universities rather than those further afield, although it may take more than a decade before any discernable shift in attitude towards Asia and its education systems can be measured.  As it hasn’t been tried before, it’s at least worth the effort as an experiment in increasing cultural literacy,