On Wednesday of this week, the LDP held its presidential election and, through either a monumental failure to read either public or party sentiment or a moment of epiphany that no political commentator could have foreseen, chose Abe Shinzo to once again lead the LDP as its President, thereby ousting Tanigaki Sadakazu. The question that has been reverberating around numerous political offices since the result became public is; Why Abe? Since throwing in the towel a year into his prime ministership in 2007 for health reasons, Abe has essentially sat in the backbenches, solidifying his ties to the Aso and Koga factions while also working on peddling influence among other LDP Diet members. All this behind the scenes manouvering scored Abe the comeback of his political life when despite being beaten by Ishiba Shigeru in the primary vote (most of which was drawn from regional LDP representatives), as Ishiba had not secured the necessary number of Diet votes to be declared winner, a second round of voting consisting only of Diet members saw Ishihara Nobuteru's supporters switch their allegiences to Abe thereby handing him victory.

This state of affairs did not sit well with regional representatives, particularly those from Akita Prefecture (namely Ono Chueimon, Shibuya Masatoshi, and Kawaguchi Hitoshi), along with Kato Koichi of Yamagata Prefecture. Despite Ishiba winning  a majority of regional votes, it appears the LDP executive believed that only Diet members should have ultimate say over the next president of the party, leading Shibuya to address the media wondering why the party went to the trouble of including regional representatives in the latest election process at all (J). So furious were they with their party's decision that all four representatives soon after resigned from the LDP, a move that was followed by tweets from Tokushima Prefecture representative Kitadai Masafumi wondering aloud when Abe would quit (in his words..."Will the reason have changed from diarrhea to constipation this time around?" - Kitadai, having thought better of it, soon after closed his Twitter account) (J).

The fact that Abe has subsequently appointed many of his old Cabinet colleagues back to positions of importance in the party hasn't won him too many supporters either, with voices raising concern that by appointing Amari Akira (former Agriculture Minister under the Abe Cabinet), Shiozaki Yasuhisa (former Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Abe Cabinet), and Suga Yoshihide (former Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications in the Abe Cabinet), Abe was merely surrounding himself with sycophants rather than talented politicians that could tackle the DPJ (J). The appointment of Ishiba to Chief Secretary of the LDP will be regarded as a consolation prize of sorts, although just what effect this will have on the LDP's re-election chances will become more apparent as the general election period grows closer (J).

That Abe has not yet outlined his policy for dealing with low economic growth, reconstruction, debt reduction, not to mention the LDP's objections to Japan joining the TPP do not augur well for a party that has yet to inspire confidence in its ability to tackle Japan's present dilemmas (if public polls are anything to go by). What Abe has done is ratchet up rhetoric on the need for a strong security relationship with the US, and not giving an inch in territorial disputes with China and South Korea. While this may win Abe supporters among constitutional revisionists, it doesn't address the more pressing concerns faced by the average Japanese citizen. Abe's election may also finally convince the public that there is no future in the LDP, that it has simply run out of ideas, is plagued by factional divisions, and has become a prisoner of its own devising in its close ties to industry and rural producers.
If Abe can reinvent himself and his party to make it more relevant to the task of re-inventing the nation, then he might just secure the legacy that he is so keen to create, but don't hold your breath. The difficult part has only just begun, and Abe's track record in dealing with difficulties does not inspire confidence.   

In the continuing saga of territorial disputes and sovereignty surrounding Japan's decision to take state ownership of the Senkaku Islands, the sturm and drang being raised between China, Taiwan, and Japan drowned out a quick visit by Australia's Defence Minister Stephen Smith to Tokyo to meet with his Japanese counterpart, Defence Minister Morimoto, to further discuss defence relations between the two countries. That this visit has taken place a mere two weeks after Morimoto and Foreign Minister Gemba's visit to Sydney indicates that both sides are putting extra emphasis into building security ties with one another in order to offset the perceived threat to regional stability as a result of  increasingly belligerent behaviour on the part of China. According to a press conference summary released by the Australian DOD, Defence Minister Smith, in his remarks, pointed to the fact that Minister Morimoto had... "drawn attention to those areas where we believe we can enhance our practical cooperation, particularly in the area of technology cooperation following on from Japan’s change to the principles which apply to the export of technology." 

