Last week Japan managed to reduce tensions over one of its outstanding territorial issues by forging an agreement with Taiwan to allow Taiwanese fishing vessels to enter the EEZ around the Senkaku Islands. On the 10th of April representatives of the Japanese and Taiwanese governments signed the agreement, which heralded the fact that both sides would be able to jointly profit from fish stocks while ensuring that there would be no further deterioration in the strategic ties between both nations (Link- J). Indeed, on Thursday Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou announced that Japan-Taiwan relations had entered a new stage in their development (Link-J), while the news was greeted with enthusiasm in Taiwan itself, with Taiwanese papers heralding the ‘great breakthrough’ in negotiations over the fishing grounds.

In many respects President Ma had every right to drawn attention to the outcome of negotiations, especially considering that it was his government that had first proposed ‘East China Sea Peace Initiative’ that called for joint resource management with Japan. While expectations were that Japan would continue to ignore calls for joint administration out of concern that recognising the claims of another state might jeopardise Japan’s position of the ‘non-existence’ of any territorial dispute with its neighbour (and concerns how dealing with Taiwan would be perceived in China), this (astonishingly fast) turnaround in Japan’s position appears to have been aimed at one state in particular – China. By recognising Taiwan’s right to fish in the EEZ in exchange for giving up any persistent territorial claims, Japan and Taiwan have shown a willingness to put aside their respective territorial positions in the interests of regional stability. This will, no doubt, be looked upon very favourably by the region, and, as John Lee has outlined here (firewalled), will place pressure on China to make similar concessions.  

Of course, China has shown no willingness to consider any resource sharing agreements of late, indeed the Chinese reaction to the above news was to express “extreme concern” with the deal between its two rival claimants. According to this article in the South China Morning Post, part of the deal between Taiwan and Japan gives Taiwanese coast guard vessels the authority to expel any mainland Chinese trawlers caught fishing within the newly established fishing zone (how this would differentiate from Japanese coast guard vessels expelling Chinese fishing trawlers from the same EEZ is not explained). 

The formation of such an agreement does at least show that progress in territorial claims can be made if both sides are aware of the advantages in sidelining their demands. Taiwan gains access to a limited section of the Japanese EEZ, while Japan gains a more progressive relationship with Taiwan to offset its current difficulties with Beijing. Quite possibly Washington may have had some influence in persuading Japan to accept the Taiwanese proposal, if only to reduce tensions over territory among (supposed) friends and allies.  Of course, any decision to allow Taiwanese vessels into Japan’s EEZ will affect Okinawan fishing industries, and it is worth noting that Okinawan Prefectural Governor Nakaima objected to the agreement almost as soon as it had been announced (Link-J). Once again, Okinawa has found itself in an awkward position vis-à-vis Japan’s foreign relations – agree to the government’s position and suffer a potential loss in revenue, or object and risk Tokyo”s ire in impeding relations between two potential allies.

Ultimately Japan and Taiwan managed to find a solution to their differences at that should be applauded. What is more difficult to discern is whether the decision to agree to the pact will impact on the government’s already troubled relationship with Okinawa.

As the past two weeks have been dominated among blogs and other social media sites with stories related to North Korea’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric and actions, I’ve decided to jump on the bandwagon and examine what has been said so far and whether any of it actually amounts to much at all.  Reports from last week, in essence, stated that in response to a UN Security Council decision to impose the strictest level of sanctions against North Korea (Link), North Korea had declared that it had cut off communications with the South, torn up the armistice agreement with South Korea, the US, and the UN (signed in 1953), and that it was now in a state of war against the South. This was then followed by stories on North Korean television depicting missile attacks against the US, and rhetoric threatening not only to turn South Korea into a sea of fire, but that North Korea would use its nuclear arsenal to set ablaze the US territory of Guam and target Hawaii and the US west coast.

Having ensured that the world was paying sufficient attention, North Korea then began to take increment steps towards the ‘appearance’ of preparing for war – closing Kaesong industrial park to South Korean workers, closing its northern border to Chinese tourists, declaring to diplomats in Pyongyang that it couldn’t guarantee their safety, declaring to any foreigners in South Korea that they should evacuate the peninsula as there was a possibility of thermonuclear war breaking out at any moment, moving two missiles to its eastern coast, and making overtures towards restarting its long dormant nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. As has been pointed out by commentaries on this situation, North Korea has not made any major re-deployments in its troop configurations, there has been no added activity from either its air force or naval forces, and residents of Pyongyang have continued to perform their regular activities without any major civilian evacuation exercises.

