They didn't want them, but they were going to get them anyway. That appears to be the sum total of the message that the Yamaguchi prefectural government received from Tokyo and Washington earlier this week following the arrival of the first of two planned deployments of MV22 Osprey to the US Marine base at Iwakuni, Yamaguchi prefecture (J). Despite a series of accidents involving the Osprey that have called into question its reliability, on Friday of last week Deputy Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter gave Tokyo assurances that any technical data stemming from investigations into the most recent Osprey incident in Florida will be forwarded to Japan in full (J). 

Whether this is of any comfort to the residents of Iwakuni is debatable. In spite of visits by representatives of the Yamaguchi prefectural government to the offices of Defence Minister Morimoto to voice the concern of citizens regarding the Ospreys' deployment (J), they received an answer to the effect that ""your concerns have been noted, however the Ospreys are going to be placed at Iwakuni, and so your co-operation and understanding are appreciated." This is no surprise, given it is the same initial response given  to any prefectural government that objects to the deployment of US military equipment in its backyard (note the reaction of Kagoshima prefecture in 2010 when suggestions that Tokunoshima island play host to a US Marine base to replace Futenma were first raised (J). It may have been Kagoshima's good fortune that the PM at the time was Hatoyama Yukio, who folded faster than a novice Mahjong player in Macao). Yet while mainland prefectural governments have more political clout than their Okinawan counterparts (based on prefectural GDP and number of representatives), and might count on this to act in their favour vis-a-vis restricting flights by Osprey aircraft, the planned deployment of Ospreys at Futenma base in Okinawa is a different matter altogether.

Okinawa has long voiced its objection to the continued presence of US Marine forces on its soil, and the fact that the US  is already planning to have Osprey aircraft operational in Okinawa by October (a fact that was revealed for the first time on Sunday) (J) has merely upped the ante.  On Saturday last week the Okinawa prefectural government announced that it was sending Matakichi Susumu, the chief representative of the office of Governor Nakaima to Washington for direct talks with senior officials from the Pentagon and the Department of State (J). Given the determination of the US to push ahead with the deployment, and the willingness of the Noda government to agree to such measures (on condition that it is kept fully informed of developments re; the Osprey's safety record), Matakichi will probably not leave Washington with an outcome that will placate the growing anger at both the US and Tokyo that is growing in Naha.    

Even members of the Noda government have hinted that the timing of the Osprey deployment could have been better managed (J). With the government still facing internal dissent over the consumption tax increase, popular anger for approving a re-start of the Oi nuclear reactor in Fukui prefecture, not to mention the continuing ramifications from the final report into the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant meltdown (J), and with pressure being exherted on the government by the Tokyo prefectural government and its plan to purchase the Senkaku Islands (therefore leading to an uncertain and potentially belligerent reaction from China, a situation not helped by Defence Minister Morimoto's comment that any wishing to land on the islands should be allowed to do so) (J), the Osprey deployment was just one problem the Noda government could have done without.  

The Osprey deployment this week also  made a meeting between US military attaches and representatives from the MOD and MOFA held on Thursday somewhat redundant (with one lower house member from Okinawa emphasising this point by questioning what both sides hoped to achieve by debating the safety of an aircraft that had already been deployed) (J), although for the purposes of placating a suspicious public it had some PR value. This was followed up on Wednesday  with an announcement from Defence Minister Morimoto that he would establish an 'independent' Osprey evaluation committee (J). Just what terms the committee is acting under (other than receiving information on the two Osprey incidents that occured this year), and what would happen if it discovered technical or other faults in the Osprey, were not reported.

To add to the drama surrounding the Osprey, Foreign Minister Gemba declared on Tuesday that there would be a number of  joint meetings between US and Japanese government representatives before any approval for the Ospreys to become operational is given (J).  One would like to think that this would be conducted on an equal basis, but one has the suspicion that a timeline for operations has already been drawn up  and will be enacted regardless of how many meetings are held. The fact that the second deployment of Ospreys will come two months after the initial deployment means the US wants this asset up and running as soon as possible (for what would be achieved by spending the time and money transporting the aircraft across the Pacific only for them to sit unused while the Noda government tries to placate local anger at their deployment, a process that could take months, if not years?)*, and is confident, nay certain, that the Noda government will acquiesce.  

