Once again PM Abe took himself off on a foreign jaunt over the weekend, travelling to New Delhi in order to participate in Indian National Day celebrations on January 26th, in which he was ‘guest of honour’ (of sorts) at a military parade to mark the occasion (J). This is the latest in a series of high-profile Japanese visits to India over the past few months, following on from a visit by the Emperor and Empress late in 2013 and a consequent visit by Defence Minister Onodera. All this activity has ignited speculation as to whether Abe intends to promote Japan’s ties with India as a counter to the rise of China, as many Indian observers noted with interest in op-eds over the weekend (particularly this by K. Shankar Bajpai, this by C Rajah Mohan, and this by Geethanjali Nataraj and Abhirup Bhunia). Daniel Twining, writing a month ago for the Asan Forum, also provided some particularly insightful analysis and context of the trajectory of Japan-India relations and what that means for the US.

Certainly the prospect of increased ties between two of the most prominent, non-Chinese powers in the Asia-Pacific have prompted both PM Abe and PM Singh to explore bilateral co-operation across a range of areas to both profit from the amicable relations both nations share, and to provide a preliminary insurance against threat to the territorial integrity of both countries posed by China. The fact that India possesses its own independent military forces and functions as a democratic state with a burgeoning population, many of whom aspire to middle class status, makes it ideal for a Japan that is searching for an outlet for its infrastructure and technology sectors. Nevertheless, there are inherent risks, not the least of which is the very fact that India is still suffers from endemic levels of poverty, has an overburdened infrastructure in need of replacement, is periodically subject to ethnic, social and religious disputes (and a continuing dispute with its northern neighbour Pakistan) , and suffers from a prevalence of corruption may all give Japanese policy makers pause for thought. Yet given the significance of India to the region and the latent potential that India possesses, Abe has made India a core focus of his foreign policy, and further bilateral visits can be expected.

While Abe was concentrating on India on the weekend, last week he was partaking in the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Following his speech to assembled members where he essentially lauded the achievements of Abenomics (J),  Abe addressed the foreign media, where he was later reported by the BBC and Financial Times as having compared the current relationship of Japan and China to that of Germany and Britain before the outbreak of WWI. Leaving aside the fact that historical analogies almost always don’t work, given the myriad of mitigating factors that led to an event occurring in the first place, Abe does appear to have attempted to draw attention to the situation in Europe in 1914 as an example of how not to handle rising tensions, or at least an example of a fate that Asia should and can avoid. Abe’s gripe (if it can be called that) is the refusal by China to be transparent in its intentions, and that in the absence of any guarantees by China to adhere to the rule of law and explain the increases in its defence spending makes its neighbours nervous.

The interplay of regional agreements that Abe has forged certainly resembles those of pre-WWI Europe, but one has to remember that Abe is predominantly offering economic assistance to other states and has given no assurances of military or other security related support. While Japan has certainly shown interest in creating ties with countries in order to explore defence technology (namely France and Britain), it has not committed itself to any greater defence cooperation than that which already exists with its principal ally, the United States. If anything, Abe wishes to retain the status quo, and that means not increasing Japan’s defence commitments except in defence of the Japanese home territories (which rules out the idea of greater involvement by Japan in its UN mission in Africa, or elsewhere for that matter). While commentators could suggest that Abe was deliberately provoking China by bringing up 1914, his rhetoric was not that of someone bent on confrontation. Abe is no dove, but he is a realist and knows that economic development and trade are the keys to regional stability and political longevity. If he must criticise other nations to ensure that the established order is not disturbed, he will do so.  But Abe knows that co-operation is paramount in the current regional atmosphere, and will pursue foreign policy goals to that end.

