This particular post takes as its inspiration the first chapter from the book ‘Kenka Ryōseibai no Tanjō’ (the Birth of ‘Mutual Punishment’　喧嘩両成敗の誕生) by Shimizu Katsuyuki (清水克行), a relatively young scholar at Meiji Gakuin University. The book itself, as the title outlines quite clearly, is concerned with tracing the origins of the phenomenon of ‘Kenka Ryōseibai’ as it existed from the Kamakura through to the Muromachi period. The first chapter of the book sets the scene for quite vividly, as it relays an event that occurred in the 5th month of Eiryō 4 (or 1432) in the vicinity of Rokuonji temple, more commonly known as Kinkakuji (金閣寺, or ‘the Temple of the Golden Pavilion’).

Kyoto society during the medieval period periodically witnessed acts of violence committed by the members (or followers) of various temples and shrines. Some of the most pugilistic belonged to Rokuonji temple and Kitano Tenmangū (or Kitano-sha), and it was just such a clash between the followers of both institutions that brought Kitano-sha within a hair’s breadth of being attacked by a much larger group from Rokuonji. Fortunately for posterity (and those inside Kitano-sha at the time), Muromachi Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshinori received news of the impending attack and sent troops of his own to prevent it from happening thereby keeping any damage to a minimum. Strangely enough, it was the most innocuous of incidents that led in turn to the Shōgun having to call out the troops, and concerned a perceived insult against Rokuonji by two members of the Kitano-sha. (12)

The incident itself began when seven or eight priests belonging to Kitano-sha decided to pay a visit to Rokuonji in order to do a bit of sightseeing. The priests themselves had travelled from the provinces to the capital in order to participate in the ‘Kanjin Kusemai’ (勧進くせ舞, or a temporary ritual performed in order to raise funds for the construction of new temple buildings), and were making their way back home when they decided to call in to Rokuonji, which none of them had seen before. Two young servants that were accompanying the priests had already gotten drunk on alcohol before venturing to the gates outside Rokuonji, and were quite intoxicated. It was at precisely this time that a priest of Rokuonji, not exactly acting in keeping with his profession, was standing in front of the entrance gates to the temple complex relieving himself (aka, taking a quick leak). (12)

According to testimonies that were taken afterwards, one of the servants in the Kitano-sha priests’ retinue suddenly ‘laughed’ at the Rokuonji priest. In their deposition, Rokuonji claimed that the Kitano-sha priests and their servants had all said to the Rokuonji priest…’牛が罷り透る’ (hey, a cow is ‘passing by’). This, according to Rokuonji, was what sparked the incident. It may of course be possible that the Kitano-sha group slandered the Rokuonji priest by comparing him to a urinating cow, and while this wouldn’t really elicit a response today, it’s clear that as a result of some sort of provocation by the Kitano-sha group things soon got out of hand. (13)

If all that occurred was an exchange of drunken words then that would have preferable to what followed. However, given the times in which the incident occurred, there was no way that the Rokuonji priest could let the matter go. The priest then made a retort to the Kitano-sha group, of sufficient vitriol to cause the Kitano-sha group to become enraged. As the priest was outnumbered, he ran off with the Kitano-sha group in pursuit. Eventually the priest sought sanctuary within the grounds of Rokuonji temple, where despite their best efforts, the Kitano-sha group could not prise him out. Instead they then set about trying to break down the gates at the front of the temple in order to force their way in. (13)

Clearly this attempt to force their way into the temple was doomed to fail, however at that moment an old priest from Rokuonji made an appearance and attempted to placate the anger of the Kitano-sha group. Yet given the state of intoxication that the Kitano-sha group had fallen into, the priest’s words fell on deaf ears.  Moreover, some of the group had already drawn their swords and attempted to cut the old priest down where he stood. In this period it was quite common for priests to carry weapons on their person. As such, every so often what began as a verbal argument could escalate into murder. (14)