How so, one may ask? A clue to the answer to this question was revealed by Deputy PM Okada Katsuya on the 1st of July during a visit to Shunan City in Yamaguchi prefecture. While addressing media questions, Okada let slip that while the government might demand explanations from the US on the safety record of the Osprey, it could not halt the deployment of the Osprey to Japan as it had "no authority to do so" (J). This added another dimension to the question of the Osprey deployment. While media concerns over the past week have mostly focused on the Osprey's safety record, questions have  been raised regarding Japanese sovereignty over its own airspace, and whether the Osprey constitutes a blatant example of the US forcing a decision on Japan that the Japanese government is in no position to question or refuse. 

The Osprey deployment has also not gone unnoticed by Japan's regional neighbours, either. On Tuesday the Sankei Shimbun was reporting that according to an affiliate newspaper tied to China's People's Daily (who were apparently quoting from an unnamed former US government employee), the deployment of the Ospreys to Okinawa is ultimately aimed at reinforcing Japan's territorial claims to the Senkaku Island chain (J). This may be the case - the Ospreys are capable of flying both faster and higher than conventional helicopters and would be well-suited to the quick deployment of troops and equipment to the islands should China try to land its own troops on the islands to back its claims of sovereignty. The Ospreys remove the need for the US Marines in Okinawa to rely on US Navy vessels to transport conventional helicopters (CH-53E Sea Stallions, CH-46E Sea Knights) to within deployment range of the Senkaku Islands, therefore reducing the exposure of such vessels to possible interdiction from the Chinese. 

While this may be of consolation to a government wanting to appear strong on issues of national sovereignty (at least in relation to China), it will not placate voter concern about the Osprey. Hence the degree of emphasis the Noda government has placed on demands for safety assurances from the US (despite evidence showing that, amongst the aerial assets within the US Marine arsenal, the Osprey has an exemplary safety record in regards to Class A accidents, although its record for B and C class accidents is less than stellar) (E). With the Ospreys already in Japan, all the Noda government can really do  is accept the Osprey as a fait accompli and try to keep voter attention focused on aspects of the deployment that it can be seen to influence.  

*Indeed, on Tuesday reports were already coming in that the US Air Force base at Iwakuni would begin prepping the Ospreys, running fuselage and engine checks and fuelling the aircraft ahead of eventual operations (J). The fact that this appears to have already been planned ahead of the meeting on Thursday suggests that the US is pushing ahead according to a prearranged schedule and that further meetings will will merely reconfirm the operating schedule for the Ospreys. 

This week I have decided to delve back into a bit of translation work and present an article written by Ritsumeikan University scholar and political commentator Kamikubo Masato (上久保誠人) in relation to the current standoff between the newly formed, Ozawa Ichiro led "People First" party and the DPJ, LDP, and Komeito triumvirate in favour of introducing  a consumption tax increase bill. The author, I believe, captures the essence of the disagreement between the two sides in clear prose. With that in mind, I thought it would be of benefit to those persons interested in Japan's political vicissitudes who might not be able to read the article in the original Japanese. And so, without further ado...

The direction of the stand-off between Ozawa's 'Anti-tax hike' faction and the LDP・DPJ・Komeito  'Pro-tax hike' faction - the key to understanding future developments lies in the three party agreement on 'policy before politics'. (J)

49 former members of the DPJ, including former leader Ozawa Ichiro, have created a new party titled "The People's Livelihood Comes First". Meanwhile the LDP and Komeito have increased their pressure on the government by calling for a general election,  and it appears that the political fortunes of the Noda cabinet are growing ever more dire.

