In a week dominated by news that Yokozuna-ranked Sumo wrestler Harumafuji Kōhei had resigned from competition in the wake of a scandal that arose following his attack on fellow wrestler (and fellow Mongolian) Takanoiwa Yoshimori, another issue arose in the world of Japanese politics that is of greater consequence to society as a whole but which has not garnered that much attention. On the 22nd of November, Kumamoto City councilor Ogata Yuka brought her 7 month year old son with her into the city council chamber in order to highlight the difficulties of raising a child while also being a working mother. Far from eliciting any sympathy for her situation or the message she was trying to convey, the council chamber office declared that the presence of a “spectator” during council business was a violation of council rules and tried to have councilor Ogata leave the chamber so that business could continue “as scheduled”.

This particular attitude in Japan is no surprise, given that the country still has woefully low levels of female participation in senior levels of government and business (coming in at 114th in gender equality rankings issued by the World Economic Forum), and the traditional image of adult female roles in society have not undergone any substantial changes in over 50 years. Recently this image was reflected in commentary by former Diet Upper House Deputy Speaker Santo Akiko (LDP), who said that the Ministry of Health and Welfare should consider bestowing an award on any women who give birth to more than 4 children. Santo allegedly claimed that while women’s working role in society was being recognized, not enough recognition was being given to housewives, and an award would rectify that imbalance.

That this came from a senior member of the LDP in itself speaks to the level of the problem facing Japanese women who wish to raise a family but want the opportunity to pursue a career. The traditional role of women dictates that once they have children, they should resign from their current role and attend to their children, and that any aspirations they might have had to develop their skills have to be sacrificed in order to ensure their children are well cared for while the husband fulfils the role of the main salary earner. While this might have been true 40 years ago, the situation is very different for young families in Japan today. Cost of living pressures, coupled with a lack of permanent, steady employment, mean that both parents must work if the family is to reach a minimum level of comfort, but since the number of full-time jobs available to women with children are few, and given the dire lack of early childhood facilities across Japan, women are forced into child rearing while their husbands must bear the burden for most, if not all, of the household costs.   

This dilemma has been addressed in part by PM Abe’s push to have more women involved in the workforce and contributing to the Japanese economy, knowing full well that the lack of greater female representation in the workforce is a drain on Japan’s productivity and threatens Japan’s continued prosperity.  To address this, the LDP’s election promises during the October Lower House campaign included making nursery and kindergarten free to children aged from 2 to 5, as well as making higher education (namely high school) free to lower income households. 

Whether or not this can be realized, given the ever decreasing number of taxpayers from whom the government can draw the additional 10% increase to income tax to pay for the scheme, is debatable, but it at least shows that the LDP are seriously examining the issue of under-representation by women in Japanese society as a whole. Having said that, the decision by PM Abe to pledge a donation of 5.7 billion yen (US$ 50m) to Ivanka Trump’s support program for third world female entrepreneurship raised a few eyebrows, with criticism focused on the idea that if the PM was serious about supporting Japanese women’s social position, then surely such funds would be better off being spent in Japan than going overseas. 

That the presence of a child in a city council chambers should raise such a fuss is difficult to comprehend for many in Western nations, especially given the advances in women’s societal roles in those nations in the past decade or more (particularly here in Australia, where Greens Senator Larissa Waters made headlines after she breastfed her new-born daughter while engaging in Senate business in the Australian Parliament). It highlights just how far women, even those in positions of power, must go in Japan to achieve even the minimum level of recognition of the circumstances that working women face and how society must adapt to those changes.  To her great credit, councilor Ogata has expressed no remorse for her actions, and has used the incident to highlight the degree of bias that still exists to women playing a broader role in Japanese society. In that sense she is a pioneer, and should be commended for her actions.

It’s not going out on a limb here to suggest that with the release of the Australian government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper on Thursday, the need for Australia to start working in closer concert with Japan has become more urgent as Australia heads into what could be a fairly rough political year in 2018. While the white paper itself did not include anything that would otherwise be regarded as unusual or unique in relation to bilateral relations with Japan, it did emphasize that Japan would be consider one of five key regional partners with which Australia would need to work to ensure the “rules-based international order” that has underpinned much of the economic growth of the Indo-Pacific (another term that has been embraced by more conservative members of the foreign policy community, primarily because it has a broader scope of application, and because it doesn’t overly focus on Asia, aka China).

