This week’s events got off to a particularly notable start with the visit over the weekend by PM Abe to Washington (in a trip underscored by the byline – “Japan is back” – Link: J). Given the emphasis Abe has placed on the US-Japan alliance and the need for a “renewal” in bilateral ties, the trip pretty much fulfilled the expectations projected onto it. Namely, that Abe would announce just how closely US-Japan ties had become (which he duly did, going so far to state that they had been “restored”), that the TPP would be mentioned but then sidelined as an issue in order to focus on security, and that China would be given a lecture on how to behave (Link: J). With a domestic audience concerned about the effect of the TPP on Japanese agriculture (as outlined here – Link: J), the release of a joint statement noting that the abolition of all tariffs was not a pre-condition to joining in negotiations was greeted with enthusiasm from the Keidanren and suspicion from JA and other agriculture industry representatives ne lobbyists (Link).

Part of this suspicion has to deal with the Abe government’s definition of what constitutes “sacred ground” (a literal translation of the Japanese term 聖域) in relation to goods not covered by tariff exemptions (given that Abe had laid down as a pre-condition that Japan would not participate in any agreement that did not exempt “sacred grounds”). The government has been particularly coy on this issue, knowing full well that to suggest lifting all tariffs on rice, soy, wheat and fisheries would set off a wave of panic among rural LDP seats with the (justifiable) fear that rural industries would be overwhelmed by cheap imports of agricultural goods from countries such as the US, Canada, Australia, and Chile.  The reassurances that tariff abolition is not required to join in negotiations was taken by JA to mean that tariff abolition will eventually be imposed on Japan and that Japan should therefore keep its distance. That would be fine if JA offered its own solution to the stagnation present within Japanese agriculture, but no such plan exists (farming involves hard labour coupled with serious overheads and no guarantee of returns – no wonder Japan’s youth aren’t all that interested in it as a career – Link: J), and that lack of an alternative speaks volumes about where JA’s interests lie and how hard it will fight to keep its monopoly on industry representation.

As for security ties, no real surprises there, mainly the re-affirmation of the importance of the US-Japan alliance to the Asia Pacific, a re-invigorated 2+2 agenda (more joint exercises on the way) and an agreement to go ahead with an application to lay the foundations for the building of Henoko military airport to replace Futenma (Link: J. Clearly Abe will not countenance any dissent from Okinawa on this question, and has put the plan firmly back on the table in exactly the same format as the previous LDP government. Calls for understanding will follow, no doubt). Moreover, Abe called China to task over the Senkaku Islands, explicitly stating that they are Japanese territory and that Japan will not allow any attempt to change that state of affairs. Abe was also quoted by the Washington Post as saying that China had a “deeply ingrained” need to dispute territory with Japan and other regional states (Link), a comment that initially sparked a demand from China that it be withdrawn (Link: J) before MOFA pointed out that Abe had been misquoted, and had in fact said that both “politicians and business leaders were aware of how deeply ingrained maritime issues were (presumably in the region)” (Link).

So Abe laid out Japan’s argument in detail for the US media, and did they pay attention? Partly, although as Okamura Jun noted, there weren’t too many US journalists in attendance at the bilingual Q & A at the CSIS last Friday (or else they were there but couldn’t be bothered asking questions) (Link). This is surprising, given that Japan is still the principal US ally in the Asia Pacific (sorry Oz, we’re doing pretty well, but we don’t have the same degree of technical expertise or personnel numbers, not to mention the fact that we don’t unilaterally allow the US to operate bases here), but it may be that domestic concerns have overtaken any focus on foreign affairs among the US media. Certainly a swathe of looming tax cuts (or sequestration) may ultimately affect how the US conducts its foreign policy (Link), and that has many a pundit talking (present company included).

It was with a mixture of mirth and surprise that I read an op-ed (firewalled) by Professor Bruce Jacobs of Monash University in relation to the current dispute between China and Japan concerning the Senkaku Islands. As a quick summary, what Professor Jacobs essentially said was that China, in seeking to force its territorial claims on other states for nationalistic goals, was behaving in a manner similar if not identical to the fascist states of Germany and Japan in the 1930s and 40s, and that appeasement (which, in Professor Jacobs case, presumably means surrendering to China’s demands) would not bring about peace and would merely encourage China to make further claims. Pretty inflammatory stuff, and guaranteed to provoke a reaction from some sector of China’s bureaucracy (probably a protest to DFAT, as occurred when the ANU published some some rather unpleasant truths about the CCP’s method of rule).