The brilliance of the absolute majority derived from the three party agreement

However, PM Noda, as a result of the "creation of a consensus on the consumption tax increase between the DPJ, LDP, and Komeito", has successfully formed an absolute majority in favour of the tax within the Diet. When voting was conducted on the "Consumption Tax Increase and Other Related Bills" in the House of Representatives, of the 480 seats in the lower house, 363, or 76% of the House voted in favour of the bill. Even if the bill is defeated in the House of Councilors, it will be passed upon re-introduction to the lower house, given the over two-thirds majority that support the bill.

Furthermore, of the 242 seats in the House of Councilors, the combined numbers of the DPJ, LDP, and Komeito means that 199 seats, or 82% of the upper house, are in favour of the bill. In order to break the hold of the three parties (who already have the 121 seats necessary for a majority in the upper house), a further 79 members of the DPJ would have to desert their party in opposition to the tax. The creation of this majority, when compared to the 81.8% (or 381 seats) secured by the "Taisei-Yokusankai" (大政翼賛会, a conglomeration of political parties) in 1942, shows you just what an achievement it is.

The departure of the Ozawa group allows the three parties to know who the "real enemy" is.

Nonetheless, attention has been focused on the activities of the new Ozawa-led party. Ever since the division of the DPJ, the possibility of a vote of no confidence against the Noda government passing the House of Representatives, combined with a censure motion against the government in the House of Councilors, has increased. However the only way this could occur is if the "agreement between the three parties" collapses prematurely.  

The creation of a new political party by Ozawa has reduced the possibility of a breakup of the triumvirate. At the same time, it has made the standoff over the consumption tax increase all the more clearer. Although the three parties may argue over the details of the tax, and trip over one another in the process of doing so, the appearance of Ozawa, the so-called "true opponent" of the consumption tax increase, means that the time for squabbling among the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito has passed. Allowing their opponent to take advantage of such a situation to quash the tax would do more harm than good to the three parties` interests.

Ever since the LDP and Komeito lost power in 2009, they have never stood against a tax increase. They possess a considerable amount of political clout and have maintained a close relationship with the Ministry of Finance's principal taxation bureau. As such, they are very aware of the need to increase consumption tax in order to rebuild the economy. When one examines the progress of the consumption tax increase bill through the House of Representatives, while the LDP and Komeito have stated that they are aiming at a return to power as soon as possible, in reality they have placed greater priority on making the consumption tax increase a reality.

It is commonly said that [in relation to Japanese political parties] "politics come before policy". This is not just an adage used by journalists, for in the academic world, Anthony Downs was the first to point out that, in essence, "policy is merely the roadmap necessary to hang on to political power". However in defence of the consumption tax increase, a phenomenon has occurred that is completely different to the norm. A majority of politicians are putting "policy before politics". 

We should understand that this is the stance being pursued by the three parties against the Ozawa group. If the Ozawa group remained within the DPJ and ran amok, as far as the LDP and Komeito would be concerned, a DPJ torn apart by internal dissent would be the main impediment to the introduction of a consumption tax increase. This is why both the LDP and Komeito will continue to pursue their current line for bringing down the government. The separation of the Ozawa group from the DPJ means that, for the LDP and Komeito, those left within the DPJ are, like them, in favour of a tax increase. Furthermore, in order to take on such as strong opponent as ol` "Iron Arm" Ozawa, the LDP, Komeito, and DPJ will gradually strengthen their bonds with one another.

The activity of the LDP is directed towards making "policy (a tax increase)" a reality rather than "politics (bringing down the DPJ government)".

The following antithesis has been put forward in relation to the above statement. As Ibuki Fumiaki said in relation to the `division of responsibilities` among the three parties, the LDP, in order to encourage the disintegration of the DPJ, decided to join the three party agreement. Therefore the LDP are putting emphasis on politics first.

Yet if the LDP truly wanted to bring down the government, there would be no need for them to pursue such a roundabout way of doing this in order to breakup of the DPJ. In reality, the LDP have never been opposed to an increase in consumption tax. Indeed, one of the conditions they laid down in order to cooperate on raising the tax rate, the complete repeal by the DPJ of their `social insurance reform package`,  was dropped halfway through negotiations. Instead the LDP proposed the creation of a `Citizens Assembly for Reform of the Social Insurance System` in which such issues would be debated over the course of a year. The LDP`s activities therefore should be described as providing a `lifeboat` for the Noda cabinet.

