This year, 2018, was a year of achievements in the Japan-Australia relationship, although many of those achievements have yet to bear fruit. We saw the 2+2 visit in October, followed by the visit to Darwin by PM Abe in November. Not only this, we saw the annual Japanese participation in Exercise Southern Jackaroo, the first ever involvement by Australian minesweeping craft in a trilateral exercise in Japan together with the United States, and the postponed (but soon to be held) Exercise Bushido Guardian, the first ever fighter training exercise involving the RAAF and the JASDF to be held in Japan. While the Reciprocal Access Agreement (which is essentially a Status of Forces Agreement) has yet to be completed, despite a number of opportunities to do so, it does look as though both sides will aim to have that piece of bilateral legal history shored up by the time Australia heads into yet another federal election in mid May (or early March, depending on with whom you talk).

2019 will be one of signature years for Australia-Japan relations (in a way that 2007 and 2014 were) if there is a change in government in Australia, and equally if both sides do get the RAA done and dusted. While Labor has always maintained a fairly healthy relationship with Japan, and is committed to continuing the momentum built up over the past few years, whether it remains as enthusiastic about the relationship remains to be seen.

The topic of parliamentary party relations with Japan is something that has become an interest to me, and prompted me to take a look at some of the agreements made between both countries over the past 40 years. The end result of that is the list below:

July 2014
Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA)
Coalition

July 2014
Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology
Coalition

March 2013
Information Sharing Agreement
Labor

January 2013
Defence Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
Labor

December 2011
Memorandum of Understanding on International Development Cooperation
Labor

February 2008
Convention on Taxation
Labor

March 2007
Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
Coalition

February 2007
Australia-Japan Social Security Agreement
Coalition

August 1997
Australia-Japan Partnership Agenda
Coalition

May 1995
Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership
Labor

March 1982
Australia-Japan Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement
Coalition

November 1980
Australia-Japan Scientific Research Cooperation Agreement
Coalition

June 1976
Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (the Nara Treaty)
Coalition

November 1974
Australia-Japan Cultural Agreement
Labor

July 1957
Australia-Japan Agreement on Commerce
Coalition

 
While the above chart presents a fairly simplified visual key to the course of bilateral relations (as some of the agreements were initiated under Labor only to be finalized under the Coalition, while the same could be said about the Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan), what is evident is most of the historical agreements between both countries have been reached under a Coalition/LDP government alignment.   The question then arises as to why this is the case. Is the Coalition more ideologically aligned with the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, thus leading to the higher level of agreements created when both of those governments have been in power, or have other factors played a role in this state of affairs? Note that of the above agreements, the only one that was reached without the LDP was that in December 2011, when the DPJ briefly ruled in its own right before being removed in December 2012. 

This question really goes to a broad range of factors affecting the bilateral relationship, but also to the nature of political parties in both countries.  It also points to the political leadership in both countries and the ideology of the individual leaders or members of cabinet.  To get to the root of this issue, it would be necessary to delve into the background of negotiations behind the agreements, to see how they were regarded by either side at the time.  Another issue of note is to examine whether the agreements themselves substantially impacted on the bilateral relationship, leading, for example, to greater levels of co-operation, which itself would indicate how dedicated either side was to promoting bilateral ties. 

Of particular note (from an Australian perspective) is how the relationship was regarded by successive Japanese governments. While Japan and Australia have co-operated with one another for over 60 years, most of this co-operation was concentrated in the trade arena, which until recently was the dominant factor in bilateral relations. It is only the emergence of China as a regional power and the relative stagnation of the US commitment to this part of the world that has prompted the new enthusiasm for security ties between both countries.  

Another factor that would need to be considered is the history of political attitudes to labour relations in both countries, which could be another factor that has determined how closely each government felt it could work with either their Japanese or Australian counterpart.  While the immediate postwar period saw an increase in union representation in Japan, that was superseded by the ‘boom years’ in which corporate interests were given priority in exchange for job security, with the gradual loss of influence in corporate decision making that came with this development.

One further matter is that of environmental concerns. Labor was, of course, the party that decided to take Japan to the ICJ in order to have its scientific whaling program declared illegal under international law, a point that has not been forgotten in the halls of Nagata-chō. While Japan is still reliant on Australian exports of raw materials to meet its energy needs, particularly coal and gas, the gradual social movement towards renewable energy in Australia, and Labor’s enthusiastic embrace of that technology, might impact on the trading relationship, especially if Labor decides to use legislation to curb gas exports to (rather optimistically) lower electricity prices in Australia. While there is little indication that Labor would follow through with this, it has been raised by Labor leader Bill Shorten in the past, and there is every reason to think that the policy could be revisited if Labor win power and find themselves being hemmed by electricity concerns.

