(I realise that this is not a particularly efficient way of presenting biographical information, but given my schedule it will have to do for now, hence many apologies in advance).

To continue on from the previous post, in December of 2007 rumours began to surface that Hashimoto was considering running in the next prefectural governor election. On the 11th of December, media reports that Hashimoto was indeed set on entering the governor race were denied by Hashimoto himself, only for him to appear in a press conference on the 12th within the Osaka Prefectural Office to formally declare his intention to run for office. 『毎日新聞』2007年12月5日付朝刊, “[* 大阪府知事選：弁護士の橋下氏が出馬表明「大阪を元気に」]”. 毎日新聞 (2007年12月12日). According to Miyazaki Tetsuya, an analyst who often appeared on television programs with Hashimoto, the reason for his prevarication had more to do with his concern over securing enough finances to support his campaign than whether he should enter politics or not. “「二転三転は手続き上のこと」 橋下弁護士出馬会見詳報(4)”. 産経新聞 (2007年12月12日).

On the 7th of January 2008, both the LDP and the Komeito made clear their intentions to support Hashimoto at the prefectural level. The Osaka branch of Komeito were particularly encouraged by Hashimoto’s previous comments in relation to possession of nuclear weaponry, and so decided to switch their stance from “recommendation” of Hashimoto’s campaign to “support”, a position which the head branch of the Komeito also approved. At a function organised by the Komeito for the 16th of January, the parental organisation of the Komeito, the religious sect known as Soka Gakkai, called for support from its followers for Hashimoto’s campaign. The fact that Hashimoto had such a public profile coupled with a reputation for speaking his mind served him well on internet noticeboards. When details of his father’s association with organised crime came to light, internet criticism of those media organisations that ran the story reached a peak and cooled enthusiasm for pursuing the story.

In a press conference to outline his policy platform, Hashimoto explained to the assembled media that he would seek to increase the number of designated nursery schools within the prefecture, have rice distributed at mealtimes within public junior high schools, and have cobblestones and gas lamps installed in the central district of Osaka in order to create a more pedestrian-friendly environment. However when it became clear that these policies had been adopted by local governments outside of Osaka prefecture who had then imposed limitations on their (the policies’) usage, Hashimoto was called in for talks with LDP supporters and ordered to re-think his strategy.

As for bureaucratic reform of Osaka prefecture, Hashimoto had previously said that he would dismantle the prefectural office, “turn it on its head” and that any prefectural employee not pulling his or her weight was free to resign. This obviously would place him on a collision course with the bureaucrats of the prefecture, hence Hashimoto, after changing his tune, addressed staff of the prefectural office and asked them to become the “shields and sandbags” of Osaka and “join him in the scrum.” 『スポーツ報知』 2008年1月11日.

Hashimoto’s political platform:

The four key policies that Hashimoto eventually decided upon for his governor electoral campaign were as follows:   

1.       “An Osaka which children and adults can both enjoy”

(Hashimoto’s initial policy was particularly pro-family, and emphasised creating an Osaka in which children could be born and raised in safety, where they could attend schools in a more natural environment (i.e., increase the greenery), ensure that children can grow up properly though good nutrition, create the means by which schools could provide students with a fully realised education, give children a variety of prefectural high schools to choose from, make the most of volunteer and NPO activities, and give Osaka more specialist public hospitals). 

2.       “An Osaka where people meet, greet and which bustles with activity”

(This involved creating a system of effective subsidies, and creating the means by which people can gather in both retail and market areas).

3.       “An Osaka where small to medium businesses can thrive, and where business is abundant”

(The entire prefectural government would work to support the growth of small to medium sized businesses, and also meet the needs of large scale industries. Osaka Prefectural University would also become a think-tank for Osaka as a whole).

4.       “An Osaka where the people can see the prefectural government working for their benefit, and an Osaka where the people can take a leading role (in running the prefecture)”

(This policy envisaged an Osaka prefectural government cracking down on wasteful expenditure while also becoming an investment opportunity (thereby ushering in a prosperous era of regional government). Local governments would take over delivery of essential services (i.e., direct public services), while the prefectural government would re-organise those organs responsible for issuing directives on local matters along with those that decide on the direction the prefecture will take. According to Hashimoto, Osaka was rife with meaningless and wasteful projects. As such, any government that he run would only invest in projects which promised clear results. He would be thorough in enforcing accountability and transparency in government. In sum, he would create an Osaka in which all prefectural employees would exercise their “fighting spirit” in order to work for Osaka’s benefit and bring smiles to the faces of its residents).    

