This week I want to focus on two particular issues. The first concerns the visit by PM Abe to The Hague to participate in the Nuclear Security Summit (from the 26th) and the meeting of G7 leaders to decide on a response to Russia’s annexation of the Crimea (J). Before plunging into a series of bilateral meetings, Abe did make time to visit the house of Anne Frank (J), in an unusual but symbolic gesture to quash any concerns about his own political views vis-à-vis historical memory and highlight concern at recent vandalism directed at library copies of translations of Frank’s diary in Japan (J).  As for the G7, Abe did go out on a limb to express Japan’s support for the suspension of Russia from the usual G8 format and criticism of Russia’s actions in the Crimea, moves which virtually guarantee that the current dialogue between Tokyo and Moscow on return of the Northern Territories will come to a screeching halt and might impact on negotiations over gas supplies from Siberia (although as is often pointed out in foreign affairs, economic interests trump political ones when the stakes are not absolute).

While these events were underway, news organisations were reporting on Tuesday that the Abe government was currently considering the message to be included in a statement to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. While the government indicated in a response made to questions in the Diet that it would continue to hold the same degree of historical recognition as past Japanese cabinets, it also revealed that it would be focusing on a ‘more appropriate, forward-looking message’ (J). That seems to indicate that the Abe cabinet is considering a message that advocates placing historical events in the past and urging its neighbours to cooperate with Japan. 

This may not produce the desired effect, if the events that occurred at the Hague summit are anything to go by. The summit featured a trilateral leaders’ dialogue between Abe, US President Obama, and South Korean President Park Guen-hye on the sidelines of the nuclear debate (J). The purpose of the meeting was to promote dialogue between all three leaders, particularly considering the fact that neither Abe nor Park had spoken directly to one another despite both coming to office more than a year ago, and the US needs South Korea and Japan to co-operate in order to deal with North Korea. As to whether the dialogue was cordial, that remains debatable, as the press conference following the meeting suggested (as can be seen here (video). Abe clearly wanted to use the occasion to develop some sort of rapport with Park, but that wasn’t going to happen. One can only imagine what President Obama was thinking. Overall, a very awkward situation.

Meanwhile in Australia the national focus turned from matters domestic to Australian PM Abbott’s up-coming visit to North Asia. High on the agenda for this trip is the expectation of the creation of an FTA (or EPA, if relying on Japanese sources) with Japan, with many in Australia seeing it as a natural development after the FTA with South Korea. Certainly PM Abbott intends to focus predominantly on things economic during his visit, as his domestic support depends on his ability to create business opportunities for Australian industries and allow the unemployment rate to drop.

The print media in Australia, however, has emphasised that North Asia is currently in a state of diplomatic tension, particularly with regard to the Senkaku Islands and the degree of hostility exhibited by China and South Korea towards the Abe government. PM Abbott has made no secret of his affinity for Japan, which (as every pundit will point out) is a natural part of his conservative background. In an interview with the Nikkei Asia Review, PM Abbott again reiterated his admiration for Japan as a democracy and trading partner, and, in a move that is not likely to endear him to Beijing, stated that a larger role for the SDF in the region was “very reasonable” ($).

Sam Roggeveen, in an opinion piece for the Lowy Interpreter blog, noted that Abbott had done well to steer clear in his speech to the Asia Society earlier in the week of any appearance of partisanship, however his rhetoric on the inevitability of liberalism in China might have rankled Beijing and added one further complication to his visit to China. The visit might already be complicated by Abbott’s open advocacy of Japan, preference for the US in security, and the criticisms of his government directed against China’s ADZ, although his foreign minister Julie Bishop was giving nothing away during an interview held on Thursday evening.  

Not wanting to wade into any controversy, Abbott is likely to remain firmly fixed on trade negotiations and give little attention to anything else, including issues that have captured the attention of the Australian public in the past such as whaling or Tibet (or Yasukuni Shrine, although this is not regarded as an issue of concern in Australia). With Abbott still considered an ‘unknown’ to many leaders in the region, his pro US, pro Japan position will likely garner him support among advocates for the status quo, while those seeking a greater role for China might consider him an anachronism (especially after this week, and Abbott’s curious decision to re-introduce imperial honours). While Abbott will receive a positive welcome in Tokyo and Seoul, Beijing remains the enigma, an unknown in terms of its reception to Abbott as Abbott is to most Chinese citizens.

For China, Abbott does represent an opportunity to forge a new relationship with Australia, albeit in the knowledge that he will continue to prioritise relations with Japan. Australia is, in a sense, a US-Europe ‘lite’, a testing ground for how to approach Western democracies in order to better negotiate with them. As Australia has close ties to its cultural brethren in the northern hemisphere, it presents China with the opportunity to sound out Western thinking without having to directly ask either Washington or Brussels (Canada may also serve this role, as may New Zealand).  

