I won't dwell on the first topic all that long this time around as it has been well dissected on other blogs (here), and so in relation to the incident involving the Japanese ambassador's car in Beijing earlier this week, and the Yomiuri Shimbun editorial calling for a revision of the 1993 Kono Statement on the culpability of Japan in forcing Korean women to serve as prostitutes to Imperial Japanese forces, I will say this. In the first instance, the incident itself was not particularly serious (a flag was stolen from the front of the ambassador's car, damaging the small pole affixed to the front of the car. This was the only damage reported), and given the manner in which Chinese authorities have responded by saying that they are sparing no effort in searching for the perpetrators, this should placate concerns of such attacks becoming commonplace. The fact that the perpetrators were criticised in Chinese editorials means that the Chinese government (or at least authorities in Beijing) are attempting to deescalate any tensions lingering since the Senkaku Island dispute a week earlier,  an encouraging development given the amount of rhetoric both this and last week warning of dire consequences should China and Japan clash over issues of sovereignty.

What was particularly difficult to comprehend was the editorial of the Yomiuri Shimbun on Wednesday (J) calling for a revision to the Kono Statement given that the content of the Statement doesn't reflect historical reality, i.e., since there is no documented evidence that Korean women were forced into sexual servitude, there is no need for any sort of apology. The malicious nature of this argument also beggers belief, for what it essentially says is that the testimonies of Korean, Chinese, and Southeast Asian men, women and children detailing the abuse suffered at the hands of Imperial forces matter not a whit, while also belittling the efforts of previous Japanese administrations to at least try to reach an understanding with Japan's neighbours over its wartime activities.  It just provides more ammunition to anti-Japanese sentiment at a time when Japan is trying to build ties with regional states. If the intent of the editorial was to act as a warning to Japan's neighbours not to push it too far on questions of historical culpability, then its effect will be the exact opposite. As such, if the Yomiuri Shimbun wants to use its editorial as a megaphone for a stronger stance on territorial issues, there are more constructive ways of doing this than making provocative statements that simply feed into deep seated resentments.  

In the meantime, the post that I wanted to make today concerns another Yomiuri article that came out earlier in the week (J), with a few interesting theories in relation to the lineage of Toyotomi Hideyori and whether he actually was Toyotomi Hideyoshi's biological son. I'll translate some of the article and post it below to give readers an idea of what the arguments are.

""Toyotomi Hideyori was an illegitimate child...", claims a Kyushu University professor.

Toyotomi Hideyori (1593-1615) was not Hideyoshi's biological son  - although this claim is often made within the world of fiction and myth, Kyushu University Professor Hattori Hideo (an expert in medieval Japanese history) has used the theme of undocumented  historical events (events in which no solid proof exists) as a topic for his latest work "Kawara no Mono, Hinin, Hideyoshi" (河原ノ者・非人・秀吉 - vagrants, castaways, and Hideyoshi). His claim is that a new interpretation of the "Shukusei no Jiken" (The Purge Incident) at Osaka Castle proves that Hideyori was an illegitimate child.  

Hideyoshi, in spite of having many wives, was not blessed with an abundance of children. His relationship with the concubine Chacha (Lady Yodo, or 淀殿), which he consumated when he was over 50 years old, was the only one that produced children - the prematurely born Tsurumatsu, followed by Hideyori.

From the early Edo period theories abounded that Hideyori's father was Ono Harunaga, a retainer of the Toyotomi household who sacrificed both Hideyori and his mother in the final stages of the Battle of Osaka (1615). The "illegitimate child" theory was explored by novelists Shiba Ryotaro and Endo Shusaku, yet these did not leave the realm of speculation and fantasy.

It was at this stage that Professor Hattori, after calculating backwards from Hideyori's birthday on the 3rd day of the 8th month of Bunroku 2 (1593), examined whether Hideyoshi and Chacha could have shared the same bed on or around the 4th of the 11th month of the previous year, Tensho 20. On the 1st day of the 10th month of Tensho 20, Hideyoshi, in order to prepare to embark troops to the Korean peninsula, departed Osaka Castle for his base at Nagoya (名護屋, located in present day Saga prefecture  in Kyushu), where he remained until the 8th month of the following year. In order for Hideyoshi's son to be born at the recorded time, Chacha would have had to accompany him to Kyushu.

The evidence that has been used to back Chacha's presence is a diary entry written by Hiratsuka Takisuke who was attached to the embarkation army assembled at Nagoya.  In his diary Hiratsuka wrote..."Chacha appears to have accompanied (Hideyoshi)". Yet upon re-examining many other historical records from the same time, none of them specifically mention Chacha's presence at Nagoya. What is clear is that Hideyoshi was accompanied by one of his concubines, Kyogoku Tatsuko, hence Professor Hattori theorizes that "Hiratsuka's diary mistook Tatsuko for Chacha."

On the 22nd day of the 5th month of Bunroku 2, while Chacha was still pregnant, Hideyoshi sent a letter to his wife, Kita no Mandokoro, in which he wrote..." The Taiko's (Hideyoshi's) only child is Tsurumatsu. The child that shall be born to Chacha is her's alone." This passage has previously been interpreted as Hideyoshi attempting to hide his pleasure at being able to avoid his wife, yet this appears to be an opaque sort of reasoning. Professor Hattori has instead supposed that the passage indicates that..."Both Hideyoshi and Kita no Mandokoro had noticed how unnatural the pregnancy was."