It is true that the three party agreement seeks to bring about the breakup of the DPJ.  Yet this is not being done in order to `bring down the government`, but in order to sure up support for a majority in favour of the consumption tax hike. This will involve hounding those opposed to the consumption tax increase out of power within government, reducing them to a minority. To put this another way, putting pressure on the Noda cabinet in order to force it from power requires manipulation of the anti-consumption tax increase faction. What the LDP is doing by raising awareness of the importance of a `consumption tax increase` is using politics to make this goal a reality.

The high hurdles that the anti-tax increase faction directly face in order to defeat the tax hike.

Next, I want to look at the positions of the so-called `anti-tax increase` factions, namely Ozawa`s new party, the `Your Party` (みんなの党), and regional parties. Firstly, each of these parties must be feeling daunted by just how many high hurdles they must clear in order to repeal the consumption tax increase bill.

By way of example, let`s look at the next House of Representatives` election. It seems very likely that the DPJ, by betraying the policies set out in their manifesto, will lose seats. Yet it is unclear whether the LDP will be able to recover support to the extent that they believe possible either. As such, it will be particularly difficult for either party to win an outright majority. At the same time, the triumvirate of the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito hold an enormous amount of power in the lower house by controlling 76% of seats there. Hence even if they were to lose some seats, there is a very strong chance that the combined numbers of the three parties will still enable them to continue with a majority.

On the other hand, when we look at the opposition factions, Ozawa Ichiro`s support base is only at 3%, while the `Your Party` `s time has already come and gone. While they may have been able to count on support from the `One Osaka Party` (維新の会) led by Osaka mayor Hashimoto Toru, recently Hashimoto has begun to praise PM Noda where previously he only offered criticism.

This shouldn`t be a surprise to anyone. The One Osaka Party may insist on transferring the right to create budgets to regional governments, yet it has never opposed a tax increase. It`s also likely that Mayor Hashimoto believes that any ties with Ozawa Ichiro would have a negative impact on his party`s image. Moreover, both the DPJ, LDP, and Komeito have all agreed to support legislation for the creation of a `second capital` in Osaka, whereas in the present Diet there does not appear to be any prospect of its passing either house. Hence any reasons that Mayor Hashimoto may have had for opposing PM Noda have disappeared.

Mayor Hashimoto has also said that "those people who think the same way that the PM does, if they were to gather together regardless of party affiliation, would create an enormously powerful government." A realist such as Mayor Hashimoto understands all too well the brilliance of creating a majority within government by bringing three parties together.

As for the number of seats the One Osaka Party would be able to capture in the next lower house election, experts are divided between as little as 10 to as many as 100. Yet if they were predicted to capture 100 seats at the most, it would be difficult for them to break the majority hold of the three parties over the lower house. Mayor Hashimoto would look at the situation in front of him in a calm, collected manner, and then make a realistic decision not to become involved in a `lost cause` by adding his support to the anti-tax factions.

Moreover, even if the anti-tax increase factions were suddenly to experience a boom in popularity and capture a majority of seats in the House of Representatives, they would still face a `twisted Parliament` that has been a headache for many a government over the years. The next upper house election is due to take place in July of 2013, and it is likely that the LDP, DPJ, and Komeito will continue to maintain their overwhelming majority in that house. As such, the opposition will not be able to bring a halt to the adoption of the consumption tax increase bill. 

In order to make a repeal of the consumption tax increase a reality, the opposition would need to win both the upper and lower house elections. Yet every government since that of Abe Shinzo has had to deal with a `twisted Parliament`, which is directly linked to a drop in popularity for the ruling party. Hence one is forced to admit that a hurdle like a victory in both houses may be too high to overcome. Given the difficulty of the situation, I don`t think it is very likely that more desertions from the DPJ to Ozawa`s new party will continue.