This particular issue has been doing the rounds in newspapers and on-line forums for the past two years or so but only recently has it been given added emphasis as a result of government action, particularly in the way it relates to the ideological bent of PM Abe and his government vis-à-vis education and the question of ‘historical memory’. 

In July of 2011 the ‘Educational Resource Steering Committee’ of the towns of Ishigaki, Taketomi, and Yonaguni in the district of Yaeyama in Okinawa prefecture recommended that local junior high schools adopt a history textbook published by Ikuhosha, a subsidiary company of the Fuji Sankei network and founded by the ‘Association for the Creation of New History Textbooks’ (J), a right-wing revisionist organisation.

The method of selection of the textbook was fraught with controversy, with many members who objected to the textbook being removed from the committee before a final decision was handed down. On the 23rd of August of the same year, the committee, acting on behalf of all junior high schools in the area, resolved to use the Ikuhosha textbook and gave notice of this to the Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education (J).

Despite the fact that the district had made a decision regarding its educational materials, the Board of Education of the town of Taketomi resolved that as the vetting process for the textbook had been so opaque, it would not use the Ikuhosha textbook and would instead adopt a textbook printed by Tokyo Shoseki, a more leftist publication. This presented something of a dilemma, for if one town in the district chose not to adopt the textbook used by the other two, this would produce an unusual situation whereby students from different towns in the same district would be using different textbooks. The other dilemma concerned the cost of distributing the textbooks. According to the national textbook distribution law (教科書無償設置法), in order for a textbook to be distributed gratis, local education boards must be in unanimous agreement on the book in question. While Ishigaki and Yonaguni agreed to use the Ikuhosha textbook, Taketomi did not.

When this situation was reported to the Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education, the Board convened a meeting between the educational board heads of the three towns on the 30th of August, urging Taketomi to adopt the Ikuhosha model. When that proved less than successful, an ‘all town educational board’ meeting was convened on the 8th of September, and a consensus reached by members to adopt the textbook printed by Tokyo Shoseki.

However, the Ministry of Education, citing the fact that the education board heads of Ishigaki and Yonaguni had already chosen the Ikuhosha textbook, meant that the all town education board’s decision was not unanimous and therefore void. The Ministry then directed all three town education boards to adhere to the original decision and adopt the Ikuhosha book. While Ishigaki and Yonaguni were prepared to follow the Ministry’s ruling, Taketomi again voiced its dissent and refused to comply (J).

Not one to take no for an answer, in October last year the Ministry directed the Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education to order the Taketomi Board of Education to again adopt the Ikuhosha textbook. Despite meeting with Taketomi representatives five times thereafter, the Okinawan educational board was no more successful in reaching a compromise with Taketomi, and indeed began to resent the manner in which the Ministry attempted to impose its ruling on both the Okinawan government and Taketomi itself. The issue lay dormant until Friday last week when the Ministry of Education, citing the Local Government Act, issued a direct order to the Taketomi Board of Education instructing them to re-examine their choice of textbook.  This was the first time the Ministry had issued such an order to a local Board of Education, thereby by-passing the normal channel of the prefectural Board of Education, a state of affairs that seriously irritated the Okinawan government (J).

The head of the Taketomi Board of Education, Kedamori Anzō, was reported as wondering why the Ministry had decided that it had to throw its weight around now, especially since the students in the district of Yaeyama were all learning equally and that no disadvantage had been afforded the students of Taketomi as a result of using a different history textbook. Moreover, Taketomi had been one area that suffered during the closing period of the Pacific War, when it and other towns in Yaeyama district had witnessed the forced deportation of townspeople to make way for Imperial forces, a situation that resulted in the deaths from malaria of some 3,000 town residents. In the mind of the local Board of Education, to attempt to gloss over this fact would be a disservice to the memory of those who died and to the promotion of peace, the first principle of any educational system (J).

For his part, Education Minister Shimomura Hakubun made his position towards Taketomi clear, saying that with the new school year rapidly approaching, the Ministry had decided to step in and issue its order directly to the local Board of Education. Moreover “as a nation of laws it is a matter of course that this illegal situation be resolved, and I expect Taketomi town to make a decision on this serious problem” (J).

