As many readers would no doubt be aware, in Australia there has been something of a ruckus over the past few weeks involving a change of leaders in that otherwise stalwart bastion of Australian conservatism – the Liberal Party of Australia. The switch that occurred last Monday caught pretty much every observer by surprise, for the anticipation was that the government would not switch its leader until later in the year, if then. But then Turnbull wasn’t willing to wait that long, and God knows that his party couldn’t sustain the level of disapproval being directed at Tony Abbott by the electorate. So now we have a new PM.  Let’s hope he remains in that position for some time to come, because Australians are thoroughly sick and tired of the revolving door of prime ministers that we have had in the past five years.

With a change in prime minister, one might suspect that this would also result in a shift in Australia’s foreign policy position vis-à-vis a number of relations in the region and further afield. There certainly were a large number of newspaper articles that came out just have the leadership change, pointing to Turnbull’s past comments in relation to China and how this new prime minister would not be as “tough” in regards to China’s strategic territorial ambitions as his predecessor. Yet one interview conducted by the ABC on Tuesday soon removed all doubt as to where Turnbull stood on the issue of the South China Sea – firmly in the camp populated by US President Barack Obama, Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, and every other leader in nations surrounding the disputed area. 

So the belief that Turnbull would somehow be “soft” on China as a result of his past links to the country, and the revelation that his son is married to the daughter of a (former) Chinese Community Party linked academic (as though this in itself is justification for questions about Turnbull’s commitment to pre-existing relations) has proven a little pre-emptory.  Certainly Turnbull recognises the economic opportunities that Asia presents, and China’s role in that regionally driven boom is obvious to anyone who has paid any attention to it over the past 10 years or more. Yet Turnbull is not blind to the risks presented by China’s actions in the East and South China Seas, and so articulated this concern during his interview with Leigh Sales.

Throughout the last two weeks, media commentators have been writing themselves into a frenzy over what the Turnbull government should and should not do in relation to foreign affairs, and so I thought there might be some value in condensing these views down into something more manageable so that one might not have to spend days trolling through them all. One particularly interesting point that came up was the fact that Julie Bishop is still Foreign Minister. Also, it was Bishop’s influence and her decision to eventually back Turnbull that brought many doubters on the right over to Turnbull’s camp.  Hence it is unlikely that Turnbull will try to dominate Australian foreign policy from the Prime Minister’s Office as some prime ministers have attempted to do in the past.

There is clearly value in Turnbull reassuring Japan that it has a solidly dependable partner in the South Pacific. Since Abe and Abbott were so close, the sudden removal of Abbott introduced a unknown factor into the growing strategic relationship between Australia and Japan. Since Tuesday, Turnbull’s comments (coupled with those of new Defence Minister Marise Payne and US Ambassador John Berry) would have given Japan plenty of reason to believe that the relationship will continue as per usual, which is damn reassuring for a country that needs regional partners to offset the influence of China.  Turnbull and Abe have already spoken, hence one can imagine that there was a re-commitment to continuing the already strong relationship between both countries.

The change in leaders has both up and down sides for those involved, but obviously it is ruinous for continuity. Michael Fullilove was correct in pointing out that this constant churn of leaders is playing havoc with Australian foreign policy. No sooner do we have a government establish a policy when all of a sudden we have a new prime minister and have to re-calibrate the entire scope of Australia’s foreign policy so that it conforms with the prime minister’s thinking. It’s a distraction that Australia doesn’t need, it makes other countries look askance at what Australia’s behaviour and wonder what the hell we are doing, and if Australia is to make an impact on global events it needs a stable political system.

Back to the question of Turnbull’s stance on Japan. The public record for Turnbull on his attitude towards Japan is overwhelmingly positive, indeed he has on occasion referred  to Japan as an ‘ally’ of Australia and praised its people for their stoicism.  While it is true that Turnbull has drawn reference to China’s role in the defeat of Japan in WWII and declared that this should be recognised, he was drawing reference to an event that occurred more than 70 years ago and circumstances today are vastly different.  Not only this, it is highly likely that Turnbull, upon being exposed to the intelligence apparatus in Canberra, will develop a more conservative bent in his foreign policy thinking, supporting the shoring up of alliances and new strategic partnerships rather than exploring the hazardous route of neutrality. If it happened to Julia Gillard, then it can certainly happen to Turnbull.

One other point that I found interesting about the commentary on Turnbull during the week was Malcolm Jorgensen of the Lowy Institute. Jorgensen pointed out that whereas Tony Abbott was fond of seeing Australia’s relations with other nations in terms of heritage and shared traditions (the Anglo-sphere ideal), Turnbull’s philosophy is broader than that. In Turnbull’s view, it is not heritage that binds people together, it is shared values, values which transcend cultural and ethnic barriers. That will serve him in much better stead that Abbott’s thinking, for the idea of universal values inspires confidence and anticipation far more than the more exclusionist rhetoric of heritage and tradition.

