This week I have decided to delve a bit into a particular subject of interest of mine – Japanese diplomacy, and the history of foreign policy as practised by Japan. The subject is, of course, well known to many scholars of Japanese politics and history themselves, however I thought that this particular forum might prove useful in giving a broader interpretation of such history and the evolution of Japanese diplomatic practice. 

Any attempt to grasp the nature of Japanese foreign policy as it has been practised during the modern era must begin with an examination of the system created in the wake of Japan’s defeat in WWII and how this became the foundation for all diplomatic thinking that subsequently followed it. This system, the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine”, was named after post-war Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (who served in office from 1948 to 1954), a former diplomat and one of the founders of what would become the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan[1].

 The essential ideology behind the Yoshida Doctrine was based on necessity given the concern at the time surrounding the international and domestic influence of communism. The doctrine emphasised that Japan would maintain a close alliance with the United States, that it would only commit itself to a minimal level of rearmament, and that economy recovery would be prioritised above all other concerns.

 It was, in many ways, the only form of foreign policy doctrine that would satisfy the many competing elements within Japanese politics, for while businesses and economic ministries wanted Japan to focus purely on economic development, anti-communists and pacifists argued among one another on whether Japan should rearm to defend itself against the threats posed by the Cold War, or whether Japan should strictly follow the terms laid out in the newly adopted Constitution and forsake all military capability[2]. 

That the Constitution should prove so divisive was certainly far from what its creators had first intended. With Japan’s sovereignty suspended in the aftermath of WWII, the Allied powers, led principally by the United States, had deemed it necessary for Japan to have a constitution that would permanently shift the right of sovereignty from the Imperial household to the people, and prevent a re-surge in militarism through the renunciation of war and the guarantee of democracy.

 This was a reflection of the conditions laid out in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945. Though the drafting of the constitution was difficult, and at one stage had to be completely re-written following objections from General Douglas McArthur that it still favoured former Imperial institutions, the document was adopted by the Japanese Diet and came into effect on May 3, 1947[3].

The three main features of the Constitution were that it reduced the Emperor to a symbol, it promoted the idea of human rights and democratic rule, and it renounced the capacity of Japan to ever again wage war, which included the right to belligerency and to possess armed forces. This last feature was embedded in the language of Article 9, probably the most well-known of all of the articles in the Constitution. Yet obviously this left a dilemma, for unarmed neutrality can only be guaranteed if all surrounding nations agree to accept the status-quo[4].

Hence Japan had two choices to make – it could either rely solely on protection from the UN, or it could rely on another foreign power for its security[5]. Since Prime Minister Yoshida was averse to wanting to join the Communist bloc, believing as he did that Japan’s national security and economic recovery could only be guaranteed through its association with the free market and liberal democratic values, he reasoned that Japan would be of strategic value to the US, not only geographically but also in terms of Japan’s ability to manufacture goods for the US.

In the end, the choice was obvious. The San Francisco Treaty of 1951 re-established Japanese sovereignty, while in the same year Japan agreed to the first US-Japanese security treaty giving the US the right to continue to maintain bases in Japan. While pacifist groups objected to the latter treaty, concerned that it could drag Japan into a US-led conflict, Yoshida realised that this was the only way Japan could maintain its security without pledging to increase its military strength[6].    

For the next few years Japan focused its energies on rebuilding its economy, primarily through exports to the US and Western countries, and placed any major debate related to foreign policy aside.

Yet soon both Japanese politicians and intellectuals were questioning the dependent relationship that Japan shared with the United States, and that Japan should pursue its own national strategy and identity[7]. In the wake of Prime Minister Yoshida came Hatoyama Ichirō, who in 1956 attempted to create something of an independent foreign policy initiative by moving to normalise relations with the Soviet Union while also re-writing the Constitution. Although Hatoyama’s initiatives were defeated, it spurred the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to release the first Diplomatic Blue Book in 1957 which outlined the three pillars of Japan’s diplomatic strategy – its alliance with the US, diplomacy exercised through the UN, and a focus on Asia[8].    

