As per previous years, December seems to be a particularly active time for Japanese governments, and the Abe government has proven to be no exception. On Tuesday last week it released its National Security Strategy (NSS), designed according to its rhetoric to make a ’proactive contribution towards peace’ while also embarking of a review of Japan’s ban on military exports and fostering ‘patriotism’ towards Japanese territory. The strategy itself gained most attention for its statements regarding China’s regional ambitions, claiming that China had been making claims to territory in the South China and East China Seas that were ‘incompatible with international law’ and that this could in turn lead to confrontation. As the Asahi Shimbun pointed out, at no point in the strategy is there any mention of a revision of the right to collective self-defence, which implies that this is less of a concern for the Abe government at present that the need for a boost in defence spending and possible cooperation in defence technology development with other nations.

Not long after the announcement, Mike Green of the CSIS produced this excellent analysis of Abe’s intentions with his new strategy and what that will mean for Japan’s relationship with its regional partners. In a nutshell, what Green sees is the determination of the Abe government to make Japan more relevant to the region through promotion of Japan as a tier-one power capable of resisting China. This requires the development of relations with nations further away from Japan (which are less problematic than those with China or South Korea) to shore up international backing for Japan’s position vis-à-vis territorial issues and resource availability, while re-affirming Japan’s support for its alliance with the US. Where Green sees a potential flaw in Abe’s plan is his commitment to economic reform, for without the ‘third arrow’ of Abenomics, Japan’s economic future will be less certain and still dominated by concerns about demographics and interest groups.

Green also had this to say about the role of other regional states in helping Japan through its ‘difficulties’ with China… “The United States should embrace Japan’s desire for greater jointness, planning, and readiness. Australia and other allies and partners should move in parallel based on their own national interests and specific arrangements with Tokyo. Japan needs help not only in resisting Chinese coercion, but also in refining its own foreign policy narrative and seeking opportunities for reassurance with Beijing. Friends who stand with Japan on the first objective will have more credibility in influencing the way it pursues the second”. This particular view is one that many in Australia would agree with, given the historical ties between the US, Japan and Australia and the sense of shared values that bind these states together.

China surely recognises this fact, although it may not agree with it. For China to attempt to try to isolate (or worse, punish) Australia for its support of Japan would only breed resentment within Australia towards a country that is viewed with a great deal of scepticism regarding its intentions.  Australia has no want nor desire to confront China, yet China’s actions in the South China and East China Sea are destabilising enough to warrant a reconfirmation of existing alliances and partnerships.  Japan, as a long standing partner of Australia, is regarded as far more trustworthy, stable and reliable than China, although China’s economic influence in the region may be growing. Despite this, a conservative Australian government, concerned about this influence and the ramifications for regional stability, has embraced its conservative roots and sought assurance in its ties with Japan.

This reality is not, however, to every Australian’s liking. Hugh White, in his long running series of Tuesday op-eds in the Age newspaper, has written that China will inflict punishment on the Abbott government if it continues in its blanket support of Japan and pro-Japanese sentiment. White advocates (briefly) a more neutral stance, in keeping with his criticism of the former Labor government’s stance towards China as being far too pro-US. What White wishes to see is an Australia neither in support of nor critical of China, yet neither too openly in support of either the US or Japan. He claims that this requires a unique level of statesmanship and diplomacy that Australia has never before experienced, and that the absence of such deft diplomacy is jeopardizing Australia’s future and the peace of the region.

White sees in the Abbott government a flawed desire for former alliances and partnerships, claiming that these are harming Australia’s interests rather than strengthening them, and that if Australia does not accept the reality of a greater Chinese power in the region and act accordingly then China will take its revenge to the ruin of Australia and the region. This argument is difficult to accept, not least of which because it presupposes that China is only interested in confrontation, that Chinese diplomacy operates from a level of malevolency equal to the most heinous of dictatorships and that any sign of discord with China’s position will bring about terrible revenge.  Would China, with its myriad of social problems and complicated regional relations, find any solace in inflicting long-term damage on its ties with Australia because of the current Australian government’s preference for the assurance of existing, stable relationships?  How would that serve China’s interests?

If China truly does practice ‘patience’, as claimed by Henry Kissinger, then seeking confrontation with the current Abbott government over its support for Japan would demonstrate a lack of foresight by China and prove counter-productive to its diplomatic goals. It would be a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to a perceived slight and move Australia deeper into the trilateral alliance with the US and Japan. Unless China sees Australia as a lost cause and not worth persuading, it would be far better for it to observe Abbott’s ties with Japan and learn from them.