The weekend just past (Sunday the 19th, to be precise) saw the re-election of Inamine Susumu, the 68 year old incumbent mayor of Nago City in the northern reaches of Okinawa (J). Ordinarily the re-election of a local city mayor wouldn’t garner much interest from the national Japanese media, however in this instance Mayor Inamine also happened to be campaigning on the issue of the re-location of Futenma Base in Ginowan to Henoko, located within the precinct of Nago City. In short, Mayor Inamine ran on the opposition locals felt to the recent agreement reached between the Okinawan prefectural government and the Abe administration concerning the re-location of Futenma to Henoko, and in a press conference held after the result was announced, Inamine voiced his continuing determination to ensure that no new US base would be built at Henoko. This was in contrast to his main opponent, Suematsu Bunshin, a former prefectural member with backing from the LDP who ran on a pro-base relocation platform (J).

Following his defeat, Suematsu faced the media wherein he declared Mayor Inamine’s claim that he (Inamine) had the authority to halt any attempt to construct a base at Henoko as ‘ridiculous’ (J). According to Suematsu, while permission from the mayor of Nago City would be necessary for any construction work, the mayor was unable to use his power of veto for ‘political purposes’, and that given that Governor Nakaima had already approved the plan, Mayor Inamine would be unable to halt construction.

This raises an interesting question, namely; ‘can a city mayor block the construction of assets that have been approved by the federal government?’. According to the Japanese “Public Water Body Reclamation Act” (公有水面埋立法) of 1921 (which was last revised in 2004), in the event of any construction likely to affect public stretches of water, the governor of a province has the right to refuse any construction that does not comply with Article 4 (which requires any applicant to explain, in good faith, the scale and impact of any planned construction and obtain the consent of ‘affected stakeholders’) (J). As Mayor Inamine has refused to agree to any proposals for construction at Henoko, this has been taken to mean that the governor does not have the local consent required to approve the construction of the base.

Not that this is without precedent either. In 1972, during the closing stages of the US involvement in the Vietnam War, Mayor Asukata Ichio of Yokohama refused permission for US tanks to use city roads. Without local consent, the tanks stayed where they were (J).

If local governments retain this significant veto power, then the likelihood of the Abe government succeeding in any construction around Henoko will be slim until the Nago City council (and its independent mayor) are convinced otherwise. Certainly Mayor Inamine will take a considerable amount of persuading, given that he has said that any move by either the federal or prefectural government to implement its base plans by force would be a blow to local government and raise questions as to whether the civil rights of Nago City citizens were being ignored (comparing the current situation to that of ‘colonialism’ - J). As such… ‘…both the federal and US governments should start thinking of an alternative venue’ (J).

That suggestion, not surprisingly, went down like a lead balloon with the Abe administration (and the US), with PM Abe himself telling an executive meeting of the LDP on Monday that while the loss of the LDP candidate in the Nago City election was disappointing, his government would continue with its plans for Henoko (J). As this sentiment was backed in later statements by Defence Minister Onodera and Deputy Foreign Minister Kishi (J), Mayor Inamine may have an extraordinary battle of wills in store with a government that is determined to resolve the base relocation question.

If push comes to shove, one imagines the Abe administration may use its considerable power in the Diet to simply re-write the 1921 Act, giving final approval for construction to the federal government irrespective of local concerns if all necessary procedures have been taken (environmental impact reports, consultation with prefectural governments and local communities and so forth). As the Abe government has already started taking tenders for the Henoko base project (J), it expects the Nago City council to ‘understand’ the reasons for the base relocation and accept it as a fait accompli. This could certainly blow up into a major issue for the Abe administration, and raise questions over civil rights versus the authority of central government.

The other item of interest to me over the past couple of days was this from the AFP (and which was subsequently picked up by the Japanese press – J), detailing the less-than-successful attempt by All Nippon Airways (ANA) to advertise their new international routes from Haneda Airport near Tokyo. An advertisement launched on the weekend, and subsequently pulled off air following a wave of complaints from (mostly English-language speaking) foreigners living in Japan, was supposed to appeal to Japanese consumers by using ‘internationalisation’ as a selling point. By internationalisation, this involved a comedian by the name of ‘Bakarizumu’ donning a blonde wig and a large false nose to depict a stereotypical ‘Westerner’ (or perhaps more accurately, Caucasian).

