The subject of violence in the context of Japanese politics has received renewed attention with the publication of “Ruffians, Yakuza, Nationalists: The Violent Politics of Modern Japan, 1860-1960” by Eiko Maruko Siniawer.  This book, which details the exploits of shishi, bakuto and sōshi gangs of “violence specialists” that were a feature of Japanese political life during the early years of the modern state, is a fascinating glimpse into a world that has always been lingering near the surface of historical memory but which has not yet (at least in English) received a great deal of attention. 

Starting with the closing years of the Edo period, Siniawer outlines how younger, and often poorer, members of the jizamurai class provided their muscle in support of the restoration of and resistance to Imperial rule (i.e., think the Shinsengumi, along with the Imperial supporters from Satsuma and Chōshū). It then details how these protagonists eventually faded away, to be replaced by a different sort of political activist - one that initially acted on behalf of individual patrons (often providing personal protection services to politicians against their political enemies), but which in time joined groups that supported political parties, fought against rival gangs (from both the left and right wing of the political spectrum) and contributed to the spread of Japanese imperialism.

Although the book does not include any breakdown of the number of incidents of political violence per year, which would be useful to determine if during the course of a century there was a remarkable upswing in violence for political purposes, it illustrates in vivid detail many of the more famous incidents of mayhem that punctuated political life during the nascent years of Japanese parliamentary democracy, and how political violence transformed from an instrument of democratic expression to a tool of imperialism and the rise of the fascist state.

It does seem, from the evidence provided, that to enter politics during the period of 1870 – 1930 was to take your life in your hands, and that serious injury or death could result from an inopportune meeting with ‘ruffians’ supporting your rivals or who simply took a disliking to you and whatever political platform you espoused.

What makes this book even more remarkable is the amount of detail it provides about the protagonists of this violence. While I am aware of Japan’s violent political past (and present, if the activities of Diet MPs during debate on the Abe cabinet secrecy laws are any indication), I was not sure of the extent to which it was applied and who practiced it.  Ruffians provides that background and more, down to details on the type of clothing worn by these practitioners of political violence.

Siniawer also makes the important point that political violence was not unique to Japan, and that similar incidents of groups of young men using their physical strength to impose their views on others was a feature in US and UK politics during the same period.   What is interesting is the way in which political violence was encouraged in Japan, and how it became so entwined with the public conscience regarding political action that it would distort and undermine the very democracy that had allowed that conscience to emerge in the first place. 

It is an excellent resource for those seeking to understand how political ideals were strongly contested in Japan during the century following the Meiji Restoration, and I can’t recommend it highly enough.  

The response to Malcolm Turnbull’s visit to Tokyo on Thursday last week is in, and it is, in the best (or worst) traditions of foreign policy analysis, ambiguous. While there was certainly plenty of praise for Turnbull and Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s advocacy for the continuation of talks on the future of the TPP-11, with the possibility of an agreement being concluded in March, the real focus of the media on the visit was what it might portend for the future of Japan-Australia security relations. In the end, it didn’t amount to much – essentially an announcement that discussions on the conclusion of a reciprocal access agreement (which the Australian press insists on calling a ‘visiting forces agreement’) would continue, with another vague timeframe of ‘as early as feasible’ being put forward for the possible conclusion of the agreement.

As a result of the lowering of expectations (what one commentator called ‘noteworthy but not newsworthy’), foreign policy analysis has chosen to view this visit as a ‘missed opportunity’, or at the very least evidence that Japan and Australia still have some way to go before they become truly close security partners. 

However one curious aspect of media commentary on PM Turnbull’s visit was the prevalent use of the term “alliance” to describe the relationship between Japan and Australia, despite it being obvious that Japan and Australia are not allies in the strict legal sense of the term. If “ally” somehow corresponds to “partner, colleague, or like-minded practitioner”, then Australia certainly has a lot of “allies” (to be fair, Australian politicians themselves sometimes use this term apparently without too much thought when they wish to describe close relations with another country, irrespective of whether an actual alliance exists with the country in question. Japanese commentators are more precise, preferring the term ‘quasi-ally’ and its ambiguity rather than any direct reference to an ‘ally’). 