The comments on Japan did include this particular line, though – “As close partners, each country is invested in the success of the other”. This is probably the clearest expression on where Australia sees its relationship with Japan going in quite some time. In an era where the established international order is being re-shaped by power rather than law, and where the greatest champion of the liberal international order is steadily retreating from that role, Australia has begun to cast its eye over the region to find nations that at least share its sense of values and which it believes will be able to best assist Australia in keeping something of the pre-existing order in the region intact. 

Australia has already made overtures towards Japan to keep this momentum going by enthusiastically joining in the quadrilateral strategic dialogue, while fully aware that just by talking with the three other major democracies of the Indo-Pacific region it might incur the wrath of a suspicious Beijing. The question looming over this participation is, however, whether this enthusiasm for cooperation can be sustained if Australia undergoes a change in government. While the Labor Party has not dismissed the idea of participating in a quadrilateral dialogue, neither is it overly supportive of the idea, instead suggesting that it will observe whether the “Quad” actually improves the regional security situation before committing to remain a member of it.

The thing is, if the impetus is on the “Quad” to demonstrate that it contributes to regional security, on what basis will Labor decide that it is worth the effort? For example, if the “Quad” issues a statement expressing concern about China’s island building in the South China Sea and Beijing then issues a rebuke of that criticism, will that be proof to Labor that the “Quad” is disruptive and thus grounds for once again jettisoning Australia’s participation in the dialogue? And what will it say to the other members of the “Quad”? That they, and not China, are responsible for upsetting the regional order? That they are acting against the interests of stability? If Labor adopted that stance vis-à-vis the three other members of the “Quad”, then Australia might as well give up its place at all international forums. It will be obvious that it prefers to meekly back down rather than defend its values and so is unreliable as an international partner. 

So much can be achieved by building relations with Japan that extend beyond economics, but if Australia balks every time it is faced with the prospect of incurring China’s wrath by cooperating with Japan (and India, and South Korea) on regional security issues, then it will have effectively surrendered its sovereign interests to Beijing and further damaged the cause of the international liberal democratic order for no real benefit.  With Japan committed to expanding its role in the region, Australia must do all in its power to facilitate this, and that means actually pro-actively taking part in initiatives that Japan believes is important to regional stability.

While the Coalition remains in power this dedication will remain intact, but what happens should they lose the next federal election is anybody’s guess.  Uncertainty breeds suspicion in the world of diplomacy, and suspicion is no basis for regional stability.   

I’m coming to a slow realization here.  For all of the summits and conferences that have gone on for the past two weeks, what, pray tell, has been the sum result of all that activity? Have there been any substantial breakthroughs in international relations, a reduction in tensions from existential threats, resolutions in territorial disputes, or agreements on regional trade issues? In a word, no.  Diplomacy is a tedious but malleable entity, for it requires that the interests of a number of nations be hammered, squashed or stretched into shape to suit a common purpose. The APEC, ASEAN, and EAS summits might aspire to lofty goals of regional unity and shared destinies, but reality and a strong dose of nationalism tends to interfere in the process of forming consensus on the most pressing matters of the day. That makes them exercises in frustration, briefly punctuated with moments of hilarity.   

It is clear that the last few days of regional leaders’ meetings have not produced anything by way of hard-hitting, dramatic substance, certainly not in relation to regional order.  But in a quiet, unassuming way, the four nations of India, Japan, the US and Australia have agreed to adopt a common stance to deal with the security challenges of the immediate future. China has made its objections to this ‘quadrilateral dialogue’ clear, not least of which because it has not been invited to participate, but must know that its actions over the past year are to a large degree responsible for this dialogue being resurrected after a decade of lying dormant. 