 

This week saw a flurry of activity on the political front in Japan, no more so than the hullabaloo surrounding the launch on Wednesday of Ozawa Ichiro's "The People's Livelihood Comes First" Party (J) or more succinctly "The Livelihood Party" (kudos to Michael Cucek for pointing out this abbreviated title courtesy of Michael Penn). The Party name itself (which appeared on the DPJ manifesto before the national election in 2009, a point that raised the mirth of Nagoya City Mayor Kawamura Takashi, who suggested (J) it showed that Ozawa wasn't done with his DPJ ties)  is apparently an appeal on the part of Ozawa and his supporters to those DPJ faithful who have grown disillusioned with the direction the DPJ have taken since PM Noda took the helm and promptly veered off in the direction of the LDP and Komeito (former PM Hatoyama Yukio, currently suspended from the DPJ for 3 months after initially receiving a sentence of 6 months for betraying the Party leadership and voting against the Consumption Tax Increase bill, went to far as to insinuate that the DPJ was now the 'LDP's Noda faction', which itself suggests that he too is looking to join his benefactor at some stage in the not too distant future).
 
While such political developments are always welcome for the amount of interest they generate, Ozawa and his 49 other party members might have their work cut out trying to convince the populace that they are more than just another party seeking to promote themselves above the needs of the many (as recent polling has shown (J), while Ozawa might champion the cause of repealing a hike in the consumption tax and emphasising the re-building of those areas hardest hit by the tsunami disaster of 2011, his reputation is far too muddied to realistically bring about a major shift in public opinion).

Given the fact that the PLCFP (a fairly clumsy acronym but hey, it's early days yet) appears to currently exist for no other reason than to ensure that  PM Noda and his cabinet will be hiked out of the DPJ's leadership position through a vote of no confidence in the Noda government, what happens to Ozawa's party and other former DPJ offshoots (aka, the Kizuna Party) after the next general election will be an interesting litmus test of whether the public has any faith in these new parties to enact the reforms (both fiscal and bureaucratic) that are sorely needed to sustain Japan into the future. Given past poll results (J), the likely answer will be no.

Frustration at the opacity of decision making in Japan reared its head again this week following comments made by Defence Minister Morimoto that the deployment of MV-22 Osprey to Iwakuni base in Yamaguchi Prefecture would go ahead (J), although he could not give any specific timeframe on when that would happen (expectations are that this will occur before the Yamaguchi Prefectural elections on the 29th of this month). The fact that yet another report from the US of a forced landing of an Osprey as a result of technical issues (E) came during the same week at Minister Morimoto's announcement did nothing to assuage local fears regarding the Osprey, especially those areas that will potentially be under proposed flight paths for Osprey aircraft. Methinks that the MOD and Minister Morimoto will have their work cut out for them over the next month and a half trying to convince the population of the need for Osprey deployments, even though both Japan and US have agreed that such deployments will go ahead as planned. This might result in protests outside the MOD similar to those related to nuclear energy outside the Prime Minister's Residence (J), but only time will tell.

This week also saw a report within the Sydney Morning Herald that the head of the Royal Australian Navy's Future Submarine Program, Rear Admiral  Rowan Moffitt, together with the Chief Defence Scientist, Dr Alexander Zelinsky, would be travelling to Japan this month in order to hold talks with the Maritime Self Defence Force on the Soryu class submarine (E). This move comes in the wake (no pun intended) of nearly a decade long debate within defence circles on what should be done to replace the Collins class submarine, a locally produced submarine (based on designs supplied by Kockums Shipbuilding Company of Sweden) that has undergone a mixed service history (to say the least) punctuated by propulsion and electrical  system problems.

The Collins itself has been the subject of numerous studies, articles, and a Australian government sanctioned review (the Coles review, the second part of which is scheduled to be released soon), with the consensus being that while the Collins was an ambitious project for a nation within no previous experience of submarine manufacturing, the manner in which the submarine project was managed (work on the hull began after only 25% of designs had been approved, while the propulsion system was never tested at sea before being installed) left much to be desired. As such, the current Gillard government has been ultra cautious in deciding upon how and with what the Collins should be replaced.  At present, the government has two options in front of it - build a replacement for the Collins in Australia based on native designs and technologies (probably the least preferred option, as it would be prohibitively expensive and technologically risky, although it would win favour with local defence industry groups crying out for government work), or buy a proven submarine from overseas shipbuilders (the military off-the-shelf, or MOTS option)*.