Other points raised in commentary wondered that if Australia was planning on becoming a major defence exporter, why didn’t it send Christopher Pyne to Japan along with PM Turnbull in order to further promote Australian defence exports? While timing issues and the fact that Pyne was already slated to visit India for talks with India’s Defence Minister ahead of the Raisina Dialogue might have played some role in diverting Pyne to the subcontinent, the fact that PM Turnbull visited Narashino base and was talking about the SDF use of the Bushmaster seemed like an opportunity missed for Australia’s defence industry, especially given the fact that Pyne has been very active in zipping about to other countries in the region selling the merits of Australia’s defence technology – but not Japan. 

Nevertheless, the visit produced some significant outcomes showing how far the defence relationship has come between Japan and Australia.  For starters, this year will see the first RAAF-JASDF exercise conducted in Japan (might it also be possible for Japan to participate in EX Pitch Black? Possibly, but two air force exercises in one year might be a bit much for both sides).  Furthermore, in a first for an Australian PM, PM Turnbull was invited to visit the Narashino base, which is the principal base for Japan’s special forces units, and he sat in on a meeting of Japan’s NSC.  As the press noted, these are privileges that are not bestowed on too many foreign leaders when they visit Japan, so clearly PM Abe wanted to make it clear to the Australians that he is prepared to actively include an Australian aspect to Japan’s defence apparatus at the highest levels.

The question now is whether Australia reciprocates this enthusiasm. Ever mindful of the watchful eye of China, PM Turnbull was very forthcoming in praise for China’s efforts vis-à-vis North Korea, and did not seek to portray China’s efforts in the South China Sea in a negative light, even suggesting that the situation there might be resolved (which sounds a tad over-optimistic). Meanwhile Turnbull and Abe were scathing in their comments towards North Korea, even suggesting that the world must not take the sudden thawing in North Korea’s attitude towards South Korea as an indication of a willingness by the North to discuss nuclear weapons. On this aspect of regional relations, at least Japan and Australia are seemingly in lock step.

Still, Turnbull’s presence at the Narashino base is a portent for what PM Abe might expect when he visits Australia next year – perhaps a visit to Victoria Barracks in Sydney will be in order to speak to the commando regiment there, or perhaps RAAF Base Glenbrook, or Garden Island to view Australia’s next generation naval fleet? At any rate, hopefully before then the RAA will be in place in order to facilitate a broader range of exercises between both countries, and who knows, both leaders might have a concluded TPP to spruik as they seek another avenue for cooperation.

This Thursday PM Turnbull will be paying a lightning visit to Tokyo to meet with PM Abe and (ostensibly) reach an agreement on the content of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between Japan and Australia – the first of its kind between Japan and any country other than the US. It will give a legal basis for the presence of the defence forces of either country when undertaking reciprocal training exercises with each other, as well as outlining how each side is to provide fuel, medical assistance, legal aid, legal culpability, and a whole host of other issues that may emerge when defence forces train and operate together. 

It is the culmination of at least a decade of negotiations and agreements made between Japan and Australia that stretch back to the security cooperation agreement reached between PM Abe (in his first crack at that position) and PM Howard in 2007.  It is also in keeping with the growing defence arrangements that both countries have set in place as a hedging policy against uncertainty.  As of now, Australia has an annual prime ministerial meeting with Japan, an annual 2+2 meeting between the Japanese and Australian foreign and defence ministers, an acquisition and cross servicing agreement with Japan (updated during last year’s visit to Sydney by PM Abe), and an information sharing agreement with Japan (not to mention the annual defence exercises of Southern Jackaroo and Nichigo Trident). 

The addition of a VFA to these measures will expand the scope of cooperation between both sides and ultimately define the manner by which the SDF and ADF will operate with one another in the future. It will reinforce the idea in Japanese defence circles of Australia as a ‘quasi-ally’, for no other country apart from the US has developed such progressive, broad-reaching ties with the SDF. For Japan, the possibility of undertaking more extensive military exercises with Australia is an attractive prospect for a country that lacks the space to be able to conduct exercises on the scale of those in Australia. It will increase the level of awareness in the defence forces of either country of the operating procedures and military culture of their Japanese and Australian counterparts, and add to the value of both to the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The gradual implementation of the VFA will inevitably lead to criticism that it is provocative towards China, that Australia is hostile to China’s presence in the region and that it is seeking to exploit this with Japan in order to contain China’s “rise”.  Yet the agreement, rather than being a knee-jerk reaction to China’s increased belligerence, has been in the works for years, and is more the culmination of a gradual move towards inter-regional defence support than a straight out backlash against Chinese military expansion.