Along with the four policies, Hashimoto followed this up with another 17 core projects that he would implement as governor:

1.       (Possible title) Establish a “Child birth and rearing adviser” service

2.       Promote emergency intake services for both obstetric and paediatric wards

3.       Expand the number of general health checks for pregnant women

4.       Expand the range of subsidies available for paediatric services

5.       Expand subsidies to treat sterility

6.       Develop more nursery facilities in front of and within railway stations

7.       Establish a rent subsidy system for young couples with children

8.       Support public activities for the disabled and elderly

9.       Have all sports grounds at public elementary schools in Osaka prefecture change over to use of grass  fields

10.   Advocate the introduction of subsidised lunches at all public junior high schools in Osaka prefecture

11.   Support the instalment of closed-circuit camera technology in order to create a safe and secure society

12.   Hold a winter illumination event within Osaka prefecture

13.   Create streets using “cobblestones and gas lamps”

14.   Hold large scale conventions in order to stimulate the growth of small and medium sized businesses

15.   Develop an active sales campaign led by the governor in order to increase Osaka’s level of activities

16.   Fundamentally reform corporate bodies that receive investments from Osaka prefecture (apart from those deemed essential for everyday living)

17.   Encourage the privatisation or sell-off of unnecessary public facilities and projects

Election Campaign

Hashimoto’s election campaign for governor was somewhat unusual in that neither the LDP nor the Komeito, which previously both advocated and supported Hashimoto, made their support public (instead keeping that support confined to conversations behind closed doors).  As such, Hashimoto’s election campaign office was established within Titan Entertainment and was run by a number of Hashimoto’s old high school rugby team colleagues. This may have been a deliberate ploy to ensure that Hashimoto was not perceived as being too “tainted” by his association with other political parties. This “hands-off” strategy extended to Osaka representatives of the LDP and Komeito in the National Diet, none of whom made any speeches in support of Hashimoto. The only public support he gained was from other television and entertainment personalities such as recently elected House of Councillors member Maruyama Kazuya (a former regular on the Gyorestsu no dekiru Horitsu Sodansho program) and former comedian and the governor of Miyazaki prefecture, Higashikokubaru Hideo (otherwise known as Sonomanma Higashi).

Hashimoto used his large family as a selling point for his campaign, and created a manifesto around the catchphrase of “smiling children” along with his 17 core projects and 4 core policies (which he referred to as “tries”, again using a rugby metaphor). In the midst of the election campaign (January 20), around three million political leaflets criticising Hashimoto for remarks that he made on various television programs were inserted into advertising mail accompanying various newspapers which were then distributed around the prefecture (apparently this was the work of the office of another candidate, Kumagai Sadatoshi (formerly a member of the DPJ in the House of Representatives, now a member of Ozawa Ichiro’s People First party).

In the end Hashimoto was elected as prefectural governor by a huge margin of eight hundred thousand votes. His election marked a number of milestones. At the time of his election he was the youngest prefectural governor in all of Japan. It also marked the second time that Osaka had chosen to elect a so-called “entertainment governor” since Yokoyama Knock thirteen years earlier.  He was the second serving governor to have a legal background (after the governor of Aichi prefecture Kanda Masaaki). Hashimoto was also the first governor of Osaka to have been born in Tokyo, and, as said earlier, was the third youngest governor in Japanese history having been elected at the age of 38.

After his election Hashimoto immediately began a series of media appearances. On the 29th of January he paid a courtesy call on the prime minister of the day, Fukuda Yasuo of the LDP. He also began his governor duties before being formally sworn in as governor. Borrowing an office from the Osaka branch of the LDP, Hashimoto began his term as governor by holding joint meetings on policy and the formation of the 2008 budget.

Governor of Osaka Prefecture

Announcement of a state of emergency concerning Osaka’s finances

On the 6th of February 2008 Hashimoto entered the Osaka Prefectural Office for the first time as governor. At a press conference held later in the day, Hashimoto declared that Osaka’s finances were in “a state of emergency”, and made it clear that the 2008 budget would see a reduction in spending of 10 billion yen (compared to the previous year), and emphasised his commitment to this goal by cutting his own retirement payout in half (to be received on retiring as governor). On the 5th of June, Hashimoto launched his “Program for Fiscal Rebuilding”, which outlined the main route the prefectural government would take in order to restore the financial health of the Osaka region. In line with his election pledge to “only create budgets within the limits of revenue”, Hashimoto set about re-examining a wide range of fiscal affairs involving operations, investments, and public utilities. As a result, in the course of 3 years there would be a reduction in costs to the tune of 24 billion yen while ensuring an income for the prefecture of 6.1 billion yen.