As this blog has stated in the past, any indication that the ADF might be able to benefit from Japan's technological expertise is a promising development in Australia-Japan security relations. Any exchange of information pertinent to technology requires a dedicated presence in the partner country in order to ensure compatability with domestic defence technology, which explains why both sides have agreed to a DOD representative being housed within Japan's Ministry of Defence.  Moreover, if part of this exchange of personnel results in submarine consultations, then the plans for the next generation of submarines proposed for the RAN might receive the level of advice that would enable the submarines to be manufactured in Adelaide by domestic industries without recourse to European designs yet which would still guarantee their reliability. It would, in other words, be a major coup for the Labor Party, offset any potential criticism from domestic defence industries about the lack of investment in locally built equipment, and secure the foundations for the development of an Australian submarine fleet.

This is all conjecture, of course, however given the rapidity with which the federal government is pursuing talks with Japan, it does lead one to speculate that this may indeed be the path being tread by Minister Smith. Only time will tell if Japan becomes actively involved in the next generation of submarines plan, but if technology will become a focal point of the defence relationship for the foreseeable future, then it is a conclusion backed up by a fair degree of certainty.

As the Senkaku Island dispute continues to roll on into its third week, the reaction of politicians in Japan to events to the south have caught the attention of the media, the more conservative of which has been assiduously reporting each comment made by the candidates for the LDP's presidential election which will be held on Wednesday. On Sunday each of the candidates was out on the streets (with the exception of former Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura, who had been sidelined through illness) spruiking national defence and security as pressing issues in need of resolution. Quite expectedly, the loudest in proclaiming that Japan should revise the Constitution and give itself the right to collective self-defence (meaning that Japan could participate in military ventures abroad without restriction to its activities, as any such activities would be in the interests of the defence of Japan) was Abe Shinzo. As Uesugi Takashi pointed out in his examination of the previous Abe Cabinet, Abe Shinzo, more than anything else, wants to cement his place in Japanese history as having restored Japan's legislative sovereignty by re-writing the Constitution (which Abe believes was imposed on Japan by allied forces and does not reflect the reality that Japan now finds itself in). Just as his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke forged the security alliance with the US that now stands as a (possible) deterrent to any unilateral military action by China against Japan, Abe sees his role as that of an innovator, pursuing measures that may not be popular in order to guarantee the defence of Japan through constitutional revision and a ramping up of the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Self-Defence Force.

Each of the LDP candidates has, in some way or another, voiced their support for a much more vigorous foreign and security policy, with Abe and Ishiba Shigeru both stating on a TBS morning program on Monday that Japan should possess a marine-type force capable of repelling any attempt by its neighbours to seize its territory (J). Though not as vociferous in their support for such a measure, both Ishihara and Hayashi both gave support for a re-invigoration of the alliance with the US and other regional partners.   What each candidate has not yet explored, however, is how Japan would actually pay for this revamped policy, neither have they explored how a militarily stronger Japan would be perceived by other nations in the region. For all of their rhetoric, the LDP candidates have the luxury of not having to account for any of the pronouncements that they might make on security before the party presidential election, so they are making a variety of statements which merely play to domestic concerns without regard to the wider implications. Such statements have a habit of coming back to haunt politicians, so if each candidate does believe that a more robust SDF is the key to Japan's security, they must also explore how such a force would act in Japan's interests in the face of possible involvement in foreign conflicts. 

The manner in which the events of the past three weeks have been handled by China has also left a lot to be desired, it must be said. Although protests outside the Japanese Embassy in Beijing have been prohibited (oh what a joy it must be to work there) (J), Beijing is continuing to use the dispute as a means to apply pressure to Japan and force it to relinguish its claims to the Senkaku Islands. Watching the events in China from afar, other members of the Asia Pacific community have been disturbed by what they see as a blatant attempt by the CCP to use popular dissent as a means of gaining leverage in its territorial dispute with Japan. By pushing popular nationalism as a diplomatic tool, Beijing has reinforced a perception among its neighbours that its intentions are not benign, which has then spurred on efforts by China's neighbours to forge closer security ties with one another to hedge against possible retaliation from China. 