This stereotype has often been used in comedy in Japan, apparently for the visual gag that it presents (as seen here, and here).  The AFP article suggests that the relatively homogenous nature of Japanese society may be a factor in this case, i.e., that the absence of a large minority community means that the Japanese are less aware of cultural insensitivity than other, more multicultural societies. This claim does appear to ignore the substantial Korean and Chinese communities, not to mention the large Japanese-Brazilian community, but point taken. 

What I find difficult to fathom is that with the penchant of Japanese advertisers to employ actors and actresses (not forgetting to mention sportspeople and models) from the US and Europe, why on earth did ANA settle on Bakarizumu (ok, so he may be cheaper than international stars, but there are thousands of young Westerners in Tokyo who could have stood in for a rather lame sight gag)? An airline with an international brand like ANA could surely have come up with something better to appeal to domestic consumers.

ANA has stated that it did not mean to offend by the ad. Yet in approving it ANA does appear to have forgotten that the domestic Japanese audience does include a fair few (Caucasian) foreigners, many of whom would like to use Haneda Airport to commute overseas and who would therefore have an interest in the advertisement. The AFP article also says that most commentary came from English-language social media, which implies that other language users weren’t as upset as those speaking English (either that or the AFP only researched English language media for reactions). It does seem to be little more than a storm in a teacup (after all, native Japanese viewers weren’t particularly perturbed by it neither did they appear to call for the ads’ removal), but it is indicative of attitudes towards ethnicity in Japan, and how these are perceived by the foreign community in Japan.

Not one to spend the first weeks of the year in quiet contemplation, PM Abe embarked on a visit to the Middle East and Africa on Thursday last week, with plans to take in Oman, the Ivory Coast, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. The press statement (J) issued by MOFA before the visit put particular emphasis to the economic benefits that would accrue from the first dedicated prime ministerial visit to Africa in 8 years (the last being by PM Koizumi in 2006). Before departing, PM Abe stated that as far as Japanese diplomacy was concerned, Africa ‘could be described as a frontier’, while the Middle East continued to be of crucial importance to Japan for strategic reasons (J).

In a particularly poignant article by the Kyodo Press (J), reasons for the visit emphasised the fact that in terms of gaining access to Africa, Japan has lagged behind other countries in promoting trade and development on the continent itself, a situation that China has certainly profited from through its active economic diplomacy aimed at securing greater access to resources. In the sub-Saharan region, the presence of large deposits of oil and minerals, despite being the source of numerous civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War, has meant that the region has experienced economic development on the back of increases in the price of raw materials. This, in a continent with a total population of over one billion, has led to the development of a middle class and its corresponding consumer activity.

The importance of Africa to global economic growth has spurred a continuous series of visits by foreign heads of state, the most memorable being the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in March of 2013, followed by US President Barack Obama later in the year. Such is the importance of Africa that it has become the arena for competition between emerging and established economies that has replaced the ideological battles between the US and the Soviet Union (battles that Japan fought on behalf of the US through extensions of aid and development funds from the period of PM Nakasone onwards (Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, p.16).

For PM Abe, the attraction of Africa extends to more than just resources. In the aftermath of the formation of the NSC and implementation of the NSS in December last year, the Abe government revealed its plan to have Japan appointed as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2015 (J). By doing so, this will both raise the profile of Japan on a global scale and increase Japan’s influence on decisions taken by the UNSC, an institution upon which China sits as a permanent member and whose opposition to Japan’s entry as a permanent member has vexed Japan since 2005. In order to provide a greater chance of success, Japan has approached African nations for their vote in return for a greater voice for both Asian and African interests, with a view to carrying those concerns on as a permanent member of the UNSC. It is a path that Australian trod during its candidature as a non-permanent member to the UNSC, and one that ultimately proved successful.