(The details of the program are outlined in the Japanese language version of Hashimoto’s on-line biography, found here).

At the press conference held on the 6th of February, Hashimoto backed up his electoral pledge to bring about a “thoroughly open government” by establishing an “Office of Open Information”. When asked what kind of information the office would provide, Hashimoto answered that, in essence, it would reveal everything. At another press conference on the 23rd of April, Hashimoto stated that… “freedom of information is absolutely crucial in order for a dictator-esque role such as prefectural governor to govern in a democratic manner” (J), and said that he aimed to make Osaka prefecture the most transparent in all of Japan.

On Sunday (October 28) the Gillard government in Australia launched the latest in a series of initiatives by releasing the “White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century.” The paper, which was commissioned in October last year (and which was three months late in delivery, apparently because the initial paper was far too long and did not examine how the US would influence the Asia-Indo-Pacific region over the next hundred years (E), has finally seen the light of day and outlines a series of initiatives to help prepare Australia to benefit from the rise of Asia. Leaving aside issues related to security (which the paper did not address, instead handing this task to another white paper, the Defence White Paper 2013, which is scheduled for release at some point before July next year), the Asian Century white paper emphasises the need for educational reform in Australia so that future generations will be able to deal with counterparts in Asia on an equal footing; namely, they will be more attuned to cultural differences, be able to communicate in the languages of Asia, and will use their higher education qualifications to pursue business opportunities in Asia. Conversely, businesses will have to expand their exposure to Asia to ensure that they make the most of the opportunities therein.

While kudos must definitely be given to the government for bringing this to the public’s attention, one cannot help but feel a strong sense of déjà vu in the goals outlined in the paper. As the AFR pointed out on Monday morning, Ross Garnaut pursued many of the themes of the white paper in his 1989 study “Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy”, to name but one study released in the past 23 years that addresses the growth of Asian prosperity and how Australia might profit from it. Yet if the answer has been staring Australia so clearly in the face for so long, one is tempted to ask why previous governments didn’t take the initiative and actually implement the changes now deemed so necessary for Australia’s future? Is it complacency, ignorance, or arrogance that accounts for the (presumed) lack of expertise regarding Asia within the business and broader community? I suspect that it is none of these things, and that both the business and broader community have, slowly but surely, been developing the ties that government now recognises as fundamental to the nation and its future.

Of course, if these issues had been seriously addressed 15 years ago we might now be profiting more from the growth of the middle classes in Asia, but as an old adage goes…”better late than never.” The real challenge before the Australian government, indeed for Australian society as a whole, will be educational reform centred on the Asian region. The absence of a federal plan to introduce Asian languages to schools in a comprehensive manner, a shortage of qualified language teachers, a lack of resources to promote language learning (how many Japanese or Chinese programs are regularly broadcast on Australian television in their native languages? Virtually none, apart from the news on SBS television), and the lack of cultural diversity, specifically at the executive levels of Australian society, doesn’t bode well for a plan to fundamentally re-configure Australia’s cultural identity. The absence of a fiscal plan for making the targets outlined in the white paper a reality is also problematic, for at present the Gillard government is determined the maintain budget surpluses and any broad reaching educational program will require significant investment in human and material resources, possibly for the first time in modern Australian history. If the current government has the foresight to make investments necessary for the future, then Australia will benefit, but even the best intentions can be quickly side-tracked by economic arguments and no government wants to be thought of as profligate.

As such, perhaps it behoves Australia’s business community to make the investments needed to provide it with the human resources required for growth.  If ASX 200 companies began creating educational institutions promoting Asian literacy and business competency, they would be following upon the examples set by companies in the US and Europe in the past, and within Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in more recent memory.  This would go against decades of ingrained corporate behaviour in Australia, however, where investment was in materials and technology, and it was up to the individual to acquire the skills (and make the investment) necessary to thrive in business, not the company.  If the white paper gives the incentive to companies to make investments for the long term, then it will certainly have proven its worth and be fitting testament to the Gillard government’s vision, but past performance suggests that self (or should that be state) interest will stifle reform and lead to ineffective, watered-down versions of the paper’s goals. Ever the pessimist, if in the next two years we begin to see the types of investment needed to make the paper a reality then the nation will be better for it, but ambition needs finances to work, and we’re yet to see the money.