Moreover, in the 10th month of Bunroku 2, just after Hideyori was born, a large number of Hideyoshi's female household attendants and the monk Shomoji (唱門師, a religious artist) were either punished or expelled from Osaka on Hideyoshi's orders. According to the aristocratic diary, the "Tokiyoshi-ki" (時慶記), within Osaka Castle a problem arose concerning "illicit relations between men and women", and that Shomoji had been banished for the crime of "receiving large quantities of gold and silver", while the women were "punished." The Jesuit missionary Luis Frois was in Japan at the time, and he noted that both the female attendants and upwards of 30 monks had been punished.

Professor Hattori notes that this punishment was not metered out for a simple breakdown in morals, but was done because Chacha and other female attendants had  bestowed "gold and silver" upon Shomoji and the monks in celebration of their having conceived children. The practice of Sanro (参籠), whereby a person would spend a night in either a temple or shrine in order to pray for a successful pregnancy was, according to common practices in the pre-modern period, an opportunity for sexual relations between men and women, hence the "celebration" may have in fact been referring to a sexual relation between a monk and Chacha. Hideyoshi, after returning to Osaka, "must have found out about the circumstances surrounding Chacha's pregnancy and been absolutely furious."  

If this is so, why did Hideyoshi then forgive Chacha and acknowledge Hideyori as his legitimate son? Professor Hattori writes that..."Chacha was the niece of Hideyoshi's former master, Oda Nobunaga. For Hideyoshi, who had seized the inheritance of the Oda household, any child born to Chacha would have been a blessing as it would aid in legitimising his position."

Up until this point, academia, when exploring the legitimacy of Hideyori as Hideyoshi's heir, have not paid a great deal of attention to blood ties. However Professor Hattori's book is expected to have a significant influence on historical interpretation of Hideyori's legitimacy. Established theories that Hideyori's birth led to the dis-inheritance and eventual suicide of Hideyoshi's successor, the Kanpaku Hidetsugu, and that the reason that so many of Hideyoshi's former retainers joined the eastern army (the army of Tokugawa Ieyasu) at the Battle of Sekigahara (1600) was because of questions surrounding the legitimacy of Hideyori's birth, will definitely need to be reviewed. (Ikeda Kazumasa, Culture and Lifestyle Section, Western Bureau)  

Oo, things are about to get interesting. On Friday last week, the Yomiuri Shimbun was reporting (J) that according to Defence Minister Morimoto, both Australia and Japan were currently arranging for the next 2+2 meeting between the defence and foreign ministers of both nations, to take place sometime during September following the end of the current Diet session. Given that this is the fourth such meeting since 2007, and one involving a potentially strategically important ally to Australia, you would think it would have garnered a bit more interest from the domestic media in Australia, but so far no dice. It makes one wonder whether people would sit up and take notice if the message came from the US State Department, and mentioned in passing during one of their press conferences (such is the degree of attention paid to anything coming out of Washington in Canberra), but I digress.

Both sides should have plenty to discuss - joint exercises in the northern regions of Australia, RIMPAC, disaster relief efforts, (possible) submarine technology acquisition, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, aid work in Burma and funding for Pacific islands, the question of China and sovereignty, Japanese investment in resource and energy projects (i.e, the Ichthys project),  education and the "Asian Century", progress in EPA negotiations (probably best not to dwell on this one too long), the TPP, not forgetting to mention joint work in the EAS and at APEC. In short, there shouldn't be too many pauses between subjects, so long as the dialogue remains focused on the interests of both sides and doesn't become bogged down in unilateral demands (which is unlikely to happen, given what both sides have to gain through cooperation). The fact that Japan is fielding two competent, well-respected ministers will be appreciated by Australia. Nothing derails bilateral dialogue further than having to wonder whether one's counterpart will still be in his position a month from now. 

Both sides may in fact take up the idea suggested by Dr Brendan Taylor of the ANU earlier this week (E), recommending that Australia act as an intermediary in getting China and Japan to return to the negotiating table on questions of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, given the relatively good standing of Australia in Beijing and Tokyo and the stakes involved for Australia if both sides clash over the issue. In much the same manner as the South China Sea dispute,  the reaction of the Australian government will probably be to suggest that both sides negotiate to resolve things peacefully and in accordance to international law. It might even offer to hold a discussion between both countries on neutral territory in Australia, but quite frankly, the chances of both sides agreeing to such a proposal are slim to none.  Australia does not have the leverage of say, the US, the UK, France, or Germany, not forgetting to mention Brazil, given the degree of dependency of Australia on both the Chinese and Japanese export markets. Just the threat of either side halting investment in Australia as a result of perceived favouritism would cause the ASX to halt trading lest selling on the dollar occur on too great and rapid a scale. 

To act as an intermediary would be a noble role, but the risks outweigh any benefits, and issues of sovereignty are an international law minefield that any third party nation would be well advised to avoid lest it get dragged into the
dispute against its will.  It may be a frustrating process to watch from the sidelines, but if the main protagonists are not inclined to reach an agreement (and domestic pressure prevents them from doing so), then very little will be achieved by intervening.  Granted, it is a pessimistic view of bilateral relations, but given the history of attempts to forge peace between two mutually acrimonious states (and they are acrimonious, given the results of recent polls on popular perceptions of the other conducted in China and Japan (J),  it will take a state with much greater levels of influence over both sides in the East China Sea, and one with the requisite resources to back up its promises, to get both sides talking again.   

