The US presidential election has been garnering a lot of attention over here in the Asia-Pacific, not least because of recent comments by Republican nominee Donald Trump concerning the state of US foreign policy and what he would do as president. While Australia itself has fared fairly well in comments attributed to `the Don` (apparently his camp is quite happy with the current state of the relationship $), the same cannot be said for either Japan or South Korea. In a New York Times article published over the weekend, Trump declared that he would withdraw US forces from Asia unless allies such as Japan and South Korea pay to have these forces remain in their countries.
 
In Trump`s view, both Japan and South Korea are `rich nations` that have been `free riding` on the US military presence in Asia while the US has fallen into poverty and cannot afford to maintain its forces in the region. Hence if such forces are to stay, then both countries will have to pay `100%` of the costs of maintaining them. These comments have, not surprisingly, caused a lot of consternation in both countries. In the case of Japan, Trump`s comments have been interpreted as a warning and an unwelcome one at that. According to this Yomiuri Shimbun article, government sources have been voicing their consternation about what a Trump presidency would mean for the US-Japan Security alliance, with the consensus view being that it would be plunged into dire straits.
 
One particular problem for Japan appears to be the fact that no one knows precisely who is giving foreign policy advice to Trump. Many foreign dignitaries have been attempting to meet with Trump`s campaign, but have either been ignored or stalled. It`s subsequently been impossible for Japan to be able to set the record straight on just how much Japan contributes to the defence burden sharing with the US (it`s around 946 billion yen, with a clear US advantage in terms of land acquisition, housing, transportation, and legal affairs).
 
This is just a personal opinion of mine, but I can`t help feeling that perhaps Trump is `winging it` in terms of accuracy to secure the primary nomination for the Republican Party, a party whose central political message has been driven so far to the right in recent decades that it no longer resembles its reasoned predecessor and has become a platform for polemicists and unashamed populists. Trump is one of the latter, saying whatever he likes in order to win a majority of support regardless of the damage that it will do to the Republican campaign and to the credibility of the party.
 
Trump has been reminded in interviews that having Japan pay `100%` of the costs of its defence would be tantamount to just removing US forces completely from Japan, an event which would precipitate a military build-up in Japan including the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. In Trump`s view, Japan is going to do that anyway, so why prolong the agony? Apart from the fact that the NPT in north Asia would become completely meaningless (for if Japan acquired nuclear weapons, then so would South Korea, and this could have a flow on effect on the rest of Asia, so that very soon the entire Indo-Pacific would be armed with nuclear devices with an absence of agreements to control their use), it would send a very discouraging message to every other US alliance in existence and negate the effectiveness of each and every one of them.
 
Still, it is the business of governments to prepare for contingencies, no matter how far fetched they might appear. If Trump emerges as president, then global stability will take a major hit, new alliances will have to be formed that exclude the US, and conflict will once again become a defining characteristic of international relations. No matter how one examines it, it will not be an era of optimism.  

During a week in Australian politics where the focus was predominantly on Senate voting reforms, an article came out late on Friday evening that caught my attention and caused a bit of a visceral reaction upon examining its content. According to David Wroe of the Age newspaper, DCNS has claimed that should Australia choose to adopt Japanese submarines for the Future Submarine Project, they run the risk of the submarines` lithium ion batteries exploding under use and that Australia would also risk being drawn into Japan`s strategic rivalry with China (a point that was also reiterated by the head of Germany`s TKMS in a Q&A session in Canberra on Thursday).
 
This particular statement by DCNS might be payback for an earlier statement from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, who in February stated that there would be risks in using an as yet untested submarine design for the Future Submarine Program. Nowhere in Japan`s statements, however, was the suggestion that either TKMS or DCNS` designs might result in a tragic accident or heighten security risks with China (because let`s face it, no matter what submarine Australia chooses China will voice its concerns about them), so DCNS has engaged in something approaching slander of MHI and the Japanese government in order to sow doubt about Japan`s bid.  
 
Now DCNS might claim that no lithium ion batteries could survive extended patrols of the area envisaged by the RAN, as they have said that such batteries cannot stand up to such constant usage. Yet what DCNS submarines use lithium ion batteries to the same extent as those of Japan? Could it be that DCNS designed lithium ion batteries are more prone to exploding that those of MHI? After all, Japan has been operating submarines with lithium ion batteries for some years yet there have never been any reports of incidents involving such batteries.  
 
