Chapter One   The advance from Shikoku　(continued from last week)
Miyoshi Yukinaga and the Hosokawa clan
 
1   The Hosokawa, shugo of Awa province, and the Muromachi Bakufu
 
According to the various military tales and genealogies composed about the Miyoshi clan during the Edo period, the Ogasawara of Shinano province were appointed as the shugo (an official position similar to a governor) over Awa province during the Kamakura period. A descendant of that family established himself in Miyoshi-gun (district) at the mouth of the Yoshino river, and there took the surname Miyoshi. 



While it is certainly true that this person belonged to the same family, as is often the case with many of the figures of the Era of the Warring States, it is difficult to verify the validity of claims about origins.
 
A primary source detailing the origins of the Miyoshi first appeared in the latter half of the fifteenth century.  On the 24th of the second month of Kanshō 6 (1465), Inō Shinkaku, the bugyōnin (overseer) appointed by the shugo of Awa province Hosokawa Shigeyuki, ordered one “Miyoshi Shikibu no Shō” to accumulate information about taxation paid across 3-gun districts. In Awa province at the time, the shugodai (a deputy to the shugo) of the Tōjō clan amalgamated a number of provincial districts and appointed either ko-shugodai (an assistant, usually a retainer, to the shugodai) or gundai (district administrators) to each. In the southern gun, Tōjō Wakasa Nyūdō, and in the north and west Miyoshi Shikibu no Shō, were two of these individuals.
 
In the first year of Bunmei (1469), Inō Shinkaku issued a directive to Miyoshi Shikibu no Shō, Kataho Hitachi Nyūdō, and Henmi Bungo Nyūdō to collect tithes from their respective districts.  Kataho was from Izu province and a descendant of a hikan (a retainer granted land and special authority in exchange for military service) of the Hōjō Tokusō clan of the Kamakura Bakufu.  The Henmi clan was from Kai province, and like the Takeda and Ogasawara clans, lay claim to Minamoto no Yoshimitsu as an ancestor.  Both families (Kataho and Henmi) thus bore illustrious lineages, yet if the Miyoshi were also descended from the Ogasawara, wouldn’t it have made more sense for them to also take a surname from a geographical feature in the eastern provinces?
 
Following the chain of logic here, the Miyoshi were most likely kokujin (a prominent local samurai family) in Awa province, who grew in influence to become the gundai of the north western region of Awa. In their search for a more illustrious lineage, many kokujin status families in Awa like the Ichinomiya began to describe themselves as descended from the Ogasawara clan, thus leading to the establishment of the Ogasawara theory of origin.
 
There is also a theory that this Miyoshi Shikibu no Shō was a direct ancestor of Miyoshi Yukinaga, Motonaga and Nagayoshi, each of whom would make their mark in the Kinai region (Yamashiro, Yamato, Settsu, Kawachi, and Izumi provinces).  However all three chose to give themselves the title of ‘Chikuzen no Kami’ (a common practice among prominent military figures of this era was to appoint themselves to positions based on former Imperial titles, in this case ‘kami’. The title held no actual rank, and was more a trend adopted to make one appear more illustrious. Chikuzen is the former name of modern Fukuoka prefecture). While it is possible that the family’s lineage was altered at some point, we do know that in Tenshō 9 (1581) there was still a family by the name of Miyoshi in Awa province using the official title ‘Shikibu no Shō’. Hence the chances that Yukinaga, Motonaga and Nagayoshi had a common ancestor in Shikibu no Shō are rather slim. 
 
It does appear that in the aftermath of the Ōnin War, in the seventeenth year of Bunmei (1485), Hosokawa Nariyuki and his son Masayuki were accompanied by members of the Miyoshi clan in their journey from Kyoto to Awa. So rather than originally being from Awa, there was a Miyoshi family active in Kyoto at the time. It seems more likely that the family of Miyoshi Shikibu no Shō that came to administer the north-western regions of Awa were originally the main branch of the family, while the Miyoshi that later came to adopt the more prestigious title of ‘Chikuzen no Kami’ were retainers in the service of the shugo of Awa province residing in Kyoto. Yukinaga, Motonaga and Nagayoshi were the descendants of these retainers, and during the course of the Era of the Warring States, it was this family that would eventually come to be regarded as the main branch of the Miyoshi clan.
 
The Muromachi Bakufu and the Hosokawa clan
 
The Muromachi Bakufu maintained a policy of dividing up its authority into regions, namely the Kantō, Tōhoku and Kyūshū. To the position of Kamakura Kubō (a position overseeing the administration of 10 provinces in the Kantō region) it appointed the fourth son of Ashikaga Takauji, Ashikaga Motouji, while in relation to the position of Kantō Kanrei (a position providing advice to the Kamakura Kubō and appointed by the shōgun) they appointed the Uesugi clan, a family from whom Takauji’s mother was descended. To the position of Ōshū Tandai (overseeing the far northern provinces) they appointed the Ōsaki clan (a branch of the aristocratic Shiba family), while the Mogami clan (another branch of the Shiba family) were appointed as the Ushū Tandai (the area of north western Honshū now occupied by Akita and Niigata prefectures).   
 
The position of Kyūshū Tandai went to the Shibukawa clan, thereby ensuring that all of these prestigious posts were occupied by illustrious families tied through blood relations to the Ashikaga Bakufu. On the other hand, the Tokai, Hokuriku, Kinnai, Chūgoku and Shikoku regions (known collectively as the Muromachi Dono Gobunkoku) were under the direct control of the shōgun, while the shugo of the same stretch of territory were expected to reside in Kyoto. Those who became shugo included the Akamatsu and Sasaki clans, both of whom had been instrumental in the formation of the Ashikaga Bakufu, and apart from prestigious families dating from the Kamakura era including the Ōuchi, Ōtomo, and Kōno, all fell under the Ashikaga banner. The basic administration adopted by the Bakufu involved shugo combining their responsibilities for numerous provinces throughout the country with control over those same areas, all the while providing the shōgun and the Bakufu government in Kyoto with support.
 
One issue that emerged for the Ashikaga shōgun during the Nanbokuchō period (roughly 1336 to 1392) was how to secure their position while simultaneously fighting both the Southern Court and restraining more influential members of their own family. Their solution was to make the Northern Court appreciate the significance of the role of the shugo, remove the influence of any other branches of the Ashikaga family so that the shōgun monopolized contact with the Emperor, and ensure that only the shōgun’s family occupied high office.

Meanwhile the Hosokawa clan, itself a branch of the Ashikaga family, had pacified Shikoku during Ashikaga Takauji’s retreat to Kyūshū, Through their assistance rendered to Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, Yoshimitsu was able to consolidate the authority of the shōgun. The Hosokawa were, in turn, appointed as senior councilors within the Ashikaga Bakufu. Generations of the Hosokawa clan would take the position title of Ukyō no Daibu (many of the official positions within the Bakufu and imperial system took names derived from Chinese bureaucratic titles), which in time became known as the Ukei chō. The main branch of the Hosokawa family, under the title of Ukei chō, would become one of the three principal families appointed to the position of kanrei (the Sanrankei) together with the Shiba and Hatakeyama. They would then combine their Bakufu duties to simultaneously serve as shugo to the provinces of Settsu, Tanba, Sanuki and Tosa.     
 
The Hosokawa also had their own influential sub-branches of the family. Among those who only served in the position of shugo included the Awa, Awaji, Bichū, Izumi-kami and Izumi-shimo families. Non-shugo branch families such as the Yashū and Tenkyū would serve as retainers to the Ukei chō.
 
At the height of the Muromachi Bakufu, the shōgun held a conference examining important proposals, receiving opinions from a variety of councilors. Those councilors included the sankanrei (see earlier), the Yamana, Isshiki, Akamatsu, and the Awa. In the beginning, these families would wait upon the shōgun, taking up guest spots and holding special status which allowed their attendance at events. With the coming of the Era of the Warring States, these families would be consolidated into the Go shōban shū, a group the membership of which served as proof that one belonged to a powerful, influential clan. The Awa became as renowned as the sankanrei, Yamana, Isshiki, Akamatsu, Kyōgoku, Hatakeyama, and Ōuchi. In other words, the Awa on their own became a mainstay of the Bakufu, one rank below the Ukei chō.
 
The Hosokawa were proud of their strong familial ties. By the mid-fifteenth century, unlike the Hatakeyama that had split into the Masanaga and Yoshihiro factions and fought among themselves, the Hosokawa had emerged as the leaders of the Bakufu government.

From Amano Tadayuki, "The Miyoshi Clan - The first "Lords of the Realm" of the Warring States Era", Chūōkōron Publishing, Tokyo, 2021

The Miyoshi Family of Awa
 
From the 15th through to the 16th centuries, the Miyoshi became a prominent family, advancing from Awa province on Shikoku Island into the Kinai region, a region that at the time was known as ‘the realm’. ‘Realm’ is a multi-faceted term and can refer in particular to Kyoto, the Kinai region, and Japan in its entirety. During the Era of the Warring States (Sengoku Jidai) it was mostly used to refer to the Kinai.
 
‘Realm’ does not simply designate a region but includes a nuance of centralized political power, in the same way ‘capital’ and ‘central’ is used today. In the area around Kyoto following the Ōnin War (1467-1477), the Miyoshi family were extraordinarily active. Starting with  Miyoshi Yukinaga who led a tokusei ikki (a form of protest against the imposition of land taxes), it extended to Miyoshi Motonaga who recommended that Ashikaga Yoshitsuna (otherwise known as the Sakai Kubō) be elevated to the position of shōgun, to Miyoshi Nagayoshi, who refused to show deference to the Ashikaga shōgunate and came to rule over Kyoto itself, to Miyoshi Yoshitsugu who assassinated shōgun Ashikaga Yoshiteru, to Miyoshi Yasunaga, who adopted both an offspring of Oda Nobunaga and the nephew of Hashiba (Toyotomi) Hideyoshi, through to Miyoshi Isan and Miyoshi Fusakazu, both of whom loyally served Tokugawa Ieyasu.
 
Yet when compared to the families of the eastern provinces such as the Date, Hōjō, Uesugi, and Takeda, and those of the western provinces such as the Mōri, Chōsokabe, and Shimazu, nowadays the Miyoshi are virtually unknown. Why is this?
 
When we think about the Era of the Warring States, we recall that this was the age of the three great figures of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu, which also incorporated the Azuchi-Momoyama period. The Miyoshi, who were unrelated to these three great figures, prove poor material when it comes to providing stories for manga, novels, television dramas, historical plays, movies and tourist spots. Yet all versions of the standard high school issue B textbook of Japanese history bring up the Miyoshi. For someone to claim they don’t know who they are should be considered odd.    
 
According to the newly revised version of the “Japanese History B” textbook (published by Jikkyo publishing in 2019), “Hosokawa Harumoto, who successfully managed to subdue Kyoto, had his authority seized by Miyoshi Nagayoshi. Meanwhile the authority of the Miyoshi would in turn be taken over by their retainer Matsunaga Hisahide.” These details have not changed since 1989. Moreover in the ‘Comprehensive Japanese History – Revised Version” (printed by Yamakawa Publishing in 2019), it includes a footnote that states “the struggle over the authority of government centered around the Hosokawa continued unabated”, while in the margins it says “in reality authority shifted from the Hosokawa to Miyoshi Nagayoshi, and then transferred to Nagayoshi’s retainer Matsunaga Hisahide”.
 
In other words, the Miyoshi had no other role than as an example of how retainers such as Matsunaga Hisahide overthrew their social superiors (gekokujō).  
 
When we trace the origins of this line of thinking, we arrive at Ōta Ushikazu (Gyūichi)’s “Taikaou sama kunki no uchi” (A military record of the Taikō, i.e., Toyotomi Hideyoshi) and Raisan Yō’s “Nihon Gaishi” (A history of Japanese foreign relations).  The “military record of the Taikō”, written at the outset of the Edo period (1615-1868) was a compilation of anecdotes about warring state era generals centered around Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and featured embellishments and fabrications. It was to become the basis for narratives and ballads. “A history of Japanese foreign relations” was released in the latter Edo period, and while it is unclear whether it was based on any historical evidence, through stories and ballads its anecdotes grew in popularity and were eagerly absorbed. These in turn became renowned tales that were widely read by the population at large.
 
Most notably, Raisan Yō, who possessed Confucian values, defended the previously reviled Nobunaga by claiming that Nobunaga’s harsh measures were a necessity because of the civil strife of his era. Raisan was also responsible for the formation of a view of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu as heroic figures struggling against adversity. By and large these views have carried on through to today. For my part, I have never read a primary source that says that Matsunaga Hisahide usurped the Miyoshi.
 