Given the concerns of the government, the latter option will in all likelihood be taken, with a three way competition between European manufacturers - the HDW Type 214, French DCNS Scorpenes or a Navantia based design, the S-80 (Navantia, based in Spain,  are currently responsible for construction of two Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships for the RAN, along with the design and  hull construction  for Australia's newest generation of Air Warfare Destroyers, or AWDs). There are concerns, of course, that such submarines are designed for the European theatre of operations, where submarines do not have to go on extended operations far from shore, nor do they have to adapt to moving from cold water to warm water environments.  The Collins, although unreliable, could at least perform both of these tasks.

This is where the Australian  interest in working with the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force comes into play. The Soryu class submarine is regarded as one of the best, if not the best, example of a 4200 tonne (submerged) conventionally powered (i.e., diesel) submarine in the world. The conditions under which the Soryu operates are similar to those of Australia, while in size and capabilities the Soryu resembles the Collins, although such is the degree of secrecy surrounding the systems within the Soryu that only the JMSDF and the US Navy know precisely what it is capable of doing. Ordinarily if Australia knew that the US had been developing certain military technologies with a third party nation, it would request a meeting with that nation to explore the possible sale of such technology to Australia. Yet the situation with Japan is more complicated as a result of the Japanese Constitution and restrictions on involvement in the sale of military technology to anyone other than the US. Although Japan has recently signed an agreement with the UK and is preparing to sign a similar document with France to jointly research defence systems, there is a big difference between jointly developing technology as opposed to the outright selling of technology. 

Even if Australia expressed every willingness to share information with Japan, that would not necessarily result in a win for the Japanese, besides which if it became widely known that Japan was providing information to Australia on submarine technology and manufacturing, other regional states (i.e. China) might take exception to this and threaten to withdraw investment in Australia in retaliation (a potent threat given that China is Australia's largest two-way trading partner, although Japan comes in second followed by the US).  Hence if Rear Admiral Moffitt does find much to like about the Soryu while in Japan, it may be a long time  before Australia is actually able to gain anything from his visit. The sensitivity surrounding military issues in Japan, coupled with concern about the enthusiasm with which sections of the Australian government (state and federal) promote relations with China, might give Japan pause for thought.  As this blog has previously mentioned, there is plenty of potential in an enhanced security relationship between Japan and Australia, however Australia will have to exercise patience in its dealings with Japan on this front lest it jeopardise such relations for political expediency.

 * The government also considered but  dismissed the possibility of acquiring US Virginia class nuclear submarines,  on account of the fact that Australia does not have a sufficiently developed domestic nuclear industry, lacks the port facilities or workforce to properly repair, maintain, and crew nuclear submarines, and that the RAN does not maintain carrier fleets and so does not need a submarine capable of shadowing fast-moving vessels able to deploy across the world at short notice.

Well, all the signs were there that he was going to leave, and lo and behold, on Monday of this week Ozawa Ichiro, together with Yamaoka Kenji and 50 other DPJ members of the Diet (40 from the House of Representatives and 12 from the House of Councillors), handed in their letters of resignation to Koshiishi Azuma, Secretary General of the DPJ. Almost immediately, the press was buzzing with anticipation of how many Ozawa and Yamaoka had managed to convince to jump ship and join them in their act of defiance, and within hours the answer started to become quite clear - not that many.

While 57 members of the lower house had voted against the Consumption Tax Increase bill last week, a total of 40 dissenters did not represent the kind of numbers Ozawa might have hoped would shake the DPJ to its very core and force PM Noda and Secretary General Koshiishi into a very rapid retreat from co-operating with the LDP and Komeito on the passage of future bills. Furthermore, not long after their letters were presented, two DPJ members thought better of their actions and withdrew their resignations (possibly after seeing the dearth of support  for splitting from the DPJ), with another two following the next day (although one of these later declared that he would become an independent).