So there is much to expect in 2019, and hopefully it will mean an enhanced rather than a diminished bilateral relationship.  What will be assured is the continued need of both countries to keep the US focused on this region, and on that there will be no let-up in consultation and joint action. In the meantime all I can offer is to wish you, the reader, the very best in the year to come.

Last Friday’s visit to Darwin by Prime Minister Abe was one of those “blink and you’ll miss it” moments in bilateral relations.  Shoved between the East Asia Summit in Singapore and the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Port Moresby, PM Abe managed to find the time to swing by northern Australia in order to conduct discussions with Prime Minister Morrison on matters of mutual importance, primarily the situation with China and its aid efforts in the Pacific along with discussions on the long-awaited Reciprocal Access Agreement. 

The fact that this agreement has not yet been finalized has been a source of some frustration for those watching the progress of Australia-Japan strategic relations. Perhaps the best way to regard the slow pace in developments might be to remember that “good things come to those who wait”. 

Nevertheless, both sides still had plenty to talk about over the 20 or so hours of the visit.

One particular item that was kept under wraps but later revealed during APEC was the Australia, the US, and Japan trilateral joint initiative on infrastructure funding for the Pacific.  PM Abe also took the time upon arrival in Australia to travel to the Darwin Cenotaph to pay his respects and lay a wreath in memory of those who perished during Japan’s air raids on the city in February 1942. As was highlighted during the visit, this gesture followed on from a similar one he made at Pearl Harbour in 2016. Given Abe’s political background and heritage, he is perhaps the most qualified of any of Japan’s recent leaders to make this gesture, which was generally well received by both the Darwin community and Australia at large.  Abe (or more correctly his wife Akie) also visited the memorial to the Fujita Salvage Operation of 1959 to 1961, located out the front of the Darwin Uniting Memorial Church, while the prime ministerial couple laid wreathes at the memorial to the crew of the I-124 submarine that was sunk outside the Port of Darwin one month before the air raid on the city. 

The visit was certainly more memorable for the above events than for the equally as important but perhaps less attention-grabbing visit to PM Abe to the Ichthys LNG project, Japan’s largest overseas investment. This mammoth project, which is expected to continue to supply LNG to Japan for the next 40 years, is the figurehead of the Australia-Japan economic relationship at present, and has been vigorously promoted by the governments of both countries since the announcement of the project in 2012. 

The only other event of note during the visit was a quick trip by PM Abe to greet the crew of the Japan Coast Guard Vessel “Echigo” during their inaugural training exercise with the Australian Border Force, along with anti-piracy maneuvers in Southeast Asian waters.  This is an extension of similar visits that Japanese Coast Guard vessels have made around the region, and marks a welcome expansion in Japan’s security apparatus to reinforce the sovereignty of regional states.

The visit itself will primarily be remembered for the Darwin reconciliation gesture, and certainly had more to offer than a visit to Tokyo made earlier in the year by former PM Malcolm Turnbull (a visit that also promised a major announcement, only for it to turn into a standard PR opportunity replete with a visit to an SDF base, a first by an Australian PM, if I recall correctly). While it might be a while before the leaders of either country undertake any bilateral visits (given that Australia is expected to have a federal election by mid-May, the results of which could see a change in government) it was a good reminder of just how close the bilateral ties are between both nations and how these “middle powers” are acting on behalf of their own and partner nation interests to bring some stability to this part of the world.

One of the things that you often encounter while working at the coalface of diplomacy is correspondence claiming to have an exclusive rights to technology that the writer, usually independently, has discovered and who wishes to sell to either the embassy or the government concerned.  The explanations for this technology can vary from detailed blueprints to sketches done, literally, on the back of a napkin.  It appears that this phenomenon is by no means recent, for it was during a routine search for information on the Australia-Japan relationship that I came across a rather unique piece of historical evidence of Australia’s entrepreneurial spirit and the desire to forge a link with Japan’s nascent naval fleet.

In December 1898, Japan’s consulate in Melbourne, which was an honorary position at the time, wrote a dispatch to Tokyo concerning letters received from one Thomas Carter of Scottsdale, Tasmania, pertaining to an invention that Carter claims to have created and was willing to sell to Japan. In the correspondence, honorary consul Alexander Marks (himself a former British trader who migrated to Melbourne from Yokohama in the late nineteenth century) explained that Mr Carter, a coal and chemical engineer, had approached the consulate with an offer to sell the plans for a “submerged torpedo boat” named “Annihilator”. In his explanation for making this offer, Mr Carter stated that in his view, Japan had been treated “unfairly” in its dealings with China compared to European powers, and so wanted Japan to manufacture equipment that would allow it to successfully resist attempts by these powers, particularly Russia, to impose “unjust concessions on China” (with the implication that these could later be imposed on Japan). 