Shokunin – There is a tendency for people today to be a bit too `cerebral` about matters. There are probably a lot of women who swoon over men who work using their hands to make products. `The three main jobs of Edo` were `carpentry`, `fire fighting`, and `plastering`. Amidst the many workers in Edo, these were the most prosperous, and were thus popular with the ladies. Within these jobs, the head carpenter was regarded as the most illustrious, with a `chairman` type of position, a generous salary and cover charges above those of other professions.

The traditional uniform of the carpenters of Edo consisted of a navy blue patch on the backside of their trousers and navy blue split toed socks. Above this, they would have grass sandals made from flax which were held together with a navy blue lace which had been threaded through the flax. As they had to step and walk on wood, they wore these flax sandals so that they wouldn`t leave any marks in their wake. This was a trademark of a carpenter.

A strap would be tied to the front of the sandals, and the front would then be folded back slightly, so that the carpenter could not put his foot all the way into the sandal. Hence the reason this type of method for wearing sandals was referred to as `slip on`. This looked rather smart. If the foot went all the way into the sandal, this was regarded as uncouth.

This type of work gear appeared around the middle of the nineteenth century and originated in Edo. It then spread across the country to become the norm by the end of the Edo era. Before the Edo era, carpenters would wear just their loincloth and flax sandals.

It was particularly difficult to become a skilled tradesman. When one became an apprentice carpenter, one had to go for 7 or 8 years without pay during a period known as `Nenki Bōkō` (yearly service). One wouldn`t starve or be short of clothes, but apprentices never received more than pocket money. Afterwards they would go through a year of `thanks service – Orei Bōkō`, which of course did not produce an income. Only when this was completed could they then set themselves up in business. Up until this time they were called `apprentice – deishi`, yet from then on they could style themselves as a craftsman, a `shokunin`.

After paying their respects to the head carpenter, they would be handed their toolbox, which would be the first time they had ever received such equipment to use as their own. They would only be permitted to wear the same insignia as the head carpenter after they had been made a craftsman. (pp.85-87)

The continuing drama surrounding South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak’s comments in relation to the Japanese Emperor and the culpability of Japan in not expressing sufficient remorse on the question of comfort women played itself out in the Japanese media over the course of the week, with a majority of editorials and articles taking a critical line towards the South Korean government and the effect that this would have on South Korea – Japanese relations in the short, mid and long term. One would think that the visit by President Lee to the Liancourt Rocks would have been enough to satisfy Lee’s need to appeal to the domestic vote in South Korea, but his statement demanding an apology from the Emperor, and the confirmation that this was the position of the South Korean government during the course of the week (J), set off a storm of protest in Japan and virtually guarantees that broader questions on bilateral ties between both countries will be put on hold (as witnessed here).

The actions of the Lee government are perplexing (if not a bit aggravating) in that they come from a government that initiated dialogue with the then LDP government in 2008 aimed at improving diplomatic relations with Japan, which reversed the “sunshine policy” of the government of Roh Moo-Hyun in favour of a more confrontational approach towards North Korea under Kim Jong-Il, and which sought to overturn a “pro-China” stance of the former government in favour of stronger strategic relations with the US and Japan (J). Lee’s actions last week have left South Korea in a conundrum, for at a time when China and North Korea see no need to acquiesce to South Korea’s regional concerns, calling off a defence agreement with Japan (E) and then engaging in provocative acts such as landing on the Liancourt Rocks and issuing demands of the Emperor are not in South Korea’s interests, and may reinforce a perception of the South Korean government beholden to domestic interests that occasionally manifest in diplomatic negotiations in unpredictable ways (re; the recent  controversy surrounding South Korea’s intention to undertake scientific whaling, and the dichotomy between the position of the South Korean Ministry of Agriculture versus that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (E).

Issues of historical responsibility are almost impossible to resolve amicably, for such is the degree of personal and group related trauma that discussions inevitably become bogged down in the minutiae of who did what to whom and when, and whether one side is “sincere” in its apology. To then use historical responsibility to advocate issues related to territorial sovereignty guarantees that neither side will countenance the views of the other, for by their very nature they are emotion-laden and divorced from purely legal reasoning.  The reluctance of the South Korean government to seek a resolution with Japan in relation to the Liancourt Rocks in the International Court of Justice (the proposal for which Japan submitted to the court last week (E) is implicitly linked to this sense of grievance. When South Korea occupied the Rocks in 1952, it did so without international arbitration (given that South Korea was not privy to the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, and so did not have an opportunity to press its claim for sovereignty as it was engaged at the time in a war against North Korea, its actions in occupying the Rocks before they were to return to Japanese sovereignty must be seen in this context).

Since Japan was to re-establish sovereignty over the Rocks, South Korea’s occupation amounted to a violation of international law (this was certainly the US view), yet Japan did not press the issue and sought arbitration, which South Korea refused to answer (repeatedly, as noted here). Agreeing to international arbitration would subject the South Korean claim to legal scrutiny, which may find that South Korea had acted illegally thus nullifying its claim to the Rocks (although it is not an a priori case considering the circumstances in which the Rocks were returned to Japanese sovereignty). To occupy the Rocks and then tie this to questions of reparations puts the issue outside of territorial concerns in favour of emotionally based nationalism.