For all its seriousness, however, there is not a lot that the federal government can do to force Taketomi to adopt the Ikuhosha textbook. There are no penalties for Taketomi using an alternative textbook, and even if the Ministry took the Taketomi Board of Education to court and won it could not force the town’s Board of Education to agree to use the Ikuhosha book. As the Tokyo Shimbun learnt from a member of the Ministry of Education’s executive, the whole controversy appears to be no more than a ‘performance’ on the part of Abe government to establish its conservative credentials. While the federal government could withhold funding for the Okinawan Prefectural Board of Education, given the performance of public schools in Okinawa compared to the national average (J), this might be seen as both counter-productive and vindictive.

One does have to wonder whether the issue of textbooks would have been so vigorously pursued had Taketomi been located on Naha Island. With the Okinawan government already ill-disposed towards successive federal governments over the relocation of Futenma base, to have issues of historical memory questioned in the most populated part of Okinawa prefecture would certainly produce further protests and raise the possibility of international coverage. As things stand, however, the federal government would gain little if anything trying to force Taketomi to adopt the Ikuhosha textbook and should let the matter rest.  

The 11th of March, 2011 was an ordinary day for an embassy employee such as myself, and I dare say for many others. After following news reports on the activities of the Gillard government throughout the afternoon, both myself and my colleagues were looking forward to the long weekend that was about to come and the opportunity to find some relief from the media cycle. While seated at my desk and with barely 15 minutes to go on the clock, a diplomatic staff member suddenly entered the room saying that there had been a serious earthquake in Japan, and that there were real fears of a tsunami. Not having access to a television I and my colleagues made our way to one of the monitors tuned to NHK which was broadcasting live footage of the Tōhoku region. At first I thought that I was looking at fields covered in snow, before closer examination revealed that the entire coastline was covered in water and that water was pushing ever further inland.  Soon an NHK helicopter brought closer footage of the progress of a huge black wave, devouring anything and everything in its path – houses, fields, cars, roads, everything.  Having never seen such footage before I was at a loss as to how to react to it, but it was obvious that this was no ordinary event and the consequences of it would be dire.

While the diplomatic staff at the embassy stayed at their posts to liaise with their Australian counterparts, I returned home and spent the remainder of the evening both watching footage from the BBC and CNN of the unfolding disaster, and Skyping and emailing friends in Japan to see how they were and whether they were all safe. It was while I was watching such footage that the events at the Fukushima nuclear power plant began to spiral out of control, and that with every passing hour the fear that the entire facility could suffer a catastrophic meltdown grew in all of its terrible anticipation. During that time I compiled as much information as I could on what was happening in Japan and how the world was reacting to it. This was a process that I kept up for the next three days, glued to my computer monitor and the television screen in front of me, hoping against hope that Fukushima would not fall victim to a horrific fate.

As time passed and the scope of the disaster became more apparent, I resolved to do what I could for Japan in its hour of need, signing onto the Red Cross to make an initial donation in the hundreds of dollars and fixed donations every month thereafter. I felt a sense of pride in my nation, Australia, as it offered the unconditional use of its disaster response team and dispatched transport aircraft of the RAAF to assist in the transport of people and supplies to and from the disaster affected regions. Given the degree of closeness that Japan and Australia had forged over the past twenty to thirty years, here was the physical evidence of that friendship. Not only this, for despite Australia having experienced a summer punctuated with natural disasters of its own, namely flooding in the southern Queensland and northern New South Wales border area and northern Victoria, Australians were still moved to donate hundreds of thousands of dollars to the relief effort underway in Japan.

While this was occurring, the threat posed by Fukushima to the safety of all residents in the Tōhoku and the Kantō regions escalated with the explosion of the second reactor, an event that had Tepco (Tōden) contemplate the evacuation of the facility and all of its personnel until this was halted by a directive from the prime minister’s office. Even at this distance, there was a real belief that the government of Japan had lost control of the Dai-ichi power plant and that the full extent of radiation leaking from the plant was not being accurately or honestly conveyed. As news bulletins carried pictures of the second reactor explosion and of masses of people seeking to leave Japan via Narita airport (which led to the creation of the pejorative term ‘Fly-jin’ to describe foreigners fleeing the country), world governments continued to press the Japanese government for detailed updates on events both at Fukushima and further north, with European governments in particular issuing warnings to their citizens to remain well outside the perimeters set by the Japanese government and to evacuate Japan at the first available opportunity.  To its credit, the Australian government did not follow this route, instead advising its citizens to avoid any unnecessary travel to the Tōhoku region but to remain in contact with the embassy in Tokyo and monitor news updates.