To reinforce the validity of his offer, Mr Carter enclosed a letter written and signed by the mayor of Launceston and officers from the Tasmanian military forces attesting to Mr Carter’s plan and revealing that it was of “sufficient importance to command the attention of the British Naval Authorities”.  Mr Carter followed this up with another letter a month later, in which he claimed that one of the authors of the above letter had already written to the British Admiralty and urging them to “lose no time or opportunity of securing the exclusive right of the invention”.  As such, in Mr Carter’s view, he was being “pushed for time” on whether to go ahead and sell his patent to the Royal Navy or pursue his original plan of selling the invention to Imperial Japan.

Needless to say, Consul Marks took these claims with something more than a grain of salt, mentioning in his letter that “his (Carter’s) ideas are very extravagant like all inventors” but informing Tokyo of the matter and requesting its opinion on how to proceed.   

All these details were discussed in Tokyo in February the following year. In a cable from Naval Secretary Ito Shunkichi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary Takahira Kogorō, dated for 14th day of February 1899, the Imperial Navy stated that it “had no desire” to purchase the plans for a submersible vehicle, which pretty much brought an end to the entire matter. 

Although only a minor episode in the early interaction between both countries, it is an interesting window into diplomatic correspondence as it was conducted some 119 years ago, particularly between Australia’s various colonies and the recently unified nation of Japan. One can only imagine what might have resulted if Japan had gone ahead and purchased Mr Carter’s “Annihilator”, but perhaps it came to some good use in the service of the Royal Navy. 

The response to Malcolm Turnbull’s visit to Tokyo on Thursday last week is in, and it is, in the best (or worst) traditions of foreign policy analysis, ambiguous. While there was certainly plenty of praise for Turnbull and Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s advocacy for the continuation of talks on the future of the TPP-11, with the possibility of an agreement being concluded in March, the real focus of the media on the visit was what it might portend for the future of Japan-Australia security relations. In the end, it didn’t amount to much – essentially an announcement that discussions on the conclusion of a reciprocal access agreement (which the Australian press insists on calling a ‘visiting forces agreement’) would continue, with another vague timeframe of ‘as early as feasible’ being put forward for the possible conclusion of the agreement.

As a result of the lowering of expectations (what one commentator called ‘noteworthy but not newsworthy’), foreign policy analysis has chosen to view this visit as a ‘missed opportunity’, or at the very least evidence that Japan and Australia still have some way to go before they become truly close security partners. 

However one curious aspect of media commentary on PM Turnbull’s visit was the prevalent use of the term “alliance” to describe the relationship between Japan and Australia, despite it being obvious that Japan and Australia are not allies in the strict legal sense of the term. If “ally” somehow corresponds to “partner, colleague, or like-minded practitioner”, then Australia certainly has a lot of “allies” (to be fair, Australian politicians themselves sometimes use this term apparently without too much thought when they wish to describe close relations with another country, irrespective of whether an actual alliance exists with the country in question. Japanese commentators are more precise, preferring the term ‘quasi-ally’ and its ambiguity rather than any direct reference to an ‘ally’). 

Other points raised in commentary wondered that if Australia was planning on becoming a major defence exporter, why didn’t it send Christopher Pyne to Japan along with PM Turnbull in order to further promote Australian defence exports? While timing issues and the fact that Pyne was already slated to visit India for talks with India’s Defence Minister ahead of the Raisina Dialogue might have played some role in diverting Pyne to the subcontinent, the fact that PM Turnbull visited Narashino base and was talking about the SDF use of the Bushmaster seemed like an opportunity missed for Australia’s defence industry, especially given the fact that Pyne has been very active in zipping about to other countries in the region selling the merits of Australia’s defence technology – but not Japan. 

Nevertheless, the visit produced some significant outcomes showing how far the defence relationship has come between Japan and Australia.  For starters, this year will see the first RAAF-JASDF exercise conducted in Japan (might it also be possible for Japan to participate in EX Pitch Black? Possibly, but two air force exercises in one year might be a bit much for both sides).  Furthermore, in a first for an Australian PM, PM Turnbull was invited to visit the Narashino base, which is the principal base for Japan’s special forces units, and he sat in on a meeting of Japan’s NSC.  As the press noted, these are privileges that are not bestowed on too many foreign leaders when they visit Japan, so clearly PM Abe wanted to make it clear to the Australians that he is prepared to actively include an Australian aspect to Japan’s defence apparatus at the highest levels.