Is Japan in the midst of a nationalist revival? This particular question popped into my head after reading an article by Andrew Hunter of the Australian Fabians (apparently the “think tank you have when you’re not having a think tank”, socialist in bent with ties to the Australian Labor Party) who stated that recent clashes between Japan and its neighbours are indicative of a shift in Japanese politics towards nationalism, and driven by deep-seated xenophobia and “anti-Asianism” on the part of members of the LDP led by Abe Shinzo (whose lineage as the grandson of Kishi Nobusuke condemns him in Hunter’s view, for… “a taste for the cheap liquor of nationalism is well developed in the political dynasty that may soon recapture the highest public office in Japan”), and encouraged by the actions of (former, as of Thursday 25 October) Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro in announcing that Tokyo was considering purchasing the Senkaku Islands from their private owner. As an aside, Hunter claims that the DPJ chose to purchase the islands on July 7th, although an actual decision on nationalising the islands was not handed down by the Noda Cabinet until September 11th  (J, again a poignant date, but not one likely to antagonise China as much as the 70th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge incident. Not even the LDP would be so foolish as to try to nationalise an area under dispute with a neighbouring country on the anniversary of its attack on the same country).

Given that Hunter claims that Japan has been under a nationalist revival since the mid-1990s, his evidence for this consists of the historical revisionist movement among certain sections of Japanese academia (which is by no means unified in its appraisal of Japan’s imperial past) and the decision by former PM Koizumi Junichiro to allow the dispatch of elements of the SDF (GSDF engineers and MSDF supply vessels) to take part in the occupation of Iraq in 2003, building upon a decision in 1991 to support UN (not solely US) efforts in the Persian Gulf following criticism of Japan’s lack of material commitment to Operation Desert Storm. What should be noted here is that by no means was the Diet unified in its stance towards allowing the SDF to be dispatched abroad in 1991, and that Japanese participation in operations overseas since then has been limited to providing humanitarian support to reconstruction and peace-keeping activities (Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, COFR, 2003, p.203).  Japan has consistently emphasised the importance of the UN in reaching decisions for multilateral intervention in international conflicts, and has played a leading role in the establishment of an international ministerial consultation group on nuclear weapon reduction and non-proliferation (together with Australia, a move that took place under an LDP government) (E).

An opinion poll conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister in January this year noted that 61.7% of respondents believed that it was important for Japan to make an active contribution to ensuring the peaceful resolution of conflicts and providing humanitarian assistance to other countries (J). Furthermore, in relation to whether the SDF should be more involved in operations abroad, only 28.1% of respondents agreed that it should, with a majority (61.3%) stating that there should be no change to the current range of SDF activities (J).  While support for the LDP has certainly grown since the election of Abe Shinzo as leader (J), it represents a greater degree of dissatisfaction in the manner in which the Noda Cabinet has dealt with questions of reconstruction, consumption tax increases, and recent internal disputes within the DPJ than any endorsement of a more nationalistic bent in Japanese politics (J). Although Ishihara Shintaro has thrown his hat into the federal arena once again, at 80 years of age he isn’t exactly fresh faced or brimming with ideas, and if his only concerns are constitutional reform and finding new ways to irritate China and South Korea (E), he won’t exactly have broad appeal (certainly not among either the Keidanren, for his opposition to the TPP,  or regional voters).

If Japan is in the midst of a nationalistic revival, it must be so low key as to be virtually indistinguishable from the status quo. Nationalistic politicians are not an anomaly in an otherwise pacifist Diet; they have always been a part of Japan’s political landscape, and exercised a variety of degrees on influence on the governments of the day. Abe Shinzo himself was prime minister for a year (2006-2007), and although he promoted a stronger stance in relation to Japan’s neighbours, at no time did he wish to jeopardize stability in favour of advocating outright confrontation with either China or South Korea (J). If Japan’s desire to protect its territorial integrity from incursions by foreign vessels is indicative of a rise in nationalism, then virtually every nation in East Asia, South East Asia, and Oceania is in the process of ramping up nationalism as a tool of state.  To insinuate that Japan is somehow undergoing a transformation in political attitudes by stealth both misreads popular sentiment and ascribes motives that simply do not exist among the population at large. It is, in other words, a false observation, more instinctive than based on fact, and one that think tanks should avoid.