It is early days in the Turnbull administration, and we do not yet know where this government has in store for our bilateral and multilateral relations. But with an erudite leader backed by capable ministers, the future certainly looks promising. However we as Australians must make it plainly clear to all involved in the political process:  no more leadership changes. Stick with what you’ve got, ride it out to the next election, and then make some adjustments. The nation will thank you in the long term.  

All Japanese domestic media on Tuesday reported that the incumbent PM Shinzo Abe had been re-elected unopposed as President of the LDP (the first such election to occur in 14 years) (J). In many respects, this was not a surprise, as many factors had drawn together to ensure that PM Abe would continue as party leader.  Firstly, next year the upper house of the Diet will be facing elections, and it would be a foolish party that would jettison its best chance of retaining seats by removing the most powerful political figure in Japanese politics in the last 15 years.  Abe’s re-election guarantees that he will be in office until at least 2018, thereby making him Japan’s longest serving PM, a legacy that almost no-one (yours truly included) predicted when Abe put up his hand for the presidency back in September 2012.  Abe’s control over the various factions within the LDP (seven of which voted in favour of his re-election) also freed him from being beholden to any factional leader and removed any threat to his position (Noda Seiko attempted to run against Abe, but her lack of support within the party soon became apparent and prompted her withdrawal from the ballot) (J).

One surprise from this particular ballot was the fact that a previous challenger to Abe, Ishiba Shigeru, chose not to run against the incumbent PM. This apparently came as a disappointment to many of his supporters in his home prefecture of Tottori (J), but then again perhaps there was method in Ishiba’s reticence. As Regional Development Minister, Ishiba comes into frequent contact with those regional representatives and voters who have proven crucial in past elections to securing the prime ministership. With Abe’s position currently unassailable, and given the fact that the security bills on collective self defence have polarised public and party opinion, Ishiba might have regarded it wiser to bide his time, exercising influence on the LDP members, and slowly working his way towards the leadership.  

This does appear to be what Ishiba has chosen to do, with news coming out on Wednesday that Ishiba had moved to create his own faction within the LDP with a membership of around 20 to 30 previously unaffiliated MPs (J and J).  This is without doubt a consequence of Abe’s unopposed election, for if Ishiba (who was previously unaffiliated with any faction) learned anything from his experience in 2012, it was that Abe has most LDP factions under his control, hence if one wishes to promote oneself as a leader one better have enough inter-party support to make it happen. Forming your own faction is one way to do this, and Ishiba has taken the first steps towards making himself a possible alternative to the entrenched LDP powerbase personified by the figures of Abe, Aso, and the like.

In the meantime Abe’s re-election means that the entire question of the security bills will continue to dominate the media cycle in Japan for a few weeks yet.  The extended ordinary session of the Diet ends on September 27th, and all indications are that the Abe government intends to have the bills passed by the Upper House as of Wednesday the 16th.  On this occasion, the government does not intend to use the so-called “60 day rule” (whereby if legislation introduced and passed by the Lower House is subsequently sent to the Upper House, yet the Upper House cannot reach an agreement on it after a period of 60 days, the legislation returns to the Lower House and passes into law), although they haven’t completely ruled it out using it either (J).

A real test of Abe’s leadership will come if and when the security legislation is made law. With constitutional scholars pointing to the illegality of the legislation and protests occurring across the length and breadth of Japan in opposition to the government’s plans, not forgetting to mention opinion polls that reveal a general confusion among the public about the bills and whether they are appropriate for Japan, the passage of the bills could instigate protest actions of a type not seen in Japan in two generations. However the reality of Japan’s current security situation and the positive reaction that the bills have garnered from Japan’s ally the US and closer affiliates in the region might take some of the wind out of the protestors’ sails.

Time and again Abe has pointed to the encroachment on Japanese territory by Chinese government aircraft and vessels and the need for Japan to play a more active role in security operations in the region and further afield, and has used these two factors as evidence that the time has come for Japan to assume the responsibilities that accompany Japan’s global status as a financial powerhouse and stable, democratic nation defending the rule of law. He is, in a sense, trying to match the expectations of other nations while also challenging the Japanese citizenry to adopt a more ‘real politik’ view of their current circumstances and how the nation must adapt or risk being isolated against a rising China.  Not surprisingly, he has run into opposition to this plan, especially as some believe that the SDF is perfectly adequate of defending Japan without the need to become involved in overseas operations, especially not operations that might result in casualties.

So the security bills are a kind of battle of wills – that of the government versus those of the protestors and nearly all of the opposition parties in the Diet. On this issue, PM Abe may have the upper hand. Voter apathy was the reason Abe was re-elected at the end of last year, and that same apathy has allowed the LDP/Komeito government to pass legislation that might otherwise become bogged down in negotiations with effective opposition parties. The absence of such parties, and the apathy that brought this about, is thus a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. A weak opposition, and voter disinterest in politics, have given Abe the keys he needs to bring about a fundamental shift in Japan’s security position. What he then does once the shift has occurred, however, is where things will get really interesting.