The question now is whether Australia reciprocates this enthusiasm. Ever mindful of the watchful eye of China, PM Turnbull was very forthcoming in praise for China’s efforts vis-à-vis North Korea, and did not seek to portray China’s efforts in the South China Sea in a negative light, even suggesting that the situation there might be resolved (which sounds a tad over-optimistic). Meanwhile Turnbull and Abe were scathing in their comments towards North Korea, even suggesting that the world must not take the sudden thawing in North Korea’s attitude towards South Korea as an indication of a willingness by the North to discuss nuclear weapons. On this aspect of regional relations, at least Japan and Australia are seemingly in lock step.

Still, Turnbull’s presence at the Narashino base is a portent for what PM Abe might expect when he visits Australia next year – perhaps a visit to Victoria Barracks in Sydney will be in order to speak to the commando regiment there, or perhaps RAAF Base Glenbrook, or Garden Island to view Australia’s next generation naval fleet? At any rate, hopefully before then the RAA will be in place in order to facilitate a broader range of exercises between both countries, and who knows, both leaders might have a concluded TPP to spruik as they seek another avenue for cooperation.

This Thursday PM Turnbull will be paying a lightning visit to Tokyo to meet with PM Abe and (ostensibly) reach an agreement on the content of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between Japan and Australia – the first of its kind between Japan and any country other than the US. It will give a legal basis for the presence of the defence forces of either country when undertaking reciprocal training exercises with each other, as well as outlining how each side is to provide fuel, medical assistance, legal aid, legal culpability, and a whole host of other issues that may emerge when defence forces train and operate together. 

It is the culmination of at least a decade of negotiations and agreements made between Japan and Australia that stretch back to the security cooperation agreement reached between PM Abe (in his first crack at that position) and PM Howard in 2007.  It is also in keeping with the growing defence arrangements that both countries have set in place as a hedging policy against uncertainty.  As of now, Australia has an annual prime ministerial meeting with Japan, an annual 2+2 meeting between the Japanese and Australian foreign and defence ministers, an acquisition and cross servicing agreement with Japan (updated during last year’s visit to Sydney by PM Abe), and an information sharing agreement with Japan (not to mention the annual defence exercises of Southern Jackaroo and Nichigo Trident). 

The addition of a VFA to these measures will expand the scope of cooperation between both sides and ultimately define the manner by which the SDF and ADF will operate with one another in the future. It will reinforce the idea in Japanese defence circles of Australia as a ‘quasi-ally’, for no other country apart from the US has developed such progressive, broad-reaching ties with the SDF. For Japan, the possibility of undertaking more extensive military exercises with Australia is an attractive prospect for a country that lacks the space to be able to conduct exercises on the scale of those in Australia. It will increase the level of awareness in the defence forces of either country of the operating procedures and military culture of their Japanese and Australian counterparts, and add to the value of both to the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The gradual implementation of the VFA will inevitably lead to criticism that it is provocative towards China, that Australia is hostile to China’s presence in the region and that it is seeking to exploit this with Japan in order to contain China’s “rise”.  Yet the agreement, rather than being a knee-jerk reaction to China’s increased belligerence, has been in the works for years, and is more the culmination of a gradual move towards inter-regional defence support than a straight out backlash against Chinese military expansion.

The next step in the progress of Japan-Australia defence ties will be defence technology sharing, which has a precedent in the recent agreement Japan made with the UK to undertake joint research on a missile project.  Whether Australia reaches the same level of cooperation depends on what we have to offer, although Australia’s use of upgraded CEA phased array radar systems on its new AWDs and its decision to install the Aegis system on its (soon to be announced) future frigates are certainly of interest to Japan and two areas that both countries could jointly explore. 

In the meantime both PMs will be devoting their attention to how to get momentum on the TPP moving forward after the hiccup of last year’s APEC meeting in Vietnam.  Both countries poured their diplomatic resources into getting a TPP 11 agreement confirmed, only to be disrupted at the last hurdle by a disgruntled Canada. With Davos coming up shortly, PM Turnbull will be keen to know what PM Abe believes will be achieved at this year’s trade meeting, and where he sees the course of trade relations going in the Indo-Pacific.

So it will be a short visit, but one of much promise for bilateral relations for the remainder of 2018.  At the very least, it will occur at a time of relatively low domestic political activity in both countries, so it should garner some interest from the press.  Only time will tell when the agreement will finally be signed, but all indications are that both governments want this document in place ASAP, and so expect another announcement at some point in the very near distant future.      