It may be that South Korea has resolved to force Japan’s hand on the issue of war responsibility and territoriality, betting that whatever the temporary effects on the South Korean-Japan relationship, Japan needs South Korea far more than South Korea needs Japan. South Koreans exports are rising (E), its products are out-selling those of Japan in the same markets (J), it has engaged in FTA negotiations (not withstanding a strong domestic backlash) with regional partners (E), and has sought broader defence relations with other states in the region (E).  While South Korea may in time overtake Japan in terms of GDP growth rates, like Japan South Korea’s population is aging (J), the government does not encourage immigration, and it still has to deal with the immediate threat of war with its neighbour to the north.   To bring its giant neighbour across the East China Sea to the negotiating table on North Korean issues, not to mention negotiating with China itself on issues related to EEZs (E), South Korea needs both Japan and the US for leverage, and neither of these states have been  particularly impressed with South Korea's upsetting attempts to form a solid security tripartite by insisting that historical issues be settled first (J).  

So what can be done? For the interim, neither side will want to be seen to give in to the demands of the other, hence a stand-off will continue for some months. In the meantime, given the fact that tripartite FTA talks between South Korea, Japan and China continued this week in spite of political anger over the territorial issue (J), bureaucrats in Seoul and Tokyo will co-operate behind the scenes on core interests to both countries while avoiding any overt statements related to sovereignty, leaving that to the politicians. Once South Korea conducts its presidential election and the result is made public, bilateral relations will probably raised by both governments keen to re-start initiatives stalled by the current dispute. For both countries, there is too much at stake for relations to freeze over issues of sovereignty, a point that is implicitly understood by the protaganists of both sides. Meanwhile the US will not allow its two most important allies in Northeast Asia to jeopardise the nascent defence pact being forged in the region, and so phone calls from Washington will hopefully have the desired effect in smothering the dispute before it threatens to escalate any further*.

*As of Friday, reports in the Yomiuri Shimbun were stating that Japan was contemplating a freeze on purchasing South Korean government bonds out of concerns that this may look hypocritical given the current climate. However this is not expected to have an impact on the progress of the three-way talks (J).

Kōjyō – On television and radio, commercials are often used in which sounds, voices, and images that have no relation to the product create an image while drawing our attention. The precursor to such methods were the kōjyōuri and tankabai of the Edo era.

Merchants would skillfully advertise their wares, showing off their merchandise and increase their customer numbers. Such merchants were referred to as `Yashi`, as they originally sold goods related to medicine, dental hygiene, perfume, and scents. Those unaffiliated workers (or rōnin) struggling to make ends meet would display their skills in a boisterous manner and thus gather customers (香具師). He would be written up as a yashi (or rural samurai) (`yashi` or 弥四, 矢師).

A particularly famous iainuki practitioner was Matsui Gensaemon. He made his name using his swords, medicine from Toyama, otherwise known as `Hangontan` and toothpaste. He stood on top of the goods piled up in three tiers and performed his iainuki using a long ōdachi sword. His descendant, Matsui Gensui made his name as a famous composer, and (as is to be expected) did turn his hand to selling toothpaste, yet such was his skill that even the shōgun came to listen to his performances. Gradually his name came to be associated with art from Asakusa, hence each successive artist took the name `Gensui` and handed on the artform.

One area that differed from Kōjyō was the practice of `crying sales`. It was a way of selling products by inviting sympathy, with sakura petals scattered about the midst of customers which caught their attention and brought them in. Another method of selling was known as `viewing sales`, in which wares were just put out for customers to look at. Attaching value to old furniture, pictures, china etc was a sales technique often used when such goods were expected to produce profits.

Another method of selling that was popular was the `nineteen mon spectacle`. In the mid Edo era the use of 4 mon became widespread, hence the value of goods was calculated according to multiples of 4. Those goods which might cost 20 mon were reduced to 19, for to “take a mon off and then sell it” was a discount method that became more widespread, which in a way resembles the modern practice of supermarkets and discount stores to reduced items to 98 yen. The 19 mon spectacle sold everything for 19 mon, which is the same as the modern 100 yen shop idea. They would mix in more expensive items within those priced at 19 mon, as it was important to test whether their sales methods were working. As the 19 mon spectacle became so popular, soon merchants were able to create the cheaper 18 mon stores.  (pp.48-50)

This week has seen a series of what can only be described as provocative acts in relation to questions of territorial claims and sovereignty, specifically those related to the Liancourt Rocks (claimed by Japan as Takeshima and regarded as part of Shimane prefecture, and occupied by South Korea since 1954 and referred to in Korean publications as Dokto/Tokto/Dokdo island) (E), along with the Senkaku Islands (claimed by both China and Taiwan and referred to as the Diaoyu Islands in China) (E). Following the display of a sign by South Korean footballer Park Jong-woo at the Olympics on Friday last week claiming that the Liancourt Rocks are Korean territory (for which he was reprimanded for using the Olympics to advocate a political agenda) (E), on Sunday it was widely reported in Japan (and as the week progressed across the region) that South Korean President Lee Myung-bak had visited the Liancourt Rocks on the 10th, ostensibly as part of a regional tour by an incumbent president seeking the re-election of his party (E).  It did not escape anyone's attention, however, that it marked the first time a South Korean president had visited the island, and that it occured during the week in which both nations would remember the events of 1945 and the end of the Second World War.

As if this wasn't provocative enough,  on Monday it was reported that at least 40 participants from South Korea, including South Korean singer Kim Jang-hoon, would swim the 220 kilometres from the South Korean mainland to the Liancourt Rocks, which they subsequently did (E). When President Lee was questioned about his decision to visit the island during a dinner held on the evening of the 10th, he stated that while it wasn't his intention to provoke Japan "any more than necessary", he cited a lack of willingness on the part of the Japanese government to sincerely discuss the question of apologies to Korean women forced to provide sexual services to the Imperial Japanese Army (the so-called "comfort women") as the reason for his visit, adding that during talks with PM Noda in December last year PM Noda was evasive in his responses to President Lee's questions and that nothing was done by the Japanese government to follow-up on the president's concerns (J).