In the midst of this dispute, comments made by Chinese General Zhu Chengdu at the Singapore Global Dialogue on the weekend have been met with interest. General Zhu pointed out in an interview with the Australian's Greg Sheridan that the PLA is "slightly less nationalistic than Chinese society as a whole" (which makes sense if you are at the sharp end of any possible conflict with your neighbours) (E), and that nationalism is becoming more of a concern within China. If this is true, then the recent white paper from the SDF that pointed towards a growing rift between China's civilian rulers and their military counterparts over China's foreign policy (J) might have touched on an issue that runs deeper than first anticipated. The accepted wisdom is that the PLA has been pressuring the CCP to take a harder stance on territorial and border issues to match China's growing military capabilities, yet if members of the PLA itself have been questioning the rise of nationalism in China's foreign dialogue, it may be that the PLA is split between those who believe China should not preempt any dispute with its neighbours at this stage in its development versus those who believe that the PLA is sufficiently powerful enough to make demands and back it up with military force.   

With no resolution in sight to the dispute (indeed, ceremonies marking the 40th anniversary of the re-establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Japan were cancelled by China on Sunday, although in China the cancellations were referred to as "postponements") (J), the fact that the two institutions at the heart of China's diplomatic and security apparatus are divided on China's future path doesn't exactly bring reassurance to outside observers, for in the absence of any transparent decision process among China's rulers it is exceedingly difficult to determine which particular narrative is garnering the most support.  At least (for the time being) popular anger has been sated by the protests against Japan, but if China is divided on the best approach to managing its relations with its neighbours, the potential for territorial disputes to escalate into full-blown conflict is magnified by linking popular resentment at domestic conditions to nationalism. Such situations have led to war, and there is no reason to believe that this could not again be the case.  

With the region currently bracing itself for a possible physical clash between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands, the visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Gemba and Defence Minister Morimoto to Sydney last week for the 4th 2+2 meeting with their Australian counterparts appears to have slipped under the radar of most regional commentators (the fact that Australia was debating the merits of its relationship with China on the same day may have stolen some of the wind out of the visit's sails, to use a somewhat tortured metaphor). Such was the degree of concern over the rhetoric coming out of China and the possible effects this may have on regional security that both ministers cut short their stay so that they could return to Japan on Friday evening and presumably be briefed on events by the Prime Minister's office.

So what was discussed within the ministers' meeting? Upon reading press releases issued later on the same day, the overriding message appeared to be that of "closer cooperation", as evidenced by the sub-headings given to the various parts of the official visit media release - cooperating for peace and stability,  cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, cooperation in international security issues, and bilateral defence cooperation. With all this cooperation going on, what did the talks produce? Amid the standard rhetoric of shared values, common goals, and so forth there was this paragraph:

26. Strengthening cooperation on space-security issues, bilaterally, trilaterally with the United States and with other parties, particularly on the development of international norms and confidence-building measures for
space. Working together to take forward the proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Engaging the region more on space issues, including in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

This apparently builds on sentiment that was originally expressed back in November 2010 during the AUSMIN talks between the US and Australia. This meeting resulted in the signing  of a Space Situational Awareness Partnership Statement of Principles, which basically gave Australia access to US satellite technology monitoring "foreign object" traffic passing through the stratosphere of the Asia Pacific. The US and Japan each maintain separate agreements on sharing space related security relations, however the above paragraph indicates that Japan and Australia may in turn pursue their own separate agreement (in coordination with the US), a point made all the more plausible with the signing of the information sharing agreement between Japan and Australia in May of this year (which was not reported via a press release by either DFAT or the DOD in Australia, possibly out of concern that this would impact negatively on Australia-China ties and on the respective visits by Foreign Minister Carr and  Defence Minister Smith to China thereafter. The Japanese version can, however, be found here).   

A further area of interest was this particular paragraph entered under the sub-heading of bilateral defence cooperation:

38. Deepening the relationship and linkages between the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) of Australia and the Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) of Japan.

Given the fact that Japan has already embarked upon joint development of weapons systems with the UK and France, the sentiment expressed above will give the DMO cause for hope in the possible involvement by Japanese technical experts in improving weapons delivery systems and (more importantly) submarine engine design. Defence Minister Morimoto, when questioned by an Australian journalist (most likely Hamish McDonald of the SMH, given his past interest in the issue), stated that submarines would not be discussed during Stephen Smith's up-coming visit to Japan. Maybe not, but it would be hard to imagine it being left off the agenda given the degree of interest Australia has in conventional submarines (only last month a parliamentary subcommittee was making its merry way across Europe, touring the manufacturing plants of Navantia and HDW, to name but two - E). 
 
The press release also contained these paragraphs, which really bring the whole point of the talks to a head:

34. Deepening bilateral information exchanges at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in support of interoperability.