Realising that he didn’t have a chance against the drunken priests from Kitano-sha, the old priest ran back into the Rokuonji temple grounds and began to ring the temple bell to alert the surrounding area to the emergency that was now unfolding. Realising that something was wrong, those townspeople and priests who lived in the area in front of the temple quickly rushed to the scene. It was at that moment that the front of Rokuonji temple was transformed into a bloodbath. The priests from Kitano-sha became enveloped in an exchange of blows with the townspeople and priests of Rokuonji. According to one record, two of the priests from Kitano-sha were cut down, while one of the Rokuonji supporters was killed. According to a separate account, one of the Kitano-sha group was killed, one was wounded but ran off, while a third was captured.  No matter was the result was, the fact of the matter was that what had begun as a simple visit to Rokuonji had transformed into a dramatic battle to the death. (14)

However things did not end here. The followers of Rokuonji, enraged by the insults and outrageous behaviour of the priests from Kitano-sha, decided that they would take their revenge on Kitano-sha itself. It was just at the moment when the two sides were preparing to engage in all-out warfare that the situation changed dramatically.  Having gotten word of the crisis, Ashikaga Yoshinori issued orders to his officials Inō Tametane and Matsuda Ushihide, telling them to clamp down on the Rokuonji followers. It was this intervention by the Shōgun that brought the matter to a close. (14)

Nowadays Rokuonji is a major tourist attraction, annually visited by around 5 million people. Yet there are probably none among the many visitors who realise that a fight to the death took place just outside the front gates of the temple complex. Yet the fact that such a vicious, and ultimately meaningless conflict could occur just outside the gates of Rokuonji, itself a symbol of the authority of the Muromachi Bakufu, is indicative of the age in which such events were common.  It was all the more tragic given that the incident, in which people lost their lives and required the intervention of the Shōgun, came about as a result of the mere utterance of a childish insult or some such thing, the carelessness of a young servant, and a priest taking a quick leak. (15)

To modern eyes, this seems like such a petty, nonsensical act, yet to the people of the time it was deadly serious. Clearly the fact that the servants had ‘laughed’, and that the priest had been compared to a ‘cow’, carried with it some profound meaning. In that day and age, “laughing at others, and being laughed at” could, depending on the circumstances, lead to very serious problems indeed. (15)

Should Japan reform or re-interpret its constitution in order to give its defence forces the ability to operate with allies in the defence of Japanese interests? This question, and all of the subsequent debate that has stemmed from it, has occupied both constitutional scholars and international relations analysts in Japan for the past several months following the accession to power of the second Abe administration in December of last year and the formation of the ‘Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security’ (安全保障の法的基盤の再構築に関する懇談会), which met for the second time on Tuesday this week.  In opening remarks to the panel, PM Abe outlined his expectations regarding discussion on the issue of Japanese security, saying that…“Any constitutional interpretation must not result in sacrificing people’s lives and the nation’s security,” and “I want your discussions to focus on what is needed to secure the peace and stability of the international community” (therefore leaving the panel with a fairly wide and complex brief to explore, given that peace and stability have never been prima facie characteristics of the international community and there has never been consensus on the ideal means of achieving such a goal) (E).

As the panel has until December to come up with modified interpretations of the Constitution (particularly in relation to Article 9 and how this impacts upon Japan’s obligations to the region), expectations are that the Abe administration will use those interpretations as the basis for legislation to re-define the Self Defence Forces Act (particularly Article 90, which outlines the circumstances under which the SDF may respond to acts of provocation or an attack - J). As explained by the Daily Yomiuri (see the above English language link), such legislation may encounter resistance from the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (内閣法制局, or CLB), as the Bureau has stated in the past that ‘collective self defence’ is not sanctioned by the Constitution (as former SDP leader Fukushima Mizuho outlined in this question on notice to the House of Councillors – J).

PM Abe has in part sought to mollify the CLB’s thinking by appointing former diplomat Komatsu Ichirō as head of the CLB. Komatsu himself has said that the Bureau will examine a re-interpretation of the Constitution and Article 9 based on the report by the advisory panel, and that under international law, collective self defence is not an unusual concept and is in keeping with the idea of group protection (J). Abe might not, however, have an easy time convincing the Supreme Court to adopt this position, given that former CLB head and current Supreme Court Judge Yamamoto Tsuneyuki supported the view that collective self defence is not compatible with the Constitution, which may have been a contributing factor in his removal from his former position (J). Yet considering the fact that the Diet has all but ignored previous rulings by the Supreme Court on electoral district vote weightings, objections from the Supreme Court will probably not have a great deal of influence on this matter.