South Korea has meanwhile stated that according to its own intelligence, North Korea is planning to initiate some form of missile test over the next week. At the same time it also reported that North Korea might conduct a fourth nuclear test just to up the ante with the US and UN (before later retracting that statement).  As for why North Korea may be behaving in this manner, there have been no definitive reasons put forward – speculation has gone from a possible coup against Kim Jong-un which has led Kim to try to consolidate his position and demonstrate his suitability as leader, to a dangerous game of one upmanship being played by the North Korean regime in order to force the international community to agree to its demands and reduce the severity of sanctions.

All of these analyses may be right, but only time will tell which was the most prescient. North Korea would not engage in upping the ante unless it felt humiliated (which the UN sanctions would have triggered, given that they were supported by China), and desperate to gain some leverage, any leverage, in its relations with the outside world. North Korea is probably well aware that any unilateral act by it against another state will invite retaliation, yet it may risk such retaliation if the Kim regime believes it can profit from it.

As for the reaction of other states in the region, all have urged calm and restraint in dealing with North Korea, yet clearly the region no longer has the patience to allow North Korea to keep issuing threats and expect no response. South Korea has certainly run out of patience, and has made clear that any indication from the North that it is planning to attack the South will prompt a preliminary strike against North Korean defence assets. The US has also put in place a number of measures aimed at protecting its allies in Northeast Asia, such as deploying B-2 stealth bombers and F-22 5th generation fighter aircraft to South Korea, together with the deployment of Aegis class frigates and a THAAD anti-ballistic missile system to Guam. Indeed, every time the North made another threat, the US responded by placing yet another asset near the Korean peninsula.

While some criticism has been directed at the US for taking a more provocative stance towards the North, really it has no other choice. Successive US administrations have tried bilateral dialogue, multilateral dialogue, aid initiatives, assistance initiatives (medical and energy production), sought advice from China and Russia on dealing with North Korea, and has sent a number of envoys, including former presidents, to negotiate with the North. The sum total of all of this effort has been no change in the North’s stance and an increase in belligerent rhetoric, not to mention open defiance of the UNSC in conducting nuclear tests and missile launches into the East China and Japan Seas (Link). Since the North has time and again shown that it is not prepared to cooperate with the US,   the US is simply ensuring that no matter the North eventually tries, it will fail.

Meanwhile Japan has taken its own measures to ensure its defence against any provocation from North Korea, putting in place a number of PAC-3 batteries to protect Tokyo from either North Korean missiles or the debris from such missiles should they break up over the Japanese archipelago. Interestingly enough, PAC-3 batteries only have a range of 20 kilometres as they are primarily designed to hit incoming missiles. The problem with this is that even if they do manage to bring down a missile, the debris from the explosion can still fall on those below. If North Korea were to load one of its missiles with a nuclear warhead, even if the warhead fails to detonate, its cargo would still be radioactive enough to contaminate an area 20 kilometres around the PAC-3 battery.

As such, the PAC-3 is more of a ‘last resort’ measure should all other measures fail. The first of those measures are early warning relays from US defence satellites stationed above the Korean peninsula. Should a launch be detected, these satellites will relay the rocket location to both US and SDF units based in South Korea and Japan. Such information is then transmitted to US and JMSDF Aegis frigates stationed in the East China and Sea of Japan areas in order to attempt a low altitude interception from the launch site and before the North Korean missile reaches its apex.  If this is unsuccessful, a high altitude interception can be attempted, although the preferred method is to wait for the missile to begin its descent so that it may again be intercepted at a lower altitude (thereby raising the probability of interception and destruction). If none of these succeed, then the SDF will use its PAC-3 batteries (加藤健二郎、いまこそ知りたい：自衛隊のしくみ、日本実業出版社、東京、2004年、130-131).

