Both electronic and print media were reporting on Monday on an interview given by PM Abe with the Wall Street Journal in its weekend edition, in which PM Abe expressed in unequivocal terms his desire to see Japan counter the growing influence of China in the region. More specifically, PM Abe stated that China was attempting to change the status quo through the use of force rather than through recourse to the law, and that if it persisted in this approach, ‘then it won’t be able to emerge peacefully’. To reiterate his message, on Sunday PM Abe again referred to resistance to attempts to forcibly change the status quo in a speech following a SDF review at the Asagiri Training Ground in Saitama Prefecture (J) and (J), a review that featured the first ever participation of the SDF’s Western Army Infantry Regiment, which is specifically aimed at amphibious operations, and the inclusion of a US Marine AAV.  Needless to say, China didn’t take very kindly to these words of caution, as demonstrated when the Chinese Defence Ministry responded to a report made in the Japanese media which suggested that PM Abe had authorised the SDF to terminate any foreign UAVs that violate Japanese airspace (a clear warning to China, which has previously used UAVs in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands - J).

As if to prove PM Abe’s point, on Monday four Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered the territory surrounding the Senkaku Islands, making it the 68th day in which Chinese government vessels have sought to enforce China’s claims to the islands (J).   Moreover, on Saturday Japanese newspapers reported that two Chinese H6 bombers and two Y8 early warning aircraft had flown through the airspace over Miyakojima in Okinawa Prefecture on their way to PLAN exercises in the western Pacific, the fourth such incident involving Chinese aircraft along the Okinawan ‘first defence line’ and which prompted ASDF F-15s to scramble to intercept them (J).

What all of this indicates is that PM Abe has seized an opportunity to convince regional members that with the US recently sidelined as a result of a deadlock in Congress, Japan is prepared to listen to their concerns regarding China’s approach to territorial issues and provide them with a strong backer should they choose to confront China over its conduct. By reassuring ASEAN, whom PM Abe sees as a collective whose influence could further boost Japan’s standing in the region, PM Abe also gave the US an opportunity to re-gather its focus on Asia by emphasising the necessity of a US presence in the region and offering Japanese support for the forward deployment of US military assets.

This pro-active diplomacy also signals that Abe is determined to ensure that Japan is not rolled by China in relation to its territorial ambitions. With Japan offering assistance and investment, ASEAN will, in Abe’s mind, see the benefits of working the Japan for mutual profit and devoid of any overarching security issues. In return, ASEAN could then offer its support to Japan as Japan continues to try to gain a permanent seat on the UNSC, as well as giving Japan greater influence across the Indonesian archipelago right up to the Chinese border.

China’s bellicose response to PM Abe’s comments also gives Abe the ‘ammunition’ he needs to further promote the argument for a stronger, more flexible arrangement for Japan’s defence forces, with an emphasis on greater capabilities to counter any attempt by China (or South Korea) to seize Japanese territory (such as the creation of a dedicated marine force, a greater use of amphibious vehicles, and a dramatic expansion in Japan’s submarine fleet). Aware that any emphasis by the Japanese government on defence will raise concerns among other nations in the region, PM Abe has been busily shoring up his personal relationships with leaders around the Asia-Pacific and further abroad, assuring them of Japan’s benign intentions and desire for all to operate in accordance with international law (of which Japan has a strong record). Abe has, in other words, been outmanoeuvring China’s leadership in the ‘meet-and-greet’ stakes, forging links with other leaders to ensure that they will have a sympathetic ear in Tokyo in contrast to the silence that they will receive from Beijing.

By making such statements as that mentioned above, it may be said that PM Abe is unnecessarily provoking China, and placing Japan at risk by approving the use of force against any incursion into what Japan considers its territory. Yet Abe has seen that there is genuine concern in the region regarding China’s intentions, and that any attempt to mollify China or suggest compromise is met with indifference or hostility from Beijing. Abe is therefore testing the waters, soliciting comments from China’s political and military organs that reveal their intentions without outright condemning China’s leadership. It reinforces the image of Japan as a benign power, prepared to act if its sovereignty or the stability of the region is threatened, but not actively seeking confrontation. As China has yet to clarify its intentions, Abe has assigned intentions to China that China either confirms through its rhetoric or denies by remaining silent. It is an astute act of diplomacy, and a credit to Abe’s political guile.