It’s not going out on a limb here to suggest that with the release of the Australian government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper on Thursday, the need for Australia to start working in closer concert with Japan has become more urgent as Australia heads into what could be a fairly rough political year in 2018. While the white paper itself did not include anything that would otherwise be regarded as unusual or unique in relation to bilateral relations with Japan, it did emphasize that Japan would be consider one of five key regional partners with which Australia would need to work to ensure the “rules-based international order” that has underpinned much of the economic growth of the Indo-Pacific (another term that has been embraced by more conservative members of the foreign policy community, primarily because it has a broader scope of application, and because it doesn’t overly focus on Asia, aka China).

The comments on Japan did include this particular line, though – “As close partners, each country is invested in the success of the other”. This is probably the clearest expression on where Australia sees its relationship with Japan going in quite some time. In an era where the established international order is being re-shaped by power rather than law, and where the greatest champion of the liberal international order is steadily retreating from that role, Australia has begun to cast its eye over the region to find nations that at least share its sense of values and which it believes will be able to best assist Australia in keeping something of the pre-existing order in the region intact. 

Australia has already made overtures towards Japan to keep this momentum going by enthusiastically joining in the quadrilateral strategic dialogue, while fully aware that just by talking with the three other major democracies of the Indo-Pacific region it might incur the wrath of a suspicious Beijing. The question looming over this participation is, however, whether this enthusiasm for cooperation can be sustained if Australia undergoes a change in government. While the Labor Party has not dismissed the idea of participating in a quadrilateral dialogue, neither is it overly supportive of the idea, instead suggesting that it will observe whether the “Quad” actually improves the regional security situation before committing to remain a member of it.

The thing is, if the impetus is on the “Quad” to demonstrate that it contributes to regional security, on what basis will Labor decide that it is worth the effort? For example, if the “Quad” issues a statement expressing concern about China’s island building in the South China Sea and Beijing then issues a rebuke of that criticism, will that be proof to Labor that the “Quad” is disruptive and thus grounds for once again jettisoning Australia’s participation in the dialogue? And what will it say to the other members of the “Quad”? That they, and not China, are responsible for upsetting the regional order? That they are acting against the interests of stability? If Labor adopted that stance vis-à-vis the three other members of the “Quad”, then Australia might as well give up its place at all international forums. It will be obvious that it prefers to meekly back down rather than defend its values and so is unreliable as an international partner. 

So much can be achieved by building relations with Japan that extend beyond economics, but if Australia balks every time it is faced with the prospect of incurring China’s wrath by cooperating with Japan (and India, and South Korea) on regional security issues, then it will have effectively surrendered its sovereign interests to Beijing and further damaged the cause of the international liberal democratic order for no real benefit.  With Japan committed to expanding its role in the region, Australia must do all in its power to facilitate this, and that means actually pro-actively taking part in initiatives that Japan believes is important to regional stability.

While the Coalition remains in power this dedication will remain intact, but what happens should they lose the next federal election is anybody’s guess.  Uncertainty breeds suspicion in the world of diplomacy, and suspicion is no basis for regional stability.   

I’m coming to a slow realization here.  For all of the summits and conferences that have gone on for the past two weeks, what, pray tell, has been the sum result of all that activity? Have there been any substantial breakthroughs in international relations, a reduction in tensions from existential threats, resolutions in territorial disputes, or agreements on regional trade issues? In a word, no.  Diplomacy is a tedious but malleable entity, for it requires that the interests of a number of nations be hammered, squashed or stretched into shape to suit a common purpose. The APEC, ASEAN, and EAS summits might aspire to lofty goals of regional unity and shared destinies, but reality and a strong dose of nationalism tends to interfere in the process of forming consensus on the most pressing matters of the day. That makes them exercises in frustration, briefly punctuated with moments of hilarity.   

It is clear that the last few days of regional leaders’ meetings have not produced anything by way of hard-hitting, dramatic substance, certainly not in relation to regional order.  But in a quiet, unassuming way, the four nations of India, Japan, the US and Australia have agreed to adopt a common stance to deal with the security challenges of the immediate future. China has made its objections to this ‘quadrilateral dialogue’ clear, not least of which because it has not been invited to participate, but must know that its actions over the past year are to a large degree responsible for this dialogue being resurrected after a decade of lying dormant. 

On the other hand, ASEAN has started to talk to China about an officially legally binding code of conduct for the South China Sea, 15 years after the proposal was first raised. This development is either positive or concerning depending on where one sits in the regional order. While China is a signatory to UNCLOS, it has categorically ignored its implications when conducting artificial island building in the South China Sea. Since no other state (bar the US, and its intermittent FONOPs) has risen to challenge China’s claims, the region now has a fait accompli whereby China can effectively dictate the norms of commercial traffic in its vicinity while also expanding its military capabilities just that much closer to Southeast Asian states and to Australia. ASEAN realizes this, which is why it has decided to return to negotiations on a legally binding document than spend more years in uncertainty about China’s intentions and questioning US commitment to the region.

