As per expectations, the 21st of July produced a decisive victory for the LDP-Komeito Coalition in the House of Councillors election. On its own, the Coalition secured 135 seats (76 new seats along with the 59 pre-existing seats), thereby giving it a comfortable majority (J). Both the Restoration Party and the Your Party managed to secure greater numbers (8 seats each at the current time), adding a potential 27 votes to the Coalition’s total (J).  This, combined with 2 extra votes from unaligned members of the Upper House, gives the Coalition (again, a potential) 164 votes, just over the 2/3rds necessary to implement Constitutional revision (J). 

For the DPJ, the result was, not to put too fine a point on it, an unmitigated disaster, with the DPJ’s presence in the Upper House crashing from 86 to 59, a drop in 27 seats and indicative of the degree of latent public dissatisfaction in the DPJ’s performance while it was in government. The Communist Party of Japan, meanwhile, managed to secure 8 extra seats, thereby boosting its numbers to 11(primarily in areas where Communist Party representation has been strongest – namely Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka). As for more minor parties, there was nought but bad news, with the People’s Lives Come First Party, the Green Wind Party, Reform Party, and Happiness Party all failing to secure any seats, therefore either condemning them to historical irrelevancy (J) or at least some attempt at internal reform.

Given that this election has focused on the potential for the Abe government to release the ‘’third’’ arrow in its quiver of economic reforms, the presence of greater numbers of Coalition members in the Upper House raises a number of questions. If the Abe government is committed to reform, will Abe be able to overcome the vested interests of his party to commit Japan to participation in the TPP? Will he be able to remake Japan’s business environment in order to encourage foreign investment, further liberalise the labour market, remove government subsidies to rural electorates, continue with re-construction efforts in the Tohoku region (which itself has been a missing issue in this electoral cycle), and commit Japan to defence reform, thereby altering the Constitution to recognise Japan’s right to collective self defence?

In relation to the TPP, it appears that the LDP managed to pick a considerable number of votes in rural electorates, meaning that the issue of exemptions as a pre-condition to participation in the TPP will become even more crucial. As the Abe government has placed prioritised economic growth (J), any move to blunt the commitment of Japan to the TPP will be harshly judged by the Keidanren, not to mention other participating countries, who will take any hesitation by Japan as a sign that Abe’s reform agenda is rhetoric devoid of resolve.   Not only this, both the Restoration Party and the Your Party have emphasised the need for Japan to join in as many economic initiatives as it can so as to offset any advantages held by China and South Korea in trade negotiations. If the Abe government reneges on its commitments both parties could withdraw their support, although given the size of the Coalition’s majority in the Upper House, such a threat may only derail the more audacious reforms (i.e., constitutional revision) while leaving scope for negotiation on the economy.

The most pressing issue, as far as the rest of the region is concerned, is just what PM Abe plans to do about the Japanese Constitution, and what he may have in mind vis-à-vis apologetic statements for wartime behaviour. Although Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga has reiterated on numerous occasions that the Coalition has no plans to re-write the Kōnō and Murayama Statements, the region (or more correctly, South Korea and China) has not been mollified. Moreover, as such pronouncements were made before the Upper House election, it behoves some enterprising members of Japan’s journalistic world to ask whether some revision of history is about to take place. Of course, while the Abe government may seek to make some adjustments to the statements, it may choose not to do so right now, certainly not when it depends on regional cooperation to deal with the growing Chinese threats to territorial sovereignty.

This is where questions on Constitutional revision become even more interesting, particularly for those countries (like Australia) which maintain friendly relations with Japan and have every hope that Japan will continue along its reform path. A re-write of Article 9 of the Constitution could give Japan the right to engage in collective self defence, meaning that Japan could initiate offensive operations against perceived threats in order to pre-empt an attack against its forces, territory, or, more broadly, interests. Not only this, it could pave the way for a broader interpretation of ‘defence’, including the need for firmer military ties with other regional nations part of which would involve the exchange of technological know-how, thereby building the military capabilities of these nations and thus ultimately helping to contribute to Japan’s ‘defence’. 

All this is speculative at the moment, and any commentary claiming to know precisely how the Japanese government will act will need a water-tight source within the Abe Cabinet to have any credibility. Nonetheless, PM Abe had plenty of time in the interim years between his resignation in 2007 and his resurrection as PM in 2012 to map out a plan for growth and structural reform. So far what we have witnessed is that plan being put into place, with each step providing the means to bring about change. With both Houses now under Coalition control, PM Abe has the ability to realise his ambitions as the heir to Kishi Nobusuke, and that will make the next few months of Japanese politics quite riveting.