Just how much official (i.e., government-related) information should be revealed to the public, and to what extent does the public have a right to know how their government reaches decisions are questions that have occupied the thoughts of political scientists and security commentators this week in relation to approval by the Abe Cabinet (J) for the revised ‘Secrets Protection Bill’ (特定秘密保護法案). The bill, as per the explanation given by LDP Chairman Ishiba Shigeru to the House of Representatives Budgetary Committee, is to ensure that any information deemed necessary for public security is subject to restriction, and imposes penalties for the unauthorised disclosure of such information (namely, 10 years’ imprisonment). Needless to say, the very nature of the bill has raised concerns that the government may use it to impede attempts by lawyers, journalists or academics to access information, and that it may be used to implicitly and explicitly hide government decision making from public scrutiny.

Given the recent history of public disclosure of information in Japan (particularly after the March 2011 disasters), the concerns of the public that the government may be attempting to impose more restrictions on the ‘right to know’ are understandable. The bill, even though it has been subject to revision, does have elements that have the potential to supplant rights to ‘freedom of information’, including the possibility of an extension of the 30 year ‘official secrets’ period on recommendation from a minister (with cabinet approval), and the authority of a minister (or member of government appointed to head the organisation overseeing implementation of the law) to designate information as ‘secret’, although consensus on what constitutes a ‘secret’ has yet to be reached (despite the Abe government giving its assurances that all criteria for secrets will be clarified).

The Japan Federation of Bar Associations (along with the Social Democratic Party of Japan, academics (J), and various Asahi Shimbun editorials) has certainly made its objection to the bill (J) known, citing the fact that the bill itself does not establish any clear definitions with regard to information, and has voiced its concern that this will be used as yet another means to disguise both political and bureaucratic mistakes. Yet the reasons given by PM Abe (J) on the necessity of such legislation point to the need for official secrets, especially given that Japan has embarked on reform of its state security apparatus, with proposals to establish a Japanese NSC and relax restrictions on the export of military technology. Japan clearly wants to participate in the collection and distribution of vast amounts of intelligence with partners such as the US and (more recently) Australia, yet without safeguards in place to ensure that any disclosure will be harshly penalised, it is unlikely that other partners in intelligence would be willing to share information with Japan.  

Of course, there is nothing to prevent information being leaked should a government operative decide to ‘go rogue’ and reveal state secrets out of moral concern or for personal profit (episodes of which the US and Australia have often experienced). Japanese governments are no strangers to such events (J) either, and it could be that the number and nature of leaks from within the Japanese government required an added level of assurance for other nations before intelligence sharing agreements could be brought into full effect. Under the present Self Defence Force Law, Articles 118 and 122 (J) state that any unauthorised leaking of military information (in violation of Article 59) carry either a 3 year or 5 year prison sentence, although it should be emphasised that this relates purely to military personnel, not civilians.

National (civilian) public servants in Japan are bound to preserve secrets under Article 100 of the National Public Service Act (国家公務員法) and Articles 18 and 21 of the National Public Service Ethics Act (国家公務員倫理法), with a penalty of 2 years’ imprisonment or a fine of one million yen for any violation of the obligation to secrecy. With these laws in place, adding another proviso for protection of official information seems a tad unnecessary, although the imposition of heavier penalties for unauthorised disclosure may provide sufficient deterrent to any would-be Japanese Edward Snowden. As the bill is still in the process of being debated, there is no guarantee that the final version will resemble what has been put forward to the Budgetary Committee, yet there is a greater likelihood that the final legislation will include guarantees of freedom of information (especially since the government’s own public consultations revealed that 77% of respondents were opposed to the bill in its current form, and demanded clarifications on the extent of the definition of ‘secret’).