Lecture notes belonging to one of the most prominent scholars of history during the Meiji and Taishō eras, Tanaka Yoshinari, who served as both head of the historical archives and a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, were compiled by his students following his death into the “Ashikaga Jidai Shi” (History of the Ashikaga Era, 1923) and the “Oda Jidai Shi” (History of the Oda Era, 1924). This was a time when historical studies were adopting evidence-based theories. While both works go into considerable detail on the divisions within the Hosokawa family, they note that Miyoshi Motonaga, the father of Miyoshi Nagayoshi, was responsible for the creation of a new political dynamic, but say nothing about either Nagayoshi or Hisahide themselves. Perhaps Tanaka, regarding these two as responsible for nothing more than chaos and decadence, saw no value in speaking about them.    
 
Rather, the “Nippon Kinsei Shi” (History of Early Modern Japan, Vol.1, 1916) which was authored by Nakamura Kōya while he was still studying as a postgraduate at Tokyo Imperial University, regarded Miyoshi Nagayoshi highly. For Nakamura, Nagayoshi was “without peer among the many heroic figures made flesh during the maelstrom of the sixteenth century”. In the Kinki region where he was most active, there existed “a school of thought advocating mature iconoclasm” and was a region suited to the “large scale recruitment of troops”. This ‘shining star’ lacked the forthright nature of figures such as Takeda Shingen, Uesugi Kenshin, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa Ieyasu. Yet in terms of political skill he “should indeed be admired”. The fact that he placed his main residence not in Kyoto but at Sekkasen (Izumi province, modern Osaka) was ‘extraordinarily perceptive’.
 
His response to opponents such as Hosokawa Harumoto and Ashikaga Yoshiteru was praised for its “calm repose, thorough preparation, and abundant benevolence”.  Before the war, Nagayoshi “had an established reputation as a calm and composed general that loved poetry”. After the war, most historical study on the Kinki region in the warring states period focused on the Yamashiro kuni ikki (a form of uprising led by regional leaders) and the ikkō ikki (a religiously inspired uprising linked to the Jodō Shinshū faith), as well as the emergence of independent urban areas such as Sakai. Such trends as these had their foundation in the search for the origins of post-war democracy in Japan.
 
As a result of such studies, the picture of the Kinai following the Ōnin War was one where Oda Nobunaga abruptly entered the capital and thereafter embarked on conflict throughout the nation. The history of almost a century of central government that occupied the period in between the two above events was apparently cast aside. Moreover, as a result of movements opposed to the over-concentration of authority in Tokyo during Japan’s period of accelerated economic growth, regional leaders, namely famous warlords from various places throughout the nation, garnered a great amount of attention. Almost concurrent to this trend was another where those like the Miyoshi who were active within the central government faded from view.  
 
With the turn of a new century, studies into the Muromachi Bakufu and shōguns along with those of warlords of the Kinai region evolved, resulting in the publication of a continuous series of books on the subject. Conversely doubts began to be raised regarding both Nobunaga’s foresight and creativity. The image of Nobunaga that we hold today was greatly influenced by Ōta Gyūichi’s “Shinchō Kōki” (Public Records of Nobunaga), resulting in his portrayal as a heroic, albeit somewhat unusual public figure. (The emergence of new studies into the Muromachi period) thus made it possible to compare the era of the Oda with their warlord predecessors in the Kinai region.   
 
Ultimately, to the people of the Muromachi era, the idea of overthrowing the Muromachi Bakufu and uniting the nation was both extraordinary and lacking in common sense.  People today have the benefit of knowing the history of the Kamakura, Muromachi, and Tokugawa bakufunates and how all three were overthrown by force of arms. They then tend to believe that overthrowing the Bakufu was one of the options available at the time. However the overthrow of the Muromachi Bakufu was the first time in Japanese history that this idea became reality.  To directly confront the shōgun and then overthrow him was something that no Japanese had experienced up to this point.  
 
And while all this was going on, there is the added question of how the people at the time accepted a new form of central government in exchange for the old one? What presuppositions and environment led to its formation? In order to consider such questions, there is value in discussing how, over the course of a century in the Kinai region of central Japan otherwise known as ‘the realm’, the Miyoshi dealt with the Muromachi Bakufu and Ashikaga shōgun and then three governments each led by a different ‘heroic figure’ of the age. Let us begin, then, by examining the battles of the Miyoshi family.   

After many months of absence from this particular blog, I’ve been inspired to once again apply what analysis skills I have to the announcement of the updated Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation that was signed in Perth in late October last year. The visit to Perth by Prime Minister Kishida was brief but telling in the fact that it took place in the run-up to the G20 in Bali, making it the fourth occasion in the space of a year that newly elected Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese had met with his Japanese counterpart.
 
The principle takeaway from the updated Declaration was language outlined under Article 6, stating that “we will consult each other on contingencies that may affect our sovereignty and regional security interests, and consider measures in response.” As was commented upon at length by Australian journalists and assorted analysts, this sentence has a strong resemblance to that found in the ANZUS treaty with its commitment to consultation when faced with a potential threat.
 
It marked a turning point in Japan’s security relations with its near(er) neighbours, given that Japan had not made similar commitments with any other country other than the United States in the postwar era. This development, coupled with the signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement in January last year, signaled that Japan and Australia now share a similar security outlook predicated on closer defence ties between like-minded partners.
 
The process by which this shared view came about was certainly not spontaneous, but has been steadily building over the past decade ever since the first Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was signed in 2007.  It was also not an entirely linear process – many pre-existing assumptions and, it must be said, doubts had to be overcome before the administrations of both countries could be convinced to work more closely in defence of regional security.
 
Many years ago I wrote that one of the principal drawbacks to Japan seeking an alliance with Australia was the seeming lack of ‘balance’ in any bilateral defence treaty – namely, that Australia’s military presence was not significant enough nor urgent enough to convince Tokyo to push for the creation of an alliance (not to mention the numerous constitutional and legislative arguments that would need to be resolved before such negotiations could commence in earnest).
 
This observation predated the arrival of Xi Jinping and a much more militant, nationalistic stance adopted by the Chinese Communist Party and the Peoples’ Liberation Army. While there is little immediate prospect for either country to want to push for an alliance, what is more likely to occur is for both countries to work in tandem to secure regional stability, particularly over the question of Taiwan. While both countries have not changed their respective Taiwan policies, what they have done is signal in unequivocal terms that they expect any question about Taiwan’s future to be decided peacefully.
 
This shared concern over the fate of Taiwan has spurred a great deal more dialogue between both governments on how any attempt by China to seize Taiwan by force can be resisted, with both governments agreeing that deterrence is the most effective means of ensuring a democratic Taiwan’s survival. Deterrence by either country by itself would be less likely to intimidate China, but a combined plan for deterrence, incorporating not only bilateral assets but those of regional partners (the US, India, possibly South Korea, and maybe even Vietnam) would be a much more effective by merely complicating Chinese military planning and introducing an element of uncertainty surrounding each nations’ commitment to Taiwan – the “will they or won’t they?” argument.   
 
In the meantime what will make the new defence dynamic between Australia and Japan more credible will be increased levels of exercises and personnel exchanges between both countries. Japan and Australia have decades of experience in undertaking joint training with their mutual ally the United States, but more limited experience in working together exclusively. This particularly applies to the ADF, whose interaction with the SDF has predominantly involved short-term training exercises with limited numbers of personnel. To really make significant progress in joint deterrence, much larger and more ambitious exercises will need to be undertaken encompassing all areas of defence – from the three services, to cyber security, space security, hypersonics, quantum computing, unmanned systems etc.
 
The legislative framework and associated regulations for such exercises to occur are all in place. All that’s needed now is for both sides to put the time and effort in to building their nascent service ties and grasp the opportunities that the present state of the relationship has provided.  

The Reciprocal Access Agreement signed yesterday between Japan and Australia has been a long-time in the making, given it was first raised as a possibility in 2014 during what was a brief but passionate period of bilateral courtship between then Prime Ministers Abe and Abbott.  Ostensibly the RAA sets out in detail the legal requirements for the armed forces of both countries to undertake exercises in their counterpart’s facilities, including what they can take with them, how they can use it, what their legal status is, and much more besides. From a personal perspective, I have watched the negotiation process unfold over many years, with multiple visits by Defence officials and umpteen documents exchanged seeking clarification of laws and regulations to help move the ratification process along.

As has been reported elsewhere, the main sticking point for the RAA was Japan’s use of the death penalty. As one of the few OECD countries that still practices capital punishment, successive Japanese governments have maintained that the death penalty serves as a deterrent and a means of adequately conveying the outrage of society against those who commit the most heinous of crimes. There is a social expectation that the death penalty remain an option in response to murder etc., which is at odds with legal scholarship and social mores in Western nations (bar the US) where concern over the limit of state power to execute citizens and the rights of the individual and human dignity have received greater emphasis.

The possibility of ADF personnel being subject to capital punishment proceedings in Japanese courts obviously didn’t sit well with Australia’s bureaucratic and political class, particularly given the fact that within most of the defence agreements that Australia has with nations that still practice the death penalty (the UAE, Malaysia, PNG etc.,), a clause exists that exempts or grants immunity to ADF personnel from the death penalty in the host nation.  Yet such is the central role played by the death penalty in the Japanese legal system that exempting visiting foreign military forces from it would be both legally and politically impossible.

In the background to this dilemma lies the long-standing US-Japan Status of Armed Forces in Japan Agreement, specifically Article XVII, which allows US servicemen and women to be tried exclusively by US courts (i.e., “those subject to the military law of the United States”, itself a sticking point given numerous incidents involving US military personnel in Japan over the decades), but which offers no exemptions from either the US or Japanese authorities’ use of capital punishment. 

Such was the sensitivity of this issue that following the ‘in-principle agreement’ reached by PM Morrison and then PM Suga during Morrison’s visit to Tokyo in November of 2020, no mention was made of how the issue of the death penalty would be addressed in the RAA. So the issue continued to be thrashed out behind closed doors as each side sought to convince the other of its concerns and what degree of compromise could be reached. Apparently the RAA now agrees to have a “case-by-case” consultation process for any crimes that might warrant the death penalty in Japan.

With the Agreement now signed, the next step along the road to ratification is its review by parliamentary committees in both countries.  While questions will most likely be raised about to what degree ADF and SDF personnel will be subject to the domestic laws of either country (and on what basis “case-by-case” decisions will be made), apart from some objections from long-standing opponents to security agreements, the core articles of the Agreement should receive approval and be entered into force at some point this year.

Another interesting development stemming from the RAA has been the decision to update the 2007 Joint Security Declaration. This is, according to newspaper reports, an inevitable result of the deteriorating security situation in the Indo-Pacific region and the need for both nations to engage in greater levels of intelligence sharing.  While not as visually appealing as the RAA (i.e., large numbers of SDF personnel and equipment present in Australia), an upgraded Security Declaration might have even further reaching consequences for security relations between Australia and Japan.  While some have advocated for both nations to essentially go all in and declare an alliance, the upgraded Security Declaration will influence the degree of cooperation between both sides to the point at which it will be an alliance in all but name.

No doubt reservations will be raised among some members the Australian cognoscente that Australia is committing itself to a defence relationship that might increase the risk of becoming entangled in a dispute within the East China Sea. Yet Australia is already committed to that region, and has a major interest in contributing to efforts to try and preserve the existing order and ensure a continuation of democratic principles and the rule of law.  To abrogate that responsibility and dismiss the concerns of regional partners as ‘nothing to do with us’ would condemn Australia in the eyes of nations seeking reassurance that they are not alone in the face of the rise of a belligerent, nationalistic dictatorship bent on establishing a regional hegemony.  It would, in fact, heighten rather than diminish tension and expedite the already increased militarisation of the region in an ‘every man for himself’ rush to be armed to the teeth born of mistrust. 

It is better, therefore, for us to act in union with partners who share our concerns and who are willing to transcend their reservations to achieve a mutually held goal – the maintenance of stability through cooperative deterrence. Japan and Australia have shown the way forward, and the ripple effect from this will continue to echo in the capitals across the region and further afield for many years to come.

(The following translation is taken from Owada Tetsuo’s “Mōri Motonari – The strategy and tactics of a master general”, published by Mikasa Shobō in 2013. The book is a general introduction to the character of Mōri Motonari, considered one of the most influential rulers during the era of the Warring States and who had a profound impact on those daimyō and jitō families located in Aki and Nagato provinces (what would eventually be known as Chōshū).  The extract below, from the introduction to the book, is an exploration of the genealogy of the Mōri and how they came to occupy the lands from which they would earn their fame. The numbers in parenthesis after paragraphs refers to the location of the information in the Kindle version of the book). 
 