35. Expanding people-to-people links and exchanges, including exchanges of strategy, policy and science personnel.

Although Japan and Australia have maintained defence links for 50 years, the actual degree of exchange going on between the defence forces of both countries has been comparatively limited. To fill in the gaps, as it were, both sides need to have a better understanding of how the other operates, what their capabilities are, their force structure, strategies, and how they see security in the region and their role in it. This requires more than the occasional tour by visiting defence delegates - in means that the defence staff from both militaries must be despatched to the respective defence facilities of the other, and there build relations that will produce the degree of interoperability that both sides seek. If this impetus continues (and there is no reason why it shouldn't), then we should see many more SDF personnel in Australia, and, quite frankly, the sooner the better. 

Throughout this week, commentators from across the globe have been hammering their way towards early onset RSI in providing analysis of the flareup in relations between China and Japan regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island chain (the background information for which can be read here). Ever since Tokyo Prefectural Governor Ishihara Shintaro upped the ante by suggesting that the Islands be bought from their current owners by the prefecture itself (the donations towards which totalled more than 1 billion yen) (E), Ishihara, the Japanese government, and Beijing have been engaged in a series discussions, accusations, and threats over each sides` claim to sovereignty over the Islands themselves. Such is the fragile nature of nationalism that great quantities of ink, paper, and electricity has been expended outlining the justifications for one side's position over the other for what are, arguably, no more than a series of 5 small islands and 3 rocky outlets lying within the East China Sea which might, might, hold gas and oil reserves beneath them (according to a May 1969 UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East report, the content of which is summarised in the following link - E). 

Last month, a group of Hong Kong activists (which in itself is an unusual phenomenon, given that a majority of activisism in Hong Kong at present is aimed at local elections, the results of which were released this week and saw a large number of pro-Beijing candidates selected to the territory parliament, sparking protests by pro-democracy supporters) sailed to the Islands and managed to land on one of them before being arrested and promptly deported back to Hong Kong (whose officials did not look at all pleased at having to travel to Japan to collect them) (E). 3 days later a group of 150 Japanese activists made their way to the Islands, ostensibly to remember the sacrifice of Japanese inhabitants of the Islands in the closing months of World War II, but which provided an opportunity for the said activists to make their way ashore and unfurl the Japanese national flag and declare the Islands a sovereign part of Japan (E).

All of this confrontation came to a head during the week with the announcement by the Noda government on Monday that the government had reached a deal with the current private owners of those Islands not yet under state control, and that the Islands would thus be administered by the state. The reaction from Beijing was as expected - Premier Wen Jiabao vowed that China would never "budge even half an inch" from defending its territorial claims, while there was this gem from the Chinese Defence Ministry...""We are watching developments closely and reserve the right to take reciprocal measures." (E)  To reinforce this message, on Wednesday it was reported that two Chinese Marine Surveillance vessels had been sent to the vicinity of the Islands (although being unarmed,  they were more for appearances' sake than a bona fide attempt to intimidate Japan into rethinking its purchase) (E). 

The ramifications of these events have already impacted upon tourism (J), industry (J), and local bilateral relations (J), which are all taking place in what should be the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between both countries. What most commentators agree on is that the dispute itself appears to be some form of pretext or strategy for domestic politicians and political parties to appeal to nationalistic sentiment among voters (in the case of Japan), and the otherwise politically ostracised Chinese populace who are denied any other form of political expression and who have been taught to loathe Japan as an alternative to directing their frustrations at the Communist Party (a point outlined by Susan Shirk in her analysis of the domestic Chinese political apparatus - "China: Fragile Superpower"). Rikki Kersten hypothesised that this dispute, together with those with South Korea and Russia, provides a pretext for a revision of Japan's pacifist constitution in favour of collective self-defence, a position that may be as potentially destabilising for the region as China's growing military power and sovereignty claims (E).

In a sign that perhaps things might stabilise despite the political rhetoric flying from one side to the other, on Wednesday it was being reported that the head of the Asia and Oceanic Division of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sugiyama Shinsuke, had met with his Chinese counterpart Luo Zhaohui in Beijing in order to convey Japan's position to China and receive a similar explanation from the Chinese (J). Both division heads agreed on the need for clear communication lines between them, and that dialogue would continue. So at the very least, both sides are still talking to one another. Should this situation change, and all dialogue cease coupled with a move by elements of the Chinese Navy into the East China Sea, then as the venacular would have it.."things will get very real".