In spite of the low turnout in supporters, Ozawa pushed on with his plans to form a new party, with various names banded about as possible titles for the party - the Shinseiken, or Shinseito, the Kokumin Seikatsuto or simply the Ozawa Shinto. If Ozawa had hoped that by splitting with the DPJ he might be able to form an alliance with other minor parties in the House to force a vote of no confidence against the Noda government, he may be sorely disappointed. In order for such a resolution to pass, Ozawa would need 51 votes in the lower house in order to reach the numbers required to force the Noda government to dissolve parliament and call a general election. At the moment he has 37, and it's not clear where the remaining 14 are going to come from. While he might be able to gain at least 9 supporters from the recently formed "Shinto Kizuna" party (who themselves are former DPJ members), this still leaves Ozawa 5 votes short.

Uesugi Takashi, in an article for the Diamond on-line magazine this week, made an interesting prediction about how Ozawa might gain the votes required. On Tuesday of this week Ozawa held a meeting with Suzuki Muneo of the Shinto Daichi, hence if he managed to convince Suzuki of his plans (which would certainly include a vote of no confidence), then he might be assured of 3 more votes. The problem is that this would leave the Socialist Party of Japan as the only other party with numbers significant enough to force a vote. At this stage, it appears fairly unlikely that Ozawa would be able to convince the SPJ to support his new party's platform, given the antipathy the SPJ has shown towards Ozawa's policies in the past (or maybe not, as this Yomiuri article implies). As such, if Ozawa was able to convince Kamei Shizuka (former leader of the Kokumin Shinto), Shinto Nippon's leader Tanaka Yasuo,  and a member of former PM Hatoyama Yukio's faction to join him, then he might just get the numbers he needs. 

Will this scenario play out? Possibly, but then again if enough of the remaining DPJ members in government choose to cross the Rubicon and vote against PM Noda then Ozawa will not need to expend energy trying to forge alliances with minor parties to get the result he desires. He may indeed have this in mind, with some remaining DPJ members functioning as 'sleepers' (credit goes to Yamazaki Hajime for this observation), merely waiting for the opportunity to bring down the Noda government and repay their debt to Ozawa (or possibly Hatoyama) for past favours received. As Aurelia George Mulgan noted in an article published this week, Ozawa, upon the dissolution of the short-lived Liberal Party in the early 1990s, apparently pocketed around 1.5 billion yen that would otherwise have been paid out to the conversative faction of the LP.  By claiming that as the conservatives had seceeded from the party (rather than the party simply dividing), they were not eligible to receive any financing from their former colleagues in the LP. 

Hence for Noda, who unlike Ozawa (and many other career parliamentarians) does not come from a political lineage (and so has far less economic influence over other members of his party), the pressure of retaining the loyalty of DPJ members that voted against his tax hike bill while searching for a means to castigate them for their dissent must be palpable. He can't afford to upset them, but at the same time he cannot appear to condone defiance within his own party. At worst, he might censure some party members (or, as in the case of former PM Hatoyama, suspend membership status for a set period of time), but any thought of expelling members would have been ruled out immediately following the resolution of the tax hike bill debate last week (after all, Noda does not want to just hand the LDP and Komeito a victory).

On that note, what will the LDP and Komeito make of all of these developments? One would think that they are merely biding their time, waiting for the end of the Diet terms in 2013 and using their influence over the Noda government to tweak any DPJ legislation to match their agenda.  That may be why neither party has yet moved to have a no confidence vote against the Noda government (such a vote can only be made once during the sitting of a parliamentary period, hence the opposition would not want to play its trump card too early). It is far easier to manipulate the current government and ensure the passage of the Consumption Tax Increase bill and other pro-LDP platforms than to go to a general election and have to negotiate such bills from zero once again.   

In the meantime all we can do is wait for Wednesday (the 11th) next week, when Ozawa is set to launch his new party. Although all indications are that it will be a failure (as it has no popular support and little political clout, as outlined by Michael Cucek here), it will be another interesting chapter in the career of the Japanese lazarus that is Ozawa Ichiro.