As anyone familiar with the events of the leadership dialogue held last year would know, the question of comfort women was pushed by President Lee throughout the course of negotiations, despite Japan's attempts to steer the conversation towards economic and security related issues. Given that PM Noda would have to compromise his political dignity and face a storm of opposition in Japan should he agree to any conditions laid out by President Lee, small wonder then that the Japanese called an abrupt halt to discussions and refused to continue the dialogue (E). That this occured at the same time that a bronze statue depicting one of the comfort women was placed outside the front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul facing the embassy, and remains there despite protests from the Japanese that it be removed, added to the animosity between both sides.

While political commentators (and the North Korean government, (J) pointed out that Lee was pandering to a domestic audience through his visit in order to boost his credentials with those who accuse him of being too "close" to the Japanese (a point that was raised in the aftermath of scuttled talks between Japan and South Korea on defence co-operation in June (E), using highly sensitive issues to win kudos with domestic voters is a particularly risky move, and one that will have repercussions for whomever follows Lee into the presidency. At a time when South Korea needs regional partners to help it stave off the threat of war with North Korea and territorial incursions by Chinese government and  fishing vessels into South Korea's EEZ, the mercurial actions of President Lee will give other governments pause for thought, particularly if it means South Korea adopting a stance that is totally at odds with received wisdom and which threatens to escalate rather than reduce tensions.

President Lee, having upped the ante with Japan on questions of war guilt and territorial claims, then proceeded to declare on Wednesday that should Emperor Akihito contemplate visiting South Korea, he should first issue a sincere apology to those Korean activists executed by Japanese forces during the Japanese occupation of Korea (J). As history has shown, the Japanese do not take kindly to demands being made of their imperial family, particularly as the Emperor is a titular sovereign representative of the nation as a whole and so personifies the quiet dignity that the Japanese ascribe to themselves. For a foreign head of government, particularly one from a neighbouring country, to cast doubt on the sincerity of Japan's previous apologies for its actions during the 30s and 40s (J), and then state that only a further apology from an apolitical figurehead will be sufficient to satisfy him virtually guarantees that Japan will both reject his demand and refuse to co-operate with him and his government (at least until this latest spat blows over, given the high proportion of citizens of both countries in the other and the degree of two-way trade between them). 

While this topic was garnering headlines in Japan and South Korea, reports that North Korea and Japan had agreed to re-open negotiations on the return of the remains of Japanese troops and civilians that had died and been buried in North Korea managed to filter their way onto news websites (J). That North Korea was in this instance the side of Korea acting sensibly came as a surprise, although given the dire state of North Korea's agricultural regions and death toll stemming from heavy flooding, a desire to patch up relations with Japan is perhaps not quite so extraordinary, although it won't lead to any easing of sanctions for the forseeable future.  

The other matter of sovereignty that attracted attention during the week was the departure from Hong Kong by a group of Chinese activists on board a fishing vessel who were determined to go ashore on the Senkaku Islands and proclaim China's sovereignty over them. As of Thursday, reports were that the activists had managed to go ashore on one of the islands (which would be the first time this has occured since 2004), only to be subsequently intercepted and arrested by the Japanese Coast Guard (J). As of Thursday morning the 14 crew members had been transferred to Naha airport to await charges of trespassing, with expectations that the crew members would be rapidly deported back to Hong Kong (J). The fact that these activists had clearly stated their goal was to land on the islands and that this would involve confronting Japan's border security might (and I repeat that word, might) convince Beijing not to escalate tensions, unlike the events of September 2010 (E).  It might depend on the amount of time taken to process the activists, and whether China believes the activists are being undeservedly punished for asserting China's sovereignty.

Genroku – 元禄 - the `bubble` era of the Edo period. A time when society stabilized and merchants began to apply their skills to create an era of opulence. Kimono and split trousers grew in size, became gaudy, and a myriad of new designs appeared. Clothes were worn looser and more elegantly so that they would drag more.

The image that signifies the era of Genroku is a comparison of the fashions of the east and west. The wife of Ishikawa Rokube of Edo was particularly proud of her sense of fashion, for none could match her in style. Turning towards the west, the wife of Naniwa Yaji Uemon of Kyoto was proud of her fashion sense. These two met in a famous resthouse that backed onto Ginkakuji, and there east and west battled it out. Naniwa`s wife wore a bright red outfit that was hemmed with silver and gold, thus personifying Kyoto`s famous places. In contrast to this dazzling outfit, Ishikawa`s wife wore a black getup with a star studded pattern spread out across the front and back. At first glance the dress appeared to be nothing special, yet if one looked closely, each particular star consisted of small pieces of red coral. As the amount of money spent on this outfit was so obviously great, victory went to Ishikawa`s wife.