Such is the apparent pressure building within government over the dispute that perhaps it has claimed its first victim - Japan's new China Ambassador designate Nishimiya Shinichi, who was found this morning collapsed on a road in Shinjuku ward and subsequently transported to hospital (J). According to MOFA colleagues of Nishimiya, he had been "feeling unwell." Quite possibly the greatest understatement yet uttered this year, but indicative of the sort of concern that is now playing itself out in the bureaucracies of both countries. Let's hope that as Michael Cucek has observed, people are merely acting belligerently because that's what's expected of them (E) - i.e, it's all for show, and little more.

On the 21st of this month, the DPJ will conduct a leadership (or more correctly, representative) vote to decide who shall lead the party over the next three years (as a result of a revision to the DPJ party laws in January this year, leadership contests now take place every 3 instead of 2 years). According to the DPJ's representative voting regulations, candidates fight over points to determine the party leader. Each DPJ member of parliament has two points each, giving the Diet an overall total of 672 points. Non-elected party members and supporters total 409 points, while regional DPJ members have a total of 141 points. The candidates themselves each have 9 points, bringing the total number of points to be fought over to 1231. Each candidate will attempt to win a majority of 616 points, however in the event that no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first round of voting, a second vote is held between the first and second placed candidate (kudos to the Sankei Shimbun for outlining this process for us lay persons here).
 
On Monday all 4 of the DPJ's candidates put in an appearance at a hotel in Tokyo in order to conduct a Q & A session on their respective views in relation to domestic matters - namely the current state of the party and the move to reduce Japan's dependence on nuclear energy.  The candidates themselves consist of current PM Noda Yoshihiko (55), former Agriculture Minister Akamatsu Hirotaka (64), former Minister of Public Management Haraguchi Kazuhiro (53), and (until recently) Agricultural Minister Kano Michihiko (70). Given recent events which have effectively splintered the party and which led to mass defections to Ozawa Ichiro's People First Party, one would be forgiven for thinking that this election would raise bitter recriminations for PM Noda given his style of leadership  - making an alliance with the LDP and Komeito to raise the consumption tax rate, to name but one obvious example. Yet based on the performance of the candidates on Monday, it appears that PM Noda is pretty much guaranteed to continue in his current position given that his opponents could offer no more compelling arguments against Noda's rule than  "a culture of responsible government is important" (a reference to the overturning of previous DPJ policy on taxation). Since most of those dissatisfied with the DPJ have already left it, it was very much a case of preaching to the converted.

Noda has support of powerful DPJ members such as deputy PM Okada Katsuya, Chairman of the Policy Research Council Maehara Seiji, and Foreign Minister Gemba Koichi (relatively young members, it must be noted), along with the group aligned with former PM Kan Naoto and members of the former Democratic Socalist Party (J)  (most of whom were absorbed into the DPJ on a centre-right platform). This support has to be contrasted against that of Haraguchi (who is unaligned and therefore has slim chance of being elected), Akamatsu (who is a former Social Democratic Party of Japan member and a strong supporter of the DPJ manifesto, hence not likely to win much favour in the current DPJ), and Kano (who has his own faction, but is lukewarm on questions regarding the TPP and unlikely to offer much by way of strong leadership on complex questions). 

One point that hasn't yet been explored within reporting on the DPJ election is the influence of former PM Hatoyama on the voting process. Although he is currently suspended from the DPJ, Hatoyama still possesses the ability to undermine Noda's position by departing the DPJ with his supporters (the few that are still left in the party) should Noda continue in the leadership position (as he revealed here).    

While this drama unfolds, for the first time in 13 years the LDP is holding its general leadership election in the same month as that of the DPJ (J), albeit on the 26th (leadership voting for the LDP must be held 10 days before the end of the current leader's term in office, as outlined here).  In relation to the LDP's voting method, 20 current Diet members of the LDP must first express in writing their intention to contest the leadership position by submitting a letter to the party secretariat. When voting is conducted (by secret ballot), each LDP member has one vote, which in the case of Diet members is cast at a voting station within the LDP's headquarters in Tokyo while regional members vote by post on the day before the Diet members' vote. At present, there are 199 votes from within the Diet, while regional representatives have a total of 300 votes (each of the 47 prefectures has 3 votes each which are made by the executive of the LDP for their respective prefecture, thus bringing a total of 141 votes, while the remaining 159 votes are drawn from a proportion of party members from across the country - for example, 16 from Tokyo, 10 from Ibaraki, 10 from Gifu, and 10 from Kanagawa etc) bringing the total number of votes to be cast to 499. Votes from both Diet and regional members are then tallied up, and whomever gains the majority of votes (249) is declared leader. If, like the DPJ, no clear majority is established, the first and second placed candidates then face off once again. In the event that this also results in a tie, the decision comes down to the LDP's executive.      