The fact that Professor Jacobs has decided to throw down the gauntlet to China by comparing its actions to those of fascists might be seen as overly provocative, and certainly China will object by stating that (1) its claims are based on historical documentation, (2) China suffered terribly at the hands of fascist Japan, and to accuse China of engaging in dictatorial, racist, fascist behaviour (yes, Prof. Jacobs did make those accusations) insults the memory of those who died during the “war against fascism”, and (3) it is Japan who sparked the dispute over the Senkaku Islands by disturbing the status quo established by the governments of both countries during the 1970s.

By launching intrusions into Japan’s EEZ, reportedly targeting SDF vessels and aircraft, encouraging inflammatory rhetoric from domestic commentators (both military and civilian), suspending exports, ignoring (if not outright snubbing) Japanese delegates at international forums, and allowing large scale protests condemning Japan to occur in multiple places across China (a trend which will not abate so long as the CCP believes it serves a useful purpose in diverting domestic anger, hence this summer may again witness protests against Japan on a scale similar if not greater than last year’s), the CCP has not convinced anyone that it is prepared to resolve its dispute with Japan in good faith. Its attempts to browbeat its neighbours into accepting its territorial position with the threat of force belie its rhetoric of seeking a “peaceful rise”, unless this refers to the emergence of a docile domestic audience (ne middle class) that accepts the rule of the CCP and contributes to the generation of wealth for the state at the expense of China’s foreign relations. Peaceful in one sense, but overall a pretty misleading statement.

Still, I can’t quite gauge why Prof. Jacobs wrote his article, unless it was only in defence of what he believes are the threats China poses to “world democracy” (as he stated at the conclusion of his op-ed).  The forcefulness by which he disputes China’s claims to the East China and South China Seas suggests a growing sense of anger at how China is conducting itself and the apparent nonchalance by which it dismisses any criticism of its conduct. Then again, he may have written the article to answer the claims of those “former Australian politicians” he believes are promoting the “big lie” of Chinese sovereignty over the islands (on this point, he appears to be pointing towards an article by former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans for Project Syndicate – Link -  that claimed that Japan had not shown enough contrition for its wartime activities and that the Abe Cabinet may be trying to ramp up nationalist sentiment in Japan).  

Nonetheless, Prof. Jacobs article does provide some contrast to the suggestions of Sourabh Gupta of Samuels International. Professor Gupta’s suggestion was that both China and Japan revert to the situation between them before September, 2010 and that neither side continue to press their claims against those of the other. His reason for hope lies in the numerous bilateral agreements signed between both countries and others in the region regarding joint development of oil and gas fields, marine research, and fisheries access. This may come to pass in time, however the Senkaku Islands are a highly politicised issue that neither side will back away from without concessions from the other. Japan has administered the area since the 1970s, and regards it as its territory. China, while not administering the area directly, argues that the islands have always been Chinese and is prepared to enforce its claim using semi-military means.  

Asking China to accept the status quo doesn’t appear to yield much by way of results, not when so much has been made of its claims. This doesn’t mean that such a resolution can’t be reached, but merely makes it less likely. For China to agree to discuss its claims with Japan, cease its patrols of the Senkaku area, and have the situation revert to the pre-2010 status quo would require political and possible physical courage on the part of the members of the Chinese Central Committee, particularly President Xi Jinping. With the transition process only just concluded, it is too early to expect any changes in China’s stance, so if both sides can avoid escalating the situation to the point at which shots are fired, a resolution will inevitably be reached.

The incursion into Japanese airspace above Hokkaido last week of two Sukhoi Su-27 aircraft has given rise to speculation as to the reasons for such an action, and what it signifies for the direction of Japan-Russian relations.  Given that Russia has a long history of making incursions into Japanese airspace, the incident in itself would ordinarily have been passed off as posturing, yet in the current climate of increasing tension between Japan and China over the issue of the Senkaku Islands, for Russia to have entered Japanese airspace, knowing full well that it was doing so given the history of such incidents, increases the possibility that Moscow is seeking leverage on the question of the Northern Territories and testing Japan’s resolve.

One possible reason for this behaviour may lie in the need for President Vladimir Putin to be seen as uncompromising in Russia’s claims to the Northern Territories. Given the assurances made by former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev that Russia’s claims to the territory were not negotiable, being upstaged by a former deputy in the defence of Russian interests would not sit well with a figure such as Putin. Putin may also be seeking to draw Abe Shinzo out on the issue, getting him to re-assert Japan’s claims to see whether he is indeed committed to resolution or whether he is bound by the rhetoric used during the recent election campaign on Russia’s “illegal” occupation of the territory (J).