If there was a prize distributed for political ineptness, one would be hard pressed to decide whether this should be given to former Minister of Law Tanaka Keishu for demonstrating unparalleled arrogance in refusing to attend a summons issued by the House of Councillors Oversight Committee last Thursday to answer questions on his previous ties to organised crime groups and accepting foreign donations (which Tanaka acknowledged after they were first revealed by weekly magazine Shukan Shinko) (J), or to the DPJ for blithely accepting Tanaka as Minister for Law without first examining whether he was a suitable candidate for the position (given Tanaka’s murky political past, the fact that he was even considered raises a whole swathe of red flags concerning the DPJ executive’s judgment). As such, the DPJ’s own blinkered approach to cabinet appointments means that Tanaka’s resignation as Minister on Tuesday (for “health reasons”, according to PM Noda, after only a month in the position (J) has only further damaged PM Noda’s sagging popularity and strengthened opposition LDP and Komeito calls for a snap election.

The situation wasn’t helped at all by comments made by former Foreign Minister and current National Policy Office Secretary Maehara Seiji. On the 21st Maehara appeared on a Fuji Television network program “News 2001”, and promptly managed to unleash a whole wave of speculation regarding debate within the DPJ about a snap election by declaring that…” In my understanding, dissolving parliament in the new year would not constitute (dissolving parliament) “soon”. The Prime Minister is a man who keeps his promises.” (J) This statement has been interpreted as either a slip of the tongue by Maehara (who is not noted for being unduly candid on camera – re: his time as Foreign Minister), or an indication that Maehara believes that only a snap election held within the year will save the DPJ from being hammered at the polls and ceasing to exist as a viable alternative to the LDP/Komeito coalition (as explored very astutely by Yamazaki Hajime here).  In short, the longer the DPJ clings to power, the more it damages its chances of maintaining any influence in a future parliament. With the DPJ out of power, PM Noda could step down as leader and allow the party to rebuild its thoroughly tarnished public image. In the meantime Abe Shinzo would be PM before the Senate elections next year. This would result in votes moving back to the DPJ (given Abe’s unpopularity with sections of the community, not to mention his standing with Japan’s neighbours) and head off any attempt by the Reform Party (led by Hashimoto Toru) to seize seats in the Senate.

Whether this scenario has been considered by Maehara is a question that will have to be left to future biographers. At this stage, all one can say is that PM Noda’s term in office may come to a dramatic conclusion if younger members of the DPJ begin to waver in their support and openly suggest that PM Noda call an election. This will be precisely what the opposition wants, but in the end it will restore the DPJ and increase the chances of a LDP/Komeito coalition having to deal with yet another hung parliament.  

With political talk this week being dominated by whether or not the Reform Party (or Isshinkai, also known as the One Osaka Party) would link together with either the People First or Your Party political parties in order to contest seats at the next general election for the House of Representatives, I thought it best to delve into the past of the founder of the Reform Party, Hashimoto Toru, in order to give the reader some idea as to who this individual is and what he means for Japan (hint: a promising regional politician, but not necessarily all good news on a national level). I will admit to pilfering Wikipedia for much of the information herein (J), but given the limited amount of detailed information on Hashimoto’s background, it’s as good a place to start as any, and I will try to provide links where ever possible in order to verify the details that follow.

To begin with, a few basic details. Hashimoto Toru was born on the 29th of June 1969, thus making him 43 years of age (J). Though he now represents Osaka City as its mayor (the 19th to serve in that post since the end of the WWII), he was born and spent the first years of his life in the Hatagaya district of Shibuya ward, Tokyo. According to his Twitter comments, when he was in 2nd year of elementary school (i.e., around 7 years of age) his father, who was a member of a Boryokudan (or organised criminal) group, committed suicide (J). By this time Hashimoto was already living with his mother in separate accommodation, and so Hashimoto himself has said that he does not have many memories of his biological father. His mother was apparently quite strict in his upbringing, but did not pay particular attention to studies or how he developed as an individual.