Following the declaration by current LDP president Tanigaki Sadakazu on Monday that he did not intend to contest the next leadership vote (for reasons well analysed here), the favoured candidates for the LDP election are former PM Abe Shinzo (57, aligned with the Machimura faction)  former Policy Research Secretary and Defence Minister Ishiba Shigeru (55, unaligned), former Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura Nobutaka (67, head of the Machimura faction),  (possibly) current Policy Research Acting Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa (51, of the Koga faction), and, as current favourite, LDP Secretary General Ishihara Nobuteru (55, of the Yamazaki faction, although expectations are that given the withdrawal of Tanigaki from the race, Ishihara will gain the support of the Koga and Nukaga factions, the latter of which doesn't have a champion of its own).  

As for what each candidate stands for, that it more difficult to discern (Abe Shinzo's appearance has raised more than a few eyebrows, given the lacklustre performance he gave as PM and the ignominious manner in which he ditched his post when it all became a bit too much. He is most likely running in an attempt to seem relevant, garner some idea of his following, and foist his decidedly nationalist agenda upon whomever emerges as leader in return for his support). Ishiba has voiced his support for the tripartiate alliance formed with the DPJ and the Komeito to push forward with tax and social security reform. However, as Ishiba is a relative lightweight among the challengers given his lack of factional support, his election seems least likely. Ishihara might promise more, and given the fact he supported Tanigaki's deal with the DPJ on the consumption tax hike he can be expected to push for more fiscal reform. However in the absence of a firm statement outlining a vision for the LDP and how he intends to revive its fortunes, Ishihara remains something of an enigma, although given his previous support for Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (J), he will be in good stead to win favours from Hashimoto Toru's Renewal Party (which has its own rightist agenda)  and Abe Shinzo's followers . 

*This post was updated on the 15th of September.
       

This particular article came up during the week in the literature section of the Yomiuri Shimbun (J) for Tuesday, the 4th of September. The content was quite interesting, so I thought I`d provide a translation of it below.

"The portraits of three figures (designated as national treasures) held by Jingoji temple in Kyoto have long been thought to depict the founder of the Kamakura Bakufunate, Minamoto no Yoritomo, Taira no Kiyomori`s son Shigemori, and an aristocrat of the late Heian period, Fujiwara no Mitsuyoshi. However, debate about the true identity of the figures in the portraits has continued ever since the art historian Yonekura Michio declared in 1995 that the portrait of Shigemori was in fact the founder of the Muromachi Bakufunate Ashikaga Takauji, that of Yorimoto was Takauji`s younger brother Tadayoshi, while that of Mitsuyoshi was in fact Takauji`s son Yoshiakira. Now a new work by Rissho University Professor Kuroda Hideo (a historic portraiture critic) titled `What are the three portraits of Jingoji?` (国宝神護寺三像とは何か) (Kadokawa Books) has cast a new stone into the debate. It follows the reasoning behind the creation of the portrait reportedly of Yoritomo from the point of view of Tadayoshi.

The portrait of Yoritomo was recently put on public display as part of a special exhibition titled `Yoritomo and Chogen` (which runs until September 17) and sponsored by the Nara National Museum. The portrait itself, which depicts a figure in courtly dress and exudes grandeur, is 1.4m long by 1.1m wide, and dominates a room with its presence.

According to Jingoji temple records, there exists three portraits of three figures created by the master portrait artist of the late Heian-early Kamakura era, Fujiwara no Takanobu. The three portraits held by the temple, which are almost the same size and drawn upon a single frame of silk, are thought to be the portraits referred to in the records. However according to Professor Kuroda`s theory, the three portraits were in fact created in the 14th century, and bases this upon a historical record which says that Tadayoshi donated a portrait of himself and that of his brother Takauji to the temple in 1345. 

