This particular post has been prompted by a bit of reading I did recently of Ikegami Akira’s “Political School” (published in 2012). Ikegami, a long-time commentator on Japan’s political parties, politicians, and Japan’s relations with the world, devotes part of the first chapter of his book to an examination of what he believes to be growing apathy among Japan’s youth (in this case those citizens aged between 20-35) towards politics and how this will impact on society as a whole. Ikegami argues that in the midst of an aging society, politicians of all persuasions are more inclined to support measures for older citizens than concentrate on those for youth as older citizens are more likely to visit polls on election day to cast their vote (pp.17, 40-43). It therefore makes greater political sense to concentrate on policies that advocate issues of interest to senior citizens (pensions, aged care, disability insurance) than to consider policies that will assist future generations of voters. Moreover, Ikegami writes that in the post-Cold War world, ideology has become less relevant and certainly less likely to inspire political involvement by younger voters. As a consequence, traditional parties such as the JCP and SPJ have lost the youth vote and are slowly becoming irrelevant to the future of political discourse in Japan.

Yet is this actually the case? Are younger voters in Japan apathetic towards politics, or have the usual standards for measuring political involvement missed a shift in voter activity among Japan’s youth? Statistics released by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications following the Upper House elections of July last year (J, PDF) tend to support the conclusion that Japan’s youth are moving away from active involvement in politics. Voter participation among 20-24 year olds was the lowest of all age groups at just 31.18%, and no other age group up to 40 years of age surpassed the 50% mark. By contrast, voter participation rates among older age groups exceeded 60% or more (particularly those among the recently retired). Based on this result, Ikegami’s thesis appears to be solid.

 This particular article (J) from Nipponseiji.com also gives pause for thought. In the 2012 Lower House elections, only 37.9% of voters aged in their 20s turned out to vote, less than half that of those aged in their 60s. However, when the Cabinet Office’s Policy on Cohesive Society Office released its findings on global youth attitudes towards various social issues in 2010 (J) (a survey conducted every five years), it found that Japanese youth had the highest level of interest in politics compared to youth in South Korea, the US, the UK, and France.  In another barrage of statistics, the Association for Promoting Fair Elections released a report into the 2012 Lower House election which surveyed the attitudes towards politics of 3,000 voters aged over 20. It found that among those in 20s, only 14.4% had any interest in the election, rising to 31.9% among those in their 30s (J, PDF).

So what does this tell us? On the one hand, it does appear as though youth attitudes towards politics were much more positive in the early months of the DPJ government than they were before the Lower House elections of 2012, when voter dissatisfaction with the DPJ resulted in them being replaced by the LDP/New Komeito coalition. Perhaps this too then explains why youth voter turnout during last year’s Upper House election was so limited – the return to an LDP/New Komeito government cannot have inspired the youth of Japan to take an interest in politics, particularly when the issues being discussed had little direct relevancy to the youth vote (although that doesn’t really explain why the youth vote had more interest in politics in 2010 either, given the fact that the issues at the time still revolved around questions of social security and foreign relations and were of little relevance to youth).

There are many questions left unanswered by all of this. For example, what is the cause of all this apathy, and has anything been done to address it on a federal level (the picture accompanying this post does suggest so, but how effective has that campaign been)? Do the combined effects of a falling birthrate and aging society mean that younger Japanese no longer believe that the nation’s destiny lies in their hands but in those of their parent’s generation? Is it a consequence of social attitudes towards politics, that since only the wealthy or party-endorsed candidates have any chance of being elected, political involvement is a waste of time, and since these candidates are only interested in re-election, what is the point of trying to get them to endorse youth issues when all they concentrate on is securing votes from the largest group of voters who will turn up on election day?  I’m quite sure that some form of social research must have been done on these questions, but I haven’t yet had the time to search for it.

However I did find this. According to this particular piece that appeared on the Giin-navi site in 2012 (J), apathy towards politics amongst younger voters began to climb following the establishment of greater economic security and economic growth.  Political parties didn’t help matters either, for whereas youth in the 50s and 60s had given support to Communist or Socialist ideals in great numbers, the increasing wealth of society as a whole took the sheen off Marxism/Leninism, and encouraged voters to accept the status quo as a necessary condition for prosperity. With few ideals left to fight for, political parties splintered and reformed as separate entities, different in name but essentially promoting the same message. As Japan’s domestic political landscape remained virtually unchanged for half a century (except for a brief period in 1993-1995), people’s expectations towards politics and politicians appears to have dropped off despite the economic malaise of the 1990s.