When Hashimoto was in 5th year of elementary school, his mother moved with him to Suita City in Osaka Prefecture (『新潮45』（2011年11月3号）pg.34). One year later his mother managed to secure public housing accommodation in East Yodogawa ward in Osaka City. Apparently when Hashimoto’s mother applied for the accommodation, it was granted almost immediately. Yodogawa has long been associated with members of the Buraku minority in Osaka, and Hashimoto’s mother had never told him prior to this that his father was a member of the Buraku community. He had, in other words, grown up in Tokyo ignorant of this part of his family’s history. Thereafter Hashimoto would move around a number of Buraku neighbourhoods in Osaka City, and, according to Hashimoto, was brought up “torn between two worlds.” (『週刊新潮』（2011年11月3日号）pg.24)  He was apparently quite large for his age and so stood out at school, and as a result became the target of bullying from his classmates. To compensate, Hashimoto modified his behaviour depending on whomever he was dealing with at the time, which would prove useful later in life (「橋下徹研究」 産経新聞大阪社会部編著 産経新聞出版 pg.15-16).

By the time Hashimoto had entered junior high school he was already 170cm tall and able to speak convincingly about various subjects thus earning him the nickname of “old man.” (『新潮45』（2011年11月3号）pg.36)  During the summer of his second year of junior high he was caught stealing a bicycle and cautioned. Afterwards Hashimoto poured his energies into the school’s rugby team, soon after becoming its captain. Apparently he was meticulous in preparing the team, for other team mates at the time remember Hashimoto lecturing the team on why it was important to practice in order to build up the team over time. When time came for his classmates to prepare for the entrance exam season for high school, Hashimoto created a study group with his friends, although eventually Hashimoto himself became the educator, a role he apparently relished. His classmates also noted that he was particularly ambitious, and that he spoke of becoming a politician in the future (「徹底検証 橋下主義(ハシモトイズム)」 読売新聞大阪本社社会部編著 梧桐書院 pg.228-229).

One thing Hashimoto was not too keen on was being made to stand apart from other students because of his Buraku background, and in his graduation essay complained about this fact. What particularly bothered him was the practice of concentrating students together in their local area. In other words, academically gifted students would be made to attend local schools together with the less academically inclined as a means of preventing too great an academic disparity from emerging between them. Hashimoto railed against this system, and managed to graduate to Kitano High School (J), a fairly prestigious school noted for its scholastic achievements. There he found himself adrift among a sea of students from privileged backgrounds, which stood in stark contrast to his Buraku upbringing. This disparity served to fire Hashimoto’s resolve to make something of himself, and he regards his time spent in East Yodogawa as his formative years (「橋下徹研究」 産経新聞大阪社会部編著 産経新聞出版 p.23, 『週刊新潮』（2011年11月3日号）pg.24).

In high school Hashimoto earned himself the moniker of “Hashige” (apparently a play on the adjective “Hageshi”, meaning “intense”). One of Hashimoto’s former teachers remembers that during gym class Hashimoto would pay out any classmate who failed to perform sufficiently, whereas he would make himself scarce when time came to clean classrooms or engage in any other kind of group activity (『新潮45』（2011年11月3号）pg.37). In high school he again joined the rugby club, although his team mates from the time recall that he was not an enthusiastic member of the club, and was often late for training. As a result he was dropped from the regulars, an event which inspired him to put all of his effort into training. While Hashimoto disliked the monotony and predictable nature of practice, in a game he would become a completely different person. In his 3rd year of high school his team advanced to the 67th national schools rugby competition (in which Hashimoto was albeit briefly recorded by T.V cameras rushing down the sideline to score a try, which can be seen here), and thought up various plays aimed at getting the ball out of the scrum in a hurry. Recently Hashimoto, in a Twitter comment, stated that he was not the best student at high school (J), and that there were plenty of teachers who disliked him (J).     

Upon graduating from high school Hashimoto gave up trying to gain entrance to Kobe University (mainly as a result of his mediocre high school grades), and attempted to gain entrance to Waseda University by taking exams for two different schools, but failed in both attempts. (高寄昇三 『大阪都構想と橋下政治の検証: 府県集権主義への批判』 公人の友社 2010年) A year spent revising proved useful, for in the following year Hashimoto passed the entrance exam to the economics department of the School of Political Economy of Waseda University. Shifting to the capital, Hashimoto took up lodgings in a tiny apartment in Tokyo, minus a bath, which he shared with one of his former high school female classmates (who later became his wife) (J). To make ends meet, Hashimoto would often do part-time jobs selling apparel, an experience which again led to a brush with the police and sparked his interest in the law.