The hero of the Genroku era was Kinokuniya Bungiemon, otherwise known as Kibun. He fulfilled the dream of many a Edoite and `Broke open the Great Gate`, meaning he bought up all of the establishments in Yoshiwara and had the place all to himself. A picture remains of Kibun`s visit to Yoshiwara, depicting him throwing beans. There were small pieces of silver and gold on the floor in exchange for beans. Musicians and geisha are competing against each other to pick up the pieces. In one evening, 1,000 to 2,000 ryō would be spread around in this manner. Those picking up the wealth would not place it in a pursue or wallet, for behind the musicians and geisha stood public officials. The musicians and geisha were thus picking up the gold and silver for the officials. Afterwards they might receive a small reward, such as 1 or 2 pieces of gold. Such handouts were bribes in every sense of the word, for such favors for public officials would result in work for the purveyor. Such a gorgeous performance became a means for the officials to advertise their abundant resources, and came to be called a `Kibun Daijin` 紀文大尽.

Kibun`s life was something of a mystery, for we do not know when or where he was born. Like the dish known as `Kibun`s sweet miso soup`, he lived fairly frugally. From building bridges and working on construction projects, Kibun would encourage the workers, trying to be useful where he could. In the end he ended up being arrested on special charges brought up by the Bakufu. Not long after, a fire broke out in Fukugawa lumber yard in which all of the materials were lost, thus forcing the Fukugawa Hachiman store to close. Kibun`s unpredictable life became the source of tales for Kabuki and human drama stories.

Naraya Mozaemon was another rival for the tital of Kibun Daijin and distributed his wealth by throwing it about. Gathering all of his guests together on the premise that they would see an opulent snow fall, Naraya planned a prank on them. Placing pieces of silver and gold on top of the snow, all of the guests dived for the wealth thus destroying the display. So much for watching snow, although Naraya thoroughly enjoyed the performance. (pp.63-65)

It's not often that I am stunned by the degree of non-chalance by which a company can ignore public opinion and further sabotage its already heavily sullied reputation, but the decision by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Tepco, or Toden) to release for public consumption earlier this week footage taken from inside Tepco's headquarters in Tokyo during the meltdown disaster last year  (J)  was almost a textbook case in how not to address questions regarding the competence of senior management in a crisis.  The fact that the Noda government saw nothing wrong in allowing Tepco to edit the footage (out of concern for the privacy of its employees, according to Tepco), which resulted in the audio track being removed from footage showing former PM Kan admonishing Tepco executives, is even more incredulous.

At hearings into the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and the reaction of Tepco executives held earlier this year, former PM Kan stated that his office had received notice from Tepco that it was planning to pull its staff out of the power plant, thereby allowing all of the reactors to potentially meltdown and release catastrophic levels of radiation into the atmosphere. During the same hearings, Tepco denied ever having issued such a directive, a position that the inquiry report into the disaster subsequently supported (J).  If former PM Kan was trying to compensate for a lack of leadership during the crisis by making such a claim (which emerged in the weeks following the disaster),  the footage from Tepco would have at least shed some light on what Kan had said to the executives and their response. Yet by removing the audio, Tepco has essentially declared that its own testimony is correct, that Kan made unsubstantiated claims, and that the general public does not have a right to know what was said by whom in the midst of the crisis.  

This level of corporate obfuscation, which has fuelled the hostility of the general public towards Tepco, only serves to increase the degree of suspicion surrounding the nuclear industry in Japan and government complicity in keeping the details of dialogue between the Kan Cabinet and Tepco hidden from open scrutiny. Industry Minister Edano and Tepco stockholders (those that are still left) had been urging Tepco to release the video and audio files in their entirety and give the public some indication of what occured during the crisis (J), thereby either exhonerating or further condemning the response of the DPJ at the time.

Mind you, the DPJ haven't done themselves any favours with the public by putting forward a membership list for a nuclear accident response project team that doesn't include a single member opposed to nuclear energy (J). Even within the DPJ there was a backlash to this wilful disregard for public opinion, prompting Party Secretary General Koshiishi to issue a blunt warning instructing all DPJ members to tow the party line.  Despite the DPJ's executive agreeing to explore the possibility of reducing Japan's dependency on nuclear power to O% by 2030 (J), the Noda government has essentially indicated that it cannot countenance adopting any alternative energy sources at present and that it has no choice but to continue to rely on nuclear power. That might explain the reluctance of Industry Minister Edano and other senior DPJ members to meet with representatives of their own party from Fukushima and the leaders of the civil action groups camped outside the front of the PM's residence demanding an end to the nuclear industry in Japan (J, apparently 70% of the general public are now opposed to nuclear energy, according to this Asahi newspaper poll J).   

What this means is that for a party struggling to keep itself together following mass defections and continued insurrection from within, not to mention the threat of a vote of no-confidence being laid against it once (or should that be if)  the consumption tax increase bill passes the House of Councilors, any acquiecence to popular opinion (particularly rural protests) or reneging on pre-determined energy policies (which is keeping the manufacturing sector running) risks the political fortunes of the party, as it reinforces an image of the DPJ as a party than cannot make hard decisions. Better to at least make it look as though something is being done to address concerns about nuclear energy than actually resolve to remove it as an energy option.  At least the DPJ can then claim it is acting in the public interest while simultaneously avoiding  making a decision that might have unforseen consequences. The irony of this situation is probably not lost on Japanese political commentators either.  

*The ever entertaining Uesugi Takashi has written a piece for Diamond magazine exploring the media's reaction to Tepco's release of its video footage, and the lack of questioning as to why the entire footage was not made available  and the absence of an audio track for footage of former PM Kan's visit to Tepco headquarters. It can be found here - J 

Kanban Musume – In the midst of the Edo era, the most famous of the `kanban musume` (advertising model) was Kasamori Osen. The tea store that she worked at, known as Kagiya (or `Key House`), was somewhat outside of Edo near the Kasamori Inari area of Yanaka. Although it was a bit far, there was no let up in the number of customers who would traipse all the way out to Yanaka to see her. Many young women also paid a visit and stole something of her fashion sense. Until this time there were many girls of repute throughout Edo, yet Osen was the first whose name reverberated throughout Edo itself.