To further substantiate this theory, Professor Kuroda points out that upon an examination of the portraits, all three of them use silk the thickness of which was common from the 14th century onwards, and so refutes the original theory that they were works of the Kamakura period.  He also pays particular attention to a record detailing dialogue held between Tadayoshi and the Zen priest Muso Soseki (夢窓疎石) titled `the Muchu Monto Shu` (or Collection of Dialogues within a Dream).

Muso began his dialogues with Tadayoshi in order to instruct him in the canon of Buddhist law as outlined by Prince Shotoku, and spoke of a portrait that depicted both the founder of Shingon Buddhism in Japan, Kukai, together with the protective deity of the Genji clan Hachiman Daibosatsu, which was known as the `Tagai no Miei` (互いの御影) (The Shared Influence) and was housed within Jingoji temple.  Professor Kuroda says that Tadayoshi took this example, and had himself painted as Kukai, the latter manifestation of Prince Shotoku, while he had Takauji depicted as the guardian and war god Hachiman, and then donated the portraits to Jingoji as a offering to ensure the continuation of the dual nature of the Ashikaga dynasty.

As for the portrait reportedly of Mitsuyoshi, the temporary victory afforded to Tadayoshi during his conflict with Takauji during the Kanno War (1350-1352) gave him all the incentive to donate a new portrait of Yoshiakira to the temple in order to replace that of Takauji.  In the early stages of the Muromachi Bakufunate, Takauji was responsible for military matters while Tadayoshi took care of political and administrative matters. On the recommendation of Muso, Tadayoshi had affiliates of Zen temple Ankokuji built throughout the nation. Professor Kuroda theorizes that the portrait of Mitsuyoshi is inferior to the previous two portraits, reflecting the time and circumstances under which it was made.

However Professor Kuroda`s theories have been disputed by those who point out that the only direct proof that he uses to substantiate his claim is a single record. Hence the Yoritomo theory for the portraits remains strong. The exhibition in Nara also displays a portrait of Yoritomo belonging to Seifukuji of Fukuoka. Records clearly state that this portrait is that of Minamoto no Yoritomo, and was donated to Jingoji in 1698. So at the very least, this particular portrait is definitely that of Yoritomo.

Tadayoshi was eventually defeated by his elder brother and killed, yet fundamental questions still remain as to why the figures depicted in such masterworks  would be forgotten.  Professor Kuroda says that he welcomes criticism and alternate theories for the portraits, and expects that the debate will only heat up from here on in.

(Culture Bureau, Hayakawa Yasuo) 

In a slight and ever so subtle way, Australia and Japan are growing closer in their security relations. Evidence for this came on Friday of last week when Australia's Department of Defence, together with Japan's Ministry of Defence, released details (E) of a joint initiative between the ADF and the SDF, whereby two military personnel from the ADF would be embedded with the SDF in Juba, South Sudan, for the purposes of providing the SDF with "information related to the implementation of the mandate of UNMISS" (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan)" as well as "provide liaison services to assist communication and coordination with relevant bodies including UN agencies". As might already be obvious, this particular deployment is note worthy purely in terms of its symbolic value (which, to their credit, both defence ministeries acknowledged). 

While undertaking infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa provides both sides with a credible humanitarian mission to contribute their respective expertise to (thereby gaining kudos with both the UN and the African Union), the stationing of ADF personnel with the SDF marks the beginning of what will inevitably become a more regular occurrence given the interest of both sides in working together to..."enhance interoperability between the JSDF and the ADF." The inclusion of maritime SDF forces in Exercise Kakadu 2012 (E) serves to reinforce this goal, and is to be applauded.  All the signs point towards more regular visits to Australia by the JSDF, which in turn may produce larger scale joint exercises in the future. For example, the creation of a tripartite exercise, with members from each service arm of the US, Japanese, and Australian (and quite possibly South Korean) defence forces working in tandem over a period of two weeks would provide the basis for hereto unprecedented levels of interoperability. It could, in fact, become a substitute for Exercise Talisman Sabre (the ADF's principal joint exercise with the US), and would be politically justifiable given the security ties already shared between all of the participating states. An emphasis on disaster response operations (the reasoning for which has already been applied to the deployment of US Marines to Darwin here)  would serve to reinforce the benign nature of the exercise without completely ruling out  conventional military training activities. It's worth a shot, at the very least.   