This is only part of the answer, I feel. I may return to this subject again at a future date, certainly after I have gathered further resources that can explain in detail how generational differences, economic circumstances, ideology, social expectations, and political activity itself have all contributed to a ‘greying’ of Japan’s voter base.

Monday this week saw news organisations in Japan (and abroad) report on the release of rather lacklustre Japanese economic data for the end of last year, with the economy only registering growth of 0.3% in the fourth quarter against projections of 0.7%.Despite this, Finance Minister Aso Tarō put a positive spin on things, saying that the economy was still steadily growing (this was the fourth successive quarter for growth).

Given the increase in consumption tax scheduled to begin from April 8th this year (which may account for a brief spike in consumer spending), the combined effects of a still sluggish global economy, a weaker Japanese yen, weaker demand for Japanese products, and cautious domestic spending signals difficult days ahead for Abenomics.

The significance of an increased level of consumption tax is certainly weighing on the average Japanese consumer, with 54% of respondents to this Yomiuri Shimbun poll (J) saying that they believed their household spending would decrease as a consequence of the tax hike. The unpopularity of the tax increase has not had a noticeable effect on the Abe government’s popularity however, with the same poll showing that support remains at 60%, only marginally down from the 62% recorded earlier last month.

Yet with wages not expected to grow beyond 0.4%, the effect of increased consumption tax could take further steam out of domestic demand, which may be positive in terms of keeping a lid on Japan’s burgeoning deficit but which will prove a drag on growth. According to an NHK poll taken earlier this month, 49% of respondents did not think that the economic recovery spurred by Abenomics was personally benefitting them, with 15% answering that is was and 34% undecided (J). While PM Abe may have called on private industry to increase wages as a necessary condition to ensure the continuation of a 2% inflation rate (J), business may not be convinced as to the wisdom of doing this while growth remains so modest (despite Yomiuri again using a poll to show that 46% of companies surveyed expected to increase wages over the fiscal year. It should be noted that a predominant number of these businesses are related to the construction industry, a major beneficiary of the ‘second arrow’ in the Abenomics bow – i.e., large scale investment in domestic infrastructure projects (J).

Others have pointed this out on numerous occasions, as have I, but the real test of Abe’s commitment to economic stimulation lies in the third arrow of Abenomics:  structural reform. Abe has certainly been pushing for greater trade liberalisation, and is currently pursuing EPAs with a number of countries to help create greater incentives for investment both in Japan and abroad. While preparing the domestic market for foreign investors, Abe has also been calling for changes to employment laws to provide greater certainty for Japan’s large number of non-permanent workers, along with an increase in female workplace participation.

So far, this has mostly amounted to rhetoric with little by way of concrete proposals, and does not really address either the demographic issues facing Japan nor the rigidity of Japan’s labour practices and immigration laws, but as this is the ‘arrow’ with the greatest potential to cure Japan of its economic malaise, one cannot fault Abe for being more cautious with his approach. With issues regarding educational reform, national security, and constitutional revision starting to creep back into the political narrative, there is a risk that economic priorities will be sidelined in favour of debate on the LDP’s pet subjects and that fiscal reform will start and end with EPAs. If economic growth is to occur it needs the third arrow as much if not more than the previous two, and some solid determination from Abe not to allow traditional vested interests (i.e the construction industry) to hijack the entire process of reform.  So far so good, but there is a long way to go.

By now most readers will be aware of the result of the Tokyo gubernatorial election held over the weekend, in which independent but LDP/New Komeito endorsed candidate Masuzoe Yoichi was elected (J) as the next Tokyo governor with more than two million votes in his favour. Masuzoe, a former LDP health minister, overcame challenges from JCP, SDP and Japan Federation of Bar Associations endorsed candidate Utsunomiya Kenji and former prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro (who himself had received endorsement from former LDP PM Koizumi Junichiro for his anti-nuclear energy stance) to become the 8th governor of Tokyo and its surrounding region (J). The election followed on from the resignation in December last year of former governor Inose Naoki amid allegations that Inose had accepted money from the Tokushūkai group, a pseudo medical-religious organisation with active links to the regime in North Korea (J).

So who is Masuzoe Yoichi, and what does he promise for Tokyo?

Much of the following synopsis of Masuzoe comes by way of the Huffington Post’s Japan page, hence I’ll admit here that this is primarily a translation of that information, interspersed with some observations of my own. Masuzoe (65) is a native of Fukuoka prefecture in Kyushu, who after graduating from the law department of the University of Tokyo, undertook postgraduate work studying international law and politics at the University of Paris. After returning to Tokyo in 1979, Masuzoe was appointed as an assistant professor to his alma mater at the ripe old age of 30.