Chapter One
 
Motonari in his youth, and the limits of endurance
 
Birth of the Mōri clan - the founding period of the Kamakura Bakufu
 
The Mōri clan traces its origins to Ōe Hiromoto, a retainer of merit who emerged during the formative period of the Kamakura Bakufu. Following receipt of an invitation extended by Minamoto no Yoritomo, Ōe travelled from Kyoto to Kamakura in the 1st year of Ganreki (1184). He was appointed as the head of the Kumonjō (which later became known as the Mandokoro, in other words the centre for the administration of the Bakufu), and served as an aide to Yoritomo, later being assigned to positions such as shugo and jitō (both of which in the Kamakura era referred to retainers granted estates originally belonging to aristocratic families, and overseers of those estates). 
 
Such was the value of Ōe’s service that he was granted the territory of Mōri-no-shō (毛利荘) in Sagami province, Shimazue-no-shō (島末荘) in Suō province (now known as Tōwa-chō, in Ōshima-gun, Yamaguchi Prefecture), Yamamoto-no-shō (山本荘) in Higo province (Uekimachi, Kamoto-gun, Kumamoto Prefecture, now part of Kumamoto City), and Kuruma-no-shō (栗真荘) in Ise province (now Shiroko, Suzuka City, Mie Prefecture). 
 
The Ōe clan had served generations of emperors as imperial tutors (jidoku), fulfilling their role at court as instructors in letters and literature in the same manner as the Sugawara clan.  Yet it was Hiromoto’s generation who first underwent the transition from ‘tutor’ to ‘retainer’.  Hiromoto had six sons and five daughters. His eldest son, Chikahiro, was adopted into the household of Kuga Michichika, Minister of the Interior (naidaijin), while his second son Tokihiro and third son Masahiro adopted the surnames of the Nagai clan and Nawa clan respectively. His fourth son, Suemitsu, took the surname Mōri, while his fifth son Tadanari took the surname Kaitō. His sixth son entered the priesthood. (Loc.303)  
 
So, the surname Mōri finally made an appearance. Its origins lay in the name of the Mōri-no-shō (毛利荘) in Sagami province, bestowed by Ōe Hiromoto upon his family. In other words, as a consequence of the division of inheritance among Hiromoto’s various offspring, the fourth son of the family, Suemitsu, took up residence in the above area and adopted the shōen’s name as his own. (Loc.334)
 
The Mōri-no-shō from which the Mōri clan took its name is believed to extend from the northern part of Atsugi City in Kanagawa Prefecture, all the way through to the southwest of Aikawa-machi in Aikō-gun in the same prefecture.   It is important to note, however, that one shouldn’t read the name ‘Mōri-no-shō’ with the lengthened vowel, but should instead read it as ‘Mori-no-shō’. This is because in some documents from the period, the character for ‘woods’ (森, mori) is used (thereby giving an indication of how the title was pronounced).
 
No historical documents survive that explain when the Mori-no-shō was founded,  however in the “Sonbi Bunmyaku” and volume three of the “Heiji Monogatari”,  there is a record that the Mori-no-shō in Sagami province was ruled by Minamoto no Yoshitaka, the younger brother of Minamoto no Tameyoshi. We know that Yoshitaka was referred to as the ‘ruler of Mori’, and so it appears that the it had been established as a shōen around the end of the Heian period. (Loc. 334)
 
Minamoto no Yoritomo is entertained at Mori-no-shō
 
Furthermore, it appears that there was another lineage who bore the name Mōri separate to that of Mōri Suemitsu at Mori-no-shō.  The existence of a warrior retainer who went by the name of Mōri Kageyuki has been confirmed, who lived from the late Heian to the early Kamakura periods.  It’s been hypothesized that this individual might have belonged to one of the pioneer families that developed the region (Loc.334), however this theory is scant on details.  Mōri Kageyuki appears to have been affiliated with the army that Minamoto no Yoritomo took with him to attack the Taira at the Battle of Ishibashi-yama. (Loc.353)
 
The entry in the “Azuma-kagami” marked for the 18th day of the 1st month of the 1st year of Yōwa (1181) states that “At Mori-no-shō in Sagami province there is a tale a monk who resided there and went by the name of Inkei”. This makes it clear that a monk known as Inkei lived at the shōen, and is believed to have been a member of the family of Mōri Kageyuki mentioned earlier. The use of the title “Mori-no-shō” in this manner also reveals that it had already been established by the time the entry was made. (Loc.353)
 
As we continue to read the “Azuma-kagami”, we learn that the Mori-no-shō was divided into an upper and lower half.  For example, when we examine the entry for the 8th day of the 8th month of the 5th year of Genkyū (1194), it reads “it is said that Inaba Zenji…received guests in lower Mori-no-shō”. In other words, what this tells us is that Inaba Zenji, otherwise known as Ōe Hiromoto, played host to Minamoto no Yoritomo.  The same entry records that on that day, Yoritomo made a pilgrimage to Hinata Yakushi. While on the way there, he dropped by the residence of Ōe Hiromoto in lower Mori-no-shō and received Ōe’s hospitality.
 
Now, even though it is said that the shōen had been divided into upper and lower sections, there is no mention in either any literature or records, starting with the “Azuma-kagami”, of an upper Mori-no-shō. Also, it is said that the remains of Mōri Suemitsu’s residence are located at Iiyama in Atsugi City, which would put it in the middle of Mori-no-shō. (Loc.353)
 
Were the Mōri descended from the Imperial family?
 
Although Mōri Suemitsu became a member of the Council of State (hyōjōshū) from the 1st year of Tenpuku (1233), before this time, in the period from the 6th year of Kenpo (1218) to the 3rd year of Shōkyū (1221), he became a member of the priesthood at Chōrakuji after meeting Ryūkan (a renowned priest of the late Heian – early Kamakura period), adopting the priestly name of ‘Saia’.  In the 1st month of the 1st year of Hōji (1247), the same year as the Battle of Hōji (which will be discussed later), an inscription was made on the base of a statue of Prince Shōtoku kept by the temple of Tenshūji (located in modern Gyōda City in Saitama Prefecture). The inscription reads “Offered by the venerable Saia”. This is the same ‘Saia’ as referred to above, - i.e., Mōri Suemitsu. (Loc.378)
 
Furthermore, Ryūkan was invited to the Mōri estate belonging to Suemitsu and spent his final years there, passing away at Iiyama on the Mōri estate.  The remains of that residence became the foundation for the temple of Kōfukuji at Iiyama. As such, we can suppose that Iiyama in Atsugi City served as the site for Mōri Suemitsu’s residence. (Loc.378)
 
While we have revealed most of the details of the origins of the Mōri clan, one further point remains to be clarified.  That concerns what came before the appearance of Ōe Hiromoto (Loc.378). 
 
When we examine the Mōri clan genealogy, we find that it claims Ame-no-hohi-mikoto (a god of Japanese mythology) as its founder. Part way through this genealogy, after claiming descent from Nomi-no-Sukune (regarded as the father of Sumo wrestling) and Ōe no Otondo (a courtier and Confucian scholar of the Heian period), it arrives at the famous Ōe Masafusa (a famed poet, scholar, and tutor to emperors Shirakawa, Horikawa and Toba). Hiromoto is allocated the position of grandson of Masafusa. (Loc.404)
 
However, the “Genealogy of the Ōe clan” in the 7th volume of the “Zoku Gunsho Ruijū” claims that the Emperor Heizei founded the family, thus confirming a clear difference with other theories. In truth, even the genealogy that Mōri Motonari himself wrote had notes of caution, stating “the grandchild of Emperor Heizei was the son of Prince Abo Shinnō” and that “25 generations have passed from Emperor Heizei to Motonari”. In other words, the Mōri had become separated from the Imperial family. However, if we pursue the theory that the line of the descent came from the Emperor Heizei, then the explanation for the clan name Ōe vanishes into thin air.
 
In the 1st year of Meiji (1868), scholars Kondō Yoshiki and Kondō Kiyoshi made a submission to the Mōri clan, which determined that Ame-no-hohi-mikoto was the founder of the family, thereby giving it a divine genealogy.  Despite this, the theory of descent from Abo Shinnō could not be dismissed, leading to a division of usage which established that ‘the lineage comes from the gods, while the bloodline comes from the Emperor.” (Loc. 404)
 
The Mōri enter Yoshida-no-shō in Aki province

So how was it that a noble family like the Mōri, that grew and developed in the Kantō region, came to plant themselves in Aki province (in the far west of Japan)? One of the main reasons is thought to have been the “Battle of Hōji” that broke out in the 1st year of Hōji (1247). According to records, a leading figure within the Kamakura Bakufu, Miura Yasumura, got into an argument with the Shikken Hōjō Tokiyori, thereby transforming Kamakura into a battleground.  Miura was defeated, and the conflict was later regarded as the catalyst for the monopoly that the Hōjō would hold over the office of Shikken. (Loc. 420)
 
At the time, the household of the Mōri was under the control of Suemitsu.  Suemitsu’s wife was the daughter of Miura Yoshimura, aka Yasumura’s younger sister. This particular point would prove crucial in what was to follow.
 
When he learned that Yasumura was engaged in conflict against Hōjō Tokiyori, Suemitsu joined Yasumura’s army without hesitation. Nevertheless, at the battle on the 4th of the 6th month, Suemitsu was beaten and fled to the sanctuary of the temple of Hokedō (法華堂). In the aftermath of the battle, Suemitsu’s eldest son, Hiromitsu, his second son Mitsumasa (also styled Jirō Kurabito Nyūdō), and his third son, Yasumitsu were all forced to commit ritual suicide.
 
Suemitsu had one son left by the name of Tsunemitsu. At the time of the Battle of Hōji, he was in residence at Sakyo (Sahashi)-no-shō in Echigo province (Kariwa-gun, Niigata Prefecture), and so had nothing to do with Yasumura’s uprising. Hōjō Tokiyori chose not to exact revenge on him, and so settled for appointing him as the steward (jitō) to Yoshida-no-shō in Aki province. However Mori-no-shō was still confiscated by Tokiyori.
 
Ordinarily, because of his involvement in Yasumura’s revolt, all of Suemitsu’s property and holdings would have been seized by the Shikken. Possibly out of a sense of guilt for having eliminated so many influential retainers on his own side, the punishment due for Tsunemitsu was set aside by Tokiyori. In the end, this decision ensured the continuation of the Mōri clan. (Loc.420)    
 
Unfortunately there is no information available that tells us when and under what circumstances Suemitsu was granted either Sahashi-no-shō in Echigo and Yoshida-no-shō in Aki.  It may be that in relation to Sahashi-no-shō, this was inherited from Hiromoto, however as for Yoshida-no-shō, it may have been given as a reward for Suemitsu’s involvement in the Jōkyū War.  At any rate, Tsunemitsu later divided Sahashi-no-shō into its northern and southern parts, with everything south of the Nagatori River becoming Minami-jō shō, and everything north of the same river becoming Kita-jō shō. (Loc.439) The division of property by inheritance continued under Tsunemitsu, with his eldest son Motochika inheriting the property of Kita-jō shō, while his fourth son Tokichika inherited Minami-jō shō. Indeed, Tokichika managed to gain possession of both Minami-jō shō and Yoshida-no-shō. This occurred around the 15th day of the 7th month of the 7th year of Bunei (1270).  (Loc.439)   
 
Having inherited both properties, Tokichika found himself appointed as a member of the Hyōteishū, one of the highest councils of the Kamakura Bakufu located at Rokuhara in Kyoto.  In order to pay for his upkeep while resident in the capital, the Bakufu granted Tokichika the property of Kagata (加賀田) in Kawachi province (now part of Kawachi-Nagano City in Osaka Prefecture).  Minami-jō shō had a production rate of 2000 kan, while Yoshida-no-shō produced 1000 kan.  Kagata added another 200 kan to this. In the 4th year of Einin (1296), Yoshida-no-shō was divided up, with the southern part at Toyoshima and Takehara going to a resident pioneer family (the Kazanin), while the northern half of Yoshida and Asahara remained under the control of the jitō (the Mōri themselves).
 