On the other hand, ASEAN has started to talk to China about an officially legally binding code of conduct for the South China Sea, 15 years after the proposal was first raised. This development is either positive or concerning depending on where one sits in the regional order. While China is a signatory to UNCLOS, it has categorically ignored its implications when conducting artificial island building in the South China Sea. Since no other state (bar the US, and its intermittent FONOPs) has risen to challenge China’s claims, the region now has a fait accompli whereby China can effectively dictate the norms of commercial traffic in its vicinity while also expanding its military capabilities just that much closer to Southeast Asian states and to Australia. ASEAN realizes this, which is why it has decided to return to negotiations on a legally binding document than spend more years in uncertainty about China’s intentions and questioning US commitment to the region.

Meanwhile Australia and Japan, over the course of these past two weeks, have been unified in the messages they have conveyed regarding the need for co-operation, closer ties, and consultation. In the bilateral meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe on the side of the EAS, they essentially agreed on the same points they touched upon during their meeting in January – namely the strategic partnership, shared interests and values, freedom of the seas (which in this case was referred to as the “Indo-Pacific” - インド太平洋地域) , and an early resolution to finalization of the details of the TPP11 (of which so much was expected for this year’s summit season, only to have those hopes dashed by a rampant Canada and its concerns for a re-negotiated NAFTA and an FTA with China).

For the first time in 3 years, the leaders of the US, Japan, and Australia all met in the same room before the start of the ASEAN session on Monday, where the topic of conversation was, quite understandably, North Korea and how to contain its nuclear ambitions. This meeting itself was unusual because it was originally meant to be a bilateral between the US and Australia, and it was only at the last minute that an offer was put out (presumably by the US, as a meeting between PMs Turnbull and Abe was already scheduled to take place the same day) for Japan to join in discussions.  The bilateral between Australia and the US was then re-scheduled as a dinner, which was then re-scheduled to a short official meeting. In all fairness, Turnbull had already informally spoken to President Trump at APEC in Da Nang, so neither leader really had anything else to add to their previous conversations.

So bar the fallout from the TPP (which is still alive, although it will undergo further revisions in the coming months), those messages that were espoused throughout the year have been aired once again, albeit in different venues.  One should be happy with that result, as at the very least it confirms that everyone (which in this sense, means the liberal democratic order) is on the same page regarding regional security priorities (and less so economic ones). Yet the fact that so much time and effort was put into events that produced little of substance makes you wonder if everything couldn’t have been sorted out at the ministerial level, or by a really well thought out tele-conference.       

Over the past two days, there have been a number of incidents at venues in both the Kansai and Kanto regions that point towards a concerted effort by unknown elements to disrupt public transport and educational institutions in Japan. In the first instance, a number of bomb threats were made via telephone on the 5th of November and concerned train stations, department stores, and ferries in the Kyoto, Osaka, and Hiroshima regions. On Tuesday, news came via the Sankei Shimbun that a bomb threat had been made against Waseda University in Tokyo, although the method of correspondence was via a web-based enquiry form (both of these threats follow on from a threat made against the Tōden coal-fired power station in Chiba Prefecture in late September, which was made via email).

The fact that no devices have yet been found also suggests that the purpose of the threats was to create disruption rather than casualties.

Terrorism in Japan is a phenomenon that has a long and storied history, but one element that has been constant in each incident is that the perpetrators have all been Japanese citizens. From the exploits of the prewar Genyōsha, to the activities of the Japanese Red Army in the 70s and 80s, right through to the Sarin gas attack on the Kasumigaseki station in 1995 by Aum Shinrikyō, all of these organizations have been formed and attacks carried out by Japanese nationals, although the targets have not always been Japanese citizens or institutions.  In this instance, since the threats have been limited to specific targets, and given that warnings have been issued beforehand, suggests that they have been done for nuisance value, distracting law enforcement agencies from other tasks and irritating commuters and tourists but not really intended to cause destruction.

Until the perpetrators are caught and their motives revealed, we can only speculate as to why these threats have been issued. They may be related to President Trump’s visit, they may be related to the recent election victory by the LDP/Komeito coalition, they may be an act of a left or right wing activist group intent on sending a message to authorities, they may be the work of a disgruntled citizen or group of citizens who object to some development in their local community, or they might be a case of simple harassment. It is unlikely to be terrorism inspired by religious teachings, and certainly not extremist terrorism, although the targets do have common characteristics with incident sites in other states. The use of a bomb threat alone distinguishes these threats from those made by extremists in other countries, although we do not yet know the details of the threats. What we do know is that they were made in Japanese, directly to Japanese institutions, and so point towards the standard pattern for terrorist threats in Japan.