At any rate, this is how the year has ended and a new one is to begin. 2014 promises to be an interesting year in Japan-Australia relations, with bilateral visits by both Abbott and Abe to one another’s countries. Given that Australia hasn’t had a Japanese PM visit since Koizumi, this will be of significance, and coupled with a possible visit from Indian PM Singh will certainly put Australia front and centre in regional diplomatic dialogue. In the meantime, many thanks for reading these posts over the past few months, and I’ll fire up the commentary once I return in early 2014. A Merry Christmas to you and yours, and see you in the New Year.

As an aside to the usual comments I make in relation to regional issues, I wanted to return for a moment to the issue of the Secrets Protection Bill, and its implications for the Abe government. On Thursday last week (the 5th), the Upper House Special Review Committee gave its consent for the Bill to be introduced to the Upper House, a cause for concern among many commentators because it did not appear that the Review Committee had actually spent a great deal of time debating the pros and cons of the bill itself. To reinforce this point, the Asahi Shimbun reported on Friday (the 6th) that the total amount of time that both houses had devoted to debate on the bill had come to less than 70 hours.

By way of comparison, the Consumer Tax Increase Bill of 2012 had a total of 129 hours devoted to debate, while the Post Office Privatisation Bill of 2005 saw approximately 120 hours of debate.   Nevertheless, apart from an amendment included in the Bill by the Reform Party and Everyone’s Party for a third party organisation to examine materials designated as ‘secret’, the Bill was passed as intended by the Upper House on the 6th, and will be made law during the regular session of the Diet starting in January, 2014 (as the temporary Diet session ended on the 9th, the speed at which the Abe government moved to have the bill passed by the Diet becomes all the more apparent).

Since the introduction of the Bill to the Lower House on the 25th of October, the LDP and New Komeito numbers in both Houses have guaranteed the passage of the bills related to the re-organisation of Japan’s security apparatus without prolonged discussion, a situation that has infuriated the other minor parties and seen protests outside of the prime minister’s residence and the Diet building itself (the DPJ attempted to have a vote of no-confidence passed against the Abe government on the evening of the 6th, ultimately a futile gesture, but a registration of the level of dissent in the Abe government’s unilateral actions. Meanwhile LDP Party Secretary Ishiba Shigeru managed to compare the protestors to ‘terrorists’ in a less-than-well-considered blog entry).

The public has clearly been rattled by the implications of the bill, as PM Abe’s own popularity took a dive for the first time since coming to government last year (according to the Yomiuri Shimbun’s own poll), dropping 9 points to 55% (in part this may also be because of dissatisfaction among the populace at the lack of benefits flowing on from Abenomics).  While PM Abe has given his assurances that the Secrets Protection Act will be fairly and objectively applied, overseen by a regulatory body, suspicions that the Act will be arbitrarily imposed on any ‘inconvenient’ documentation regardless of whomever is supposed to regulate such decisions.

Where this may cause a problem for the Abe government is in how the Act is used. Japan well remembers its pre-war censorship, and anything that resembles an attempt at censorship will invite scorn on a government that tries to keep information from reaching its audience. Moreover, many of those radicals of the late 50s and early 60s will still remember the secrecy that surrounded the renewal of the US-Japan Alliance Treaty of 1960 by the Kishi and Eisenhower governments and the backlash this invited from the population. By creating enough discontent concerning the path Abe is taking, they may yet force the Abe government to strictly regulate the use of the Act and call into question the transparency of the government itself. The Abe government was elected on the back of dissatisfaction with the DPJ – that support could evaporate if the Japanese people believe that the LDP/New Komeito are trying to avoid accountability.

Certainly it appears that the Abe government, having established both an NSC and the laws to protect its operations, will seek to shift the domestic gaze to the economy and relations with China and the US. To allay the fears of the populace, it can’t hurt to remind them as to why the administrative changes were necessary in the first place.

In a related issue, on Monday Andrew Hunter of the Australian Fabians had another op-ed on the East China Sea. In his article, Hunter stated that “Ultra-nationalism was thoroughly discredited by its actions during the Pacific War but has returned as a force in Japan”, thereby attempting to draw a comparison between Imperial Japan of the 1930s and 40s and the current Abe government. Moreover, Hunter posed the following two questions in relation to China’s declaration of an ADIZ, writing… “It is true that China's precipitous actions have raised tensions. We have reason to be concerned. But why did we (meaning Australia) not react similarly in 2012 when the decision was made by Japan, without much trace of consultation, to nationalise the disputed territories? Why did we not express our disdain about the decision to nationalise the islands - announced on the anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge incident that triggered the Sino- Japanese War? ”.

