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SDF Participation in Exercise Talisman Sabre

26/5/2015

 
PictureUS Department of Defense
Last week the Australian Department of Defence put out a press release announcing that this year’s Exercise Talisman Sabre would feature the participation of the Japanese Self Defence Force, together with the New Zealand Defence Force. This news was not in itself surprising – it had first been reported in the Australian newspaper in November last year - yet it was treated by local media in Australia as a major development in the trilateral strategic relationship between the US, Australia, and Japan, and how this might have implications for Australia’s relationship with China.

Exercise Talisman Sabre is the main joint exercise conducted between the ADF and elements of the US armed forces. It is held once every two years, and takes place in and around Townsville and Rockhampton in Queensland. This year marks the first time that the SDF has participated in the exercise, although the numbers involved (40) are not exactly overwhelming. Nevertheless, the fact that the SDF have been assigned to operate with the US Marines during the exercise suggests that they will focus on amphibious landings, which is a reflection of both Japan’s increasing concern in maintaining its territorial integrity and the fact that the Marines are the principal US military force residing in Japan. 

Expectations are that the SDF’s involvement in this year’s exercise will be the start of a much broader plan for bilateral and trilateral training between Japan, the US and Australia. Last weekend Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop was in Iwaki, Fukushima Prefecture, to attend the PALM7 dialogue on Pacific Island issues. While there Bishop met with PM Shinzo Abe, where they discussed an upgrade in the arrangements concerning bilateral training so that the SDF and ADF can more easily transit through one another’s countries to participate in exercises.   

The fact that this conversation has come a week before the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where expectations are that the US, under Defence Secretary Ashton Carter, will deliver a fairly stern rebuke of China’s island building in the South China Sea and unilateral imposition of restricted air and sea zones, adds to the rumour mill on just where Australia-Japan security relations are headed.

Australia has made no secret of the fact that it regards Japan as a crucial regional partner and a force for stability in an unstable world. The current deliberations in the Japanese Diet on Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defence (and the manner in which it will be exercised) have been closely followed by Australia’s political and policy class, and commentary on Japan’s intentions have generally found favour with a more ‘pro-active’ stance by Japan in ensuring that the region operates according to established laws and regulations.

Legislative activity by the Abe government has also brought about the possible involvement of Japan in Australia’s Future Submarine Project, and if this goes ahead, then clearly it will be in the interests of both countries to have a far larger defence relationship with one another.

The involvement of 40 SDF troops in Talisman Sabre is merely the beginning of regular military exercises between the forces of the US, Japan and Australia (not forgetting to mention New Zealand). At a time when China’s activities are raising serious questions about their intentions, it stands to reason that countries be prepared for whatever scenario may arise in the near distant future.


NSC approves technology sharing with Oz

17/5/2015

 
Picturenews.goo.ne.jp
(The following comes from Asahi Shimbun, quoting from an earlier article written up by Reuters)

Abe government approves sharing of submarine technology to Australia, a first for weaponry

Miwa Sachiko, Imano Shinobu - Asahi Shimbun Monday, 18 May 2015 (translation is mine from the original Japanese article)

The Abe government confirmed on Monday that it will share technology related to the SDF’s latest generation of submarine class, the “Soryū”, with Australia ahead of a joint development in a new class of submarine based on the Soryū. At a meeting of the National Security Committee held on the same day, a decision was made to participate in the selection process for joint development. Expectations are that Australia will choose Japan’s model, and if this is formally adopted, it will be the first time that military technology will have been shared using the ‘Three Principles for Transfer of Military Equipment” that replaced the previous “Three Principles on Arms Exports” abolished in April last year.

Participation in the selection process illustrates how cooperation between the US, Japan and Australia is being used to confront the growing maritime power of China.  This has also been reflected in the Abe government’s new national security legislation that was presented to the Diet on the 15th, and the revised “US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines” revealed last month.