The announcement of this joint activity in South Sudan and the up-coming 2+2 meeting in Australia leads me to examine an area of Japan-Australia relations that I have not yet explored, and that is the comparatively poor state of reporting about Japan that occurs in Australia. Japan is Australia's second largest trade export partner, remains the third largest economy in the world, has fostered peaceful, progressive agreements with Australia for over 60 years, has invested in the development of Australia and Australians (re: Fujitsu, Mitsubishi, Toyota, Canon, Mitsui, Nomura, Nissan, not forgetting to mention Nippon Kogyo and energy resource companies) for decades, while Japanese is the most commonly studied Asian language in Australia at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (much to the chagrin of Indonesia specialists, to be sure). In spite of this, and all of the relevance of Japan to Australia in this the "Asian Century", media networks here would be hard pressed to reveal when they last produced an exclusive on Japan, interviewed Japanese ministers, academics, business leaders, activists, senior bureaucrats, entertainers, indeed anyone from Japan of national significance.

As a case in point, Wednesday morning's total coverage of Japan from the ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the national, public broadcaster of Australia) consisted of the following article; "Redback bites woman in Japanese nursing home."  This appeared to be based on a minor article reported by the Yomiuri Shimbun on Tuesday afternoon (J) and picked up by the ABC for its novelty value (presumably the tenuous link between the spider involved and Australia). At a time when Japan's political world is undergoing turmoil over defections, re-alignments, up-coming party leader elections (the LDP is set to elect a new leader this month after current leader Tanigaki lost the backing of his own faction earlier in the week (J), not to mention questions of sovereignty and diplomatic clashes with China and South Korea, the seeming indifference of Australia's media to events in Japan borders on negligent. To its credit, the Australian newspaper does keep its Tokyo correspondent Rick Wallace busy summarising reports drawn from AFP, Bloomberg, the WSJ and Reuters while occasionally combining these with his own observations to give his stories an Australian bent. Yet such reports are few and far between, and a single correspondent attempting to cover the entire scope of Japanese political, social, economic, and environmental issues is asking more of the reporter than he can deliver, certainly not without further investment from the newspaper itself. 

As such, Australians commonly receive their news about Japan from US and European sources, neither of which have any reason to include Australia's point of view or explain to readers/viewers how events in Japan ultimately affect Australia. The only time Japan is mentioned in detail within the Australian press (with the exception of last year's earthquake and nuclear disaster in Fukushima, which was predominantly reported to Australians via overseas news networks) is in relation to whaling, WWII or, more recently, radiation, all of which carry negative connotations. While child abductions became an item earlier in the year, it hasn't been followed up despite legislation formally signing Japan up to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction being approved by the DPJ for submission to the House of Representatives (J). When Japan is mentioned outside of the above three issues, it is normally in relation to frivolous topics such as crowded pools (E),  the quirks of Otaku culture, or highlighting the exotic nature of Japan (from a Western perspective, a never-ending source of inspiration for any Japan correspondent stuck for ideas and pressured by short deadlines and with no interviews on the books).

Mind you, this indifference is reciprocated by Japan as well. Australia virtually never gets a mention in any of the major Japanese media outlets (3 in four months for the Asahi Shimbun), indeed none of the Japanese newspaper dailies appear to have correspondents based in Australia, and reports that are made about Australia in the Japanese press are summaries of English language articles with a small bit of context added by the Japanese reporter in question.  If Australia appears on Japanese television news programs, it is in relation to a JAXA initiative to launch rockets from the Woomera test range in South Australia, the TPP, or the introduction of another marsupial to a zoo. While the leadership battle between Julia Gillard and Kevin Rudd in February this year sparked some interest from media commentators (J), by and large Japan's media outlets ignore Australia or report about it by proxy, and there are no indications that this situation is set to change.  

In all honesty, Australia needs to be better informed about its regional partners, for it cannot blithely expect to understand domestic issues in China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, or the Philippines based on the occasional article or broadcast. What occurs in those countries is as important to us as what occurs in Washington, Brussels, London, Paris or Berlin (or New Delhi for that matter),  yet the dearth of information from Asia means that the general Australian public, and the politicial representatives of the public are none the wiser as to the concerns of the people of those countries, what inspires and motivates them, what issues they regard as crucial to their interests, and their impressions of Australia. Perhaps as Australia's demography diversifies, the need for wider and more comprehensive coverage of Asia may force Australian media outlets to invest more in establishing branch offices in capitals throughout the region, or else social media will fill the gaps with timely but not necessarily accurate reporting. Whatever does eventually happen, hopefully it will be better than the current state of Australian reporting on Japan which is sorely in need of improvement.