Tokichika bore witness to many pivotal events in Japanese history, from the downfall of the Kamakura Bakufu, the establishment of the Kenmu Imperial government, through to the founding of the Muromachi Bakufu by Ashikaga Takauji. He eventually gave Kagata to his eldest son Sadachika, while Minami-jō shō was divided up between his second son Chikamoto (who subsequently gave it to his son Iechika), as well as his third son Hiroaki and Sadachika’s son Chikahira. Tokichika himself also placed the son of Chikahira, Motoharu, in residence at Yamada village in Yoshida-gō, which was part of Yoshida-no-shō (now part of Kamiobara, Kōda-chō, Hiroshima Prefecture). All this took place in the 7th month of the 1st year of Engen (1336), immediately after the defeat of Kusonoki Masashige by Ashikaga Takauji at the battle of Minato-gawa (Minato River). (Loc.462)    
 
Tokichika retained overall control of Yoshida-no-shō, which consisted of 4 gō (sub-divisions) named Yoshida-gō, Asahara-gō, Toyoshima-gō, and Takehara-gō.  His main residence (or fortress) was not at Kōriyama (which would later become the seat of power for the Mōri) but instead was located at the peak of Tōnanroku, to the south-east of Kōriyama. The Mōri at the time focused their attention on Yoshida-no-shō, and endeavoured to unite its scattered parts under one rule. (Loc.262)

Goza Yuichi, ‘The Principles of Ikki’ (Ikki no Genri), Chikuma Gakugei Bunkõ, 2017, 3rd edition
 
Introduction – Was ikki (translators note: a revolt or uprising) an anti-establishment movement?
 
Towards an age of uncertainty ‘post 3.11’
 
The unprecedented disaster that struck Japan in 2011 proved to be an opportunity for us to reconnect with the long-forgotten value of relationships.  Words such as ‘relationships’ and ‘bonds’ were used with such frequency following the disaster that issues that until recently had occupied society, such as people dying alone and the ‘disconnected society’, seemed like they had been concocted out of thin air (of course, all that had happened is that reporting about the issues had decreased, not that they had actually improved).  These words continue to be put to good use. (13)
 
When your average person hears words like ‘relationships’ and ‘bonds’, the first thing that probably comes to mind are relations with family.  Immediately after the disaster, there were many people who sought out family members, desperate to know whether they were safe and using every means imaginable to get in contact with them.  Among my friends, some took their parents in to live with them after their family home was swept away by the tsunami.  And post-disaster, the number of people who decided to tie their nuptials increased, leading to the term ‘disaster wedding’ (shinsai kon). (14)
 
In addition, households in which three generations live under one roof (an aspect of which contains strong expectations regarding economic and child-rearing support), which had (according to 2010 statistics) fallen to just 7% of all households, started to show signs of a recovery, particularly in cities.  Of course, in modern society, where the make-up of the family continues to diversify, it would be difficult from a practical point of view to bring about a revival of large families.  For people who have left their home town to move to the city, if they then decide to live with their parents, they either have to bring their parents to the city or they have to give up their job in order to return to their hometown. And then there are housewives who don’t need to hear that “no matter how violent your husband is, you mustn’t divorce him, if only for the sake of the children”. (14)
 
While there has been a boom in recent years in nostalgia for the Shõwa era, specifically ‘the Shõwa era in which a family, although poor, leaned on one another and happily lived together’ (which contains a considerable amount of romanticisation), you can’t turn back the clock, and there are limits to the safety net of relying on relations with family members.(14)
 
In fact, one of the largest problems that modern society faces are those people who have slipped through the cracks of the pre-existing arrangement between families and businesses and who find it difficult to cope.  Given that the Japanese taxation and social welfare systems were created for the ‘husband works full time as a company employee, wife remains at home with two kids’ model - in other words ‘the happily married couple’ - those who fall outside of this model, such as households where both parents work, or where there is only one parent or where a parent is a temporary labourer, experience great social disadvantage. (14-15) And knowing what might befall them should they happen to slip up, there has been a trend in couples who fear any issues that might arise between them and so allow their relationship to atrophy (in the case of company employees, they might throw away any of their own ambitions or ideas and become entirely subservient to the company, so much so that they apparently live on company grounds).(15)
 
With non-permanent employment on the rise in today’s society, anyone who lives as a ‘full time housewife’ or ‘full time employee’ might be regarded as a ‘winner’. Yet given that this means that you must hang on for dear life no matter how dreadful either a family situation or workplace happens to be, these ‘winners’ are actually in a ‘prison’ where happiness is in limited supply (while the Japanese economy was growing, these problems remained hidden beneath the surface). (15). 
 
The new ‘medieval era’ present in modern society
 
Some of the more elderly ‘intellectuals’ in Japan may have forgotten that in Japan’s post-war democracy, ties of ‘blood’ and ties to ‘land’ were regarded in a negative light.  Recently a young essayist by the name of Furuichi Noritoshi made an astonishing literary debut by pointing out that these ties proved an impediment to the development of the ‘modern individual’ and criticised them as antiquated ‘restraints’. (15)
 
In my specialist field of medieval Japanese studies (particularly the research conducted by Katsumata Shizuo and Amino Yoshihiko), ‘unrelated’ (muen, or ‘without ties’) as a concept carries a positive meaning (as discussed later) and is not distinct to the development of the modern intellectual and his or her progressive ideas. (16) Indeed, I do think that it is quite indulgent for people to say “the best course of action is for family members to rely on one another” when disaster strikes.  
 
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, many young people made a beeline from across the country to the disaster zone to serve as volunteers.  According to Furuichi, the earliest responders to the disaster and those who took a leading role in their volunteer work were members of foreign volunteer organisations who had experience delivering aid to developing countries such as Cambodia and Bangladesh.  (16)
 
While claiming that “Japan is one”, for these volunteers, ‘the Great East Japan Earthquake’ and ‘Cambodia’ were inter-changeable as events that required their assistance.  Their motivation for taking the lead in heading for the disaster area was not a result of nationalism emanating from an idea that ‘we’re all Japanese’.  Rather it was because they felt sympathy for ‘others’. (16) Now while it might seem a bit cold-hearted to refer to the people of the Tohoku region as ‘others’, consider how tolerable were people who, even though they weren’t directly affected by the disaster, self-indulgently pontificated with a know-it-all expression about their ‘belief in the strength of Japan’ and ‘how Japan will definitely recover’? Rather than relying on an overly sentimental identification with ‘Japan’, it is only by squarely confronting the cold reality of the very different circumstances that these people are under compared to those people in the disaster zone can new bonds be formed and true recovery assistance commence. (16-17)
​
Together with the march of globalisation, modern society, in which modern order as defined by the sovereign state is becoming increasingly relative, is gradually being referred to as a ‘new medieval era’.  Indeed, the idea of overcoming adversity through the creation of new networks rather than relying on the return of communal organisations is the same idea behind the ikki of the medieval period. (17)
 
The post-war historical view of ‘Ikki’
 
And yet ‘ikki’ has an almost inseparable association with revolutionary imagery.  When a continuous series of revolutions occurred throughout the Arab world from 2010 to 2011 (afterwards referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’), something that caught my eye were comments on the internet saying “they are like the ‘ikki’ found in Japanese history”, thereby revealing an association of anti-government people’s movements with ‘ikki’.  (17)
 
In 1917, women from a coastal town in Toyama Prefecture led protests against the monopolisation of rice by local rice merchants and land owners and the unreasonable price at which rice was being sold. This event, subsequently known as the ‘rice riot’ (kome sõdõ) was referred to by papers at the time as the ‘Etchû(translator’s note: former name for Toyama) women’s ikki’.  The security protests that took place in the 1960s were also regarded as ikki.  (17). The Nobel literature prize awardee Oe Kenzaburõ, in his novel titled “The Silent Cry” (published in 1967) combined the peasant ikki of 1860 (the first year of Manen) with the protest over the security treaty in 1960 (Shõwa 35). (18)
 
This problem is not merely confined to how the general population regards the phenomenon of ikki.  Even specialists in Japanese history more or less treat ‘ikki’ as revolutionary movements.  All 5 volumes of the series ‘Ikki’ published by the University of Tokyo in 1961, and which still serve as the foundation for most studies on ikki, describe ikki in their preamble as a ‘fixed form of pre-modern class struggle’. 
 
Class struggle is one of the key concepts of communism. Simply put, it envisages that in a society made up of classes, the non-ruling class will struggle against the ruling class in order to prevent being exploited.  In more modern parlance, you might say that it is an anti-establishment, anti-ruling power resistance movement.  In its most extreme form, the non-ruling class refuses to abide by the system established by the ruling class and overturns it in a ‘revolution’.  The ‘Communist Manifesto’ published by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in 1848 declared that “all history is the history of class struggle”.  Class struggle thus occurs over and over again, and every time it does society is reformed and advances.  Once the non-industrialist class ‘the proletariat’ seizes political power (the proletariat revolution), the history of class struggle comes to an end and the communist society becomes a reality.  This is the ‘class struggle view of history’ that Marx espoused. (18)
 
So should we regard the ikki of the Sengoku and Edo periods as examples of ‘class struggle’? It does seem as though the dreams and ambitions of postwar historians were reflected onto ikki.  Communism gained popularity in postwar Japan in the period of reflection that followed the age of militarism.  In historical study circles, ‘Marxist history’ rose to the fore.  These historians regarded communism as the pinnacle of social development and held hopes that a communist revolution might take place in Japan as well. (19) 
 
As a result, the ‘history of the Japanese people’s struggle against authority’ became a major theme in postwar historicism.  This trend then led the history of ikki to be studied from the point of view of the ‘history of class struggle’.  It’s because these historians thought ‘we’re fighting for the revolution too!’.  Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end to the dream of revolution, this historical bent, after undergoing a little bit of revision, continues to this day. (19)
 
Ikki was ‘a link between people’
 
As will be detailed in this book, in reality ikki was not a struggle over authority or power.  To put it more bluntly, the insistence that the ikki of the pre-modern era were examples of class struggle has not basis in fact and were fantasies concocted by postwar Japanese historians.  In other words, it something that they wanted to believe was true. Rather than thinking of them as either violent demonstrations or revolutions, it would be more realistic to consider ikki as one pattern of relationships between people. (19-20)
 
Moreover, the student and union movements of the 1960s did not burn with high-minded ideological fervor, and the fact that they were festival-like in manner speaks to the popularity of ‘utagoe-kissa’ (or coffee shops where one could sing tunes) at the time. Of course, I’m not saying that the participation of folks who indulged in a bit of fun was in any way pointless or ridiculous.  If they wanted to belt out tunes so much the better.  What I’m saying is rather than trying to deify only those directly involved in trying to bring about revolution, one should also cast an eye over all of the inter-personal relations that form the basis of a political movement. (20)
 
When one accepts that ikki was not a ‘class struggle’ but a social network, one ceases to think of ikki as simply “something that happened a long time ago”.  The study of ikki thus becomes directly relevant to modern society.  This book takes that view as a starting point when considering the role of ikki in Japanese history.  What I hope to offer is a new way of examining modern society where relations between people often undergo radical transformation. (20)

The decision by Abe Shinzo to resign in late August over continuing health problems set off something of a proverbial bomb among regional analysts and Japan watchers who had come to view the Abe government as a bastion of stability and sensible governance in a region increasingly fraught with disagreement and confrontation.  Following speculation on a likely successor, the emergence of former Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide as the frontrunner came as a fait accompli, particularly when the LDP voted Suga in as LDP president on the 14th of September, followed two days later with Suga’s victory in the three-way prime ministerial election playoff between himself, Kishida Fumio and Ishiba Shigeru.  

As Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga himself was certainly known to Australian diplomatic and political staff, but his profile in general had been largely limited to a domestic one.  Being the scion of an ordinary middle class family with a farming background, Suga was not raised as part of a political dynasty and has no record of having studied or worked abroad in his youth.  Suga has also not overtly expressed an interest in diplomacy or written about foreign affairs at length. Hence his selection as prime minister has fuelled speculation on what Australia might expect him to do as the leader of Australia’s ‘special strategic partner’ in the north.

A majority of Australian content about Suga focuses on Abe Shinzo’s achievements with Australia and the expectation that Suga will seek to continue the trend towards closer security ties begun by his predecessor.  Others have speculated that since Suga is expected to call a general election in 2021, it is still far too early for Australia to have much invested in a relationship with Suga until he is able to firmly cement his place as PM through popular endorsement. This would explain why, after being selected as PM, most Australian commentary has concentrated on Suga’s role as one of Japan’s longest serving Chief Cabinet Secretaries but without any analysis as to whether this would prove beneficial to Australia’s interests in forging closer ties with Japan.  To date, one of the most revelatory pieces of information concerning Suga and Australia is that he has a fondness for Bill Granger’s pancakes, which is certainly interesting as trivia but not exactly grounds for hope for a close bilateral relationship.