Hunter does acknowledge that ‘some’ level of consultation was made by Japan regarding its decision to nationalise the Senkaku Islands. Japanese journalist Tahara Sōichirō, in an article written on the 27th of March this year, wrote that former DPJ Deputy Foreign Minister Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi went to China on the 31st of August 2012 to discuss the then Noda government’s plan to nationalise the islands with Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary Dai Bingguo. Secretary Dai explained that while China’s position on the islands would not change, it would seek to work with Japan to manage the situation in the future. Unfortunately for Dai and Yamaguchi, the Noda government, in a secret deal with Ishihara Shintarō made on the 19th of August, had already decided to nationalise the islands and so Yamaguchi’s message from Dai came too late to change the outcome (PM Noda did mention Japan’s intentions to President Hu Jintao in a brief meeting between the two at the APEC meeting in Vladivostok on the 9th of September, to which President Hu voiced China’s strong opposition. Two days later, on the 11th, the Noda government formally announced that the islands had been nationalised by government resolution)*.

As to why Australia didn’t voice any objection to Japan’s nationalising the islands, it should be remembered that the negotiations on the islands were conducted between the Japanese government and persons who owned titles to the islands (a situation that the CCP never challenged). The Japanese government offered compensation to the owners in return for their titles, thereby using legal process as a means of acquiring territory. This was conducted within Japanese territory using Japanese domestic law, and was a transaction between private individuals and the government. Unless Australia implicitly wanted to back China’s claim to the islands by demanding an explanation from Japan on why it had nationalised property belonging to Japanese citizens, it chose not to raise it as an issue. Also, the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration in 1972 saw the US recognise Japanese jurisdiction over the islands. If Australia suddenly voiced its concerns about how Japan administered its territory, it would receive a very quick rebuke from the US. As Australia had only just signed an agreement with the US to host Marines in Darwin from 2012 onwards, it would look somewhat hypocritical for the pro-US Gillard Labor government to then suddenly lambast another US ally for defending its interests against an encroaching China.

China, on the other hand, did not consult with any regional or global state when it decided to announce its ADIZ. believing that it was in its right to do so according to its own logic. Rather than emphasizing the legality of its actions (in accordance with internationally recognised channels for registration of ADIZ), China simply announced the ADIZ as a fait accompli and expected surrounding nations to agree to it. It was a provocative move, designed to heighten rather than lessen tensions. While PM Noda sought to justify his actions by pointing out the potential for greater harm by having the islands administered by the Ishihara administration in Tokyo (a position rejected by China), it was an attempt to diffuse growing concerns in China over Japan’s intentions. If the Ishihara administration had offered to purchase the islands and this was accepted by the owners, it would be a transaction carried out according to Japanese commercial law which the government was bound to uphold. Unlike the CCP, the Japanese government does not exist separate to or above the rule of law, which made its position more difficult to negotiate.

This could have been recognised by the CCP, but instead it chose to use it as a catalyst to promote its own claims to the islands and denounced the Japanese government for attempting to change the status quo.  This in turn may also have influenced the Australian decision not to criticise Japan, recognising that Japan had attempted to diffuse an already worsening situation, and that criticising Japan would be of little to no value in resolving the situation.

*The Asahi Shimbun also reported on that PM Noda had sent PM Secretary Nagashima Akihisa to China shortly after Ishihara Shintarō’s declaration to purchase the islands for the Tokyo Metropolitan Area during his visit to Washington in April, 2012. The article also claims that the breakdown of ‘silent recognition’ from China towards the plan by the Noda government to nationalise the islands came because of internal struggles within the CCP.

It should also be noted that PM Noda’s comments made on July 7th, 2012 indicated that his government was examining the purchase of the islands, not that it would purchase the islands. As to whether this was deliberately chosen to occur on the anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge incident so as to provoke China, PM Noda was visiting Iwaki City in Fukushima Prefecture on the day the comments were recorded. Whether Noda, in conversation with Ishihara, made a promise to Ishihara in private conversation to mention their negotiations on this specific day if asked by the media seems farfetched, although not implausible.

Following on from the post made last week, since the declaration by China of an ADIZ over disputed areas in the East China Sea, debate has been unfolding across the Asia-Pacific on what the implications of the ADIZ are and how each respective state should react to it. Japan, for its part, made its position very clear from the outset, categorically rejecting any attempt to unilaterally impose regulations on aircraft passing through the zone, and went so far as to force its national airlines to refuse to abide by the regulations laid down by the Chinese. Other nations, unsure of whether this was a wise move or not, were less forthcoming in their demands on commercial airlines, with the US declining to force either UA or AA to ignore China’s demands in order to avoid misunderstandings. That didn’t play out so well in Tokyo, with allegations that Japan had complained privately that the lack of unity from the US in response to China’s challenge had weakened Japan’s hand and would make China more likely to employ provocative measures in relation to territorial issues.