Meanwhile Australia and Japan, over the course of these past two weeks, have been unified in the messages they have conveyed regarding the need for co-operation, closer ties, and consultation. In the bilateral meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe on the side of the EAS, they essentially agreed on the same points they touched upon during their meeting in January – namely the strategic partnership, shared interests and values, freedom of the seas (which in this case was referred to as the “Indo-Pacific” - インド太平洋地域) , and an early resolution to finalization of the details of the TPP11 (of which so much was expected for this year’s summit season, only to have those hopes dashed by a rampant Canada and its concerns for a re-negotiated NAFTA and an FTA with China).

For the first time in 3 years, the leaders of the US, Japan, and Australia all met in the same room before the start of the ASEAN session on Monday, where the topic of conversation was, quite understandably, North Korea and how to contain its nuclear ambitions. This meeting itself was unusual because it was originally meant to be a bilateral between the US and Australia, and it was only at the last minute that an offer was put out (presumably by the US, as a meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe was already scheduled to take place the same day) for Japan to join in discussions.  The bilateral between Australia and the US was then re-scheduled as a dinner, which was then re-scheduled to a short official meeting. In all fairness, Turnbull had already informally spoken to President Trump at APEC in Da Nang, so neither leader really had anything else to add to their previous conversations.

So bar the fallout from the TPP (which is still alive, although it will undergo further revisions in the coming months), those messages that were espoused throughout the year have been aired once again, albeit in different venues.  One should be happy with that result, as at the very least it confirms that everyone (which in this sense, means the liberal democratic order) is on the same page regarding regional security priorities (and less so economic ones). Yet the fact that so much time and effort was put into events that produced little of substance makes you wonder if everything couldn’t have been sorted out at the ministerial level, or by a really well thought out tele-conference.       

In an interview with Nikkei Shinbun last week following the LDP/Komeito electoral victory, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono raised the prospect of a four-way dialogue between Japan, the US, Australia, and India. This comment was in response to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s advocacy of greater US involvement in the Asia-Pacific with its regional allies and in response to the growing reach of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Abe government has a long history of advocacy of dialogues with other regionally based democracies, with the initial proposal for a “quadrilateral security dialogue” being made early in April 2007 by none other than PM Abe himself. This proposal was met with a favourable response from each of the capitals of the invitees at the time, and so officials from each of the four countries (US, Japan, Australia, India) met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Meeting in May 2007 to thrash out some of the details of what a quadrilateral dialogue would look like and what it would hope to achieve.  However, Beijing caught wind of this discussion before it took place and sent urgent letters of protest to Washington, Canberra, Tokyo, and New Delhi, warning each of the potential participants that any moves to create a regional dialogue that excluded China would be interpreted as an attempt to contain Chinese ambitions and hostile to Chinese interests.

The warning had the desired effect. In July of 2007 then Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson, on a visit to New Delhi immediately following one to Beijing, said during a press conference that Australia had no wish to enter into a quadrilateral dialogue and was satisfied with the trilateral arrangement that already existed between Australia, Japan, and the US.  Following the removal of the Howard government and the accession of the Rudd government in November 2007, Australia became more reluctant to pursue any further discussion of a quadrilateral arrangement. In February 2008 this was spelled out in plain language by then Foreign Minister Stephen Smith during a visit to Australia by then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, thereby removing Australia from any further participation in the “quad”. 

Yet a lot has changed over the course of 10 years. Australia has witnessed the growing infiltration of Chinese state owned enterprise and private investment into its private sector, its educational sector, and its political class. It has seen China seek influence in the Pacific through loans, thus turning Pacific Islands away from their traditional relationship with Australia, while Australia’s security and sovereignty has been threatened by cyber-based espionage launched from China.  It has also seen China move to break up ASEAN by turning member states against one another,  militarize the South China Sea to turn it into a Chinese controlled enclave, threaten an open border war with India, openly collaborate with Russia to oppose US and EU interests, and ignore international opinion and law in pursuit of unilateral goals.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Australia has voiced far more support for the idea of a “quad” in the past two weeks than in the past 10 years. In the age of uncertainty, or more accurately the age of Trump, Australia needs to ensure that it has the support of fellow democratic governments in the region so that its security won’t be compromised by being left alone to deal with China’s encroaching power.    
Australia has always relied on having a major power to back up its security posture, and the combination of the US, Japan, and India as security partners would ensure that enough authority is there to cause China to pause before attempting to put pressure on Australia to adopt positions at odds with Australia’s interests (and/or its values). If a revived quadrilateral dialogue proves useful, this could then lead to other democracies, namely New Zealand and Singapore, wanting to join the framework, moves that Australia would definitely support and which would further strengthen the cause of democratic government in the region.