More substance has been provided by newly (re) appointed Defence Minister Kishi Nobuo (Kishi served as defence minister under Aso Tarō) and re-appointed Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu.  Motegi is better known to Australia, having been brought in as the successor to Kono Tarō in September last year, and who has spent the past year advocating for the bilateral relationship as part of the Abe and Suga governments. Motegi appears to have a good, steady working relationship with Marise Payne, which bodes well for progress in bilateral and multilateral discussions at regional fora.  Kishi Nobuo is, as is commonly known, the younger brother of Abe Shinzo, and has something of a history of interaction with Australia. As Deputy Foreign Minister he visited Australia briefly in 2017, and met with representatives of the Australian parliament during their visit to Japan.

Furthermore, during his time working for the Sumitomo Corporation he was dispatched to work in Australia with responsibility for procuring trade in food products.  This would have given Kishi direct experience of Australia’s corporate and political culture, as well as giving him a unique link to Australia. Many of Japan’s foreign and defence ministers have histories of having worked and/or studied in either the US or Europe, but very, very few have had any interaction with Australia before entering politics and being promoted into ministries.

As Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga did not speak all that often about Australia, but when he did it was generally positive, with a view to advocating Abe Shinzo’s position of Australia being Japan’s ‘special strategic partner’. That view did not change even when Japan missed out on being selected for the Future Submarine Program, which Suga described as being “greatly disappointing” but which would not change Japan’s desire for closer relations with Australia.  It is also telling that Suga chose to speak with Scott Morrison first among all world leaders – itself unprecedented in Australia-Japan relations, and an indication of just how much Suga is prepared to invest in the growing relationship between both countries.  That level of attention to Australia has apparently be reciprocated by Scott Morrison, with his positive tweet concerning Suga’s visit to Vietnam and Indonesia on his first overseas trip as PM. 

Whether this camaraderie continues remains to be seen, but it does indicate that Canberra and Tokyo are far more attuned to one another’s activities and share more interests than at any other time in the history of bilateral relations between both countries.  The fact that Scott Morrison is considering visiting Tokyo in November, which would constitute his first overseas visit anywhere since the Coronavirus hit, is evidence that the dynamic between both countries is changing.  

In addition, Canberra recently announced the appointment of Jan Adams as the next ambassador designate to Japan.  Adams is one of Australia’s most experienced diplomats, with an extensive work history in north Asia, including as Australia’s ambassador to China. The fact that she has been chosen for Tokyo is indicative of the level of importance that Canberra has placed in its relationship with Japan, as Adams has the ear of both Marise Payne and PM Morrison and is a champion at negotiating trade deals.  Although her work will be more focused on strengthening the security relationship between both countries, her presence in Tokyo will help to draw more Japanese investment into Australia, thus helping to offset some of the losses felt as a result of China’s economic punishment of Australia and the desire by the Australian government to diversify Australian exports away from over-reliance on the Chinese market.  

The translation below comes from a general introduction to Australia written by Takeda Isami and titled “A history of the Australian story – the reality of a multicultural middle power”.  The content of the book, as will become apparent, is fairly general and seeks to educate Japanese readers on some of the basic facts underlying modern Australian society.  I thought it would be worthwhile to translate the chapter related to the White Australia policy, as it is interesting to get a perspective on the policy from those in other nations that would have been subject to it if it still existed.  As is often the case with Japanese historical writing, it doesn’t always try to follow one train of thought but moves around as the author’s whim dictates.  But it is undoubtedly eye opening in just how Japanese authors view a policy that has become synonymous with racism and discrimination, and give a Japanese reaction to it and how it operated.    
 
Takeda Isami, “Monogatari – O-sutoraria no Rekishi: Tabunka Midoru-Powa-- no Jikken”, Chūkō Shinsho,

The ‘White Australia’ (Hakugō shugi) Nation

What was “White Australia”?

Australia was previously known as the “Hakugō shugi” nation.  Hakugō (the pronunciation of the characters in Kanji) means “White Australia”, or more specifically, “Australia for white people”.  It refers to the creation of a society with British origins and primarily made up of Caucasians.  When casting an eye back over world history, it was the first instance where a policy of racial discrimination was adopted at the federal level and made Australia synonymous with racial discrimination. 

A policy of racial discrimination that placed Caucasians at the apex of society was not something unique to Australia, and shared aspects of its idealism with other colonies settled by immigrants from the United Kingdom including New Zealand and Canada.   However the ‘White Australia’ policy, which legalized racial discrimination, was deemed indispensable to the creation of the nation. Australia, through various forms of media, strongly advocated this policy.

The terms ‘Hakugō shugi’ (‘White Australian-ism’) and ‘Hakugō seisaku’ (‘White Australia policy’) were not based on legal definitions but were, at best, common terms of reference used by both politicians and the media.  The legislation that enabled the White Australia system was called the “Migration Restriction Act” (1901).  Japan itself had immigrant restriction laws which placed restrictions on what activities migrants could undertake based on whether they were permanent or temporary migrants. Hence a more accurate translation of these would be ‘migration restriction laws’. 

The Australian Migration Restriction Act didn’t suddenly spring to life in 1901, however.  Australia’s colonies had their own legislation which, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, sought to ban Chinese or other persons of colour from settling there.  The Migration Restriction Act merely consolidated these various migrant acts into one overarching piece of legislation, and was the end result of already well-established practices.  It was the culmination of a demand for answers to problems that beset the nineteenth century.

So why did Australia deem it necessary to introduce a national policy with such a striking name? Looking at it from the point of view of the present day, it is impossible to avoid the policy’s association with racism. Yet to Australians at the time of its introduction, it was a core strategy essential to the protection of the nation. Australia, which began as a small, overwhelmingly Caucasian society, had seen a rapid influx of foreign labourers of Asian extraction in the nineteenth century which threatened the very foundations of Australian society (or so it was believed).          

There were no tourists at that point in time, and those seeking to enter the country were either white labourers looking to permanently immigrate or else non-white (coloured) non-skilled labourers brought into the country on contracts of a few years’ duration.  Most of the coloured labourers were Asian, and a majority of these were Chinese. In modern society, the term ‘coloured’ is discriminatory and is not used, with ‘non-white’ the preferred alternative. However historical records from the time used ‘coloured’, it shall be the term used here.  Also, since ‘non-white’ is a modern term, it won’t be used in order to avoid confusion.  Incidentally, the term ‘coloured’ continued to be widely used up until the end of the Second World War.    
The Chinese did not come as immigrants, but by and large sought to enter Australia as ‘contract labourers’ in order to undertake simple laboring tasks.  In Japan, it was common knowledge that Australia sought to limit the intake of Asian migrants, but in truth this policy was predominantly aimed at ‘contract labourers’.  With the passage of time, many of these Chinese labourers began to operate grocery businesses, laundries, furniture, and small scale farms in the vicinity of major cities.  This then led to a rapid growth in permanent settlement. 

During the colonial period, laws had been introduced to prevent such settlement. Yet these were undeveloped, and so Chinese societies began to spring up within the central districts of Sydney and Melbourne. Since there was no movement of labour from either Central or South America, or from Africa, a majority of the labour movement into Australia was confined to either the Asian region or the South Pacific.  Most of the labourers were either Chinese, Japanese, or Indian, or else Kanaks from the South Pacific.    

In order to deal with the large inflow of Asian labourers to the country, itself a prelude to Chinese settlement, a large number of Australians agreed with a proposal to severely limit the intake of coloured people into the country, focusing on Asians in particular.  The end result of this was the formation of ‘White Australian’ society.  As far as Australia was concerned, this society was the ideal, and was adopted into the creation model for the Commonwealth.  The legislation banning on principle the entry into Australia of Asian labourers became the Migration Restriction Act, which was the first Act passed by the newly formed federal Australian parliament.

The formation of the Migration Restriction Act – a Christmas present

The Christmas present awaiting the people of Australia at the turn of the twentieth century was the Migration Restriction Act.  On the 1st of January, 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia was formed, with the first order of business for the new federal parliament being the said Act.  It was introduced to Parliament by the first Prime Minister, Edmund Barton (January 1901 to September 1903). Following extensive debate about the “coloured question”, it unanimously passed both houses on the 23rd of December and was signed by the governor-general just in time for Christmas. 

Under the law, during the colonial period the resident governor, and then once federation occurred the governor general, was responsible for signing any legislation.  Any unsigned legislation was not considered to be in effect.  Approval by either the governor or governor general meant that the legislation had been formally approved by the British government. For more than half a century following its creation, the Migration Restriction Act carried on its task of legally excluding any potential Asian labourers or those wishing to immigrate to Australia.
The ‘coloured question’ debated by parliament was predominantly one based around arguments concerning Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and Kanaks.  The large number of Chinese were regarded as a problem; the Japanese, while fine people, were considered a threat; while the Kanaks were regarded as a problem from the point of view of abolition of the slave trade.  The debate ultimately concluded by restricting all coloured migration, yet it did point to the problem of characteristics peculiar to each group. Debate on Indian migrants was the most lax, but this had more to do with the fact that debate on the Chinese, Japanese and Kanaks had come before it and not because of any perceived lack of urgency in debating about Indian immigration.

Abolition of the slave trade

One particularly interesting point about these debates was the occasional reference to America as an example of what not to do.  Australia was conscious of and had a history of referring to the American experience during the process of building the United States, with one particularly controversial subject being slavery.  There was a shared view in Australia that the growing seriousness of the ‘negro problem’ in the US meant that Australia should not follow in America’s footsteps by introducing its own system of slavery.  Even today, there are few people of African origin living in Australia.  The reason their presence never became a political problem was because of the harsh lessons learned from the US. 

As we will see later on, Australia in the nineteenth century did make use of a ‘type’ of slavery.  This was an age in which many Kanaks were arranged to be brought from the Solomon Islands and the New Hebrides (modern Vanuatu) to Australia, where their indentured labour on Queensland sugar plantations became the norm.  However the emergence of a political view that refused to countenance the incorporation of a slavery system made up of coloured people led to debates in parliament, with those opposed to the importation of Kanaks eventually winning the majority of votes. This signaled the end of the colonial era slavery system.  Moreover, as a result of the ban in principle on migration by coloured people to Australia, a side product of this was the simultaneous adoption of the South Pacific Islander Labourer Act (1901) which was the final nail in the coffin of slavery. The Act essentially abolished slavery, hence both it and the Migration Restriction Act were landmark pieces of legislation.

The mechanism for excluding Asians

In what way were Asians excluded from entering Australia as a result of the Migration Restriction Act? The mechanism for entry into the country was extraordinarily simple.  If you were Caucasian, you could enter the country without question. If you were a person of colour, you would be refused entry.  It was plainly obvious that refusal was based on the colour of the applicant, yet a condition for entry was the educational level achieved by the applicant.  This came in the form of a language dictation test.  The mechanism at work here saw Asians and other people of colour having to take a test which nearly all of them failed. 

The test was not conducted in English, but in one of a number of selected European languages and consisted of 50 questions in all.  If the Asian person applying was proficient in French, the test would be conducted in German.  If they were proficient in French and German, then they would be presented with questions in either Italian or Spanish.  The words used in the dictation test were prepared from a wide variety of sources, including some European minority languages.  It was a system that ensured that even if the applicant was a well-educated Asian labourer, they would fail to pass.    

Before the test was established, it may have been possible to gain entry by passing the dictation test, but what needs to be understood is that in reality passing the test was nigh impossible.  The adoption of this customs system as a national strategy made the White Australia policy an infamous example of racist policy making. 

A racially discriminatory system that selected immigrants based on their skin colour was bound to cause friction in the colonies, which was why Britain first adopted a system of educational selection (re: discrimination) for the South African colony of Natal in 1897.  It signaled the birth of the Natal system of discrimination against coloured people based on tried and true methods and an amalgamation of laws. This system was then suggested to Australia by British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain. Australia later adopted the Natal system as a migration control mechanism.  The dictation test itself lasted until 1958, meaning that this system lasted over half a century.

Why was this test applied to Japanese migrants?

It is a little known fact that the original draft of the Migration Restriction Act had Japanese applicants in mind when it incorporated the use of an English language dictation test as part of its provisions.  The English language test took into consideration the ‘face’ (or pride) of Japanese applicants, and was proposed by Prime Minister Edmund Barton after mulling over both anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia and British-Japanese relations.  Hardline supporters of the White Australia policy were opposed to including an English language test, which is why it ended up being substituted with European languages. 

In the background to Barton’s proposal lay a number of conflicting issues.