Osen helped her father out in his store from the time she was 12 or 13. Around the time she was 18, she caught the attention of the painter of beauties, Suzuki Harunobu, who fell for her at first sight and painted her portraiture on a nishikie. 10 or so different nishikie depictions of Osen made their way around Edo which provided her with her break. Every day brought more customers to see Osen, who would often sit and drink so much tea that they would make themselves ill. Of course, they could only look – no touching was allowed.

This led to an increase in the number of stores with kanban musume, which led to a sharp increase in the price of tea. Before this time, one cup would cost 1 sen, yet with the appearance of kanban musume, at its very peak the cost of a cup of tea rose from 50 mon to 1 shu. At the teahouse known as `Nijikken` found in Asakusa, they brought together a number of different beauties, yet it was said that `one smile will cost you 100 mon`. Their sales level was different to other stores, so they had to search far and wide in order to find stylish girls.

A ranking of young, amateur beauties known as the `Musume Hyōbanki` was published seasonally, such was the attraction of the young women of the city. Osen was ranked as a `Daikyoku Jyō Jyō Kichi`, which was the highest level of ranking available.

The fashion of the tea house women changed as well. Up until this time, women wore the `maedare`, which was meant to prevent a kimono from becoming dirtied. This underwent some major improvements. In summer, it incorporated crepe and flax. In winter, it was a double-layered jacket and a wrinkle finish. On dark blue white lacing would be used, and after the lacing met at the back it might continue down to the bottom of the cloth. Eventually the price for a maedare would outdo that for a kimono. One would not buy it for oneself, but would receive it from a regular customer. Many customers would pay attention to see how the individuality of the girl could be brought to fruition through the use of the maedare.

Kanban musume usually reached their peak from between the ages of 13 to 18, and retired after they turned 20. These girls so captured the imagination of Edo that the Bakufu issued a decree banning their employment “Kanban musume are limited to those women under the age of 13 and over the age of 40”, hence women in the prime of their youth were no longer allowed to appear in such roles.(57-58) 

Miya Daiku - The almost timeless grace and beauty of temples and shrines that we see today allows us to gaze upon the type of work done by laborers both before and during the Edo era. If the shrine or temple has never suffered fire damage, we can see the names of those who worked on the site on the decorations and surfaces of the building.

 This is an indication of how venerated the job of `shrine carpenter` (miya daiku) was. It wasn`t something that just anybody could do. At construction sites, an audition would be held among the carpenters to measure how good their skills were – “Can he use a wood plane well?”, “Is he skilled in using a small axe?”. If a carpenter wasn`t particularly talented, then he wouldn`t be employed. By the process of elimination, an elite group of builders could be assembled.

 Shrine carpenters were known as `kiku` (規矩) and `kiwari` (木割). These carpenters needed special skills that other carpenters didn`t possess. The `kiku` possessed the skill of judging which lumber to use for construction by making measurements with a `compass divider` and other devices, after which he would mark the lumber with black ink. The `kiwari` had the ability to judge with his eyes the answers to questions such as `what part of the tree will be used for construction of the building?`, `what measurements will be used to construct the building?` and `what angle should the roof and beams be set at so that they support one another?`.

 When it came to examining the construction site and the kind of building that would be created, a shrine carpenter could tell in an instant how much lumber would be required to complete the job. If he knew the size of the surface area and the height that the building would be constructed to, he would neither use one log too many nor would he have one log too few. All of his calculations would be done just by looking at the site.

 At the beginning of the Meiji era, the technical skills of the `kiku` and `kiwari` enabled the construction of western style buildings based purely on visualization (i.e, paintings and drawings).

 Various types of instruments were used at the construction site. The `bunmawashi` (規), an instrument that enabled the carpenter to draw circles in a similar manner to a `compass divider`, was made from bamboo. There were also `compasses` (spelt using the characters 根発子) which were made out of metal. This particular device was introduced at the beginning of the Edo era from Nagasaki. The `mizuhakari` (準) was a spirit level that measured horizontal angles. The carpenter`s square formed a square root by lining up the front scale exactly with the rear scale. This type of technique was called the `masugumi` (斗組), and enabled the carpenter to calculate the numbers necessary to combine timber to form a box-shape.   

 `Sumitsubo` (墨斗), the application of black ink to a piece of thread, was a particular device used by Japanese carpenters to draw a straight line on timber. Carpenters then intersected the `sumitsubo` line with carvings made using an axe. The particular skill of a carpenter could be judged just by looking at the `sumitsubo`.

 Shrine carpenters were divided up into different schools, and their way of building things and traditions were all different. The fact that the Ise Shrine `Shikinen Sengū` (式年遷宮 the rebuilding of the shrine) is carried out once every twenty years by a particular school is testimony to the traditions that each school possesses.