Not a few weeks after the disaster, Australia took a more active approach in displaying its solidarity with Japan through the visit of then PM Julia Gillard to the town of Minami Sanriku in Miyagi prefecture. This was heralded as the first official visit to the disaster area by a foreign head of state (French President Nicholas Sarkozy had diverted his schedule at the time to be the first to visit Tokyo and speak with then PM Kan Naoto, although this was not officially sanctioned).  While Gillard had been the subject of much criticism in Australia for the manner of her coming to power, her visit was an edifying moment. It showed a regional leader prepared to risk her personal safety in order to assure the people of Japan that they were not alone and that Australia stood by them. For all the faults that Gillard had, one could say that this was a prime example of statesmanship, and one for which she should receive ample recognition.

 In August of 2011 I journeyed to Japan myself, undertaking a two week visit of the country that would take me from Kyushu all the way up to Hokkaido. While I was in Japan I paid a number of visits to bookstores across the country, and found the volume of material voicing criticism of the government response to the disaster in March to be quite surprising. The most common theme running through each magazine article and book describing the events of 3.11 was the complete disregard shown by Tōden for the people of eastern Japan, how Tōden had prevaricated and obfuscated its response to the disaster, how it had ignored recommendations to increase the wave walls at Fukushima Dai-ichi or install back-up infrastructure separated from the coastline (which led to criticism of the Ministry of Infrastructure for not enforcing stricter regulations regarding the operation of nuclear facilities). There was real anger in those materials, at how government and industry had conspired at the expense of safety, how profit seeking had overridden any concern about building nuclear power plants in a country so prone to earthquakes and other natural disasters, and how Tōden seemed answerable to no-one, not even the government.

With the passing of the years, the Tōhoku region has slowly followed along the path of progress, although that path has often been hampered by funding concerns and a lack of urgency from government agencies responsible for recovery. It is true that large parts of the coastline of the Tōhoku region remain uninhabited and may never again be so, not while the threat of another such event looms large in the memories of its residents. 3.11 was an event of such trauma and on such a scale that communities up and down the Pacific side of the Japanese coast have built countless monuments both to the victims and warnings to future generations, reminding them that the horrors of 3.11 could again be repeated without continued vigilance, and that the ghosts of those taken might remain unmourned amid the empty ruins along the shore.  

When is an apology not an apology? On Tuesday last week during a meeting of the House of Councillors Executive Committee, members of the Reformist Party (led in the National Diet by Ishihara Shintarō) proposed that the testimonies of 16 former ‘comfort women’ (or ‘sex slaves’) from South Korea that formed the basis of negotiations between Japan and South Korea that led to the ‘Kono Statement’ of 1993 should be re-examined.  According to the Reformist Party representatives, the testimonies themselves did not appear to be supported by any evidence, and thus their reliability as witness statements was questionable (J).  They then proposed establishing a review committee similar to that which oversaw a review of the Fukushima nuclear disaster to verify whether the Kono Statement itself (and by implication the issue of comfort women) should be re-examined.

The momentum for a re-examination of the statement gathered pace during the week, following on from former Deputy Cabinet Secretary Ishihara Nobuo declaring in a Diet Budget Committee hearing on the 20th that the Kono Statement, which Ishihara had been involved in drafting, was not backed up by verified evidence.  The right-wing Sankei Shimbun, together with the Fuji News Network then conducted a survey of attitudes towards the Kono Statement, and found that a majority of members of the Abe Cabinet (or 70.3%) were in favour of a re-examination of the statement (as to the particulars, 66.7% of Reformist Party members, 65.4% of LDP members, and 62.2% of New Komeito members supported such a move, with opposition mostly coming from SPJ and JCP members.  Members of the ‘Everyone’s Party’ were also not in favour of a revision, stating that ‘history should be left to historians’) (J).

As to why this issue should cause such a ruckus, it might be worthwhile quoting from the text of the Kono Statement itself so as to provide some context surrounding the position of the Abe government towards the statement, and why this has upset South Korea so much. According to MOFA’s website, the statement says;

“The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime "comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study.

As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment.

We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.

As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto”.

The statement provided the then government of Miyazawa Kiichi with an opportunity for reconciliation with South Korea through recognition of the suffering that Japan had inflicted upon South Korea, and it was accepted by South Korea in that spirit.

The announcement then by Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga on the 21st of last month that the Abe government would begin a review of the Kono Statement in lieu of former Secretary Ishihara’s comments (J) thus hit Japanese-South Korean relations for six and elicited criticism from around the Asia-Pacific and further afield. The most vociferous criticism came from South Korea (understandably enough), with President Park Guen-hye urging Abe on the 95th anniversary of the March First Independence Movement to “stop denying the past and write a new history of truth and reconciliation”.