A narrative that has occupied commentary on Japan’s defence posture over the past three years has generally focused on one issue – China, and what its growth has meant for Japan’s security environment. The release of the 2013 Defence White Paper by the Japanese Ministry of Defence on Thursday of last week brought to the fore what many had been waiting for the Japanese government to state outright - that the security environment around Japan has worsened, and that one country in particular has been instrumental in bringing this about. As Benjamin Schreer of ASPI noted, Japan no longer uses rhetoric ‘welcoming’ China’s regional role, instead quite forcefully stating that China “is strongly expected to recognize its responsibility as a major power, accept and stick to the international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role in regional and global issues”.

This state of affairs is the accumulation of nearly ten months in frosty, if not covertly hostile China-Japan relations. For Japan to now categorically state that it does not trust China to abide by international regulations, and that China was risking conflict by engaging in provocative acts near the Senkaku Islands (J), means that an impasse has been reached that neither the Abe government nor the CCP will be able to resolve without concessions being made by both sides. Considering that Xi Jinping has staked his reputation on being seen as ‘decisive’ and a strong ruler, any diplomatic move towards the Abe government would be seen domestically as capitulation to a right-wing, nationalistic Japan. While PM Abe may offer to engage in talks with the CCP leadership, he has no desire to be seen as conciliatory towards China, especially given the intrusion by Chinese government vessels into seas surrounding the Senkaku Islands.

A survey released by the Pew Research Centre on Thursday last week did not give one cause for optimism that the current situation will be resolved anytime soon.  PM Abe currently enjoys high levels of popular support (for a Japanese prime minister), in part driven by his series of economic measures, but also a reflection of his own ability to craft an image of being a ‘reformer’. Moreover, while a majority of Japanese still oppose constitutional revision (56%), the number of those in favour of undertaking revision has risen to 36%, admittedly only a 5% increase over 2008 results, but enough to raise debate about whether constitutional reform will be part of the Abe government’s agenda post-July 21. More worryingly, 90% of those Chinese respondents to the survey stated that they did not have a positive view of Japan, a figure in keeping with previous Japanese government surveys of Japanese public opinion towards China (J), thereby confirming a trend that shows no signs of abating. For their part, 77% of South Koreans said that they too did not hold positive views of Japan, again an indication that regional relations are not about to undergo a period of détente.

Such attitudes inevitably play a part in influencing domestic political sentiment towards participating in the annual visit to Yasukuni Shrine to pay homage to Japan’s war dead. In his first term as PM, Abe Shinzo astutely avoided antagonising either China or South Korea by participating as a public figure in the event, although this did not prevent him  attending as a private citizen or subsequently attending as a member of the opposition. On Monday, Komeito Representative Yamaguchi Natsuo mentioned during a public appearance in Nagoya that the government was considering its position for August 15th*, although he added that the government was planning to send a delegation of younger politicians to China following the House of Councillors election (J). This implies two things – either the government is planning to have its representatives visit Yasukuni Shrine and so wants its younger members to deliver the message, thereby taking heat off more senior party members; or that the government is not planning to conduct an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and proof of the sincerity of the Abe government will be conveyed by the younger party members who, after all, represent the future of the party.  

It is of course possible that a third option exists – that PM Abe does seek dialogue with China’s leaders, but he won’t be the one doing the talking. PM Abe has previously stated that he is willing to talk although he won’t do so on terms set by the CCP(J), hence sending younger parliamentarians in his stead may be one way for PM Abe to canvas the CCP leadership’s thoughts without appearing to capitulate to CCP demands.

In the meantime Japan’s House of Councillor members have been out spruiking their respective platforms from street corners, in front of railway stations, from the back seat of cars (a method that has always struck me as being somewhat counter-productive, given that most voters don’t want to have election slogans blasted via loudspeakers into their living rooms at ten in the morning. It might produce more protest votes than supporters) in an effort to up their public profiles. The House of Councillors election for the 21st is also the first which has allowed politicians to promote themselves on the internet, although the manner in which this occurs is still quite limited (as outlined here in Japanese. Not only this, internet canvassing has yet to grab the populace’s attention, as this Sankei article states).  Nonetheless, voters (or at least those voters who make use of Twitter) have voiced concerns regarding nuclear energy, constitutional revision, and participation in the TPP (these being the three most discussed policy topics on Twitter - J), while respondents to this Asahi poll (released on July 7 - J) put the economy, employment, and social welfare at the top of their list, a result that was similar to an earlier poll conducted by the Nikkei Shimbun (J).