 The wooden architectural skills of the Japanese are world-renowned. The `golden temple` (金堂) at Hōryūji (法隆寺) is the world`s oldest wooden building, while the `Great Buddha Hall` (大仏殿) at Tōdaiji (東大寺) is the world`s largest wooden building.(92-94)

This week Ichitani (Shinjuku ward) was abuzz (albeit briefly)  following the release on Tuesday of the 2012 Defence White Paper by Defence Minister Morimoto.  For those who might not have the time nor inclination to wade through the whole document itself, Jiji Dot.com provided a brief synopsis of the details contained within each chapter (J), which I have taken the liberty to translate and post below:

Part One - The Japanese Security Environment
[The security environment surrounding Japan] Questions over sovereignty with regard to the Northern Territories and Takeshima island remain unresolved.
[The U.S] In January of this year President Obama announced the creation of a new national defence policy. Attention will be given to the strategically important region of the Asia-Pacific, and ties with allied nations in that region will be strengthened. 
[North Korea] A new order centered on Kim Jong Un established itself within a short period of time. Adjustments have been made at the state level and directives issued to the regions, with expectations that the new order will eventually bring some stability.
[South Korea] Recently South Korea has actively pursued exports of military equipment, putting it within the top 10 arms exporting countries of 2012. It aims to be within the top 8 by 2015.
[China] In relation to the standoff with neighbouring countries over interests, and indications of directives to place high levels of pressure on such countries, there is concern surrounding the future direction China will take. The growth in social disparity, inflation, environmental pollution, and an aging society are all issues capable of destabilising the government and its control.  There is a view that the relationship between the Politburo and the PLA is growing more complicated, and that the influence of the military on foreign policy decisions is undergoing a transformation.  This is illustrated by the  growth in recent years of incidences that highlight the attitude of the Chinese military toward  issues surrounding sovereignty and maritime authority. Conversely, it appears that there are limits to the Party's influence on military matters.  
It is clear that maritime activities by China have increased, including observation activities in seas close to Japan. Forays by Chinese naval vessels into the Pacific are becoming more common, and the relationship of the PLA to cyber attacks against a myriad of government agencies in various overseas countries have also been confirmed.
[Trends in the cyber sphere] There have been a number of cyber attacks carried out against private industries and government offices involved in the production of Japan's military equipment. Attention therefore needs to be given to threat trends in cyber space. 
[Trends in International Terrorism] Although the central apparatus of al Qae'da has weakened, affiliated organisations concentrated in North Africa and the Middle East are growing in influence.

Part Two - Japan's Basic Strategic Policy and Defence Capabilities
[2012 Defence Capability Upgrade] Implement both effective and efficient defence spending aimed at producing dynamic defence capabilities.

Part Three - Japan's Defence Facilities
[The presence of US military assets in Okinawa] The concentration of US military assets and facilities in Okinawa is, according to local residents, placing an enormous burden on them. Every effort must be expended in reducing this burden.

On the face of it, there doesn't appear to be much in this White Paper to distinguish it from its predecessors, apart from the added emphasis given to China and the seeming disparity between the leadership of the CCP and the intentions of the PLA, a point taken up eagerly by those in the conservative press. For its part, the Asahi Shimbun mentioned the sparcity of attention given to the Osprey and its deployment, which the MOD said was a result of publishing issues and not because it was trying to play down the significance of the Osprey (the content of the white paper is decided on at the end of June, hence any post-June edits are apparently not possible) (J).   

The transition in the CCP's leadership later this year and the gradual encroachment of PLA influence on Chinese foreign policy are familiar themes to security and defence analysts, although this year marks the first time that a Japanese defence white paper has explicitly drawn  a connection between the two. The white paper's assertions were met with criticism in Beijing,  which in itself was not unexpected, along with a protest from South Korea over Japanese claims to Takeshima (again, not an unexpected reaction from Seoul) (E). In sum, the white paper was not radical departure from previous MOD policies in relation to neighbouring countries, neither did it signal any significant change in SDF deployments (unlike the 2011 force posture review).  It was, in other words, business as usual for the MOD.

This week also saw the appearance before the US Congress House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee  on Readiness of CSIS analysts David J. Berteau and Michael Green, whose report into US force posture in the Asia Pacific and possible redeployment of US military assets across the region garnered its fair share of attention, particularly in Australia (E). Apart from a suggestion that the US house a carrier strike-fleet at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia (a suggestion that was quickly ruled out by Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith), the other point of interest for Australia was the suggestion that the US become more involved in assisting Australia in its attempts to find a replacement for the Collins class submarine, and that Japan should also be involved in this program.  

It has been noted elsewhere in this blog that while the suggestion of Japanese involvement in any submarine development program in Australia would most certainly be welcome, such a scenario presents alternative problems that would rule out any immediate Japanese participation (not least of which would be the absence of any precedents for Japanese cooperation with Australia in submarine development, and the non-commercial nature of Japan's own submarine program).  If the US was willing to circumvent this, by providing the initial technical expertise and possible equipment loans, that might provide a buffer while Japan arranges to become involved in the program. However such a plan would still have to receive approval from the Diet, which would definitely bring it to the attention of China, who might then start having a quiet word with DFAT officials in Canberra about how this would jeopardise China's pre-existing investments in Australia and frighten the be-jesus out of the Barnett government in Western Australia.

As such, if Australia does want Japanese submarine expertise, it is going to have to wait a while until this becomes a viable option. It might have to be done surreptitiously, although that would risk even greater public ire in Japan at the duplicitous nature of the government in charge and violation of article 9 of the Constituition. Hence while it is certainly an attractive option, promoting Australia-Japan defence ties through cooperation on defence projects, the US might find the task more arduous than anticipated, and needs to examine this in greater detail to see whether it is worth the time and expense involved.