There will be those in the Australian community who will voice objections to any move to join the “quad”, but their views will not be those of the majority, particularly the majority in power. The real question though is whether the Australian Labor Party has moved on from its position in the late 2000s.  Recent commentary from Opposition defence spokesman Richard Marles indicates that Labor has begun to appreciate that regional relations will be crucial to handling overall relations with China and that being involved in a dialogue with partners is preferable to being left outside this grouping and attempting to deal with China on our own.  Opposition foreign affairs spokeswoman Penny Wong has also said words to this effect, although she has also said that China relations should not be seen through what she calls the “lens of risk management”.  With the Labor left faction in the ascendancy on policy formulation, it will be interesting to see whether Labor does indeed agree to follow on with any quadrilateral dialogue with other regional democracies (albeit conservative democratic governments), or, in the event it wins the next federal election, it once again sees fit to pull Australia out of any such arrangement and thus leave Australia in a vulnerable position during the “age of uncertainty”. 

Over the past 24 hours, Australia has again been graced, if that is the right term, by the presence of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The reason for this visit is ostensibly a simple one - the annual bilateral leaders' meeting that was agreed to by PM Abe and Abbott in 2014. Ordinarily this visit is supposed to be biennial, however as I explained last week, circumstances that occurred last year conspired to make such a visit by PM Abe impossible. All that has been rectified, however, and the results made plain.

The visit has produced two ends, each auspicious in their intent and ambitious in their scope. Both Australia and Japan have signed an upgrade to the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) originally signed back in 2010, which will allow both the SDF and ADF to exchange armaments and ammunition should they be deployed together, and which paves the way towards further joint exercises and exchanges between both defence forces. This is not a moment too soon, given the current state of affairs in the security of the region, but it is also welcome because until now, whenever the SDF wished to conduct exercises in Australia, it had to go through a swathe of bureaucracy much of which appeared designed to hamper rather than promote such exercises.

The other consequence of the visit was a mutual recognition by both leaders of the importance of the TPP and RCEP to the promotion of free trade and the greater liberalisation of commerce. PM Abe has often stated that the TPP is the lynchpin for stability in the region, for it would combine all of the major economies of the Asia Pacific, save that of China, India and Russia, into one large tariff free zone, so that each nation would be obliged to work together to ensure shared prosperity. It would also demonstrate that the US is committed to remaining an economic force (and by default a military force) in the Asia Pacific, which for Japan is a crucial matter given the importance of the US to Japan's security.

But the election of Donald Trump threw all of that ambition into the shadows, for if the president elect does not support the TPP, then what hope does it have without the US? PM Abe himself expressed his doubts in the immediate aftermath of the US presidential election, however subsequent debate on the matter may have convinced him that there is still life in the TPP, and Japan, with its remaining economic strength, can provide leadership to ensure that the agreement survives and is actually brought into practice. Commentary by US Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson has also given PM Abe cause for optimism, as Tillerson, during congressional hearings last week, voiced his opinion that while sharing Trump's scepticism about whether the TPP was to US advantage, he also believed that the TPP has merit.

One other consequence of the weekend's visit was discussion on investment, a matter of importance to Japan given the need to stimulate Japan's industries to offset the slow domestic growth of the past few years. As has been pointed out elsewhere, Japan is a major investor in Australia, and its industries have poured billions into the Australian economy to take advantage of raw materials and stable supply. However Australian investment in Japan is virtually nil (a mere $14 million), and which is primarily focused on finance and tourism. For Australia to have any impact on shifting Japanese domestic debate towards the advantages of closer ties, it must raise its public profile and demonstrate that it has both the desire and the intent to strengthen such ties. After all, unilateral enthusiasm fades fast in the face of indifference.
​
Nonetheless, there is much cause for optimism in the future of the relationship, and it's about bloody time.

The past week has witnessed what can only be described as a pivotal moment in Japan-Australia relations but for all the wrong reasons. On Tuesday (the 26th), the Turnbull government announced the winning bid for the Future Submarine Project, which ultimately went to French defence company DCNS. For observers of the entire bid process for the past three years, this outcome was indeed surprising, and a credit, of sorts, to the ability of both the Australian government and the bureaucracy to keep the entire Competitive Evaluation Process hidden from the prying eyes of the media. But the outcome heralded another, more troubling development - that despite the earnestness with which Japan entered into the CEP and the strong indications that it wanted to further its security relationship with Australia, in the end that did not count for anything.
 