As for why President Park reacted so strongly to the Abe government’s decision, apart from the political gains to be made from criticism of the Japanese government (no South Korean government ever lost votes using such a strategy), the following paragraphs from Jeff Kingston pretty much sum it up…”…the Kono Statement has been Japan’s official stance on this historical controversy — a stance that infuriates Abe and like-minded conservatives who have continually disparaged it.

Why has Abe repeatedly vandalized Japan’s wartime and colonial history? He arrogantly dismissed Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s 2010 apology to Koreans on the centenary of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty; he bashed Prime Minister Tomoichi Murayama’s 1995 apology for Japanese aggression; he oversaw forced revisions of school textbooks in 2007 regarding the Battle of Okinawa that implicated Imperial armed forces in instigating collective suicides by Okinawans; and he has worked to overturn the Kono Statement”.

The decision to revise the Kono Statement will only increase the rift that exists between the governments of Japan and South Korea, for the South Koreans will take it (and indeed, have taken it) as evidence that the Abe government has no interest in reconciling Japan’s colonial record with the suffering of the Korean people, and that Abe seeks to distort history by using it to promote a false version of Japan’s past that dismisses any controversy in favour of an ideal to inspire the present. It also plays into the fears of a return of Japanese nationalism, that by taking a more active approach to its defence and ignoring the objections of its neighbours Abe is leading Japan once again down the path to militarism.

On Sunday, LDP Chairman Ishiba Shigeru went on Fuji television (video) to refute any claim of belligerency on the part of Japan and the Abe Cabinet, adding that at the present time it was important to countries such as South Korea and Japan, as allies of the US, to combine their efforts in order to offset the threat presented by North Korea (J). While any strategic analyst would agree with this observation, the fact that Ishiba, as deputy head of the LDP, chose to emphasise this rather than a possible reconciliation with South Korea over the Kono Statement spoke volumes about the LDP’s priorities, and how the Park government can’t expect any contrition from Japan anytime soon. This is disappointing, but not unexpected.

From the point of view of the Abe government, past Japanese administrations have repeatedly made apologies for Japan’s behaviour during its past but these have failed to placate its critics. Hence the value and meaning of an apology is diminished by the refusal of the other side to accept it. Japan, as an emerging power in the early twentieth century, was forced by circumstance to pursue imperialism lest it too suffer at the hands of Europe and the US. If this process meant that Japan had to annex the territories of its neighbours to secure its future, then any acts taken during that process were justified by the result – a stronger Japan, able to defend its interests.  

No country pursued Imperialism without inflicting suffering on native populations, yet Japan has been unfairly singled out in contrast to the behaviour of Europe and the US who were, in the eyes of Japanese revisionists, as guilty of committing acts of cruelty as Japan. Why should Japan apologise, when it was trying to survive at a time of rapacious European and US exploitation of non-European nations? A lack of territory and resources left Japan vulnerable to sanctions imposed, again, by European and US administrations who did not consider Japan (and more broadly Asians) to be their equal. Japan would forever remain at the mercy of European and US demands if it did not act, and so it embarked on the colonisation of nations closest to it and which could not offer (so it was thought) sustained resistance to its rule.

This view, which sees Japan as a victim of circumstance, overlooks the impact of Japan’s colonialism on Korea and China, two nations with strong identities of their own who found themselves humiliated and divided by their neighbour. The trauma of Japan’s colonial rule completely transformed the nature of both countries, for the legacy of Japan’s rule left both deeply suspicious of other states and their motives, particularly that of their former ruler. Neither China nor Korea were involved in the post-war occupation and de-militarisation of Japan, and were not privy to the decisions taken in San Francisco in 1951 regarding reparations. As such, both Korea and China did not undergo any reconciliation with Japan until 30 to 40 years after the end of WWII.

No matter how one looks at it, any move to reconsider or re-examine apologies made for wartime conduct will only prove detrimental to Japan’s interests. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, on Monday Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga stated that the Abe government was not ‘directly’ seeking to re-examine the Kono Statement, and that the government’s position had not changed vis-à-vis the content of the statement. Instead, argued Suga, the government was merely seeking to establish how Japan and South Korea had conducted interviews with the former comfort women (J). If this is so, why go to the trouble of announcing a re-examination of evidence in the first place? Perhaps the LDP felt they were being outmanoeuvred by the Reformists on nationalist issues and wished to seize the initiative.

If this was the justification for the press conference of the 21st, the LDP/New Komeito might be better off without Reformist support, especially if it means the further destabilisation of Japan’s relations with its neighbours. Then again, perhaps the Abe government felt nothing would be lost in terms of cooperation from South Korea by announcing the revision (the ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ defence). Ultimately the best thing to do would be to leave the Kono Statement be and concentrate on matters more pressing to the average citizen.