The guidelines have made much of the “search for opportunities for cooperation with partners in relation to military equipment and technology”. This not only applies to the US-Japan bilateral relationship, but means that such opportunities can be pursued with other third party nations such as Australia.  In order to increase the ability to contain China, the SDF will deepen its relations not only with the US military, but that of Australia as well.

Australia is currently examining how to replace its submarine fleet by the 2030s and has shown interest in Japan’s submarine technology.  At the trilateral leader’s meeting held in Australia in November last year, PM Abe, President Obama, and Australian PM Tony Abbott agreed on a policy to “deepen cooperation in security and defence” with an eye on China’s maritime advances. PM Abbott touched upon the subject of Japan’s submarine technology, and said that “cooperation between the US, Japan, and Australia is essential”.

On the 6th of May, Defence Minister Nakatani Gen held a telephone conversation with Australian Defence Minister Andrews, in which Australia formally invited Japan to participate in the submarine selection process.

As a result of the NSC’s decision, Japan will provide Australia with all the necessary information it needs to make a decision on submarines.  It is the first time technological information related to weaponry has been shared since the “Three Principles on Arms Exports” policy was abolished. The NSC’s decision was based on the fact that as submarines themselves could not be manufactured based purely on information provided by Japan, and that as Australia had given its assurances that the information would not be passed to any third party countries, there was no risk to Japan’s security.

Both France and Germany are also involved in the selection process, however there is a strong chance that Japan will be chosen.


Let's talk railways

12/5/2015

 
Picturetoyokeizai.net
First of all, I admit that’s not the most inspiring of headlines, but bear with me as this post has a bit to say about Australia’s infrastructure and how it could be improved through high speed rail. In a week dominated by news about the 2015-16 budget in Australia, the pessimistic forecasts for Australia’s immediate economic future got me thinking about just how this situation could be arrested, if not reversed.  One issue that has often come up in political debate in this country has been the importance of infrastructure building, especially for a country such as Australia which has a burgeoning population but an infrastructure system built for the mid-20th century. In times past, governments has turned to infrastructure projects to provide a boost to the economy, using them as a means of raising revenue, creating and sustaining employment, and promoting nation building.

With Australia’s resources boom coming to a (temporary) end (temporary in the sense that if India decides to start importing large quantities of raw materials then once again Australia might experience a boom similar to that experienced with China), it is abundantly clear that Australia needs to diversify its economy if it is to have any chance of escaping the cycles of boom and bust that accompany the raw material trade.  For a nation that is growing in population, and concurrently in ambition, there is a need to ensure that the more remote areas of the nation are more closely linked to the major population centres on the coastal fringe.  To that end, there needs to be a conduit established between major population centres that will allow for the mass transportation of people from city to city, and city to country, without the environmental effects of either automobiles or aircraft or the considerable delays experienced by the current rail network.

Australia has been examining the potential of high speed rail transport since the early 1980s.  Private studies, coupled with state and federal government sponsored studies, have reached various conclusions based on a number of factors; the engineering involved in construction and maintenance, the potential number of passengers, negotiations between state and federal governments over costs, and legal aspects arising from environmental impact statements,  compensation claims from rural properties affected by noise and pollution and compensation for land claimed as part of the planning process.  Despite the clear benefits of having such a railway network (as outlined in this 2013 DOI report), one factor has consistently acted as a brake on high speed rail becoming a reality: political will.

Put simply, because high speed rail would involve a considerable amount of investment from government (state and federal), neither level of government has been particularly enthusiastic about taking it up as a means of nation-building.  A federal government review of the feasibility of high speed rail concluded in 2001 that it would cost around AU$51bn to build a such a network between Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne, and that these costs, coupled with the relatively low number of passengers, therefore made it an economic impossibility.     Federal governments, wary about imposing an additional tax to pay for the construction of such a network, have consistently delayed making any decision about high speed rail, instead insisting that only private funding could support such a project.

For a nation such as Japan, which embarked on nation building through infrastructure projects during the 1950s and which completed its first Shinkansen line in 1964 (J), the saga of Australia’s on-again, off-again relationship with high speed rail has been instructive, especially when it comes to dealing with foreign governments and the question of wills. 