If the incursions continue, Russia may well be attempting to use Japan’s dispute with China as a further test of Japan’s alliance with the US, probing the extent to which it can provoke Japan before garnering a response from Washington. Such a strategy would also play into the hands of Putin, as it would be taken as evidence that the US was seeking to interfere in a bilateral issue that President Putin had previously sought to resolve (J). 

The message from Russia could not be any clearer, given the intrusion occurred on a day marked as “Northern Territories Day” (E), in which calls are made for the return of the territories to Japanese sovereignty. Whether any progress in negotiation in made from here will depend on both sides entering talks in good faith. Given last week’s act, and Putin’s previous comments that there will be no halt to the development of the Kurile Islands, means that there will have to be an awful lot of negotiation before even an inkling of a resolution comes to light.

Events this week between China and Japan have, unfortunately, provoked an increase in tensions to a degree that raises the probability of an incident between the military forces of both countries. As was pointed out by Benjamin Schreer on the ASPI blog The Strategist, China now conceives of its position on the Senkaku Islands in the same manner as its relations with Taiwan, in that it will insist on its right to sovereignty over the islands and accommodate no attempt to reach a compromise lest this be perceived as weakness on its part.  The revelation (J) by Defence Minister Onodera on Tuesday that on two separate occasions in January, Chinese naval vessels (described as being of frigate class) used their fire-control radars to ping a SDF naval vessel located 3km from their position, as well as pinging an SH-60J Seahawk helicopter, set off a storm of diplomatic protest from Japan. The Abe cabinet subsequently warned that such provocative acts were incredibly dangerous in the current bilateral climate, called on the Chinese to exercise greater restraint (J), and suggested that China be removed as a permanent member of the UN Security Council for violating article six of the UN constitution(J).

In a press conference at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Wednesday, China’s diplomatic arm stated that it was investigating the background of the incidents to determine whether Japan’s protests were factually based, which essentially implied that the Ministry had no idea that they had taken place(J).  This raises a particularly worrying question which stems from comments made in the Japanese defence white paper of 2012. In the paper, it stated that there were elements within the PLA which are inclined to act unilaterally and influence foreign policy without recourse to other government organs (as analysed here). The fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly stated it had no idea what the PLAN were doing or had done five months previously gives further credence to Japan’s analysis of China’s internal dynamic, and suggests that should an incident occur near the Senkaku Islands, China’s diplomatic arm will be forced to react to a situation without warning thereby undermining its credibility with foreign governments.

It appears that this act of provocation on the part of the PLAN was an attempt to test the reaction of the US to any threat to Japan’s control of the Senkaku Islands, as well as testing the resolve of the Abe Cabinet and its claims to sovereignty over the island. If Japan had retaliated, China could claim it was the victim of Japanese aggression, a position the domestic Chinese media has been promoting over the last few months in anticipation of the Abe cabinet’s accession to power (E). The PLAN could then point to the need for greater naval surveillance of the islands to ward off Japanese attacks on Chinese vessels, and that any subsequent retaliation by China against Japan would be justified by Japan’s initial act. The Central Committee would find its options for negotiating with Japan reduced, for domestic anger directed at Japan (and the US as Japan’s principal ally) would demand tough rhetoric on the part of Xi Jinping and other senior members of the Central Committee. Far from being able to dictate events, the CCP would find itself being drawn into a conflict propagated by the PLA, the outcome of which would have dire consequences for the region.

The role of the military in forcing the hand of government is a phenomenon that is centuries old and confined to no specific continent or society.   The acts of the PLAN indeed do bring to mind those of officers within the Imperial Japanese Army in the prelude to the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. In that instance, an act of sabotage perpetrated by army officers, with the tacit approval of their commanders, served as a pretext for the invasion of Manchuria. What the PLAN did off the Senkaku Islands could therefore be regarded as a Mukden-like Incident in reverse, providing justification for military action on the basis of overt hostility on the part of Japan. Like the Mukden Incident it could provoke a wider conflict, with global bodies powerless to intervene as the states involved harden their stance and resent any resolution that would weaken their claims to sovereignty and right to self defence.      

In all, it is a disturbing development, and hopefully there will be no repeat of it.

As for the news of an incursion of Japanese airspace by two Sukhoi Su-27 aircraft on Thursday, more on this in the next post.