Tuesday this week saw Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop address the Japan National Press Club to give the views of the newly elected Abbott government on what Japan means to Australia, and how Australia sees Japan’s role in the region and further abroad. With Tony Abbott’s ‘greatest friend in Asia’ sentiment still ringing in the ears, Ms Bishop took this rhetoric one step further by revealing the Abbott government’s support for any move by Japan to modify its constitution to enable the SDF to more pro-actively participate in collective self-defence and joint operations. Such words will have undoubtedly raised more suspicions in Beijing as to Abbott’s motives, most likely resulting in analysis that Abbott intends to push Japan to be a more visible presence in military operations, for by doing so Australia will be able to mitigate some of its own defence costs by sharing them with Japan while the US sorts out its financial problems.

As Hugh White observed on Tuesday, Abbott’s rhetoric with regard to Japan is risky as it may prompt retaliation by Beijing against Australia in the form of a freeze on negotiations for an FTA and the cancellation of any ministerial visits to Australia. It would be difficult to believe that the Abbott government has embarked on its current path without taking this into consideration, with the conclusion being that any potential difficulties with China will be offset by the shifting nature of economic relations in the region. China could certainly damage Australia’s economy by sharply dropping its mineral imports and cancelling investments in Australia, but this presumes that no other country would want to benefit from China’s absence. Moreover, to launch punitive actions against Australia for drawing closer to another democratic state would reflect badly on China, it would reveal too much of China’s own strategy for building influence in the region and further abroad and work against China’s long-term interests.

Hence one gets the feeling that China will allow Abbott to continue his support for Japan so long as this doesn’t translate into an active attempt to intervene in China’s territorial dispute with Japan. China is well aware of the trend among conservative Australian governments to support pro-US nations abroad, and Japan is one of the most traditional of US allies in the region. As Australia is not in a formal alliance with Japan, the risk that Australia might join the US in defending Japanese interests is less of a concern for China so long as this situation continues.

As for Australia’s own reaction to Bishop’s comments, they are likely to be positive given the ties shared between Australia and Japan and the degree of trust exhibited by the Australian population towards Japan. The possibility of having Japan involved in regional exercises has been actively supported by commentators in Australia, as has the potential for Japanese involvement in the future submarine program.

The Abbott government has outlined its foreign policy position with relation to Japan, and is waiting for the Chinese response. Foreign Minister Bishop has said that Australia wants a deeper relationship with China while addressing the media in Japan, a message the Chinese will interpret as a challenge to obtain the trust of the Abbott government. Given the concern in the region regarding China’s intentions, Abbott has apparently gambled that China will not risk alienating Australia for the sake of its argument with Japan and so has taken the initiative to promote Australia-Japan ties. It’s an interesting strategy, but one which will very much depend on Abbott’s nerve.

Thursday this week saw media coverage of Prime Minister Abbott’s visit to Southeast Asia shift to his attendance of the East Asia Summit in Brunei, and his first official talks with Prime Minister Abe as Australia’s elected representative. From the reporting on the meeting, it appears that PMs Abbott and Abe shared opinions in keeping with expectations, with PM Abbott declaring before a private meeting with PM Abe that Japan is Australia’s ‘greatest friend in Asia’ (see here too - J). While this comment might have come as a bit of a “what the?” moment for both Jakarta and Beijing, Abbott wasted no time in qualifying this statement by inviting PM Abe to address a joint sitting of the Australian Parliament next year. To be extended such an invitation implies that Abbott sees Japan as Australia’s ‘true’ partner within the Asian region. It sends a powerful message that under an Abbott administration, Japan will be given priority and that PM Abbott will personally oversee developments in the bilateral relationship through close co-operation with PM Abe.

In a sense, one could suggest that Abbott is trying to emulate John Howard in creating a pro-active stance towards Japan, re-establishing the ties that Howard had with the LDP (and PM Abe) later in his prime ministership. Certainly Abbott appears to be far more relaxed in dealing with Japan than he does with China, for while Abbott appreciates the significance of China in regional development, he is particularly careful in his rhetoric towards China, neither attempting to give too much credence or criticism towards China lest it be misinterpreted by others as endorsing or repudiating Beijing. Given Japan’s status as an ally of the US, this makes the task of bilateral relations much easier from Abbott’s point of view, particularly considering his affinity for parliamentary democracies. One also gets the sense that Abbott is particularly impressed by Japan’s stoicism and reputation for efficiency, and that he sees in Japan a reflection of his own determination and desire for a reputation for being both courteous and reliable.