Based on these three principles, the period of the 1960s through to the 1980s saw a number of attempts by various prime ministers to define Japan’s regional role and to build an international identity for Japan.  In 1960 Kishi Nobusuke managed to have the US-Japan security treaty revised despite widespread domestic opposition to Japan so closely aligning itself with the US (and risking engagement in foreign conflicts).

This backlash prompted Kishi’s successor Ikeda Hayato to again promise that Japan would concentrate purely on economic growth, so much so that by the end of the 1960s Japan’s technological and economic power was approaching that of the US. This new-found economic power began to convince those within Japan’s industrial community that Japan should pursue a more independent defence and foreign policy, however concerns about how this would be perceived in Washington meant that such ideas did not go beyond the hypothetical stage[9].

Following the visit by US President Richard Nixon to China in February of 1972, members of the LDP, led by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, soon realised that Japan was no longer bound to adhere to US anti-communist doctrine and so signed the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement with China in September of 1972 that normalised relations between the two countries while adding to Japan’s growing interest in pursuing more active ties with other nations in the Asian region[10].  

The agreement with China signified a move by Japan’s political leaders that they were prepared to pursue a more independent foreign policy distinct to that of the US, particularly as the war in Vietnam had shaken Japanese faith in the ability of the US to not only provide for Japan’s defence but also to ensure its access to resources[11].

The embargo on oil exports by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (or OPEC) in the mid-1970s merely heightened such concerns, for until this period Japan had predominantly depended on Western nations to meet Japan’s energy demands[12]. The impetus was now for Japan to pursue a more multilateral economic policy that moved beyond dependence on the US and Europe, which in turn spurred a greater level of investment in developing countries, particularly countries in Asia, in order to ensure that they could meet Japan’s demand for resources.

This desire for access to growing markets in turn led Prime Minister Tanaka in 1977 to declare that Japan would pursue a closer relationship with Southeast Asia through the institution of ASEAN, a relationship that Professor Gerald Curtis described as…”…one of the outstanding achievements of post war Japanese diplomacy[13].” Hence as Japan’s financial strength grew, so did its desire to establish favourable trading relations with a number of countries which it then reciprocated with aid and other financial donations and investments[14].

By the 1980s, Japan’s confidence in its economic status and ability to influence global markets (starkly demonstrated by Japan’s inclusion in the G-6 nations in the mid-1970s) had given it a newfound desire to raise its profile on the international stage and seek a much more diverse role for itself in global politics[15]. Under Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan firmly committed itself to Western notions of security and increased its aid donations to third world countries in order to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union[16].

Nakasone increased defence spending in Japan by 6% per year (from its previous limit of 1% of GDP), and his decision to agree to the G-7’s “Plaza Accord” in 1985, thereby increasing the value of yen, gave Japan a leading role in providing funds for global growth. Under Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru, Japan became the world’s largest donor of ODA (60% of which was going to Asia in 1992[17]) while simultaneously becoming the world’s largest creditor nation[18]. 

At this point, I will draw this particular chapter to a close, however in subsequent posts I shall try to continue the narrative of Japanese foreign policy as it entered the 1990s and 2000s, much of which had a bearing on the decisions taken recently by the Abe government.


[1] Michael Green, Japan`s Reluctant Realism, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2007, p.11

[2] Ibid.

[3] John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the aftermath of World War II, Penguin Books, London, 1999, pp.360,401

[4] Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, 2005, pp.24-25

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid, p.26

[7] Michael Green, op.cit, p.13

[8] Ibid, pp.13-14

[9] Ibid, pp.14-15

[10] Ibid.