I`m not often in agreement with Greg Sheridan about matters related to foreign policy, but on this matter I do share his indignation at the manner in which Japan was treated by the entire submarine process. As for who is to blame for this state of affairs, and why Japan lost the bid, there are a myriad of guilty parties and reasons available. Some of the blame can fall on the previous Abbott government, who raised Japan`s expectations for an overseas build for the submarines despite not being entirely in control of the domestic ramifications for such an eventuality. Some of the blame goes to South Australia`s political class, who so politicised the entire submarine selection process that any true objectivity went right out the window once it became clear that Liberal seats were at risk of electoral wipeout. Some of the blame does fall of the Department of Defence, who should have made clear indications to Japan at an early stage if it appeared that its bid was not going to succeed, at least to give the Japanese government time to prepare for the fallout of the decision rather than finding out about it through the press.  
 
Some of the blame must also fall on Japan`s side, particularly in the case of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. As revealed from an interview held during the week, MHI did not conceive that when Japan altered its three principles for defence exports, that it would suddenly find itself having to immediately bid for a major defence contract for the pinnacle of Japan`s maritime defence technology. MHI had to figuratively be dragged by the Japanese government into the bidding process, a process that MHI would have known would have been beyond its capability to compete for given that both of its rivals had long histories of defence manufacturing in foreign countries. This reluctance became manifest in Japan`s bid and public perceptions of it, which is why the Japanese government, at every opportunity, had to re-double its efforts to try and convince the Australian government of the seriousness of its bid and the benefits that could be accrued from it.
 
So the bid was lost, and this news was not well received in Japan. One of the main theories that has arisen over the past week is that China so exerted pressure on Australia that the Turnbull government folded up and removed Japan`s bid from the table. From a personal point of view, I don`t think there is any merit to these allegations, which are obviously being driven from a sense of betrayal by Australia, but the fact that Malcolm Turnbull was in China earlier in April, that he has a `China-centric` view of the region and that his office contains a number of China experts has added fuel to the conspiracy theories. Yet Australia is perfectly capable of making its own decisions in its national interest without outside interference (as evidenced by the fact that it went with a French bid contrary to all expectations that Australia to choose Japan based on pressure from the US), hence the implication that Australia would just buckle under pressure from Beijing is without merit if not a little insulting to Australia.  
 
While I do not believe, unlike Greg Sheridan, that disappointment in the bid outcome runs across Japanese society as a whole (indeed there are probably some sections of Japan`s society who are very pleased that PM Abe did not succeed in plan for a major defence export), there is certainly frustration and anger in the defence and foreign affairs community of Japan at how Japan was treated by the CEP and the Turnbull government and whether Australia can ever be trusted to become true member of the trilateral arrangement with the US in the region. Mind you, there are precedents for this type of decision making by Australia. Some might recall that on two occasions over the past five years, South Korean defence industries have suddenly found out that they`ve been eliminated from potential Australian defence contracts at the last minute and often with no prior notification. That this has been allowed to occur in the case of Japan, which is supposedly a major regional strategic partner for Australia, is nothing short of an indictment on Australia`s decision making processes and the complete disregard for regional sensitivities.
 
So where will Japan-Australian relations go from here? While anger still remains under the surface, Japan will continue to try and further its security relationship with Australia, probably through an increase in joint exercises with the ADF. One way that Australia could make amends would be to push through with the plan for a fast rail network on the east coast and from the very outset make JR the only company to be consulted on design and construction of the enterprise. It would go some way to placating that anger and show that Australia is still a country in which Japan can both invest and rely upon at its word. One aspect of Japan`s failed bid that has still yet to be fully explored is how much investment Australia has missed out on from Japan as a result of going with a European bid. France does not have as much regional business exposure as Japan and its industries are not as profitable in this quarter of the globe as those from Japan, so Australia has chosen to go with a partner whose overall business potential is far less than that of Japan. If the government was looking to boost employment from this enterprise, then this is well and truly a major opportunity lost.
 
For the time being the relationship will run at a slower pace than in recent years as Japan re-evaluates its ties with Australia. As Australia is about to go into a federal election there will be a drop off in Japanese interest until the outcome of the election is known, after which things may pick up again. At some point over the year PM Abe must make a visit to Australia to fulfil the content of the agreement he made with Tony Abbott two years ago for annual visits by the leaders of both nations, but the visit may be fairly short (maybe no longer than a single day) and with a limited agenda. To offset this, Australia needs to now make a much more pro-active effort to rebuild and reassure Japan of its desire to grow closer to its regional neighbour, for any delay in conveying this sentiment will breed further resentment and end up freezing relations entirely, an outcome for which Beijing would be surely overjoyed.