While one could suggest that the result of the Twitter survey is incompatible to the newspaper surveys given that the Twitter survey was not an exercise in gathering voter opinions on specific topics, the level of interest among Twitter users (who are, demographically, younger than their newspaper counterparts) in issues that have not been canvassed in great depth by candidates or sitting members gives pause for thought as to whether this is a generational gap in priorities, or whether it reflects the editorial position of the news outlets that reported such news.

*As at the time of writing, Minister for Bureaucratic Reform Inada Tomomi has offered up a ceremonial lantern to Yasukuni Shrine, citing the reasons for doing so as being a ‘sign of respect for those that gave their lives’. Not a move likely to reassure Japan’s neighbours, but not out of character for members of the LDP, and certainly not Inada, who participated in a similar pilgrimage to Yasukuni in April this year - J.  Although I have no data on this issue, I would be interested to know if female members of the LDP actually express far more strident nationalistic/patriotic views than their male counterparts. If so, why do they hold such views, and is it an attempt to compensate for their perceived femininity in an overwhelmingly male party apparatus, or a reflection of their individual upbringing?

As happens when my works duties start to weigh on my time, I must begin this particular post with an apology for the lateness in the posting and the scattered nature of its content. I wanted to begin by drawing the reader’s attention to the start of the electoral campaign for seats in the Japanese Upper House (which officially kicked off on July 4th), with voting to take place on the 21st of July. At a party leaders’ discussion panel convened in Tokyo on the 3rd, each representative of the major parties contesting the election put forward their electoral goals, coupled with commentary on how they believed their party would shape Japan’s future. Not surprisingly, the LDP, under PM Abe, pointed towards the need for an end to the ‘twisted parliament’ that had halted the progress of legislation aimed at bringing about greater economic rewards, and placed emphasis on the economic achievements of Abenomics so far. For their part, the DPJ under Kaeida Ban expressed caution against the ‘side effects’ of Abenomics (essentially greater levels of public debt), and stated, quite plainly for a political party, that their sole aim at the Upper House election was not “to retake the House, but to prevent a stampede by the government”.

This was hardly going to be a riveting debate, and it became even more of a one-sided argument when in response to PM Abe’s taunt as to what the DPJ planned to do the invigorate the economy, representative Kaeida could only point towards a ‘healthy’ expansion in consumption and sustainability as necessary for economic growth (no reforms then, Ban?). Given the fact that the DPJ were in power in the Lower House until December last year, the fact that they could emphasise a need for a ‘bureaucratic review’ seemed an empty promise, one meant to garner attention rather than seriously propose a reform process for the bureaucracy. Things didn’t get any better for the Socialist, Communist, and People’s Lives First platforms either – they could all be summed up as opposition to joining the TPP, opposition to US bases in Okinawa (a standard view of the Communists and Socialists), and opposition to increases in consumption tax.

The Reform Party mentioned its pet projects of Diet reform (the creation of a single parliament by eliminating the Upper House), public election of the PM, and re-distribution of legislative authority to regional governments, while the Everyone’s Party decided to follow its particular bugbear of reducing the overall number of parliamentary representatives. In spite of the format of the discussion, clearly most of the questions asked were aimed at PM Abe, who wasted no time in stating the LDP’s position and criticising those of his opponents. This appeared somewhat unfair, and People’s Lives First representative Ozawa Ichiro said as much when questions about his former membership to the LDP and DPJ were raised by the media, with no questions aimed at the People’s Lives First policies(J).

Clearly this election is very much focused on PM Abe and his plans for the Upper House, almost to the exclusion of any other issue. As PM Abe himself stated during a press conference on the final day of Parliament’s sitting (June 26th), the current Parliament halted the passage of ‘vital laws’ such as energy reform legislation, benefits legislation,  the formation of a Japanese NSC, and legislation dealing with the redistribution of electoral districts (the 0-5 plan)(J), hence a ‘twisted parliament’ was “the difference between a government that can achieve things, versus a government that is stifled in its aims”. As PM Abe still enjoys voter support levels in excess of 50% (J), the expectation of the electorate is that the LDP/Komeito Coalition will gain a majority of seats in the Upper House (at present there are 242 seats in the Upper House. As a majority requires 122 seats, and considering that the LDP and Komeito already hold 59 seats that aren’t up for re-election, the LDP/Komeito must capture 63 seats to ensure a majority, or 70 seats to secure a comfortable majority) (J).