Firstly, Joseph Chamberlain sent secret correspondence to Prime Minister Barton in which he demanded that Barton consider the situation in the Far East. At the time, Britain was engaged in highly secret negotiations with Japan concerning the creation of a Japan-UK Treaty (ratified in January 1902).  Clearly Barton must have been paying attention, because the final stage of treaty negotiations happened to coincide with the introduction of the Migration Restriction Act (December 1901).  Chamberlain never explicitly mentioned the negotiations, but given the special place occupied by Japan in British thinking, Barton certainly understood their implications.  It goes without saying that the Japanese government made its objections to the introduction of the Act known to the Australian government via its embassies in London and Sydney.

Secondly, Japanese labourers were needed domestically.   The Japanese had a relatively high level of functional English language ability and there was a growing demand to bring in Japanese labourers to contribute to the development of the nation. This was certainly something of which PM Barton was well aware.  

Thirdly, Australian and British trading companies made their objections to the law felt.  If the Japanese weren’t able to enter Australia, these companies warned, then there was a possibility that this would cause problems in the sale of Australian wool, dairy products, and meat products to Japan and other Asian nations. This could then jeopardize the burgeoning wool trade.  It was just because of these concerns that a decision was made to incorporate an English language test into the Act.  This illustrates the existence of a political decision that would make a special exemption for the Japanese while continuing to exclude both Chinese and Kanaks.

Despite such a highly placed decision, Barton’s proposal was ultimately overruled by the voices of hardline supporters of the White Australia policy.  There are two reasons why the proposal ultimately failed. First, the Labor Party, with its call for White Australian nationalism, made their objections to exemptions for any persons of colour felt and refused to compromise. Moreover, speeches by the influential conservative politician Alfred Deakin, who was standing for election in Melbourne, ended up burying Barton’s proposal.  Deakin, who plainly believed that the ‘superiority’ of the Japanese made them dangerous and thus in need of exclusion, was the leading figure in the debate about the threat posed to Australia by Japan.  He would later go on to become prime minister.

Second, if an English language test was used, there was a danger that this would shut out migrants coming from the European continent. This was more of an issue related to the proposed system itself.  While the government had no intention of using language dictation tests on migrants from Europe, if for the purposes of conformity an English language test was incorporated into the Act, then this would place European migrants at a disadvantage and run the risk of extinguishing European interest in migrating to Australia.  It was for these reasons that the English language test was abandoned and a test using European languages employed instead.  

Exceptions exist for everyone - The acceptance of wealthy Asians

Despite introducing the White Australia policy, the Commonwealth government did not entirely shut off Australia to Asians.  There were exceptions made for a variety of countries. 

So what sort of Asians were able to meet the criteria for these exceptions? Namely, those with financial power, technical know-how, and/or character.  Character by itself was not enough, so it had to be backed up by either financial power or technical ability.

The peak in Asian permanent migration to Australia in the early 20th century occurred immediately before the introduction of the White Australia policy (i.e., 1901).  Thereafter, for over half a century, the number of permanent migrants continued to fall. In 1901 there were 30,542 Chinese residents in Australia.  By 1921, this had fallen to 17,157. Later in 1947 numbers dropped through the 10,000 line to 9,144.  Japanese migrant numbers also fell dramatically, from 3,554 in 1901 to 2,740 in 1921 to 157 in 1947.  The main reason for this was the outbreak of conflict between Australia and Japan during the Second World War.  The smallest drop in numbers was experienced by the Indian community.  From 4,681 in 1901, their numbers fell to 3,150 in 1921. Thereafter their numbers remained fairly steady, dropping to 2,189 in 1947. 

While there were dramatic falls in immigrant numbers, they never fell to absolute zero.  Asians continued to live in the Australian community, and while they might have temporarily departed the country, they were still allowed to re-enter.  These were the people that Australian society decided had economic merit.  Major exceptions were made for entrepreneurs with large amounts of collateral, trading companies that were contributing to exports, and experts that possessed detailed technical knowledge.  Kanematsu Shōten made a considerable contribution to Australia-Japan trade (previously known as Kanematsu Goshō, it underwent a name change in 1990 to Kanematsu).  Many divers who were involved in collecting pearls for the company came from Wakayama Prefecture and were classified as ‘technicians’.   
 
Half of those Asians that entered Australia were men, with very few women allowed.  The reason for this was evident.  It was to prevent the mechanism that gave birth to Asians, which would then naturally increase the number of Asians in the country.  From the nineteenth century through to the early twentieth century in Australia, Caucasian women on average gave birth to 5 to 6 children.  As there was a strong fear that Asians were capable of creating larger households than Caucasians, passage to Australia was limited to singles.  However a small number of wealthy immigrants and technical specialists were allowed to bring their wives with them. 

The restrictions were easiest on the Japanese, followed by the Indians, and then finally the Chinese.  The Chinese not only made up the largest ethnic Asian community, they also had the largest disparity in wealth and education, with the largest number of unskilled labourers.  At the time, most of those working below decks on Australian and British ships were Chinese.  Whenever a ship with Chinese crew weighed anchor in either Sydney Harbour or the Port of Melbourne, customs procedures dictated that all Chinese crew had to possess an identification card (with picture attached) and had to submit to giving finger prints.  These conditions were not imposed on either the Japanese or Indians.  This meant the problem of smuggling involving Chinese ship crew members had become common enough to warrant customs measures specifically aimed at the Chinese.   
     
The standards applicable for granting exceptions for Asians gradually changed as well. After Australia became a ‘white’ country following the passage of the Migration Restriction Act, the bureaucratic measures applied to implement the Act became exceedingly complicated.  When seeking to re-enter the country after travelling abroad, Asians who possessed a residency card would be permitted to enter. This was later changed to proof of ownership of property in Australia.  Furthermore, if accompanied by a spouse after returning from overseas, there were times when entry might be granted or refused.  For example, there were cases in which entry was permitted but limited the spouse to only six months’ residency in Australia. Yet it was also possible to extend the period of residency to a year.  Exceptions were also made for wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs to enter with their wives and families. So one can only conclude that the bureaucratic measures concerning entry were applied randomly.

Why did the Chinese become the target of exclusionary measures?

The concept of White Australia had the Chinese as its main target.  Both anti-coloured and anti-Asian movements were so limited in the scope of their activities that they could effectively be described as anti-Chinese movements.  Other people of colour, such as the Japanese, Indians, and Kanaks, merely existed of the periphery of these movements.  As such, it would be worthwhile to examine the processes that were employed to expel the Chinese from Australia. 

From the nineteenth century onwards, the process of expulsion was divided into three stages.  The first stage involved economic causes, the second stage then shifted to social causes, while the third and final stage involved political causes. 

(1) Economic causes – The group that felt most threatened by the Chinese from the very outset were blue-collar Caucasians.  The involvement of the Chinese in the development of gold mining in Australia, which they undertook for low wages, led to a large drop in the wage standards of Caucasians working in the same industry.  We can summize that the lead cause for the expulsion of the Chinese at this stage was the appearance of ‘poor whites’ and their economic grievances.  From the 1870s through to the 1880s, the employment of Chinese labourers began to diversify, which was accompanied by an increase in complications concerning Chinese labour.

In 1878, Australia experienced a large scale strike by ship workers.  The impetus for this strike was the decision by the Australasian Steam Navigation (ASN) to hire Chinese labourers to crew their ships. Both British and American steamship companies had opened up international competition and the routes to and from Australia were fair game.  The same steamship companies began to employ the Chinese in order to secure greater international competitiveness for themselves.  At the time, the average wage of a Caucasian stoker was 6 pounds a month.  By contrast, a Chinese stoker earned half that at 2 pounds, 75 shillings a month. 

The ASN ran fixed cruise lines along the east coast of Australia, centered on Sydney, but travelling to Melbourne and Brisbane.  It also opened up routes to New Zealand, New Caledonia, and Fiji.  As these routes were also used for delivering mail, the colonial governments of both New South Wales and Queensland provided subsidies to the ASN, thus making the company quite influential.  When a route to Hong Kong was opened up in 1878, arrangements were made to hire a Chinese crew, who then boarded the ship and were brought back to Australia. It soon became clear that the jobs of white crew members had been snatched away by the Chinese.  The ship workers’ union then set about organizing the first mass strike, which paralyzed the fixed shipping routes. 

We must not forget the existence of those white labourers who had their employment taken away by Chinese workers and those entrepreneurs and industrialists who had hired Chinese in the first place and then reaped the rewards.  It helps to explain why these unemployed whites became the spearhead of the Chinese expulsion movement and were the most fervent supporters of the White Australia policy.  As far as these white labourers were concerned, expulsion of the Chinese meant the total expulsion of all Asian labourers from Australia.  They would not countenance any other arguments.

As we will see later on, the same labour questions would be applied to Afghans plying their trade with their camels.    Afghans were brought into the country together with their camels in order to contribute to overland transport. Yet this resulted in the halving of revenue available to Caucasian carriage drivers and the laying off of auxiliary staff. Transport companies that plied the dry, desert areas of the country also knew that horse drawn carriages belonging to whites had no chance of beating the Afghan camel trains.  While this is but one example, it is no exaggeration to say that the problem of Asian labourers was on a scale that covered the entire nation. 

(2) Social causes – Social causes refers to the display of hostility by Australian society as a whole to the Chinese residing in that society.  Since the Chinese were limited to living in certain regions, and given that their communities were concentrated in those regions, smaller region towns located near gold mines tended to have larger Chinese populations than the local Caucasian community.  The different lifestyles and cultural habits of the Chinese gradually drew the ire of the Caucasian residents to the point that the very existence of the Chinese community was regarded as a problem. 

As these Chinese communities occasionally harboured smallpox victims, the Chinese were regarded as the leading cause for the outbreak of the disease.  Smallpox was an infectious viral disease that also affected the poor white districts of Sydney, but the Chinese became the target for criticism.  In caricature pictures drawn at the time, the Chinese were represented as strutting about in groups with long braided hair and smoking opium pipes.  The message such pictures sought to convey was that this scene should not be tolerated by Australian society.  In the same way that the human body sought to expel any foreign matter from it, white society began embrace feelings of loathing towards the presence of ‘yellow races’.  This was the point at which economic reasons for anti-Chinese sentiment switched to social reasons, and the White Australia policy began to be more widely accepted by those with similar values.

(3) Political causes – The final stage of the adaptation of the White Australia policy involved the political classes.  The ideal picture of white society had been sullied by the presence of Chinese labourers, and there were real fears that their existence would prove fatal to the plans to create an ideal society.  It was a sentiment widely shared among white society.  Given that Chinese labourers had brought down the average wages of white blue-collar workers, the Chinese created economic problems. This gave rise to a consensus among the citizenry that society could not allow this problem to fester, and so moves began to find a political solution.  The Chinese question proved to be an elixir that gave rise to a sense of unity among whites, and the ‘White Australia’ policy became the focal point for a Caucasian-driven large scale social movement. Within the parliaments of various colonies, attention was given to legislative procedures aimed at expelling the Chinese, with both Chinese exclusion laws and coloured exclusion laws arranged separately.  The sense of unity among whites transcended colony borders and fermented, eventually transforming into the push for federation.  All of this political will found its final expression in the creation of the Commonwealth.  This unity then brought about the amalgamation of all of the above laws into the Migration Restriction Act (1901).

The influx of foreign labourers

• Chinese, Japanese, Indians, Kanaks –

News of an increase in Chinese immigrants, and labour movements in the nineteenth century

Why was there such a large increase in Chinese immigrants to this new continent in the nineteenth century? 

The biggest reason lay in the abolition of the slave trade.  Britain announced the end of slavery in that country in 1833. About the same time, the East India Company ceased to hold a monopoly over trade with China. This made it possible for other private British enterprises to freely enter the Chinese market.  The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 also announced the end of slavery in the United States.  All this coincided with the abolition of the British transportation system in the 1840s, in which criminals were previously sentenced to exile abroad.  Meanwhile Australia was suffering from a critical shortage in labour necessary to cultivate the new continent.   

One measure adopted to resolve the labour shortage problem was to use the Chinese.  The Chinese were employed in great numbers in various fields of endeavour, including the development of gold mines.    The Arrow War (also known as the 2nd Opium War of 1856-1860) resulted in the defeated Qing Empire signing the Treaty of Peking (Beijing) with Britain and France.  The treaty included clauses that gave public approval to foreign agents employing Chinese labourers within the treaty ports.  This provided a legal basis for British merchants and trade companies to then begin sending large numbers of Chinese labourers to Australia, the US, and Canada. 