In an article for the National Bureau of Asian Research (PDF), Jeremy Taylor and Michael Walsh raised the possibility that emphasis by PM Abe on Japan’s role in the UNMISS (UN Mission in South Sudan) may in turn provide Abe with the means to further the ‘normalisation’ of the Self Defence Forces through ‘proactive pacifism’. This theory presupposes that UNMISS will prove a litmus test for the Abe government as it seeks to reinterpret the constitution and successfully pass legislation concerning collective self defence (which is unlikely considering the New Komeito’s position on the issue (J), and certainly not without provisos). By doing so, Japan will be able to participate in international operations on an equal footing with other nations, as…’To date, Japanese security operations in East Africa have enabled incremental changes that have moved Japan closer to collective defense in peacekeeping and the adoption of broader rules of engagement in military operations overseas’.

All of this is entirely plausible, although it seems somewhat far-fetched to suggest that East Africa is the ‘serious political, diplomatic, and military challenge’ to the Abe government that the authors claim it is. If any SDF member were to be killed by rebel forces, it would certainly provoke calls within Japan for withdrawal (primarily from the SDP (J) and the Japanese Communist Party (J), yet it would have little to no bearing on the Abe government’s commitment to the UN mission – indeed it could be used as a pretext for greater commitment, demonstrating that Japan, like other UN partners, is prepared to share the risks of international peacekeeping operations. This would be in keeping with the ethos outlined in the NSS (PDF, p.24), although it should be noted that in terms of Japan’s security priorities, Africa comes a long way down the list detailed in the NSS, with greater emphasis given to the Asia-Pacific, Europe, the Americas, and the Middle East.

Africa is certainly an opportunity in terms of its economic potential , but its attraction to Japan at present lies more in the collective votes in can provide in the UN than in any involvement in PKO and incremental changes to SDF operating procedures. Further visits from Abe government ministers will naturally follow, primarily to offset the influence of China and demonstrate Japan’s commitment to its promises of development assistance. Japan is still playing catch-up in increasing its presence on the global stage, yet if PM Abe’s recent activity is anything to go by, Japan will come to the fore of foreign affairs debate over the next twelve months, and that could make for interesting times indeed.

Readers of this particular blog will probably have paid close attention to news out of Japan on December 26th, which reported that PM Abe had paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine in order to offer, in his words, “sincerity in mourning for those heroes that fought and lost their lives for their nation, to venerate the fallen, and to pray that they may rest in peace”. In the same media statement released by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the same day, PM Abe declared that Japan must never again instigate war, a position derived from ‘severe and painful regret’ for past actions.  As such, PM Abe had ‘stoutly pledged’ never to engage in war, a pledge made in front of ‘the spirits of the victims of war’ (J).  Once news of the visit became public, the reaction of (international) social and traditional media to the visit was mostly negative, to say the least.

Kazuhiko Togo, writing in the East Asia Forum, noted that PM Abe had chosen to visit Yasukuni at a time when tensions with China were already high over issues concerning the Senkaku Islands, and that any move to ratchet up the ante in such an atmosphere could have dangerous consequences. For their part the Chinese flatly condemned the visit, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry stating that the visit was an attempt to whitewash history and overturn the outcome of WWII, while South Korea was equally vehement in its criticism, claiming that the visit was a consequence of Abe’s ‘wrong perception of history’ and that it would destabilise the region.

Of even greater significance (at least as far as Japan was concerned) was the rebuke the visit earned from the US, with the US Embassy in Tokyo issuing a statement expressing US ‘disappointment’ in Abe’s decision to visit the shrine. In caged diplomatic speak, this was tantamount to a direct criticism of Abe, and the Japanese media certainly reacted to it in this way. As Prof. Togo explained, the US had been urging Japan not to engage in any provocative behaviour that might upset China, hence this move by Abe would cause the US to reconsider its position vis-à-vis cooperation with Japan. As the US had spent considerable time trying to get Japan to work in greater unison with other regional partners such as South Korea, for PM Abe to suddenly throw a diplomatic spanner into the works was not appreciated by Washington.

