Over the past 24 hours, Australia has again been graced, if that is the right term, by the presence of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The reason for this visit is ostensibly a simple one - the annual bilateral leaders' meeting that was agreed to by PM Abe and Abbott in 2014. Ordinarily this visit is supposed to be biennial, however as I explained last week, circumstances that occurred last year conspired to make such a visit by PM Abe impossible. All that has been rectified, however, and the results made plain.

The visit has produced two ends, each auspicious in their intent and ambitious in their scope. Both Australia and Japan have signed an upgrade to the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) originally signed back in 2010, which will allow both the SDF and ADF to exchange armaments and ammunition should they be deployed together, and which paves the way towards further joint exercises and exchanges between both defence forces. This is not a moment too soon, given the current state of affairs in the security of the region, but it is also welcome because until now, whenever the SDF wished to conduct exercises in Australia, it had to go through a swathe of bureaucracy much of which appeared designed to hamper rather than promote such exercises.

The other consequence of the visit was a mutual recognition by both leaders of the importance of the TPP and RCEP to the promotion of free trade and the greater liberalisation of commerce. PM Abe has often stated that the TPP is the lynchpin for stability in the region, for it would combine all of the major economies of the Asia Pacific, save that of China, India and Russia, into one large tariff free zone, so that each nation would be obliged to work together to ensure shared prosperity. It would also demonstrate that the US is committed to remaining an economic force (and by default a military force) in the Asia Pacific, which for Japan is a crucial matter given the importance of the US to Japan's security.

But the election of Donald Trump threw all of that ambition into the shadows, for if the president elect does not support the TPP, then what hope does it have without the US? PM Abe himself expressed his doubts in the immediate aftermath of the US presidential election, however subsequent debate on the matter may have convinced him that there is still life in the TPP, and Japan, with its remaining economic strength, can provide leadership to ensure that the agreement survives and is actually brought into practice. Commentary by US Secretary of State nominee Rex Tillerson has also given PM Abe cause for optimism, as Tillerson, during congressional hearings last week, voiced his opinion that while sharing Trump's scepticism about whether the TPP was to US advantage, he also believed that the TPP has merit.

One other consequence of the weekend's visit was discussion on investment, a matter of importance to Japan given the need to stimulate Japan's industries to offset the slow domestic growth of the past few years. As has been pointed out elsewhere, Japan is a major investor in Australia, and its industries have poured billions into the Australian economy to take advantage of raw materials and stable supply. However Australian investment in Japan is virtually nil (a mere $14 million), and which is primarily focused on finance and tourism. For Australia to have any impact on shifting Japanese domestic debate towards the advantages of closer ties, it must raise its public profile and demonstrate that it has both the desire and the intent to strengthen such ties. After all, unilateral enthusiasm fades fast in the face of indifference.
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Nonetheless, there is much cause for optimism in the future of the relationship, and it's about bloody time.

As has begun a common trait of this blog over the past year, I must
start with an apology for the HUGE amount of time
that has passed since my last post. However given what has happened
over the past six months, and everything that took place before then,
then the somewhat tardy nature of my posts can in part be explained.
In many ways, 2016 was a very, very unusual year. It was a year that
was marked, for better or worse, by demonstrations of both the power
of democracy and its obvious weaknesses.

In terms of the relationship between Australia and Japan, what could have
potentially been a momentous year instead turned into a fizzle. Apart from the
disappointment of the future submarine announcement, a series of events
during the year - a general election in Australia, the onset of the
diplomatic silly season (September to November), and illness, all
conspired to both derail a potential bilateral leaders' meeting, and
led to the cancellation/postponement of the annual 2+2 foreign and
defence ministers' meeting.

Hence for both sides, restoring a degree of normalcy to the relationship
and reinforcing its importance will be priorities in the new year. And
this goes for all nation states. While the bureaucracies of states are
already well versed in inter-state ties and would (I suspect) prefer to
keep the involvement of the political class in such relations to a bare
minimum, it is the political class that is ultimately responsible for
the success or failure of such ties. So it is imperative that this
class acts in a manner that reinforces and defends the standing protocols
between states rather than seek to undermine them.

To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, the stakes are too high for the political class
to be involved in petty squabbles and retaliation for perceived insults.

Just a glance at this region reveals a myriad of issues that could potentially
destabilize the global order and lead to not only recessions but the outbreak
of open warfare. The most pressing of these is obviously the situation in the
South China Sea, where competing economic and security interests have combined
to create one almightly doozy of a diplomatic problem, and where any unilateral
action by one state can trigger hostile reactions from one or more rival states.
While the potential for conflict is very real in that area, so is the potential
for cooperation, which will become more important as the natural resources of the
region continue to be depleted.

That, in fact, might be what pushes both ASEAN and China to restart their negotiations towards a Code of Conduct, which has been much discussed but never resolved. Ever since I attended a lecture on the subject at the Australian Institute for International Affairs back in 2011, I have been curious as to these effect that sudden and catastrophic depletion of fishing stocks in the South China Sea will have on state relations in that area. With stocks already near extinction, those states wishing to provide a food source for their population and a livelihood for their fisheries industries will be forced to send their fleets further and further into international waters outside of the South China Sea, and will therefore create sources of conflict between states that until now have had amicable relations.

This is assuming, of course, that the states involved don't first reach an agreement between one another to preserve and protect what fish stocks are left, but given the history of both ASEAN and its relationship with China, that is a very low possibility. So in this state of affairs, and with no alternatives currently in sight, expect to see many more fishing vessels from Southeast Asian states and China turning up in the territorial waters of Australia, New Zealand, Pacific Island
nations, Japan, South Korea, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Central America, Canada, India, Sri Lanka, if not as far as the east coast of Africa and potentially the Hawaiian Islands.

The other issue is of course US China relations. Already this has seen US president elect Donald Trump indicate his support for the pro-independence Tsai government in Taiwan, thus both catching Beijing off guard in its reaction to such news and infuriating the CCP through its brazen contempt for China'd core interests.

Just over the past two days, President Tsai has gone on a visit to the US and Central America, a visit not formally recognized by the US but which will certainly involve some form of discussions with members or affiliates of the Trump administration. Beijing is of course watching this very closely for any sign of
greater affinity between the Tsai and Trump camps, and there is speculation that perhaps Trump will use Taiwan as a bargaining chip to gain more concessions from China over trade.

So once January 20 rolls around and we end up facing the reality of a Trump presidency (which, by the way, might be one of the most closely scrutinized in US political history, particularly given the damning report from US intelligence agencies on the direct involvement by Russian cyber spies in hacking the DNC, stealing emails related to Hillary Clinton, and then using this to damage Clinton's campaign and assist Donald Trump in winning the White House), we could indeed be in for some interesting times ahead, but very much in spirit of the Chinese use of the term.