The Asia-Pacific saw a rapid escalation in labour movement centered on China during the nineteenth century.  The 1850s bore witness to the discovery of gold in both the US and Australia, which heralded the beginning of the era known as the “gold rush”.  As in the United States, investors and developers in Australia began examining the systemic importation of Chinese labourers as a cheap source of labour to help develop gold mines.  In response to this, British and American shipping, trading, and HR companies located in Hong Kong, Macau, and Amoy (Xiamen) began to send vast numbers of Chinese labourers, referred to as ‘coolies’ (on account of the Chinese characters used to describe their work – 苦労) to Australia and the United States. Some of those companies included, from the British side - Jardine Matheson, John Squire, Glover, and P&O.  The Americans, with their interests centered on Shanghai, were represented by companies such as Russell & Co.  Jardine Matheson, who established themselves in Canton in 1832, shifted their head office to Hong Kong in 1841 and thereafter became well known for their trade in opium.

These US and British representatives engaged in fierce rivalry with one another in the China trade ports.  Using British agents, a majority of those Chinese labourers sent from Hong Kong, Macau, and Amoy aboard transport ships ended up on the east coast of Australia. However others sent to West Australia first went by way of Singapore, which was geographically closer (to southern China).

The spread of Chinese cuisine

The international movement of labourers naturally led to movement in cuisine culture.  Half of all those Chinese who left China were from the modern province of Guangdong (Canton), and their cuisine would go on to dominate the Chinese enclaves, or ‘towns’, that sprang up in both the US and Australia.  While there were certainly plenty of labourers stemming from Fujian province, the majority were from Guangdong.  Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane all witnessed the formation of ‘Chinatowns’ within their precincts, while the US saw these emerge in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York, Piccadilly Circus in London in the UK, and in Paris. The Chinese in Britain and France, unlike those who went to Australia and North America, were not contracted labourers sent to work in gold mines. 

Chinese society in London was predominantly made up of sailors from Shanghai. In contrast, and in order to compensate for a loss in labour strength stemming from WWI, Paris had a history of ‘coolies’ coming from Canton to work in construction projects.  Paris in the present day also plays host to a large Vietnamese refugee community, which has contributed to the diversification of the food culture in the resident Chinatown.  Sydney’s Chinatown, which was built on a foundation of Cantonese cuisine, began to adopt elements of Peking cuisine from the 1980s onwards.  However Cantonese cuisine still remains the dominant Chinese food culture in Sydney.  

Not migrants, but contracted labourers – the labour allocation system

While it is generally agreed that the racist White Australia policy excluded Asian migrants from Australia, in reality the law targeted Asian labourers, not migrants.  The image of Asian labourers as it was conceived then is similar to that of the Asian labourers that you see working in Japan today.  From the 1970s through to the 1980s Asian migrants began to be accepted by Australian society as a whole, yet even before this time Asian immigration was not really considered a problem. 

Migrants and foreign labourers are by and large motivated to move for economic reasons.  However, while migrants can pre-qualify as either temporary or permanent, labourers rely on pre-determined periods of contracted employment, thereby making their circumstances completely different.

Asian labourers that worked in Australia during the nineteenth century were referred to as “contract labourers”. Following the lead established by the Chinese, these included Indians, Afghans, and Japanese, and eventually broadened to include Melanesian workers from the South Pacific known as Kanaks.  These labourers tended to be employed by and divided up between select private industries, all of which contributed to the development of Australia’s labour power from the 1860s through to the 1880s.

Indians and Afghans were brought by the British from the Indian subcontinent in order to contribute to the development of the interior region of Australia known as the ‘outback’.  While the Chinese were predominantly sent to work developing gold mines, the Japanese went into industries such as pearl diving and to plantations where they harvested sugar cane. The Kanaks were also involved in sugar cane harvesting, and many of them were employed by plantations.     

In the British territory of Fiji, Indians, who were referred to as the ‘vanguard’ of ‘Australian imperialism’, were employed by sugar cane plantations. 

However by the close of the nineteenth century, the existing system of division of labour began to collapse and Chinese workers began enter a far broader range of occupations.  While previously confined to working in gold mining, by 1891 most Chinese in Australia were market gardeners with mining dropping to second place. Many of those Chinese became permanent settlers, thereby actively contributing to the diversification of the labour force while initiating the process whereby they could build wealth. 

Ujie Mikito, “Historical records of crimes committed during the Edo period” (Kobunsho ni miru Edo hanzai kõ), Shõdensha, 2016. (All pages are in parenthesis after paragraphs)

Tonight we come to our final story.  And what more appropriate theme could there be (for a book on records of crimes of the Edo period) than executions? I would thus like to spend this evening discussing the executions that occurred at the magistrate’s residence (or rōyashiki) at Kodenma-chō. 

Of course, while I say executions, there were many ways in which punishments could be inflicted, from extremes such as crucifixion and being burned alive to more simple punishments such as zanzai and geshūnin (both of which still ended up with the condemned having their head cut off).  Incidentally, shizai (or ‘punishment by death’) was reserved for commoners, whereas zanzai (‘punishment by cutting or slicing’) was exclusively for samurai that had fallen foul of the law.  Geshūnin (literally ‘lesser person’, referring to those condemned to death) was the least ‘heavy’ of the various forms of capital punishment available, and so was also imposed on commoners. (284)

What were the differences between these three forms of capital punishment? The biggest difference, it could be argued, was how the corpse was handled after execution.  In the case of shizai, the torso of the condemned, whose head had already been removed, would be carried from the ‘execution ground’ (or shizaijo) to part of the magistrate’s residence known as the ‘exulted testing ground’ (or O-tameshiba). There the torso would be sliced up in order to test the cutting edges (or ‘quality’) of the various swords belonging to the Shōgunate.   The corpses of prisoners subjected to either zanzai or geshūnin would not be used to test swords, despite having already been decapitated. (285)

The expression ‘sliced up’ seems like an exaggeration, but it assuredly was not.  Starting with a technique to slice the centre of the torso in half (known as ichi no dō), there were a myriad of ways in which a torso could be carved up.  And not only the torso. The heads of the condemned were also subject to blade testing, and would be cut with swords or stabbed with spears.  The perpetrator of these punishments was Yamada Asaemon, a hereditary name given to whomever was hired to test sword blades on behalf of the Shōgunate, together with his apprentices.  ‘Asaemon’ was of rōnin (masterless samurai) status, but many of his apprentices were samurai from the regions of Japan or else their apprentices.  All travelled from across the nation to learn how to ‘test blades’ under the tutelage of Asaemon. (284)

The primary purpose of ‘tameshi-giri’ (blade testing) was to guarantee the quality of the Shōgunate’s weaponry.  This was why the space within the magistrate’s residence reserved for such practice was not simply referred to as the ‘testing ground’, but was the ‘exulted testing ground’ (O-tameshiba).  In reality it was not only the Shōgunate’s weapons that ended up being checked for quality.  Hasegawa Keiseki, born in what is now modern Tomigiwa-chō in Chuō-ku, Nihonbashi, in Tenpo 13 (1842), was the author of a visual guide to Edo in the last days of the Bakufu and the start of the Meiji era titled “Edo Tokyo Jikken Garoku” (A true pictorial record of Edo and Tokyo).  A picture within that work titled “Testing swords within the magistrate’s residence” has a description attached to it, which reads,

“Swords undergoing testing within the grounds of the magistrate’s residence.  These (swords) are gathered from many different places.  Corpses are then cut up using both new and old swords alike”.

Hence not only the swords of the Shōgunate were tested at the O-tameshiba. Many daimyō and members of the Shōgunate’s closest retainers (the hatamoto) sent their swords to Yamada Asaemon for testing on the corpses of executed criminals.  Keiseki, after his introduction on the various forms of cutting employed in testing swords, says “In truth, human bodies can’t be cut up as easily as one supposes”, thereby confirming that Keiseki himself had witnessed sword testing on corpses within the magistrate’s residence.   After the Shōgun’s personal swords had been tested, Asaemon’s apprentices would take the various swords that had arrived from across the country and proceed to test them on pre-severed torsos and heads.  (285-286)

Keiseki’s depiction of this scene is particularly striking.  Eight figures, quite possibly apprentices of Asaemon (with a blacksmith included among them) are engaged in what appears to be nonchalant conversation while they cut up dead bodies.  (288)

There were a number of detailed regulations outlining how sword testing was to take place.  For example, in addition to samurai, blade testing was not to be practiced on the bodies of women, priests or shrine officials.  However explaining all of the exceptions would take too long, so I’ll bring this short excerpt to an end here. (288)

Ujie Mikito, “Historical records of crimes committed during the Edo period” (Kobunsho ni miru Edo hanzai kõ), Shõdensha, 2016. (All pages are in parenthesis after paragraphs)
 
Chapter 12   The dramatic crimes of Nezumi Kozõ (continued)
 
Apocryphal tales and legends
 
While it isn’t particularly clever, there is a certain attraction in being generous and having no attachment to money.  The ‘Miscellaneous Tales from Bunbõdõ’ spoke of Jirõkichi, who had spent half a year on pilgrimage to Kyoto to visit Konpira Shrine only to return to Edo in order to continue to pursue a life of gambling, in the following manner. 
 
“Regardless of whether he had lost or won at gambling, Jirõkichi would give money to anyone; from those who had lost every stitch of clothing to professional gamblers, and would do so without question.  Depending on the person, he might buy someone clothes or treat them to entertainment at Yoshiwara or at the Okabasho (red light districts).  The fact he would be so generous while lending money led to him being praised with comments like ‘That’s just like Jirõkichi’, and everyone from cats to ladles (a phrase basically meaning ‘all and sundry’) sang his praises, calling him ‘Taishõ, taishõ!’ (literally meaning ‘general’, but in this sense meaning ‘big man’ or ‘boss’). (242, 244) 
 
The extraordinarily generous Jirõkichi was obviously a vital acquaintance for the many poor residents of Edo.  This too was recorded in the ‘Miscellaneous Tales from Bunbõdõ’:
 
“(Jirõkichi) would lend money to whomever needed it, from the poor, to those afflicted by serious illness and in need of treatment, to those heading out on a pilgrimage to Ise shrine.” (244)
 
While the money that Jirõkichi gave away might have come from somewhat illicit sources such as burglary and gambling, one can say that Jirõkichi himself had every qualification necessary to be recognised as a true gizoku.
 
For his part, Matsuura Seizan compiled a variety of sources related to Nezumi Kozõ. They are contained within the eighty-first scroll of the ‘Evening Tales of the First Lunar Cycle’ under the heading ‘Various Stories of Nezumi Kozõ’.  I’d like to introduce a few of those to the reader. (244)
 
When he was being questioned, Jirõkichi admitted that:
 
“I tried two or three times to break into the household of the lord of Hikone province, the Ii family.  (Because they were an illustrious samurai family) both the inner and outer walls (of their household) were high, and I knew it would not be easy to either get into or to steal anything from there.” 
 
He also had the following to say about the Ginza (a place to manufacture coinage, much like a treasury or a mint):
 
“Even in the dead of night, the security (for that place) was water-tight.  In the end I wasn’t able to steal a single thing.” (245)
 
Yet the Ii household and the Ginza were the exceptions to the rule. By and large the security for samurai households was lax, and someone of the talents of Jirõkichi could easily find a way to break into them.  The ‘Various Stories of Nezumi Kozõ’ also contained the following tale:
 
“When breaking into the house of an important daimyõ family, Jirõkichi would spend around two or three days hidden in the garden of the residence.   He would watch the interaction between the daimyõ and his wife, seeing how they offered one another drinking cups and the type of names they called one another.  This way he would remember every minor detail about the couple.  Apparently the officials listening to this confession later relayed its content to the guards from the residences described by Jirõkichi, and the guards were terribly embarrassed.” (245, 246)
 
Seizan also felt affinity for the type of attitude Jirõkichi displayed during his interrogation:
 
“When he was being questioned, Jirõkichi showed no signs of fear, saying “This is divine justice.  I scaled the high walls of many samurai household and managed to break in and easily take whatever I wanted. The fact that I am now bound by ropes and been reduced to this state is humiliating.  My time has definitely come.” (246)
 
As an afterward to this paragraph, Seizan added the following “While Nezumi Kozõ was brave, the world has no use for a thief’s bravery.” 
 