In 1983, Masuzoe penned a book analysing French politics following the election of Francois Mitterand (under the title ‘Akai Bara wa saita ka?’, or ‘Did the red rose bloom?’). The publisher’s blurb on the rear of the book cover hailed Masuzoe as a ‘new type of international relations scholar’, and a figure to watch in academic circles. However in 1989, Masuzoe left Tōdai to establish his own research institute, dubbed, appropriately enough, the ‘Masuzoe Political and Economic Research Institute’. During the 90s, Masuzoe began to make a series of television appearances, predominantly in the role of a commentator on international relations and global developments*. In 1999, Masuzoe made his first run for the Tokyo governorship as an independent, where he came a respectable third. The same election saw Ishihara Shintarō elected as governor, which gives some idea as to the level of competition Masuzoe was up against.

In 2001 Masuzoe made a pitch for federal politics, standing as an LDP candidate for the Upper House. After being elected, Masuzoe served as backbencher until being appointed as health minister under the first Abe Cabinet in 2007. It was Masuzoe who was responsible for dealing with the so-called ‘vanishing pensions’ scandal that broke out in the same year (a result of flawed administrative practices by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, which meant that pensions accumulated at one workplace were not rolled over when an employee transferred to a different workplace ). After the LDP lost power in 2009, Masuzoe was vocal in his criticism of the LDP executive (of which Shinzo Abe was a member), and resigned from the party in April of 2010.  Masuzoe, with another six former Upper House LDP supporters, then formed the ‘New Reform Party’, an act for which he was punished by the LDP by having his name struck from its list of members (always an after-the-fact move by parties wishing to chastise rogue party members, more a symbolic act than an actual punishment. Incidentally, Masuzoe resigned as leader of the ‘New Reform Party’ in June of 2013 following the party’s failure to increase its membership).

Despite their fractured past, it seems that the LDP/New Komeito, when examining the possible options for the next governor of Tokyo, decided that Masuzoe was the ‘best of a bad lot’ and threw their support behind him. This was the first time a political party had embraced a member whom it had previously punished, and sets a precedent for the LDP that may come in handy in the future (J). Masuzoe will, of course, most likely be governor at the time of the Tokyo Olympics in 2020, and as an election slogan promised to give Tokyo the ‘greatest of all olympics’. 

Yet on the question of whether Masuzoe will give his consent to the restart of nuclear reactors that the Abe government has pinpointed as crucial to Japan’s economic recovery, no clear answer has been forthcoming. Bloomberg was reporting on Tuesday that Masuzoe had said that safety at Japan’s nuclear plants needs to be improved rather than shutting all such plants down, and that renewable energy use in Tokyo would be boosted to 20% of all power consumption ($).  Yet in a pre-election interview, Masuzoe revealed that he too supported moving away from reliance on nuclear energy, saying…”Tokyo is Japan’s largest consumer of electricity. We are able to enjoy a fruitful life because of electricity…The electricity that we use is made in Niigata and Fukushima. And I am thankful for it. That is precisely why I went to Fukushima after the disaster where, amid such sadness, I thought about what I could do for Fukushima. It was there that I decided that I too would support removing reliance on nuclear energy, and it’s something I’ve continued to talk about ever since” (J video).

The fact that Masuzoe received the support of the LDP will play no small influence on his position regarding nuclear energy, as will the fact that he received so much of the vote ahead of his anti-nuclear opponents Utsunomiya and Hosokawa (although this in part might have been because of the weather, which from all accounts was frightful across the Kanto region on Sunday, leading to a very low voter turnout (J).  Mind you, Masuzoe is not creature of the LDP executive, and is more likely to listen to the concerns of industry while advocating a shift to renewable, sustainable energies and placing a priority on disaster prevention and social welfare policies (J). While commentary on the electoral result has focused on Masuzoe as ‘Abe’s man’ in Shinjuku, time may prove such viewpoints to have been a tad premature.

*I am aware, of course, of Masuzoe’s thoughts regarding the suitability of women for high office made during his time as a media commentator. Essentially Masuzoe said that women can’t be leaders because they menstruate and are irrational. Needless to say, this did not go down very well with female voters, who used Twitter to urge a sex boycott for any man who voted in favour of Masuzoe on the weekend. Given the electoral result, I’d say there’s not much lovin’ going on in Tokyo at present.