Nevertheless, Japan is certainly ready to provide the planning, engineering, maintenance, and management of a high speed railway that Australia needs. While other countries (namely China and France) have also expressed an interest in being involved in any future high speed railway network for Australia (a sore point for Japanese railway industries in the case of China, whose companies the Japanese accuse of stealing Japanese technology), Japan’s long history of operating high speed rail networks, its impeccable safety record, and the future potential of Japanese designed high speed trains all point towards Japanese industries being given priority in any future Australian high speed rail network. 

Yet nothing can begin if the political will is not there to support infrastructure building. This is an issue that needs to be resolved, yet 35 years of deliberation, obfuscation, and procrastination has prevented it from progressing any further than as a topic for conversation.  It does not augur well for the Australian nation if issues of national importance such as an effective, efficient transport network, geared towards population growth, urban development, and the movement of capital from cities to the country, cannot progress any further than as a talking point for a research paper.


The new US-Japan security guidelines, Abe's Congress speech, and many other things besides

3/5/2015

 
Picturekantei.go.jp
Right. Once again it appears that I have fallen behind somewhat on my updates to this blog, mainly because the amount of information I am crunching at the moment, combined with other tasks, has robbed me of the spare moment that I need to post new articles. It has been less than a week since PM Shinzo Abe made his address to a joint sitting of the US Congress, a speech (J) that was, as far as is discernable, amicably (if not a bit nonchalantly) received by its American audience in contrast to audiences in China or South Korea. Earlier last week, ANU academic Tessa Morris Suzuki wrote this particular piece for the East Asia Forum which was quite insightful as to the reasons why China and South Korea have been so adamant in their opposition to Abe’s speeches despite their message of co-operation and peace. In sum, it all comes down to semantics, and the perception that Abe’s ‘deep repentance’ does not equate to an apology for Japan’s colonial legacy in East Asia.

The Australian media essentially followed the line of the US and Japanese media in noting the historical significance ($) of Abe’s address, while also echoing the by-line that Abe was looking for support from the US during his visit for both the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and for Japan’s new defence guidelines with the US. The implications behind the new guidelines were not lost on Australian observers, with one noting that these guidelines point towards more activities between Australia, Japan, and the US in the Asia Pacific region that might serve as a hedge against China, while another noted the changing regional dynamic and how the guidelines will allow Australian forces to work on a more equitable basis with Japanese and US partners in areas such as disaster response and humanitarian missions.

The Diplomat magazine had an interview with MOFA Press Secretary Kawamura Yasuhisa about the new guidelines, in which Kawamura did reiterate the line that they would relate to offering mutual defence against attacks that involve missiles, a scenario that has been given a great deal of analysis in the Japanese media over the past two years ever since PM Abe raised the prospect of reinterpreting the Constitution to allow for collective self defence. A more thorough analysis of the guidelines was offered by Jeff Hornung, who concluded by writing that “While Japan still is not a “normal country” that can fight alongside American troops in combat, it is voluntarily taking on larger security roles alongside its American ally”.

On a more personal note, last weekend I turned 40.  That is in many ways a milestone, and it has been quite a journey getting here.  Much has been achieved, and much has yet to be achieved. Everyone’s experience of being 40 is different, and so I can’t claim to be able to speak definitively about what being 40 actually feels like.  Although I can say this – it feels no different to being 39. So here’s to the next 10 years, when I’ll again be waxing lyrical about turning 50. In the interim I will get a lot more done and do many more things, of that I am sure!   


    Author

    This is a blog maintained by Greg Pampling in order to complement his webpage, Pre-Modern Japanese Resources.  All posts are attributable to Mr Pampling alone, and reflect his personal opinion on various aspects of Japanese history and politics (among other things).

    弊ブログをご覧になって頂きまして誠に有難うございます。グレッグ・パンプリングと申します。このブログに記載されている記事は全て我の個人的な意見であり、日本の歴史、又は政治状態、色々な話題について触れています。

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