The Coalition itself has often expressed its support for Japan and the affinity of its members towards Japan (most notably here), and Abbott may indeed be merely reflecting the party’s mood towards Japan. Yet I suspect that Abbott himself has wanted to promote the bilateral relationship, for in creating improved relations with Japan Abbott will be able to claim it as a diplomatic success and evidence of how seriously the Coalition takes the need for closer engagement with Asia. It does not come with the political baggage of complex relations with Southeast Asian nations (notably Indonesia), and avoids the potential minefield of trying to improve relations with China while at the same time expressing concern about China’s territorial ambitions vis-à-vis the Philippines or Vietnam.

While China represents the current economic reality for Australia, Abbott may in fact be seeking to diversify foreign investment by encouraging those nations (Japan, South Korea) to further invest in Australia, thereby keeping Australia’s assets in the hands of more diplomatically ‘reliable’ partners who (primarily) operate according to trade conventions and who do not seek to use investment as leverage in diplomatic negotiations (thereby upsetting the Coalition’s minor partner, the Nationals). Abbott’s bilateral dialogue with Japan is just beginning, and promises much for the foreseeable future.

This post follows on from that made last week, in that it continues with another chapter taken from Shimizu Katsuyuki’s 「喧嘩両成敗の誕生」, specifically that which deals with an attempt by the Muromachi Bakufu to change the mores of the mid-medieval period away from reliance on ‘Jiriki Kyūsai’ (自力救済, or ‘self-preservation’) to enforcement of central authority in disputes between rival retainers of various households. (156) The legislation that the Muromachi Bakufu adopted in order to do this was known as 「本人切腹制」”Honnin Seppuku Sei”, or “System for the Ritual Suicide of the Person (s) Concerned”. In his introduction to the chapter, Shimizu relates a specific example of this system at work. (156)

In the sixth month of Bunmei 11 (1479), there occurred an incident out the front of Kitano Shrine in Kyoto. A retainer of Isshiki Yoshinao by the name of Nariyoshi, with a number of accomplices, attempted to steal bamboo roots that were growing amid the piles of wood out the front of the shrine. The attendants of Kitano Shrine (known as Miyaji, or 宮仕, themselves a lower class of attendant), upon catching Nariyoshi’s mob in the act, tried to stop them from making off with their loot. Nariyoshi and his group did not take kindly to this, and so a fight broke out among the two groups. It appears as though Nariyoshi’s group had the advantage in numbers, for three Miyaji from Kitano Shrine were killed with no apparent losses to Nariyoshi. Other Miyaji from Kitano Shrine that witnessed the violence were so incensed by Nariyoshi’s act and the senseless deaths of their colleagues that they resolved to shut themselves up in the inner sanctum of the shrine. They then used the divine authority vested on the shrine as a shield to send a message of protest to the Bakufu, demanding that Nariyoshi and his group be dealt with promptly. (156-157)

The Muromachi Shōgun at the time, Ashikaga Yoshihisa, was unusual in that he took a particular interest in administrative and legal matters and so moved rapidly to deal with the culprits. Yoshihisa handed down a missive to the Nariyoshi’s master, Isshiki Yoshinao, ordering him to punish Nariyoshi and the others based on ‘their equivalent crime’ (相当の罪). As a consequence, Nariyoshi was forced to order one of his followers to commit ritual suicide, given that this person was the instigator or ‘person concerned’ of both the theft of the bamboo roots and the violence that followed. Nariyoshi himself later fled the capital. (157)

In the medieval period, the term 「相当」(Sōtō) meant  ‘damage or loss to the same degree or extent’. Since three Miyaji of Kitano Shrine had been killed during the incident, the punishment to be metered out based on ‘equivalent crime’ meant that three members of Nariyoshi’s retinue would also have to die. However in this instance, the only person forced to commit ritual suicide was the one who had sparked the violence out the front of Kitano Shrine. On this basis, one could not say that is was ‘punishment based on an equivalent crime’.  Yet this measure appears to have satiated the desire for revenge by the Miyaji of Kitano Shrine, who then came out from the inner sanctum, thereby bringing the entire incident to a peaceful conclusion. From the point of view of traditional medieval social logic, which demanded punishment of an equal kind in retaliation, this conclusion was completely nonsensical. Yet it was indicative of the system used by the Muromachi Bakufu, that of the Honnin Seppuku Sei. (157)