Central right politicians in Japan have been in favour of Japan at least agreeing to examine the possibility of collective self defence, given that this concept is itself sanctioned under international law. According to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations [1945]…”Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security” (Donald R Rothwell et.al, International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2011, p.626). This definition has been seized on by prominent LDP politicians such as Ishiba Shigeru to lend weight to their argument that if Japan expects its allies (or more accurately, ally) to come to its aid should be attacked by a hostile power, Japan must first demonstrate that it too has the resolve to protect its allies and contribute in an active manner to maintaining the peace and security of the region (石破茂、国難　政治に妄想はいらない、新潮社、2011年、p.101-102).

It is certainly not outside of the realms of possibility that many of the states within the Asia-Pacific would see any move by Japan to assert itself militarily as evidence that Japan is again embarking upon a path towards militarism, and that Japanese involvement in military operations would make a mockery of its constitutional position on the use of force. Yet one could also argue that as Japan realises that the regional dynamic has shifted in favour of a state that harbours hostility towards Japan, it is no longer viable for Japan to remain neutral on issues of regional security when its own interests hinge upon receiving assistance from other states that exercise collective self-defence.

As PM Abe has indicated that he wishes to form closer defence ties with ‘like-minded’ states within the region, for Japan to remain neutral or contribute in limited ways to regional security initiatives would undermine Japan’s status as a regional power. Unlike other prominent ‘neutral’ states such as India, Japan does not possess either the population nor military arsenal to act as a deterrent to hostile states (or more correctly, large scale military powers), and thus relies on its alliance with the US for the ‘deterrent’ that a nuclear superpower can provide. Yet if Japan were to remain idle while the US and other pro-US states become involved in a dispute within the Asia-Pacific region, Japan’s value as an ally would come under question, leading to the possibility of strategic isolation (which would in turn require Japan to make significant investments in its defence forces for its own benefit, including nuclear weapons, which would further complicate an already dire situation).

Still, don’t expect to see this particular issue being pursued with any form of vigour for the next few months as both parties within the ruling Coalition work through their various stances on collective self defence. While Satō Shigeki of the New Komeitō has expressed the need for Constitutional revision to bring this about, LDP Chief Secretary Ishiba Shigeru (mentioned above) as said no such modifications are necessary, and all that what remains is for the meaning of the Constitution to be re-interpreted.  As the Tokyo Shimbun has reported (J), the entire question of what collective self defence means has yet to be played out within political advisory groups let alone the general Japanese public, hence it may be some time before any sign of a conclusion to the issue is reached.

By now the result is already well known to any who have followed regional politics for the past few months, however for posterity’s sake the Coalition under Tony Abbott gained control of the Australian House of Representatives on Saturday, winning an added 16 seats, thus giving the Coalition a majority of 89 seats in a House consisting of 150 seats .  Given the intense domestic focus of the election, it was always going to be difficult to garner any interest in foreign affairs and the direction Australia would take under a Coalition government. However given that this blog takes some inspiration from developments in Australia-Japanese relations, I thought it worthwhile to look into what a Coalition government will mean for bilateral ties between both nations.

In their foreign policy document (released on Thursday evening last week, two days before the election), the Coalition placed Japan as second in the list of five priority nations with which it plans to improve and expand ties. In describing its approach to Japan, the Coalition said …”As well as giving priority to expanding economic relations by finalising the Australia-Japan free trade agreement, the Coalition will build a stronger strategic partnership with Japan based on the Howard Government’s Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue;” (p.4). This is in keeping with the Coalition’s focus on putting economics ahead of other foreign policy concerns (a line also included in the document), while reiterating the well-worn rhetoric in praise of the Howard government’s achievements in forging closer defence ties with Japan.

Certainly in regard to defence and security issues, both sides will be keen to improve on what has gone before. Senator David Johnston, the Defence Minister Elect from Western Australia, has made no secret of his affinity for Japan, having studied there briefly in his student days. Senator Johnston has often asked whether negotiations were being conducted with Japan over technology related to Sōryu class submarines, and has stated that as Defence Minister he would re-open the options available to government for the next generation of submarines for the RAN. Expectations are that with the development of trilateral dialogue together with the United States (which will be boosted by events such as this scheduled in October), defence relations between Japan and Australia will reach a new level of co-operation under a Coalition government, not least because PM Abe also shares a desire to forge such ties.