Upon graduating from Waseda University in the Spring of 1994, Hashimoto took and passed the examination to become a lawyer. Two years of legal training paid off in the form of a solicitor’s certificate, and in 1997 Hashimoto was registered as a lawyer with the Osaka Law Association (時間管理の達人2004年5月/弁護士　橋下徹さん).  In his second year as a lawyer (1998), Hashimoto established his own legal advice firm in Osaka City (appropriately named the Hashimoto Law Office), which became noted for its abilities in out-of-court settlement negotiations. A flurry of activity led to the office dealing with 400 to 500 cases per year. Hashimoto was predominantly responsible for corporate compliance, M&As, entertainment law, and sports business law. As a side note, Hashimoto, through his contacts, later formed a partnership with the Titan Entertainment Company (based in Tokyo), which then assumed responsibility for managing Hashimoto has a “personality” (more on this soon).  In return Hashimoto represented Titan as its lawyer.

According to his Wikipedia profile, Hashimoto did his legal training in the Kabashima law offices in Osaka City (『週刊新潮』（2011年11月3日号）pg.27). The head of the firm, Kabashima Masanori, has been particularly scathing in his criticism of Hashimoto during his time as an intern (as detailed here). In a tweet in October last year, Hashimoto himself stated that the head of the law firm in which he worked loathed him, as did many of the other lawyers working for Kabashima (J). However Hashimoto shrugged off this criticism as merely a difference in methods. After entering the Kabashima firm, Hashimoto was at pains to remove himself from his association with the Buraku community, claiming that although he lived in a Buraku ward, he was not himself a member of that community, and did not receive any government subsidies. As such, Hashimoto played no part in the deposition launched by Asada Zennosuke Group of the Buraku Liberation Alliance against rent increases in residential areas of Kyoto City (『g2』（講談社、2010.December、vol.6）森功「同和と橋下徹」p.28). 

It was while working as a lawyer that Hashimoto got his break into the entertainment industry. One of his high school seniors asked him to appear on a MBS radio program as a representative of the legal industry. By chance, a producer for Asahi productions happened to be listening to that broadcast and asked Hashimoto to appear on an Asahi production, “Wide ABCDE-su”, together with journalist Otani Akihiro. Thereafter he appeared with Otani on other Asahi TV programs “Super Morning” and “Move!”. Television producer Dave Spector, who happened to appear on the same Osaka based programs as Hashimoto, sent a tape of Hashimoto’s broadcasts to various major broadcasting stations in Tokyo.  In April of 2003, the retirement of Kubota Noriaki from the nationally syndicated program “Gyoretsu no dekiru Horitsu Sodansho” (J) (literally ""the legal advice office that can line people up", or perhaps more accurately; “the Popular Legal Advice Office”) provided Hashimoto with an opportunity to step into the national limelight with his regular appearances. In July of the same year he also became a regular guest on the local Osaka program “Takajin no soko made itte iinkai” (produced by Yomiuri Television), where his unique way of phrasing and word choice raised his public profile, particularly in Osaka.

While Hashimoto was particularly noteworthy for his criticism of various entertainers and artists (together with the odd dirty joke thrown in for good measure), he also appeared on a number of variety programs in which he strongly promoted his views in relation to the issues and events of the day.  He was also not averse to criticising the existing legal system, legal problems, and the qualifications of lawyers and judges, which occasionally came back to bite him in his legal affairs.

At this point, I would like to diverge yet again to just give a flavour of the type of individual Hashimoto is before delving into his political career. Given the paucity of siblings that he had as a child, Hashimoto has been no slouch in the family department. Between his wife and himself he has 3 boys and 4 girls (7 children in all), although he admits that he has not been responsible for their upbringing, leaving most of those activities to his wife (「まっとう勝負」p.253). In spite of his self-deprecating stance towards child rearing, in June of 2006 he was voted “Best Father” by the Yellow Ribbon award committee. However Hashimoto’s reputation suffered a beating earlier this year when the weekly magazine Shukan Bunshun revealed that he had been having an affair with a high roller club hostess in her late 20s back in 2006 (apparently Hashimoto is a fan of “cosplay” and had the woman dress up as a stewardess) (J). After initially denying the accusations, Hashimoto appeared in front of the media following one of his regular press conferences and admitted his guilt (although he did partly excuse himself by saying that he had not lived like a saint before becoming city mayor).    