There were three particular characteristics of this system at work which explain why it was implemented. The first, and most important, was the fact that no matter how many victims there were, the ‘instigator’ directly responsible for causing the incident would be the only one punished. The second was that the punishment metered out against the ‘instigator’ would not be carried out on a direct order from the Bakufu. Instead the Shōgun would send an order to the lord or master of the ‘instigator’, demanding that he deal with his retainer. The third was the fact that in the end, the instigator would accept the order from his master and commit ritual suicide (or jigai, 自害). (157)

These were the characteristics of the system. It’s now worthwhile exploring each in turn. First, let’s take a look at the second characteristic, the more ‘roundabout’ system of punishment whereby the Shōgun would not pass sentence against the ‘instigator’ directly but instead would order the master of that ‘instigator’ to carry out the punishment. As was outlined in Chapter Two, the area within the private residence of shugo daimyō during the Muromachi period possessed a strong degree of independence, to the extent that the Shōgun himself could not enter it the residence without prior permission from the owner concerned. This exactly mirrored the system of control that the shugo daimyō themselves exercised against their retainers. (158)

From a logical point of view, as the Shōgun was the master over the shugo daimyo and they were his vassals, and as the retainers of the shugo daimyō were vassals of those daimyō, then the Shōgun should have been able to exercise direct control over the retainers of the shugo daimyō as well. Yet in principle this was not permitted. In the 5th month of the 23rd year of Ōei (1416), a retainer of Hatakeyama Michiie and another of Uramatsu (Hino) Yoshisuke became involved in a fight while returning from the Kamo Kurabeuma ( 加茂競馬, a religious event held at Kamigamo Shrine in May), which resulted in bloodshed. The Shōgun at the time, Ashikaga Yoshimochi, thereafter reprimanded (突鼻, totsupi) the masters of these retainers, Hatakeyama and Uramatsu, but did no more than this. (158)

In medieval Europe, “the retainer of a retainer is not your vassal” was an often said phase, yet the same could also be said of medieval Japanese society. Although the master of a criminal might be his own vassal, in principle the Shōgun did not have the power to transcend his vassal’s authority in order to punish the criminal. Under the mores of the day, what the Shōgun could do was to order his vassal to punish the transgressor, yet there was no direct way through which the Shōgun could question the authority of his vassal or punish his vassal.(158) It was the same no matter what level of society it occurred at.(158)

In order to punish the ringleader of the violence at Kitano Shrine, Yoshihisa first issued an order to Nariyoshi’s master Isshiki Yoshinao demanding that he punish the perpetrator. Isshiki then issued his own order, demanding that Nariyoshi punish the guilty party. The circuitous administration of the Honnin Seppuku Sei  was entirely in keeping with the master-retainer system that existed at the time. Such administration was an unavoidable fact of life at the time, and may in fact have been encouraged. A particularly asute and intelligent aristocrat of the mid-to-late Muromachi period, Ichijō Kaneyoshi, in his collection of political essays dedicated to Shōgun Ashikaga Yoshihisa known as the Shō Danchō (樵談治要), paid particular attention to the growing menace of “ashigaru” (or foot soldiers, 足軽) that began to appear on the streets of the capital following the Ōnin and Bunmei periods (late fifteenth century). Kaneyoshi called the ashigaru “extreme villains” and launched into damning criticism of them in his writing.(159)

Kaneyoshi’s writing is a particularly valuable historical resource given its recount of the activities of these ashigaru and how these contrasted to the prejudiced views of the aristocracy.  As such, it is often quoted in historical studies although the writing itself is not very well known. I offer the advice Kaneyoshi put forward to getting rid of the ashigaru as an example of his work. (159)

“No matter who the ashigaru happens to be, every ashigaru has a master. If such things happen again from here on, the masters of each of the ashigaru should be made to take responsibility and punish their ashigaru. If a system existed whereby an ashigaru, if he happened to be either a peasant or a merchant, would be subjected to punishment after an order was sent to his ‘place of residence’ (either a village or town), ashigaru as a profession would cease to exist.” (159)