In an interview with Nikkei Shinbun last week following the LDP/Komeito electoral victory, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono raised the prospect of a four-way dialogue between Japan, the US, Australia, and India. This comment was in response to US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s advocacy of greater US involvement in the Asia-Pacific with its regional allies and in response to the growing reach of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Abe government has a long history of advocacy of dialogues with other regionally based democracies, with the initial proposal for a “quadrilateral security dialogue” being made early in April 2007 by none other than PM Abe himself. This proposal was met with a favourable response from each of the capitals of the invitees at the time, and so officials from each of the four countries (US, Japan, Australia, India) met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Meeting in May 2007 to thrash out some of the details of what a quadrilateral dialogue would look like and what it would hope to achieve.  However, Beijing caught wind of this discussion before it took place and sent urgent letters of protest to Washington, Canberra, Tokyo, and New Delhi, warning each of the potential participants that any moves to create a regional dialogue that excluded China would be interpreted as an attempt to contain Chinese ambitions and hostile to Chinese interests.

The warning had the desired effect. In July of 2007 then Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson, on a visit to New Delhi immediately following one to Beijing, said during a press conference that Australia had no wish to enter into a quadrilateral dialogue and was satisfied with the trilateral arrangement that already existed between Australia, Japan, and the US.  Following the removal of the Howard government and the accession of the Rudd government in November 2007, Australia became more reluctant to pursue any further discussion of a quadrilateral arrangement. In February 2008 this was spelled out in plain language by then Foreign Minister Stephen Smith during a visit to Australia by then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, thereby removing Australia from any further participation in the “quad”. 

Yet a lot has changed over the course of 10 years. Australia has witnessed the growing infiltration of Chinese state owned enterprise and private investment into its private sector, its educational sector, and its political class. It has seen China seek influence in the Pacific through loans, thus turning Pacific Islands away from their traditional relationship with Australia, while Australia’s security and sovereignty has been threatened by cyber-based espionage launched from China.  It has also seen China move to break up ASEAN by turning member states against one another,  militarize the South China Sea to turn it into a Chinese controlled enclave, threaten an open border war with India, openly collaborate with Russia to oppose US and EU interests, and ignore international opinion and law in pursuit of unilateral goals.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Australia has voiced far more support for the idea of a “quad” in the past two weeks than in the past 10 years. In the age of uncertainty, or more accurately the age of Trump, Australia needs to ensure that it has the support of fellow democratic governments in the region so that its security won’t be compromised by being left alone to deal with China’s encroaching power.    
Australia has always relied on having a major power to back up its security posture, and the combination of the US, Japan, and India as security partners would ensure that enough authority is there to cause China to pause before attempting to put pressure on Australia to adopt positions at odds with Australia’s interests (and/or its values). If a revived quadrilateral dialogue proves useful, this could then lead to other democracies, namely New Zealand and Singapore, wanting to join the framework, moves that Australia would definitely support and which would further strengthen the cause of democratic government in the region.

There will be those in the Australian community who will voice objections to any move to join the “quad”, but their views will not be those of the majority, particularly the majority in power. The real question though is whether the Australian Labor Party has moved on from its position in the late 2000s.  Recent commentary from Opposition defence spokesman Richard Marles indicates that Labor has begun to appreciate that regional relations will be crucial to handling overall relations with China and that being involved in a dialogue with partners is preferable to being left outside this grouping and attempting to deal with China on our own.  Opposition foreign affairs spokeswoman Penny Wong has also said words to this effect, although she has also said that China relations should not be seen through what she calls the “lens of risk management”.  With the Labor left faction in the ascendancy on policy formulation, it will be interesting to see whether Labor does indeed agree to follow on with any quadrilateral dialogue with other regional democracies (albeit conservative democratic governments), or, in the event it wins the next federal election, it once again sees fit to pull Australia out of any such arrangement and thus leave Australia in a vulnerable position during the “age of uncertainty”.