In terms of personal interests Hashimoto is a fan of Okinawa group Orange Range, and confessed that he listened to Michael Jackson’s Thriller cassette tape until he wore it out. He was previously a smoker, but gave it up and now has a strong aversion to cigarette smoke. He also used to suffer from poor eyesight and wore glasses on a regular basis. However after undergoing eye surgery his eyesight recovered to the extent that he began wearing glasses purely as an accessory. Since becoming mayor of Osaka City Hashimoto has sworn off wearing glasses and has not been seen in public wearing them for some time.  Quite surprisingly, Hashimoto is a fan of the Yomiuri Giants baseball team (which is based in Tokyo, leading to some to question his suitability to run as governor of Osaka prefecture in 2008) (J). Given his modest upbringing, Hashimoto has no particular love for gaudy aesthetics or archaic forms of entertainment, and earned the ire of traditionalists when in 2002 he suggested that people who like No and Kyogen drama are, quote, “oddballs” (『スポーツニッポン』 2003年10月13日). He also became the target of criticism for reducing the budget of the Osaka City orchestra, citing a lack of attendees to concerts as a reason for the cut. That prompted conductor Akagawa Jiro to wonder whether Hashimoto was therefore suggesting that the popular girls group AKB48 was somehow superior to Beethoven (「橋下氏、価値観押し付けるな」 朝日新聞2012年4月12日付け東京版「声」欄).   

More recently, the insistence of the Asahi newspaper group to search for more evidence of Hashimoto’s family lineage led Hashimoto to refuse to answer any questions from Asahi reporters or appear on Asahi related programs. He labelled the attempts by non-fiction writer Sano Shinichi to track down aspects of his background as “synonymous with the Nazi’s obsession with ethnic cleansing”, and exceeding the limits of the right to freedom of expression (J).

While these anecdotes could go on at length, Hashimoto’s political ambitions are what concern us most here, and so the next post will look into the beginnings of Hashimoto’s move into politics and what that means of the domestic political scene in Japan.

After a two week hiaitus (primarily to recharge the batteries), this week I thought I'd kick things off by offering a retort to a claim made by James Holmes on The Diplomat website in relation to Australia's seeming recalcitrance to "get on board" the US shift to Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. In an interview with the on-line magazine, Professor Holmes said the following in relation to Australia..."To start with, much of what I wrote about that was predicated on finding a more central position in maritime Asia for heavy forces, presumably in Australia. That would position U.S. forces ideally to move between the Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters. The Australian government, however, saw fit to torpedo that idea with extreme prejudice when it appeared in a recent CSIS report. Whether that represents the end of the matter or the opening stage of tough negotiations, I guess we will see. If we can't strike some sort of basing agreement with Australia, our position in the Indian Ocean -- centered on Bahrain, inside the Strait of Hormuz and within easy reach of Iranian forces -- will be increasingly tenuous." (E)

What should be noted in response to the above excerpt is that at no point has the Australian government declared that it would not allow US naval use of Australian bases, quite the opposite in fact. After the release of the CSIS report, the main concern in Australia was related to whether Australia would agree to a US carrier fleet being based at HMAS Stirling, concerns that the Australian government moved quickly to dispel (and which the CSIS report did not repeat in its final recommendations to the US Senate Committee on Defence, as outlined here by one of the report's authors, Dr Michael Green). Although it could be argued that Australia already plays host to US bases, namely at Pine Gap (E) and again with the recent stationing of US Marines in Darwin, the US does not exercise unilateral control over bases in Australia. Any agreement drawn up by the armed forces of both countries explicitly notes that facilities in Australia are to be jointly administered.  

Defence Minister Smith, in his response to the CSIS report and media speculation, noted that Australia expected to see a much greater use of Fleet Base West (HMAS Stirling) by the US Navy,  hence at no stage did Australia "torpedo" the idea of US naval assets using Australian bases or being housed in them.  Furthermore, Mr Smith explicitly made mention of the importance of the Indian Ocean and the manner in which Australia might assist the US in maintaining a increased naval presence in the region. Hence the suggestion that Australia was somehow prevaricating in its reponse to the stationing of US naval assets in its ports is unfair and needed to be corrected.