Of particular concern to analysts was whether China actually meant to do what it did. On The Strategist blog, Harry White outlined his reasons for why China had chosen a deliberate strategy of encroachment, challenging Japanese sovereignty to the Senkaku Islands in order to make a statement on China’s growing confidence in its military capabilities. Others didn’t buy into this argument, reasoning that the PLA, although it may deliberately have planned to raise tensions in an already volatile region, was far less likely to engage in such provocative behaviour, and that the CCP and its own internal logic may have ignored the serious ramifications of the ADIZ declaration out of hubris. Given the lack of detail regarding China’s decision, any commentary on whether the CCP erred by declaring an ADIZ or performed a master stroke in strategic thinking is speculative at best. The implications of the move suggest that it was deliberately made, and that it received the tacit approval of all sections of the government (as revealed by the language used by Chinese delegates at the 3rd Australia-China Forum held at the ANU on Friday last week. No where was there any suggestion that China should have consulted with other nations before the ADIZ was declared, neither was there any admission that the ADIZ had heightened tensions at the expense of ‘strengthening Chinese security’).

As to how deliberate the decision was, this report from the New York Times made things abundantly clear: it came from the very top of the CCP, from Xi Jinping himself, a leader who has never had close ties to Japan and who had been searching for a way to force Japan to admit that it had a territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands. This was apparently part of a year-long strategy by China to place pressure on Japan to negotiate over the Senkaku Islands and (more importantly) have the US reconsider its position in the East China Sea. The problem with this is that while Japan and the US were suitably annoyed, so were many other nations in the region who saw China as over-reaching its ambitions and acting in a provocative manner. If Xi had been trying to mend relations with other Asian nations, this unilateral act had the opposite effect, which suggests that it was done more for a domestic audience than an international one. Pick a target. Make a unilateral announcement.  Demonstrate resolve to protect Chinese sovereignty. Repeat.

Throughout this process Japan has, it must be said, been showing a great degree of restraint. Knowing that China had Japan firmly in mind when it announced the ADIZ, Japan has been vocal in its condemnation of China’s unilateral action and has refused to accept the attempt to change the status quo. At the same time it knows that it cannot allow the Chinese to provoke it into retaliation, and so has maintained its policy of observation and reporting territorial intrusions by Chinese vessels and aircraft. This is as much to demonstrate Japan’s control over the islands as it is to keep a record of Chinese activity in the area.  China, through the declaration of an ADIZ, can be expected to do the same, although the Chinese ability to police the area appears to be less than initially thought. Certainly Japanese authorities claimed on November 30th that despite China claiming that it had scrambled fighters to intercept Japanese aircraft within the ADIZ, no such interception took place.

In terms of whom is being more provocative, I must admit that I don’t agree with Prof. Rikki Kersten of the ANU who characterised the Abe administration as accelerating Japan’s move towards ‘normalisation’ as a military power, and how Abe’s actions have allowed China to successfully present the East China Sea issue as one that evokes Japan’s militarist past. One will remember that the entire issue of the Senkaku Islands and sovereignty was sparked by Ishihara Shintarō’s attempt to have the islands declared property of the Tokyo municipal government, a move against which the then Noda government tried to placate China by having the federal Japanese government assume responsibility for their administration. China would not acquiesce to this, and has continued to ramp up pressure on Japan over the issue.

China has known for some time that Abe holds rightist points of view, although he is prepared to shelve them in the interests of regional cooperation. At the same time, China’s regional diplomacy, and its past behaviour of seizing territory around its borders, has promoted anxiety in Japan over China’s intentions towards it. Abe has attempted to rectify this by engaging in an active and widespread PR campaign in Southeast Asia and further abroad (most recently in India), and by all reports this has been well-received by those countries he has visited. Abe has sought to re-assure other nations that he is not in fact the rabid nationalist that he is portrayed as in the Chinese and South Korean media, and that he is in favour of cooperation with other regional states in economic integration and development assistance.  Abe is not pushing any rhetoric of confrontation against China, yet he is also not going to accept China’s ADIZ strategy, for what leader would agree to a unilateral move by a neighbouring state that imposes hereto unnecessary regulations and directly affects Japanese sovereignty?  

Abe is defending Japan’s interests, and that requires that he seek US confirmation of the strength of its alliance with Japan. Abe has not suggested that the US commit itself to troop increases in Japan or insisted that the US give a more solid display of unity with Japan on defence issues – all of that initiative has come from the US itself. Japan’s security hinges on its alliance with the US, and any weakening of that alliance would force Japan to pursue a much greater, much more expensive, and much more controversial path of armament against external threat. The Japanese public mood does not support such a move, hence the US itself must realise that maintaining a firm commitment to Japan is in its interests in the area, particularly when it comes to providing a counter-weight to China.  No country wishes to be caught defenceless against a rising power, and so Japan is seeking reassurance from the US that its alliance with Japan trumps any move to acquiesce a more belligerent China.