The decision surrounding the submarines is ultimately one that Australia and Australia alone will decide, but DCNS, and by implication the French government, have attempted to circumvent Australia`s own sovereignty by suggesting that we risk strategic complications with China if we choose a Japanese submarine. If Washington doesn`t have a problem with French submarines, as DCNS claims, they will have a problem with such statements being made in public, especially as the US is engaged in strengthening alliances in the Indo-Pacific and doesn`t need DCNS to suddenly jump into the fray and cast dire warnings about strategic consequences left, right, and centre from closer defence relations between Australia and Japan.  
 
Ultimately MHI may not choose to get into a slagging match with DCNS about their technical capabilities, although they`ve been given a pretty good reason for doing so. It`s a tactic that DCNS might ultimately regret, as it smacks of desperation, and DCNS cannot point to any specific flaws in Mitsubishi`s lithium ion batteries (and there is a vast difference in how car and submarine batteries are manufactured, it must be said) which would heighten any risk of explosions. At any rate, the CEP in the public sphere just got a little bit uglier, and a few tit for tat articles can be expected in the weeks ahead.

On Friday last week, the ABC reported that Japan would be sending one of its Soryu class submarines to Australia, JS Hakuryu, together with two of its destroyers in order to participate in exercises with the RAN and RAAF in April.  This particular report followed earlier reports in Tokyo last week, which announced the same details and outlined the same objectives.  In the case of Australia, it was the astute eyes of Brendan Nicholson who actually first cottoned on to the fact that Japan was sending one of its submarines this far south, although that observation was buried in a longer article dealing with USAF General Lori Robinson’s comments about negotiations on the rotation of US aircraft through Australia’s northern regions.

For Australian observers, the fact that Japan is sending a Soryu immediately led to a conclusion that Japan had upped the ante on its rivals for the Future Submarine Program. By dispatching the Soryu,  Japan is not only demonstrating that: A) the Soryu has the range to reach Australia from the northern Pacific, but that B) through exercises with the RAN Japan wants to further promote its submarine relationship with Australia. Given the fact that neither France nor Germany have actually built their prototypes yet, for Japan to send a Soryu class submarine to Australia is a PR strategy par excellence to convince any doubters of Japan’s capabilities and to send a signal that Japan is going all-out to win the CEP.  What will be particularly interesting is whether Japan will allow any of the CEP committee to tour the submarine, because presumably that’s one particularly area that Australia would have a great deal of interest in.

This development has yet to fully grab the attention of Australians, but that will be a different story by the latter part of next month.  My expectations are that there will be a lot of media outlets competing not only for interviews with Hakuryu crew members, but also requests for tours of the submarine itself.  Given that the Soryu-class is rarely featured on television in Japan, it’s hard to imagine these requests being approved unless it is in a strictly controlled manner.  But the fact that a Soryu-class submarine will be in Australian waters, the first ever Japanese submarine to do so since WWII, will excite op-eds and commentary across the board.

Of course, there will be questions as to whether Australia is following the right path, and there will inevitably be comparisons to the Soryu and Imperial Japanese submarine operations in Australian waters during WWII (hell, it’s already happened. Just see the very first link above). If the Soryu visits Sydney, then those comparisons will resonate even louder. But such comparisons will be missing the larger picture.

The fact is that Japan is offering to share its most secret technology with Australia and is doing so because it knows Australia faces a burgeoning capability gap which needs to be addressed.   Japan is willing to forego any commercial profit from its engagement with Australia because it sees a long-term future in closer Australia-Japan security ties. Does Japan expect Australia to come to its aid if it becomes engaged in a conflict with China? That would surely depend on what Australia can offer, and I think the influence of ANZUS would weigh more heavily on Australian thinking than anything that Japan might demand. After all, if the US were to call for a coalition to resist China, and did so across its wide network of allies both in the Indo-Pacific and further afield, then the onus on Australia to join such a coalition would become very great indeed.  

Anybody paying attention to news in Australia for the past fortnight would know that last Thursday the Turnbull government released the very, very long awaited defence white paper. This indeed is one reason why I haven`t been able to do any updates to this particular blog since Julie Bishop`s visit to Tokyo last month, as every day has been occupied with going over that document and its implications. Overall, the document has been well received by the defence and security community, who say that with its co-released investment plan and costings for equipment, it provides both defence and the defence industries with a blueprint for Australia`s evolving defence position for the next 10 years.
 