[11]  George R Packard, “The United-States – Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a grand bargain?”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2010, website: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66150/george-r-packard/the-united-states-japan-security-treaty-at-50?page=2, accessed March 12 2012

[12] Yutaka Kawashima, op.cit, p.20

[13] Yoichi Funabashi, “Tokyo’s Depression Diplomacy”, Foreign Affairs, November/December Vol.77 No.6, 1998, p.29

[14] Narongchai Akrasanee and Apichart Prasert, “"The Evolution of ASEAN-Japan Economic Cooperation,", ASEAN-Japan Cooperation:A Foundation for East Asian Community; (ed. Japan Center for International Exchange), Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003, pp. 63-74

[15] Ibid, p.62

[16] Michael Green, op.cit, p.16

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “50 years of Japan’s ODA” (Pamphlet), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 2002, website: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/cooperation/anniv50/pamphlet/progress3.html, accessed March 23 2012

[18] Ibid.

Anybody paying attention to the news over the past five days would be well aware of the incident that occurred in the skies over the eastern Ukraine on Thursday last week. Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, on its way from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, was, in Joe Biden’s words “blown out of the sky” by a Surface to Air Missile (SAM) launched somewhere within the Donetsk Oblast region of Ukraine. The last couple of days have been replete with horror stories of what became of the passengers (a majority of whom were Dutch, with other nationalities from Malaysia, Australia, the UK, Germany, Belgium, Indonesia, and Canada), with the fuselage of the aircraft spread over a wide area along with the belongings of the passengers. Compounding the problem has been the continuing conflict in eastern Ukraine between the Ukrainian government and what are variously referred to as pro-Russian separatists, or rebels, or simply “armed groups”, which has prevented any international investigation of the incident and retrieval of the deceased passengers and crew.

Once it became evident that Australia had lost a considerable number of citizens in the incident (28 citizens, with another 9 non-citizen residents, bringing Australia’s total loss to 37), the Abbott government lost no time in pointing the finger at pro-Russian forces in eastern Ukraine*, mentioning them in a statement delivered to Parliament on Friday last week and referring to the incident as a crime.  With the loss of Australian lives and no-one admitting culpability in bringing the aircraft down, the Abbott government decided to name Russian President Vladimir Putin as the one person who could both convince the armed groups in eastern Ukraine to allow inspectors to visit the crash site and secure proper treatment of the remains. Moreover, Australia was in no mood to delve into semantics with Russia over who was or wasn’t responsible for the incident, quickly moving a resolution in the UN Security Council for a full investigation into the incident and proper treatment of the remains of the victims.

In terms of Japan’s reaction, Foreign Minister Kishida stated on Friday evening that Japan had offered its condolences to those countries whose citizens had been lost in the incident, and that it had called on all countries related to the incident to co-operate in any initiative that might be launched in relation to MH17 (J). Japan, for its part, would offer whatever assistance necessary.

While Japan has no direct stake in the investigation, it did take a stance against Russia at the G7 leaders meeting in Brussels in June, expressing Japan’s support for the Ukrainian government of President Petro Poroshenko and calling on Russia to co-operate in a constructive way to resolve the crisis in eastern Ukraine (J).

This action was reported at the time as being particularly courageous of PM Abe, given that his government was in negotiations with Putin at the time for talks to begin on the transfer of the Sakhalin Islands back to Japanese sovereignty, the signing of a formal treaty ending WWII hostilities between Russia and Japan, and discussing Russian gas exports to Japan. Clearly the Abe government came to same conclusion as many other countries in the vicinity of Russia – that trust of the Putin government could only be taken so far, and that it was better to side with other democracies in their condemnation of Russia’s behaviour than to continue with a perceived neutrality towards an enigmatic government with a history of ignoring international protocols and which is growing ever closer to China.

Nonetheless, as this particular interview indicates (J), the Abe government still hopes to create a dialogue with Putin over the northern territories question and is still planning to host Putin in a visit to Japan in or around September or October. If Putin agrees to the international investigation of the cause of the crash of MH17, and is able to convince the pro-separatist forces in eastern Ukraine not to interfere with the investigation, then he may gain enough credit in Japan’s eyes for further dialogue to continue.