As an aside, it should be noted that in order to change the 96 articles of the Japanese Constitution, PM Abe would require a 2/3rds majority or more in both the Lower and Upper Houses (J). While the LDP, Komeito, Reform Party and Everyone’s Party hold a ¾ majority in the Lower House, the Upper House is an entirely different prospect. While Abe may gain a majority in the Upper House, whether this extends to 162 seats will depend on just how much the voting public is in favour of constitutional revision.

This then raises questions of what PM Abe actually intends to do with his newfound ability to control both Houses. According to Professor Nakano Koichi of Sophia University (interviewed by the Australian’s Rick Wallace for its Saturday edition), Abe will probably use his authority to reform the education system (as was outlined in his 2007 book “Towards a Beautiful Japan”), seeking to increase the amount of positive messages on Japan’s achievements and reduce the previous focus on Japan’s culpability for deeds committed by its former Imperial forces. This issue is part of a larger narrative (explored earlier in this blog) on what PM Abe intends to do in relation to bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and whether his government intends on repealing or re-writing the Kōnō and Murayama statements to bring them more into line with what PM Abe has described as ‘correct’ historical interpretation (E).

This type of rhetoric has the region worried, not least of which Australia. Such is the concern that Japan is about to re-write its position on the issue of war responsibility that Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith, during a visit to Tokyo last week, felt it necessary to mention to Defence Minister Onodera and Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga that it is in no-one’s interests for either statement to be re-written, and that any move to do so could only worsen relations between Japan and its immediate neighbours (E). Whether this results in any reflection on the part of the Japan is debatable, however given that the US has also voiced its concerns, this may have some bearing on how the Abe government approaches issues of historical responsibility should it gain control of both Houses.

Not that Japan will be in too keen a mood to listen to the Australian government at present. The proceedings within the ICJ concerning Australia’s case against Japan’s whaling program (which is referred to in the Australia media exclusively as ‘so-called scientific program’) have led to some fairly sharp rhetoric and accusations of insult and duplicity. Attorney General Mark Dreyfus’ ire was particularly raised by the accusations levelled at Australia by Japan’s legal representative Professor Payam Akhavan, who claimed that Australia was engaged in a moral crusade and cultural imperialism, that Australia was somehow colluding with Sea Shepherd and attempting to turn the IWC into an anti-whaling body (E).

The strategy being adopted by Japan’s lawyers appears to be to demonstrate that Australia is bringing the case to the ICJ for emotional, not scientific, reasons, that the Australian argument is driven by the ‘prejudices’ of the Australian electorate, and that this should be no basis for debating whether the JARPA II program is scientific or not.  Australia has retorted by saying that it has not referred to any cultural or moral arguments, and is merely seeking to prove that Japan’s scientific program is not in fact science but commercial whaling by other means, which is a violation of the moratorium on whaling (enacted in 1986).

The whaling issue itself has received extensive coverage in Australia (courtesy of the ABC, the Fairfax media, and the News Ltd media), and has gained some exposure in Japan where it has garnered the interest of newspapers (the Yomiuri Shimbun covered it here- J and here - J, the Mainichi Shimbun here - J and here- J, the Asahi Shimbun here - J ) but limited coverage on television (a quick examination of the internet only brought up hits for FNN, NHK (no video available) and TBS). Accusations of collusion between the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the whaling industry have also clouded the issue, with Australia stating that Japan merely uses the issuing of scientific licences by MAFF to whaling companies as a cover for commercial whaling.

As Japan will give its verbal retort to Australia (and New Zealand’s) accusations in the ICJ next week, the issue will continue to cause some friction between all three countries, although Attorney General Dreyfus did clarify his statements in the ICJ by pointing out the otherwise good relations between Australia and Japan.

At any rate, Australia will be watching the progress of the Upper House election with some interest, with expectations that a win for PM Abe might finally lead to the third arrow of Abenomics being released (as newly appointed Treasurer Chris Bowen made clear to the AFR during an interview held last week - the article is here, although being the AFR, it is behind a firewall).  With Australia set to go to the polls at some point before November 30, any sign that Japan may finally engage in market restructuring and put its signature to an economic agreement with Australia would be welcome news for the incumbent Labor government, and one it might be able to capitalise on to swing the rural vote in its direction.