The next step in the progress of Japan-Australia defence ties will be defence technology sharing, which has a precedent in the recent agreement Japan made with the UK to undertake joint research on a missile project.  Whether Australia reaches the same level of cooperation depends on what we have to offer, although Australia’s use of upgraded CEA phased array radar systems on its new AWDs and its decision to install the Aegis system on its (soon to be announced) future frigates are certainly of interest to Japan and two areas that both countries could jointly explore. 

In the meantime both PMs will be devoting their attention to how to get momentum on the TPP moving forward after the hiccup of last year’s APEC meeting in Vietnam.  Both countries poured their diplomatic resources into getting a TPP 11 agreement confirmed, only to be disrupted at the last hurdle by a disgruntled Canada. With Davos coming up shortly, PM Turnbull will be keen to know what PM Abe believes will be achieved at this year’s trade meeting, and where he sees the course of trade relations going in the Indo-Pacific.

So it will be a short visit, but one of much promise for bilateral relations for the remainder of 2018.  At the very least, it will occur at a time of relatively low domestic political activity in both countries, so it should garner some interest from the press.  Only time will tell when the agreement will finally be signed, but all indications are that both governments want this document in place ASAP, and so expect another announcement at some point in the very near distant future.      

This year marks the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, a pivotal moment in the history of Japan when the feudal policy of isolation was abandoned and Japan itself became a ‘nation state’, united under a central government and with the Emperor at the apex of a power structure divided between parliamentary rule and the military. The lead-up to this period was one of great upheaval, with many sacrificed during the course of founding a modern nation. 

One of the tragic figures to emerge during the decade leading up to the eventual restoration of Imperial rule was Saigo Takamori, principal negotiator of the Satsuma (Shimazu) clan, whose dedication to the overthrow of Tokugawa rule and the installation of Imperial rule would sow the seeds of his own destruction.

Given this is the centenary and a half of the events of 1868, NHK has launched its new ‘Taiga’ drama. For those who don’t know what these are, every year, starting in January, NHK (Japan’s national broadcaster) launches a drama series based on the life of some famous historical figure in Japanese history.  These dramas are known as “Taiga” (大河) (literally ‘great river’, as in the flow of time) and have for decades been a staple of Japanese television.

However, in this age of internet TV and satellite broadcasting, the popularity of Taiga drama has steadily been declining as audiences find other programs to watch which don’t take an entire year of dedicated viewing in order to find out how they end.  Aware of this dilemma, NHK have tried to offset the rather staid, stiff image of Taiga dramas by putting pop culture figures (namely young actors and singers) in the title roles, with very mixed results. 

I myself have been a fan of Taiga drama since watching ‘Aoi’, the drama outlining the lives of the first three Tokugawa shoguns, way back in 1999.  Others I have enjoyed since then have been ‘Shinsengumi!’ in 2005, ‘Furin Kazan’ (about the life of Yamamoto Kansuke) in 2007 (if I remember correctly), ‘Aohime’ in 2009, and ‘Taira no Kiyomori’ in  2012.  This last drama was notable in that it broke with tradition in depicting 12th century Japan with more gritty realism instead of relying on actors in pristine clothing and with flawless skin pretending to be commoners in the otherwise grimy conditions of medieval Japan (this series wasn’t very popular with the general viewing public, who apparently objected to the level of ‘accuracy’ that the drama was attempting to achieve).

So I have taken interest in the fact that this year’s series, titled “Sego don” (mimicking the Satsuma dialect pronunciation of “Saigo dono”) has not exactly gotten off to a stellar start. The first episode only secured 15.4% of viewers, the lowest number of viewers in recent years, and certainly the lowest since “Hana mou” in 2015 (which only grabbed 16.7% of viewers’ attention). As for why “Sego don” might not have sparked much viewer interest, this may be because the cast are relatively unknown, or might stem from the fact that while Saigo Takamori is a famous person from Japanese history, he is one of those tragic figures who perished in a lost cause, and thus not likely to gain much interest from a public looking for inspirational leaders.