Seizan also wrote about how Nezumi Kozõ made efforts to ensure that his relationships with women would not cause them difficulties.  In one of these, he wrote:
 
“(Before he was arrested) Jirõkichi sent these women ‘declarations of separation’ (to prove they were not co-habiting). To those women reduced to living in a nagaya (a boarding house, usually occupied by the poor) after leaving him, he would unfailingly show concern down to the smallest detail for their well-being, often sending gifts to their landlords or ‘pimps’ (for their rent and food etc).  He was praised for being a man unparalleled in his combination of both intelligence and sense of honour.” (247)
 
A similar story was relayed in the ‘‘Miscellaneous Tales from Bunbõdõ’:
 
“After being captured in the house of Matsudaira Kunaishõ-yû and realizing that he was likely to be executed straight away, Jirõkichi made a request “Don’t kill me here, but take me to the town magistrate and hand me over to him.  You can execute me after I’ve explained myself.” (247)
 
But why would he do this? Jirõkichi then gave his reason. “It seems someone has already committed seppuku (ritual suicide) in order to take the blame for a burglary for which I was responsible.  A lot of money was taken so there are probably a lot of suspects. If you take me to the official’s residence I will confess everything and ensure that more people are not punished (for a crime they did not commit).” (247)
 
So Jirõkichi was duly handed over to the town magistrate, where he confessed in full to both the houses he had broken into and the money he had stolen. Of course, he did not simply confess, but went back over all of the crimes he had committed over a decade. He explained in detail everything about his robberies, from the methods he used to enter houses to the amount of money taken. 
 
This process could not have been easy. In order to jog his memory a bit, Jirõkichi looked at a copy of the Bukan (a ledger which detailed all of the insignia of the various retainer households to the Tokugawa Bakufu, along with the posts they were responsible for administering) and tried to recall in as much detail as possible what he had done in each residence. (248)
 
Knowing that he would receive the ultimate punishment and that there was no use in trying to amend his ways, and by accepting punishment in order to absolve anyone else who might be under suspicion, Jirõkichi gave us a model of what a gizoku was mean to be. Even when he was being handed over to the authorities, the ‘Miscellaneous Tales from Bunbõdõ’ tells us that he showed no signs of fear or anger, and from the saddle of the horse he was sitting in he began to intone the ‘Lotus Sutra’ (Namu Myõhõ Renge Kyo). (248)
 
‘I, Nezumi Kozõ, witnessed your performance of Nõ’…
 
An honourable thief who doesn’t kill, and a man of deep sensitivity. Optimistic, fond of women, fastidious and brave.  Nezumi Kozõ Jirõkichi was certainly a ‘rascal’ about whom there is no shortage of legends and apocryphal stories. Yet there is no more fitting tale of Nezumi Kozõ and why he became the archetype for theatrical depictions of criminals than that contained within the forty-ninth scroll of the ‘Evening Tales of the First Lunar Cycle’, a story titled “Nezumi Kozõ watches a performance of Nõ theatre”. (249)
 
According to this story, the widow of the former lord of a subsidiary of Himeji in Harima province began talking to a young Buddhist nun one day, and that nun later went on to recall details of the conversation to Matsuura Seizan.  One of those details was as follows:
 
“A performance of Nõ theatre was to be held in the residence of a certain lord located next door to that of the lord of Himeji, Sakai Uta no Kami (obviously, because he had been the unfortunate victim of a burglary, the name of this other lord was not revealed). The owner of the theatre in which the performance was to be made(i.e., the other lord) noticed a man standing in the centre of the space used by the performers in-between acts.  The man looked to be around 18 or 19 years old, and his half-moon haircut (the haircut most common to men during the Edo period, whereby all of the hair on top of the head was shaved off, leaving just the hair around the sides and back. This apparently kept the head cooler when wearing a helmet) was long and straggly. He was wearing a somewhat audacious half-sleeve jacket, and had a short sword shoved into his waistband.  
 
The lord spoke to the retainers on either side of him, saying “An intruder! Quickly, catch him and throw him out!”.  Yet the retainers could see no sign of an intruder. The lord repeated his order, so his retainers made their way up onto the stage and searched about.  Yet again, they could find no trace of any intruder.  
 
Only the other lord had seen the man in question.  His retainers searched desperately in an attempt to find him, but to no avail.” (249, 250)
 
The forty-ninth scroll of the ‘Evening Tales of the First Lunar Cycle’ was written in Bunsei 7 (1824), when Jirõkichi was 28 years old.  The fact that the other lord said he had seen a youth of 18 or 19 suggests that Jirõkichi had a young appearance and was also somewhat short in stature.  The eighty-first scroll of the ‘Evening Tales of the First Lunar Cycle’ includes a depiction of Jirõkichi’s appearance after he had been executed and his head put on display.  “Apart from some light scarring caused by smallpox, his skin was pale, and he did not have the look of a criminal, but possessed the placid, gentle expression of an ordinary tradesman.”
 
So Jirõkichi did not look like a criminal.   But that doesn’t mean it wasn’t surprising to the other lord to see a man standing on a stage in a room within his own residence.  The fact that his retainers couldn’t also see the man probably had less to do with the man being a fabrication of the other lord’s imagination and more to do with the fact that Jirõkichi could make himself scarce very quickly.  (250)
 
The widow’s tale continued.
 
“The man may have fled into the residence next door (that belonging to the lord of Himeji). This was certainly the conclusion reached within the other lord’s household, and so word was sent to the Sakai household to be on the alert for an intruder and to catch him if they saw him.  Guards from the Sakai household were placed in the gap between both households, yet the intruder did not appear.”
 
The highlight of this tale comes next. According to the original source “Thereafter a piece of paper was discovered on the stage in the theatre. On it was written “I, Nezumi Kozõ, saw your Nõ performance”. The theatre people were unable to hide their excitement, exclaiming “Ah, that man was the famous Nezumi Kozõ!”.  It was like a scene from a period drama (in fact, this very scene may have been recreated in a movie). (251)
 
The widow who was relaying this story to the nun is believed to have been the wife of Sakai Tadasada (lord of Niita Himeji), who died in Bunka 13 (1816) at the age of 37. To what extent the above story is true we cannot tell, but the source of the story was an actual woman who lived during the time in question, and who was living in retirement in a separate abode belonging to the same household. (251)
 
So who was the other lord referred to in the story? At the time, the households that neighboured that of Sakai Uta no Kami was the castle (Edo castle) to the west, while to the north were the Hitotsubashi, one of the three main houses of the Tokugawa family. The head of that household at the time was Tokugawa Narinori. To the east lay the households of Ogasawara Daizen Daiyû Tadakata (lord of Kokura in Buzen province) and Mizuno Dewa no Kami Tadanari (lord of Numazu in Suruga province).  (252)
 
When we narrow down the candidates to the three remaining households (i.e., excluding Edo castle), we find that the reference within the ‘Evening Tales of the First Lunar Cycle’ that describes the household of this other lord uses the term ‘yagata’. It is my belief that the victim in question was none other than Tokugawa Narinori of the Hitotsubashi. 
 
As to why I think this, I can point to Jirõkichi’s own confession. The households of the other daimyõ are referred to in the confession using the term ‘yashiki’, whereas that for the three principle households of the Tokugawa family and their rulers is “O-yagata”. At the time of the incident, Tokugawa Narinori was 22 years old, whereas Ogasawara Tadakata was 55 years old and Mizuno Tadanari was 63 years old.  It seems most likely, given the manner in which Nezumi Kozõ was only seen within the blink of an eye, that the youth Narinori stood the best chance of having seen him. (252)
 
Short and handsome
 
So what did Jirõkichi look like?
 
The short-story author and playwright Hasegawa Shigure (1879 – 1941) was foremost in creating the image of Nezumi Kozõ as a man of short stature. According to Hasegawa, it was his grandmother who first described Nezumi Kozõ to him. In his ‘Old Tales of Nihonbashi’ (Kyûbun Nihonbashi), Hasegawa echoed his grandmother’s words, writing “He was short, with some slight pockmarks (on his face), quite a tiny man.” (253)
 
Hence one reason that Jirõkichi was referred to as ‘Kozõ’ (literally ‘little monk’, but also carrying the meaning of ‘shorty’ or ‘kid’) was because he was short. This becomes more obvious when one looks at the character of Heikichi, who appears in the human drama ‘Midori no Hayashi Kado no Matsutake’ (The Pine and Bamboo Gate of the Green Forest) by San’yûtei Enchõ. (253)
 
Heikichi is the boss of a gang of pickpockets, and 27 years old.  About himself, he says “While I am little, I certainly don’t starve.”  Another character who idolizes Heikichi, who goes by the name ‘Oseki’, voices his concerns about Heikichi when preparing to hand him 100 ryõ that Heikichi needs, saying “I’m worried that this (money) will make the short-statured Heikichi bigger (meaning more prominent)”. (253)
 
So Enchõ may have based his character Heikichi on the historical image of Nezumi Kozõ. But that’s not all.  At that point in time, the name ‘kozõ’ carried connotations of being either a small thief or pickpocket.  For example, the character ‘Benten Kozõ’, who first appeared in a performance at the Ichimura-za (Ichimura theatre) of Kawatake Mokuami’s ‘Aoto Zõshi Hana no Nishiki-e’ (A Portrait of Red Flowers and Blue-millstone Paper) in Bunkyû 2 (1862) is a short but handsome young man. (253)
 
The female guards attending the young princess in the story all remark on his appearance, saying that he is ‘a good looking man’ and swoon over him. For his part, the 17 year old Benten Kozõ says of himself “I have a small frame.”  (254)
 
*It also seems as though there was another person who went by the name of Nezumi Kozõ before the arrival of the historical figure best recognised for having that name.  He was neither a thief nor a pickpocket, and was in every way a ‘Nezumi’ (rodent).  He was small, sly, and wicked, and so was called that name out of spite. (254)
 
Jirõkichi – a performer right up to the very end
 
On the day of his execution, Jirõkichi appears to have discovered the ‘actor’ in him.  According to the ‘Miscellaneous Tales from Bunbõdõ’, Jirõkichi was wearing the following clothes when he was handed over to the town magistrate:
 
“He had a dark blue, rough-hewn long shirt on, underneath which he wore a white, shorter sleeved shirt.  He had an eight-layer waistband around his middle, and wore both fingerless gloves and gaiters which had been dyed white.”  While this means little to those unfamiliar with the style of Japanese dress at the time (myself included), it was apparently typical wear for someone of a short stature. After being bound and placed on a horse, Jirõkichi proceeded to close his eyes and start solemnly reciting the ‘Lotus Sutra’, as explained earlier. (254)
 
It goes without saying that crowds thronged to the roadside to see Jirõkichi pass.  Of particular interest was the comment in the ‘Miscellaneous Tales from Bunbõdõ’ which said that “People were openly weeping, and drying their eyes on their sleeves.” Jirõkichi, it must be remembered, had limited himself to breaking into the houses of wealthy samurai and hadn’t killed or injured anyone.  Any money that he took he used on gambling or entertainment, and so contributed to the economic well-being of the townspeople. So as far as they were concerned, his were victimless crimes. And so they wept as they watched him head off to his execution.  
 
Of course, they may also have been doing this because of Jirõkichi’s talents as a performer and his ability to make an audience cry.  
 
Nezumi Kozõ wasn’t the only figure from history recorded to have moved an audience to tears while facing his demise.  In the ‘Records of Interrogations by Edo Magistrates’ by Sakuma Masahiro, there lies the tale of one ‘Kawachi Mushuku Sadazõ’.   Sadazõ was a true villain, originally sentenced to exile on an island, but who escaped to continue a series of murders and armed robberies.  After being captured, he, and six of his accomplices, were sentenced to die at the Kozuka-tsubara execution ground by crucifixion.  (255)
 
On the way to the execution ground, the prisoners asked that they be provided with some food and drink.  Their overseer (the official tasked with witnessing the execution) decided to allow this to happen and paid for some refreshments using his own money. Yet Sadazõ refused to accept any of it, and rebuked his accomplices saying “It doesn’t matter how much you eat or drink, it’ll all come running out of you soon enough. It’s pathetic, so stop it.”  Sadazõ had two half coins hidden in his mouth which he then proceeded to spit at the beggars in the crowd of onlookers.  He then continued on his way to the execution ground. (256)
 
Sadazõ was tied to his crucifixion pole, and in front of him his executioners, both on the left and right, made their preparations to stab him with their spears.  I’ll let Sakuma Masahiro finish this tale in his own words:
 
“(Sadazõ) said to his executioners with a smile “make sure to stick me properly”. Even after being run through by one spear, he turned to his accomplices next to him, happily urging them to “take it like you mean it”.  In the end, all seven of them, with neither fear, nor pain, nor panic written on their faces, met their end, being stabbed a total of 12 or 13 times.” (256)
 
And so a gang of villains met a ‘befitting’ end, although this example was quite clearly a rare exception.  What Sakuma was trying to convey to the reader was that ordinarily, upon hearing their sentence of death, most prisoners would lose all of their stoicism and panic and rave. The more cowardly among them would turn a corpse-like pallid white, and would lose all the strength in their legs and collapse in a heap. (256, 257)