As PM Abe has already given approval for Japan’s defence measures to take preliminary action should any North Korean missiles head in the direction of Japan, Japan has taken the necessary precautions against the threat coming from North Korea (Link). Of course, should any North Korean missiles head in the direction of South Korea, President Park Geun-hye has given her approval for a retaliatory strike against command and control centres in the North. As other blogs have speculated on the consequences of this I will leave it to them to explain possible developments, but it suffices to say that North Korea will gain nothing from this level of antagonism (Link), and might find itself completely cut off from any and all ties with the outside world. That might precipitate an internal collapse (no fuel and no food, especially after a harsh winter in the North, could lead to mass defections), but nothing is certain in relation to North Korea’s future.

It is an often noted phenomenon in politics that when a government wishes to divert attention from its motives, it bestows an award upon a public figure of note. In Japan in recent years, this practice has proven beneficial to any administration wishing to focus the attention of the masses away from any contentious issue, or to place emphasis on the government’s magnanimity in recognising the achievements of the public figure beloved by the people at large.

For example, following criticism of the manner the DPJ government had handled the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, the victory of the Japanese women’s soccer team (“Nadeshiko Japan”) in the Women’s World Cup in August 2011 presented an ideal opportunity to bestow on the team a “People’s Honour Award” (or 国民栄誉賞, despite the fact that such awards had never before been granted to an entire team, and were meant to acknowledge numerous achievements over a lifetime, not a one-off victory). 

By ostensibly awarding an honour to “encourage the people” following the March disaster of that year, the DPJ managed to divert attention from the fact that an investigative team from the IAEA had found radiation levels around the No.1 and No.2 reactors at the Daiichi plant at 10 sieverts during the same week (by way of contrast, according to the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), an acceptable level of artificial irradiation is 1 micro sievert per annum. 10 sieverts is the equivalent of 10,000 micro sieverts) (上杉隆、国家の恥：一億総洗脳化の真実、ビジネス社、東京、2012年, pp.88-89). 

Considering the nature of these awards, and the fact that they can be bestowed by the government at its leisure to any Japanese citizen, the timing of the announcement of such awards and their intended recipients has become as much a talking point as the award itself. The announcement on Wednesday this week (Link – J) that former Yomiuri Giants players Nagashima Shigeo and Matsui Hideki would be granted such an honour provoked speculation regarding just why the Abe government had chosen now to make the announcement, less than six months out from the House of Councillors election, and why it had chosen Nagashima and Matsui in particular.

Asakawa Hirotada (Link-J) was one of the first to wade into the debate, noting that Nagashima (77 years of age) was of the same age as a majority of Japan’s pensioners, who would have fond memories of Nagashima during his playing days (and who make up a majority of the voting base in Japan). As for Matsui, although he has only just retired aged 38, his record with the New York Yankees (including a World Series championship) has been lauded in Japan, particularly among fans of the Yomiuri Giants (who have the largest following among all teams in the Pacific and Central leagues Link- J p.6). Although it seems entirely cynical to suggest that the Abe government is seeking to capture a majority of the vote in the upper house using populist methods, this appears precisely what Abe had in mind in choosing two prominent figures that appeal to a majority of voters (note the 35-70 age bracket and the increase in voter participation among such demographics here – p.8).

As an aside, the Sankei Shimbun also reported on the curious manner in which the media got hold of the news of the announcement of Nagashima’s selection for an award (Link – J). Rather than it being reported by the Yomiuri Shimbun (owner of the Giants baseball club, and whom you would expect to obtain such a scoop), that distinction went to the local Gunma prefectural newspaper the Jomo Shimbun, which broke the news on Monday before any major papers (Link-J). What makes this even more curious is that Nagashima is not from Gunma prefecture, therefore leading to speculation that the news was leaked to the Jomo Shimbun by someone within the Abe Cabinet with ties to Gunma.

So far, the most likely culprit appears to be Minister for Okinawan and Northern Territories Issues Yamamoto Ichita, a Gunma-ite through and through. Though Yamamoto protested his innocence (Link-J), the circumstances that led to the Jomo Shimbun reporting on the decision appear too unusual to rule out a leak. A regional paper scooping a nationally syndicated paper (with direct ties to the person being honoured)? Once in a blue moon perhaps, but the fact that the Jomo Shimbun didn’t note any particular access to inside information or sources makes the whole situation very odd indeed.

Of course, none of this is to detract from the award itself or its recipients, who certainly deserve recognition of their achievements. When the award process becomes politicised, however, it reflects badly on the selection process and the motives of the government. Perhaps Asakawa is right in suggesting the creation of legislation that would ban the issuing of such awards six months out from any sort of federal election.