Yet another reason might lie in the fact that the producers of the series, in their desire to stick closely to the source material (the 1963 novel “Sego don” written by Hayashi Mariko), have chosen to pepper the lead characters’ dialogue with words and phrases taken from the Satsuma dialect. This is understandable from a historical point of view, but for the average viewer looking for some entertainment on a Sunday evening, it’s a bit arduous to read subtitles in Japanese while watching a Japanese drama (one imagines that this has gone over very well in Kagoshima Prefecture, however).  Given that the Satsuma dialect is difficult for most Japanese people to understand, having the dialogue of a major drama conducted in what almost sounds like a foreign language is probably not going to lead to ratings success.

Nevertheless, it’s still early days in the series, and viewers might start to tune in more once the more dramatic side of Saigo’s life (namely the period between 1860-1868) gets underway.  For those who can’t wait, and can read English, I’d recommend “The Last Samurai” by Mark Ravina for some background on the Saigo’s life and achievements.

Since this has been such an issue for more than two months now, I’ve decided the time has come to delve into the continuing malarkey surrounding Japan’s Sumo Association and the fallout from Harumafuji’s decision to resign from his position of Yokozuna.

On Thursday, Takanohana Koji, himself a former Yokozuna and director within the JSA, and in charge of the stable that oversaw Harumafuji, was booted off the board of directors and demoted two places for his apparent reluctance to report to the JSA on the incident involving Harumafuji. The board found that despite Takanohana’s admission that he went to the police to report on the incident soon after it occurred, his failure to inform the JSA board immediately after the event and his refusal to attend a meeting of the JSA crisis management panel until December 25 were grounds for removing Takanohana from his post.

As has been widely reported, it is the first time that the JSA executive has removed a director from its ranks, itself a fairly newsworthy event. However further details have come to light which reveal more details about Takanohana’s attitude towards the JSA board and why he behaved in the manner he did.

Takanohana was admitted to the JSA executive in 2014 by former JSA chairman Kitanoumi at the relatively young age of 41 (Takanohana, along with his brother Wakanohana, were revered as Yokozuna throughout the 90s and early 2000s). Kitanoumi made Takanohana general operations manager, which was a sign of the confidence he had in Takanohana’s abilities. However in November 2015 Kitanoumi suddenly died, thereby leaving a vacancy for the position of JSA chairman.

In March 2016 elections for the chairman’s position took place pitting Takanohana against another former Yokozuna, Hakkaku Nobuyoshi. Hakkaku won the election, and appointed Takanohana as the chief of the tourism department of the JSA, a position that effectively removed Takanohana from the executive. To add injury to insult, Hakkaku then appointed one of his own stable’s members, Oguruma Oyakata, to the position of managing director of the JSA, effectively making him Hakkaku’s deputy. 

Takanohana appears to have something of an axe to grind against Hakkaku, and that might make its presence felt at the next chairman’s election. Takanohana has around 8 close allies on the board, and with another 10 supporters would have more than enough votes to clinch the top position in the organization.  The main problem here, however, would be whether the existing executive would acknowledge the result of the election, given that they had previously removed Takanohana from his position for acting in contempt of their authority.  If Takanohana was elected, and then proceeded to implement his own plan of reform, quite a few executives might object and seek to block Takanohana from exercising his authority.

So far, Takanohana has not spoken in public in relation to the controversy surrounding him, so his intentions are only known to a close circle of allies. It is highly likely that he will put himself forward as a candidate for chairman at the next election (scheduled for this year), if anything to ensure the prompt removal of Hakkaku from any position of authority. This, of course, will only perpetuate the degree of hostility between the two, and could split the JSA which would affect sumo operations and ultimately the public’s enjoyment of tournaments.  Takanohana will accept his punishment for now, but he is biding his time, and the issue will flare up again either next month or in March when electoral matters bring it to a head.