The US, however, would be less than enthusiastic for Japan to make any concessions to Putin at this stage, especially as it is attempting to convince the international community that Putin aims to destabilise the order that has kept a relative peace in Europe since the end of the Cold War.  Abe may go his own way in relations with Russia as he has previously overlooked US objections to his own nationalistic bent, but given the emphasis Abe has placed on America’s importance to Japan’s security environment, particularly in relation to China, for Abe to suddenly disregard Washington’s concerns would not go down well inside the Beltway.

*Canada’s Foreign Minister John Baird was even more blunt about who was responsible for the incident, saying “The Kremlin may not have pulled the trigger but it certainly loaded the gun and put it in the murderers’ hands”. 

Many apologies for the lateness of this particular blog entry, but with the visit last week of PM Abe to this capital of Canberra, things were rather hectic. The visit itself was either a great success or a terrible worry, depending on what side of the policy fence you occupy. Articles written in the Australian and Sydney Morning Herald welcomed the tone and message of PM Abe’s speech, with its emphasis on the rule of law and Japan’s pledge to act in the cause of peace*, while others were more cautious in their praise*. All this was aimed at calming those fears both in the region and at home that the re-interpretation of Japan’s Constitution was about to announce the re-emergence of a more belligerent Japan, a possibility that PM Abe went out of his way to attempt to dispel. Indeed, Abe made what amounted to the closest thing to an apology to those Australians who died during the Pacific War when he acknowledged the suffering that the war caused (J). His message of the need for freedom of navigation and the rule of law was picked up immediately by Australian journalists, knowing that it directly related to China and China’s behaviour in the East and South China Seas*.

PM Tony Abbott made a rather less impressive speech, which was more controversial in its content. While not directly praising those Japanese submariners that attacked Sydney Harbour in 1942, Abbott did acknowledge their professionalism, which is something that I have long suspected Abbott might do. If anything, Abbott likes a regimented workforce carrying out a mission though it be doomed, which is what I believe he was trying to convey in his comments. It was not a particularly well thought out section in his speech though, which I also suspect Abbott included himself without referring to others for comment. Abbott could have pointed to the contribution made by Japanese pearlers to the development of Australia’s north, or to those Japanese who, despite the prejudice shown against them, made contributions to Australian society before and during the war. Yet somehow I don’t think these would have resonated as loudly with Abbott, whose admiration for all things military appeared to overcome his better judgement.

As was widely reported in Australia, Abbott’s comments were picked up by Xinhua’s Canberra bureau chief and then commented on in her (English language) blog, while other state owned media organisations in China questioned the meaning and timing of Abbott and Abe’s meeting*. The Chinese government itself, however, was more moderate in its response, merely stating that it hoped that recent developments would not result in countries ganging up on China. As expected, those who have previously questioned the wisdom of Australia drawing closer to Japan in a security relationship voiced those concerns once again, while others pointed out that the fact that China was changing the security dynamic in the region meant that a closer strategic relationship between Australia and Japan was a natural consequence of such behaviour (PDF).

One thing that did strike me as odd was despite the appearance of PM Abe in Oceania and the signing of an EPA and defence agreement with Australia, Japan’s domestic media did not really consider this to be all that news-worthy, with TBS(video) and FNN (video) only devoting about a minute or two’s worth of air time during their news bulletins to Abe’s speech (NHK had a longer segment on the development in Japan-Australia relations the night before the speech). Abe’s speech was regarded in Australia as the second declaration by a visiting leader of democratic principles and security priorities for the region, following on from that of US President Obama in 2011. Yet it does seem as though Japan’s media couldn’t have cared less. The fact that Japan was being borne down on by a super typhoon certainly garnered more attention (understandably), and did North Korea shooting off rockets into the Sea of Japan, yet when the PM made his first overseas visit since the passing of constitutional re-interpretation, most domestic media outlets merely outlined the bare details and moved on.  From this, one can only conclude that Australia is still peripheral in the Japanese psyche, not a fundamental part of Japan’s security consciousness that either the US, Europe or India might be.