Last Monday saw the first policy speech by newly elected PM Abe to parliament, a speech that was not expected to produce many red herrings in terms of policy direction. True to form, the initial parts of the speech focused on “crises and dangers” facing the nation while placing an emphasis on the need for a “strong economy” based upon the three “arrows” of large scale fiscal spending, flexible financial policies, and private investment (J). Interestingly enough, within the speech came this line… “最も大切なのは、未知の領域に果敢に挑戦をしていく精神です。(Most important of all, the spirit to challenge as yet unknown territory).”  Whether this meant investing more heavily abroad or attempting to shake up Japan’s own domestic market is unclear, but one can be reassured that it probably won’t result in the degree of “spirit” necessary to bring about change in the economy. As many others have already noted (E), Japan’s economic woes are structural, and only a fundamental change to the manner in which labour and industry operate will revive Japan’s fortunes in the long-term. Pushing more women into the workforce and raising the age of retirement only resolves current labour issues, not future ones, for there will be no uptake of workers in the future, meaning less consumption, and fewer profits for existing companies (as one commentator aptly put it – “robots make lousy consumers” (E). Immigration could solve some of the problems of an aging society, but Japan is not willing to take that path, preferring to keep its migrant intake to a minimum bound by short-term visas.

In terms of foreign relations, Abe did not spring any surprises on his audience, noting the importance of the US-Japan alliance (while mentioning that his government would “expend every effort” to reduce the burden of the Futenma base on Okinawa), Japan’s ties with Southeast Asia (for new friends are needed further afield when dealing with a rising power next door – note that China was not mentioned once in the text of the speech, and neither was South Korea, Russia, or Taiwan for that matter), and the Abe cabinet’s resolve to “firmly defend Japan’s territory and airspace”. Considering Abe’s role in past negotiations over the return of abductees from North Korea, his resolve to use “dialogue and pressure” to bring North Korea to the negotiating table appeared to be little more than lip-service, devoid of any new initiatives and merely following a tried-and-not particularly-successful formula. This may account for the reason this issue was met with desultory applause by those parliamentarians assembled to hear the speech.    

In all, it was a speech that left one with the impression that Abe was mouthing platitudes without a great deal of effort put into explaining “how” his cabinet was going to bring about this economic turnaround, social reformation, and diplomatic revival. If Abe is going to inspire others in the task of reform, he himself needs to lead by example, making those decisions will while politically painful at present will ultimately build the foundations for a more dynamic society. So far there’s been little evidence that this will happen.

As if to emphasise this point, Abe’s visit to Okinawa over the weekend merely reinforced the impression that his cabinet will maintain the status quo without any recourse to more novel or productive solutions. Take, for example, his announcement that his cabinet will endeavour to reduce the burden of the Futenma base on the Okinawan people. Successive cabinets have made that pledge, only one actually attempted to do something about it, and none have been able to make any headway with the Okinawan prefectural government on reaching an “understanding” in relation to the base. The reason is simple – the US-Japan defence treaty, and the need to maintain a credible deterrent to other powers in the region to deny them open access to the Pacific.  

If Abe did aim to reduce the burden of the military’s footprint on Okinawa, a distribution of assets to other prefectures would be a start, however the experience of the Hatoyama cabinet has frightened off any subsequent attempts to force prefectures to accept larger deployments of US and Japanese military assets in their backyards. So again and again successive PMs and defence ministers have made the trek to Naha, met with Governor Nakaima, and walked away with no greater understanding between both sides than occurred at the previous meeting (E).  What was that quote about the definition of insanity? (E)....   

Speaking of every old being new again (bit of a non sequitur but bare with me), there was some hullabaloo on the weekend surrounding an act of contrition by one Minegishi Minami (J) of the all-girl pop group AKB48 who, to atone for her having spent the evening at the residence of a background dancer belonging to another all-male pop group, shaved all of her hair off and offered up an apology on Youtube (subsequently taken down as of Monday - J). Ordinarily this would not be news, other than the fact that Minegishi had violated the terms of her contract with her employer by having romantic relations while an active member of the group. To shave one’s head, however, struck many as being a tad “extreme”, for while Japan does have a tradition of women cutting their hair short to signify a change in their relationships with men, head shaving is an act reserved for nuns or particularly adventurous hair dressers.

That being said, the fact that Minegishi felt the need to shave her head to show the depth of her remorse for her actions speaks volumes about the culture of the group she belongs to, and the ridiculous demands made of the young women within it. While some could argue that she knew of the risks of holding a relationship, to expect a 20 year old engaged in the entertainment industry to act without recourse to her emotions betrays the ugly commercialism behind the group and the motives of its creators.

One does wonder whether Minegishi’s act has set a precedent, both in the entertainment world and the impressionable world of Japanese youth.