This particular post admittedly comes a little late to the issue raised in the title above (which first appeared in domestic Japanese news at the end of January). Yet given the subject matter and its implications for the workings of the media in Japan, it might prove worthwhile to outlay some background to recent events concerning Japan’s national broadcaster, Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK, 日本放送協会), and questions concerning its apparent shift in ideology to embrace a more right-wing agenda.

During a press conference held on the 25th of January, recently appointed chairman of the NHK corporation, Momii Katsuto (70), when asked a question regarding demands by the South Korean government for compensation to those women forced to work as ‘comfort women’ during Japan’s imperial expansion period, responded by saying that while morally it was abhorrent to modern sensibilities, all countries had done it in the past. While claiming to be speaking off the record, Momii then went on to voice his objections to South Korea’s insistence on reparations, asking why it was that only Japan was being singled out for using ‘forced prostitution’, and that since South Korea had signed an agreement with Japan foregoing any claims of compensation, it was ‘odd’ that South Korea kept bringing it up (J). Momii later rescinded everything he said at the press conference, yet the repercussions had already begun (video of that press conference can be seen here).

On the 4th of February, a member of the NHK steering committee, novelist Hyakuta Naoki, attended a street rally at the western entrance of Shinjuku Station for Tokyo gubernatorial candidate Tamogami Yoshio, himself a noted rightist and social conservative. During the course of his rally speech, Hyakuta brought up US complicity in the bombing of Tokyo and the role of the Far East Trials to ‘absolve the US of its role in perpetrating a massacre’. He went on to deny that the Nanjing Massacre ever took place, and that in war all countries engaged in acts of wanton destruction. Hyakuta declared himself in favour of constitutional revision, and, in time honoured rightist tradition, called for the education system to be reformed to instruct Japan’s children on the ‘brilliance of the Japanese nation’ (J).

The Asahi Shimbun was quick to point out that such pronouncements were contrary to the articles of Japan’s broadcasting law (J), which states that members of political parties cannot become executives in the NHK organisation, that neutrality and balance of opinion must be maintained by the NHK, and that no NHK board members must engage in acts which would bring the organisation into disrepute. While one could be forgiven for regarding this as another spat between the national broadcaster and its rival network, its implications for broadcasting in Japan are quite serious.

For starters, members of the executive board of the NHK are chosen by the government of the day, meaning that in the case of Momii, he was plucked by the Abe government from a position at Unisys Japan to serve as chairman of a national broadcaster responsible for the dissemination of information both domestically and abroad.  As a majority of Japanese citizens rely on the NHK to inform them of social, political, and economic developments, any hint that the rigorous neutrality that the NHK has heretofore exercised is under threat causes waves among media commentary in Japan.

Of course, one could point out that in terms of program content, NHK does not exactly push the boundaries of controversy, with a majority of its broadcasting devoted to nature and cuisine documentaries, daytime dramas, chat shows and arts programs. Whatever news NHK conveys is seemingly devoid of bias, although the fact that the NHK is an integral part of the notorious ‘National Press Club’, an exclusive gathering of news organisations whose rely upon the ‘club’ to provide access to the government and which has been accused of shielding the government of the day from criticism in exchange for favourable treatment by the bureaucracy (J), does raise questions about its dedication to objectivity.

The fact that Chairman Momii made those particular comments has led to calls for his resignation and the appointment of someone more ideologically ‘neutral’. However this may be easier said than done. PM Abe has made no secret of his opinions regarding Japanese identity and historical revisionism. Yet he categorically denied placing any political pressure on the NHK in 2005 during his first term in office when allegations were raised by the Asahi Shimbun that the LDP had demanded that an NHK program dealing with Imperial Japanese war crimes be edited so that it did not reflect on either the actions of the army of the day, nor call into question to complicity of the Imperial Household in allowing such crimes to go unpunished (J).

As Momii was appointed by Abe, it feeds into the growing belief that Abe is embarking on yet another attempt to re-define Japanese identity and ensure that a more rightist point of view is promoted by the nation’s media.  Momii certainly believes that the role of the public broadcaster, particularly when broadcasting overseas, is to adhere to the government’s line (which in itself is revelatory, and quite interesting in lieu of developments in Australia over the past week concerning the role of its public broadcaster and its relationship with the government of the day).  While NHK’s domestic news broadcasts haven’t had any discernable change towards rightist views, it may prove useful to monitor the type of programs being released by NHK over the next twelve months to see if Momii’s opinions do trickle down to the director’s floor.