Perhaps this reflected more of the reality of the relationship than that advocated by governments – that despite the rhetoric, on a fundamental level Australia and Japan’s relations are still developing, and have yet to reach the same level as those of other nations that carry more international weight. While this may be a significant step for Australia, it is one of many such strategies being pursued by Japan to secure its energy, resource, and physical security. Only time will tell to what extent this relationship will grow, for neither side has any interest, at present, in the sudden expansion of security ties across the board (which would include the formation of an alliance). Both sides are comfortable with the current state of their alliance with the US, and neither sees any need to be provocative (Julie Bishop’s comments last week on relations with China might belie that observation, although she does have her reasons, and hysteric op-eds from state run media won’t do China’s cause any good in convincing Bishop to act otherwise).

Although Abe’s visit to Oceania was a success, his return to Japan brought with it some unwelcome news for the incumbent government. Over the weekend the gubernatorial election for Shiga Prefecture was held, resulting in the election of former DPJ (now independent) member Mikazuki Daizo, a fervent critic of the Abe government. Analysis of the electoral result put the loss for the LDP/New Komeito down to a protest vote at the passing of the re-interpretation of the Japanese Constitution without adequate Diet scrutiny, and anger at LDP members heckling female opposition members in the Tokyo Municipal Assembly (J). On Monday PM Abe himself acknowledged that the government’s explanation for re-interpreting the Constitution had been lacking, and that this would need to be rectified (J).

Meanwhile Abe’s popularity rating continues to fall, with the support rate dropping below 50% for the first time since Abe was elected almost two years ago (J). The recent controversies of constitutional re-interpretation, coupled with the imposition of security legislation, the establishment of the NSC, and the Diet revision of the Kono Declaration, and the decision to re-start nuclear power plants have all contributed to damaging Abe’s support level, a situation that the powers that be within the LDP/New Komeito must be well aware of. The next few weeks will most likely see a range of legislation dealing with domestic issues raised in the Diet, most notably the desire of PM Abe to increase the level of female participation in the federal bureaucracy to 30% of all positions. The old sticking point of the Futenma base might also raise its head, together with the issue of nuclear energy. Out of the frying pan into the fire, one might say.

*  “Japan pushes for closer ties”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 2014, p. 1,4  “World citizen Japan prepares for the worst”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 2014, p. 4  “Chinese threat cannot be named”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 2014, p. 4  “A horror from the past, an offer of condolence, a moment to stop time”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 2014, p. 4,5  “’No limits’ as Japan opens arms to trade”, The Australian, 9 July 2014, p. 1,4  “Genuine warmth in the Abe-Abbott partnership”, The Australian, 9 July 2014, p. 4  “’Sincere condolences’ for Kokoda and Sandakan”, The Australian, 9 July 2014, p. 4  “’Ms Fraser, you were Australia’”, The Australian, 9 July 2014, p. 4  “Orator hits the mark in speech”, The Australian, 9 July 2014, p. 4.

*“Take care with reputation”, The Canberra Times, 9 July 2014, Times2, p.1,4 “New relationship not without costs”, The Canberra Times, 9 July 2014, Times2, p.2

*“Japan warns of China threat”, The Australian Financial Review, 9 July 2014, p. 1, 4 

*“Abe-struck Abbott on the outer with China? Think again”, The Australian, 11 July 2014, p. 8

It`s done. On Tuesday (July 1st), the Abe Cabinet officially endorsed a new interpretation of the right of Japan to exercise collective self-defence (J), a right the Abe government has maintained belongs to every state, and that in order to defend Japan’s interests and those of its allies is a ‘must have’ for the Japanese nation. To say that this has been a controversial move is only putting things mildly, as the question of the right for governments to ‘re-interpret’ the Constitution in a manner that is suitable to the government of the day has provoked a storm of protest.