For his part, Tony Abbott believes that Japan is Australia’s ‘greatest friend’ in Asia, and sees in Japan another model democracy in the region which shares Australia’s sense of values (just don’t mention the whales). While Abbott has certainty stated that both countries have their differences, he does not think they are insurmountable (although it must be said that he has not really explored the relationship in great depth. His speech to the JIIA in 2010 emphasised the rise of China and regional cooperation far more than the ties between Australia and Japan, but to his credit he did state that he wanted to strengthen defence, economic, educational and cultural exchange, a forerunner to New Colombo Plan that the Coalition announced in March this year).

Abbott certainty looks upon Japan as a reliable partner in the Asia Pacific, and one with which Australia can supplement its relationship with the US. Australia’s position as president of the UNSC throughout September and accession to the G20 leadership on December 1st will also make Australia a more attractive prospect for the Abe government, as will the pledge by Abbott to have an FTA (EPA) signed with Japan as a matter of urgency.

Despite the degree of media coverage devoted to whaling in Australia, neither Abbott nor Bishop have sought to antagonise Japan by using confrontational language with regard to either Japan’s whaling program or the case currently under review in the International Court of Justice (a marked contrast, it must be said, to the rhetoric of Peter Garrett, Tony Burke and Mark Dreyfus). While Greg Hunt (the Coalition’s Environment Minister Elect) might release statements condemning any attempt by Japan to engage in whaling while the ICJ case continues in The Hague, the Coalition will not be inclined to pursue the issue with as much vigour as the Labor government did, knowing that aggravating bilateral ties for the sake of placating environmental groups such as the Greens is not in the long term interests of the country or, more importantly, the economy.

If there is a potential spanner in the works between the two centre right governments and their ability to co-operate, it could come in the form of concerns regarding Foreign Minister Elect Julie Bishop and her contact with senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. As was outlined by Andrew Pickford for the Lowy Interpreter blog, Bishop maintains ties to individuals active on behalf of Chinese SOEs (i.e., Alexander Downer, former foreign minister and a board member of Huawei Australia.  Bishop herself has participated in many Coalition delegations to visit the headquarters of Huawei in Shenzen, and has accepted gifts from Huawei). Her corporate legal background and links to the West Australian Court dynasty make her an attractive prospect for any nation interested in gaining access to raw minerals, which could make her a prime target for intense lobbying by Chinese SOEs interested in expanding their share of ownership of mining projects.

The enthusiasm that Bishop has shown for engaging with China and the Chinese leadership has certainty gained her attention in Australia for reasons of diplomatic expediency, yet it has also raised questions as to whether she is too ‘close’ to China to forego any opportunities that may come at the expense of Japan or the US. While expectations are that Bishop will not exercise ‘inventive’ or ‘individualistic’ diplomacy and will act in deference to Tony Abbott, the fact that Bishop last undertook a visit to Japan in 2009 (while Japan was under the DPJ rule of Hatoyama Yukio) means that she is (and Tony Abbott for that matter) an unfamiliar entity to most of Japan’s current political leaders (Bishop was Minister for Education, Science and Training under the Howard government during the first Abe administration, while Abbott was Minister for Health and Aging – both portfolios do not call for a great amount of foreign policy experience).

Abbott has stated that China’s economic influence over Australia’s economy means that he will visit Beijing following a visit to Jakarta, with a visit to Tokyo thereafter. Given Abbott’s  desire to strengthen security and economic ties between Australia and Japan, the placing of China ahead of Japan in order of preference might upset some observers in Tokyo (who might benefit by reading this piece by Shiro Armstrong vis-à-vis Kevin Rudd’s first visit abroad in 2008) and raise questions over Abbott’s intentions, but this would fundamentally confuse Abbott`s economic concerns with long term strategic interests. Abbott and Abe have many shared ambitions for the region, and will certainly seek to reinforce their ties with the US (leading to a triumvirate led by Abe, Abbott, and Obama – for the military enthusiasts out there, perhaps this should be dubbed the Triple A for the sake of brevity)　while simultaneously expanding trade between both countries. It augurs well for the relationship.