The biggest part of the white paper is devoted to the issue of shipbuilding, namely the acquisition of 12 submarines, 9 frigates, and 12 offshore patrol vessels, to accompany the 2 landing helicopter dock ships recently completed at the Williamtown shipyard, and the 3 air warfare destroyers that are in the process of being built. Australia recognises that its maritime security environment has become more volatile in the wake of China`s activities in the South China Sea, and the fact that other militaries in the region are upgrading their naval capabilities means that Australia must keep up in order to maintain an edge. The white paper also outlined plans for the acquisition of 72 F-35 JSF aircraft, a grand total of 15 P-8 Poseidon aircraft by the late 2020s, 12 E/A 18G Growler aircraft, upgraded M1 Abrams tanks, 7 MQ-4 Triton UAVs, more C-17 Globemaster acquisitions, and upgrades to defence facilities across the country.
 
The paper also made special emphasis of Australia`s evolving security relationship with Japan.  There was clear recognition of the potential for further joint exercises with Japan, the paper very clearly stated that Australia welcomed Japan`s legislative changes that have brought about potential for Japan to play a more active role in regional security operations, and mention was also made of further regulations that need to be drawn up between both countries to facilitate further cooperation. While the much more traditional ties with the US were given the greatest emphasis, Japan, and India, were given more prominence in this white paper than those in the past, which itself is recognition by the Turnbull government that regional ties, and more importantly regional defence diplomacy, is going to play a much greater role in the future in helping to maintain stability in a changing security environment.
 
Speaking of Japan, last week former PM Tony Abbott went to Japan to speak at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, where he noted his concern about China`s activities in the South China Sea, and also took the opportunity to give the Japanese bid for the Future Submarine Project a boost by stating his preference for Japan`s submarine, and noting that for France and Germany the bid is commercial, whereas for Japan it is strategic. Euan Graham of the Lowy Interpreter picked up on this message, and wrote on the Interpreter blog that perhaps this wasn`t the wisest thing for Mr Abbott to have done, given that in February last year the Competitive Evaluation Process was implemented under his government on the basis that it would be impartial.
 
Mr Abbott then caused another ruckus during the week when in an interview given to the Australian newspaper`s Greg Sheridan, it was revealed that the draft defence white paper under his government had aimed to have the first of the new generation of Australia`s submarines in the water by the mid-2020s, whereas the Turnbull government whitepaper has planned for this event to occur in the early 2030s.  Abbott said that he was `flabbergasted` that such a delay had been approved, thereby putting him at odds with the Turnbull cabinet and giving the media a field day in speculation on what is currently going on inside the federal Liberal party.
 
Abbott`s comments, which have been regarded as a breach of national security laws and which have prompted an investigation by the Australian Federal Police into how such information came into the hands of Mr Sheridan, earned him a stern rebuke from PM Turnbull, who in Parliament said that the advice he had received from Defence Secretary Dennis Richardson was that since 2013 defence had been advocating the introduction of submarines in the early 2030s. This was backed up by CDF Mark Binskin, who said that the submarines timeframe had always envisioned their introduction in the early 2030s. 
 
Now while Greg Sheridan might claim that it is governments that implement policy and not public servants, it would be unwise to categorically reject the advice of the professionals who will ultimately be the ones operating such equipment. If Abbott had indeed wanted submarines introduced by the mid 2020s, that would imply that he was planning to buy material off the shelf (MOTS) from overseas and then have the remaining submarines built in Australia. It would have been expedient, but it would also have been politically damaging to Abbott`s colleagues from South Australia and other defence manufacturing states.

So the saga of submarines continued unabated in Australia. During the week Mitsubishi Heavy Industries made another pitch for support by declaring that they would set up an innovation centre in Adelaide for a large range of technologies with non-military commercial application should they win the bid. For their part, TKMS stated that they had no problems with a delayed introduction schedule ($), although they also said that they would also have the capacity to introduce subs earlier, a point also emphasised by DCNS (MHI did not make the same promise, but instead said that they would keep to any schedule outlined by the government).  
 
With a federal election looming in Australia this year, the question of submarine choices has taken on a character of its own, fired of course by the antics of politicians seeking to establish their own reputations on national security. It`s an avoidable situation, but one where the temptation to score political points is too great to resist. In my own belief, the sooner we go to a double dissolution election the better, if only to get this malarkey out of the road and begin the process of proper governing.