This point was raised very eloquently and forcefully by Jeff Kingston of Temple University last week, who wrote that in re-interpreting the Constitution, Abe was circumventing the entire Constitutional amendment process, which itself is odd given that the government has a majority in both Houses of the Diet. In Kingston’s view, Abe knew that the government could never convince the Japanese population to endorse a change in the wording to Article 9 or the inclusion of an additional article permitting the exercise of collective self-defence, and so appointed a committee to re-interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent with the Abe government’s position.

The speed at which the committee’s recommendations were adopted, consensus reached within the LDP/New Komeito coalition, and legislation presented to a pro-rouged session of the Diet for approval has outraged middle and leftist parties and raised doubts about the Abe government’s commitment to the Constitution, even among regional branches of the LDP. The self-immolation of a protestor in Shinjuku wasn’t enough to persuade the government to re-consider its actions, neither were the protests that took place outside the PM’s residence over Monday and Tuesday (reminiscent of those that accompanied the decision to re-start nuclear power plants across the nation last year). 

Concern over the Abe government’s haste has certainly affected support levels for Constitutional re-interpretation, as demonstrated by the following results for polls conducted over the past week. The Mainichi Shimbun’s own poll indicated that opposition was running at 58%, while the Nikkei Shimbun recorded opposition at 50% (the likelihood of polls being manipulated to reflect editorial positions has arisen in the Japanese media before, as this particular article from the Asahi Shimbun claims. It would be no surprise if this were the case in this instance, given the level of media attention to the question of Constitutional re-interpretation.  It does appear, though, that opposition to the government’s move is greater than any support, a fact that PM Abe himself has acknowledged in the past few months.)

Abe has again adapted the policy of “crash or crash through” on this occasion, and with the Diet numbers to support him, re-interpretation is a fait accompli. In this sense, he is imitating the actions of his grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke, who in 1960 brought about the re-confirmation of the US-Japan Security Treaty against a backdrop of widespread opposition to the move (PDF).  As this blog has already noted, Abe has a strong desire to emulate his grandfather, quite possibly believing himself to be the latest member of a political dynasty that has played an historic role in shaping the fate of the nation. It may be that Abe believes that his re-interpretation move has cemented his place in history, and that other issues will occupy his time. 

The move has already been welcomed by the US, where the belief has been that it was about time Japan got around to loosening its devotion to its Constitution, the same Constitution that the US helped to draft in the aftermath of the Second World War. With the region still concerned about China, the US expects that its ‘friends and allies’ will move to pick up the slack created by a diminished US defence budget. Japan, for its part, is doing its bit, while also signalling that it will not remain a bystander to any deterioration in the security environment in the Asia-Pacific. Although PM Abe stressed in his press conference that “nothing would really change” following the re-interpretation, it does mean that should the JSF be dispatched to a regional humanitarian disaster or operation and the troops of an allied or partner nation come under attack, then the JSF would be authorised to use force to protect those allies.

Quite possibly this means that the SDF might need to be renamed, taking the title Japan Defence Force to reflect its new reality. After nearly 70 years of non-involvement in military operations abroad, Japan’s forces are about to enter a new age of activity, some of which will cause Japanese voters to question Japan’s participation. Mind you, if one government can interpret the constitution in a certain way, that does leave open the possibility that future governments will choose to revert to the previous interpretation thereby overturning the Abe government’s decision. As long as the text to the Constitution itself remains unaltered, interpretation of that text is an infinite process but one with no permanent solution. What it does do, however, is undermine the legality of the Constitution. Rather than having bipartisan agreement on what the Constitution stands for and its wording, any future government will be able to interpret the Constitution in whatever way it chooses without actually having to re-write it.  

This much is true – we have not seen the end of constitutional re-interpretation, and that may cause further political friction (both domestic and foreign) in the future.