As Sheila Smith outlined in her blog post following the visit, Abe’s actions would frustrate US policymakers and give rise to concerns that Abe might be pursuing a different security agenda to that which was previously welcomed by Washington. Given such concerns, the US might hold back on further alliance reforms until it better understands Abe’s intentions. With the US keen to make progress on the Futenma base relocation plan, Abe’s role in securing Okinawan consent for the move was greatly appreciated in Washington, yet this same move may have given Abe the confidence to indulge in an agenda which completely negated Abe’s previous promise that his government would not escalate tensions.

As to why Abe decided to visit Yasukuni, pundits have given various reasons for this in addition to Abe’s own official line. One theory stated that as Abe has suffered a hit in popularity because of his introduction of the NSA and Secrecy Protection Bill, he was attempting to rally support among the more conservative, right-wing members of the electorate who expected Abe to make such a visit (although whether this would secure Abe any greater level of support is debatable, considering that they would already approve of his legislative agenda). Another theory states that as Japan’s relationship with China and South Korea is already poor, Abe would have nothing to lose by going ahead with his visit. In his statement PM Abe explicitly stated that he had no intention of ‘hurting the feelings of the Chinese and South Korean people’ by his visit, although he was fully aware of how it would be perceived in both of those countries.

To engage in an act with full knowledge of its likely consequences makes PM Abe’s benign claim somewhat dubious. A bigger question might be why Abe chose Yasukuni Shrine to make a pledge to peace and the renunciation of war at all, given the symbolism of the shrine and its association with militarism. A far more appropriate venue would have been Okinawa while pledging financial assistance to the Nakaima government – it would have interpreted as a more genuine act of contrition, and would have given Abe’s words more substance, at least as far as an international audience was concerned. 

Hugh White waded into the discussion on Monday by stating that perhaps Abe was sending a signal to both Beijing and Washington, reminding them that he was free to act as he wishes, while also signalling a possible move by Japan to distance itself from the US and pursue an independent path against China, given the US’s reluctance to fully commit itself to Japan’s defence (or the perception that it is less committed to Japan). In White’s view, Japan may be seeking to remove itself from its post-war reliance on the US, as the US cannot guarantee Japan’s security in the face of belligerence from China. Hence by using the Yasukuni Shrine visit as a pretext, Abe has calculated that by upping the ante with China, he can force the US to reveal whether it is committed to the alliance or whether Japan would be better served by a Japan-only defence policy founded on a right to collective self-defence.

Hence questions regarding Abe’s motives have spawned a myriad of theories, ranging from personal beliefs to strategic calculations. In all likelihood each of these theories has validity, although the idea that Abe would pursue a security policy at odds with US strategic thinking is harder to accept unless one believes that Abe harbours an ambition to reduce or remove US influence over Japan. If so, then Abe’s statements in the past reaffirming the importance of the US to Japan ring hollow, while simultaneously leaving Japan surrounded by hostile nations and devoid of strong support from its principal ally (and the added support this brings from other regional partners).

If this is indeed what Abe intended by his visit, then it suggests that Abe is extremely confident in his ability to build relations with regional partners, and that he calculated that the temporary negative impact of the shrine visit on Japan’s international relations was worth the ‘patriotic’ symbolism designed to appeal to a domestic audience. If Japan can be seen to act on its own accord, then perhaps it might be able to pursue an agenda that differentiates it from the US and gives it greater leverage against China. Abe will need to work on the charm then, given that other regional partners will need reassurance that Japan’s push for security autonomy isn’t part of some broader agenda.

Such speculation doesn’t seem plausible, however, given the emphasis Abe has placed on ties with the US, and the pre-existing ties that exist between Japanese institutions and their US counterparts. Abe has repeatedly included the US in a majority of his foreign policy statements, remarking on the importance of the US to Japan and how regional stability depends on the US-Japan alliance. If Abe has decided to scale back that support, he certainly hasn’t given any indication to that end – quite the opposite in fact. Nevertheless the repercussions of the visit have switched focus back onto Abe, which may have been an additional factor in his decision to visit the shrine. Questions on whether Abe’s decision was in fact the right one for Japan at present will have to wait until international diplomatic machines crank up for another year of summits and symposia, and how Abe is met by his regional counterparts.