Ok, a word of warning from the outset; this is going to be a long post. A few months ago I managed to get hold of a book titled "戦国武将からの手紙" (or, Letters from Generals of the Sengoku Era) by Yoshimoto Kenji. The book itself reveals details about the private lives and thoughts of a number of historically significant figures who lived during the era of the warring states (roughly defined as between 1475 to around 1575, although that is subject to dispute among historians). As the book introduces a series of texts that are not usually available to native English speakers, I've taken it upon myself to translate the book, bit by bit, in order to give such speakers a glimpse into other aspects of the Sengoku period that they might not have heard of or read about. 

As each post will  contain a chapter from the book, this will make the posts fairly long, but if you can bear with that, you might find something of interest in the details.  The first chapter from the book deals with Takeda Shingen, the daimyo of Kai province (modern Yamanashi prefecture) who is regarded as one of the principal characters of the Sengoku period. So here it is, enjoy.

Takeda Shingen – 1st year of Taiei – 1st year of Tenshō (1511-1573)

Legitimate heir of the Shugo of Kai province, Takeda Nobutora. Infant name was Tarō. Thereafter changed name to Harunobu, and took the name Shingen after taking the tonsure and becoming a lay priest. After banishing his father from Kai and establishing himself in power, he led an invasion of Shinano province. Fought a series of engagements at Kawanakajima against the armies of the Uesugi family. Attacked and scattered a combined army made up of forces from the Oda and Tokugawa, and was renowned as the most capable military leader of his age. Before realising his ambition to secure the capital, he fell ill at Komaba in Shinano province and died. He was 53 years old at his time of death.  As a talent administrator he created a series of laws known as the Koshū Hattō no Shidai which oversaw the development of mines, control and distribution of water resources, and arrangement of infrastructure, all of which had a profound impact on system subsequently carried over into the Edo period.(12)

Takeda Shingen is renowned as the general who raised the banner of “Furin Kazan” (Wind, Forest, Fire, Mountain), and as the leader of the peerless Takeda army. He was also a first rate strategist, and launched a series of invasions of neighbouring provinces from his bases in Kai and Shinano. He built military roads, developed currency, and laid the foundations of a powerful fiefdom. Even Oda Nobunaga, the man who would eventually bring the nation under his rule, bowed his head in deference to Shingen, while Tokugawa Ieyasu’s experience of facing Shingen on the field of Mikatagahara led to a humiliating defeat for the Tokugawa. If his territory had of been closer to the capital, or more correctly, if he hadn’t had to worry about his territory being harassed by the Hōjō of Odawara or threatened by the “God of War” Uesugi Kenshin,  there is no doubt that Shingen would have seized power and united the nation.(12)

While I most certainly agree with these assessments of Shingen, an examination of both his military record and his achievements lead me to doubt his reputation as the “most capable general in the land.” The first thing that comes to mind when one thinks of Shingen is his war banner of “Furin Kazan”. The words inscribed on this banner were a symbol of the strategy adopted by the Takeda army. They were taken from Sun Zu’s treatise on military tactics – the Art of War – and explained how an army was to move in the field.  To begin with, we’ll quote a little from the sentence preceding the famous line from the Art of War;

兵は詐を以て立ち、利を以て動き、分合を以て変を為す者なり。故に其の疾きことは風の如く、其の徐なることは林の如く、侵掠することは火の如く、動かざることは山の如し

“War, at its essence, is a process of deceiving one’s opponent. An army moves in order to gain an advantage over an opponent, and it must divide, assemble and change its shape. Moreover, an army should advance as swiftly as the wind,   when it waits it should be as silent as a forest, when it attacks it should move as aggressively as burning fire, and when it is still it should be as rigidly calm as a mountain.” (13-14)

The words that followed “advance as swiftly as the wind” were those written on the banner of Furin Kazan, yet I would like to pay particular attention to the preceding sentences. The reason for this is because I believe these sentences best encapsulate Takeda Shingen’s strategic thinking.(14)

“War, at its essence, is a process of deceiving one’s opponent. An army moves in order to gain an advantage over an opponent, and it must divide and assembly and change its shape”.  In these sentences, the character for a soldier (or 兵) does not merely refer to an army, but also to “battle” and “war”. The character “詐” refers to the practice of deception, or deliberately acting in a manner that disguises one’s true intention.  In other words, the sentence preceding “Furin Kazan” refers to deceiving one’s opponent, of using strategy and tactics that disguise one’s true nature from an opponent.  Isn’t it entirely plausible that this sentence was in fact Shingen’s hidden motto? (14)

In the Kōyō Gunkan, the principal source for records of the Takeda army’s exploits and tactics,  Shingen’s famous quote is introduced, the content of which states…“The people are my armies, the people are my stone walls, the people are my moats, mercy is my ally, while evil is my enemy”. The problem with this quote, however, is that it contains language that does not really reflect the reality of Shingen’s strategies or tactics, which were characterised by their under-handed, deceitful nature.   To better understand Shingen, we need to cast off the image of the “Shingen of legend” that emerged during the Edo period and pay particular attention to his exploits. By doing so, we can see just how merciless Shingen’s tactics were and how he burned with ambition to expand his territory.(14-15)

Not all of the people whom Shingen deceived were his enemies. On the 14th day of the 6th month of Tenmon 10 (1541), Shingen received word that his father, Nobutora, had departed from Kai for Suruga province. After sending troops the border between Suruga and Kai provinces, Shingen ordered them to seal the border, thereby preventing Nobutora from returning to Kai. By sending his father into exile, Shingen was then able to assume the position of head of the Takeda household. This was, if anything, an appropriate tactical debut for the man who would eventually become known as the “Tiger of Kai”. (15)

Yet there are questions regarding Shingen’s conduct during this coup. At the time he was still a young man. Politically he did not have a great deal of support, and so it is difficult to believe that he could have executed the coup by himself. Hence a question remains as to who actually created the plan behind the coup. In truth, Shingen later received a letter addressed to him from the Shugo of Suruga province, the Imagawa family, the same family to whom his father Nobutora was travelling to visit when Shingen launched his coup.(15)

Letter Sender: Imagawa Yoshimoto

Receiver: Takeda Shingen

Date: 23rd day of the 9th month of Tenmon 10 (1541)

“Recently I planned to send a messenger to you to convey the following information, however considering that Sōinken will make a journey to Kōfu (seat of the Takeda family), I have asked him to relay the content of this letter to you.

It pleases me to know that a number of good days have been forecast for the 10th month, and that the women of Nobutora’s retinue will be able to journey here during that time. Let it be known that I wish to  accommodate these women.  It is my fervent wish to act in accordance with the Way of Heaven, if that is indeed possible. 

In relation to the cost of Nobutora’ s upkeep, in the 6th month both Taigen Sessai Sūfu and Okabe Mino no Kami Sadatsuna visited Kōfu and I believe gained your understanding on this matter.  It is gradually growing colder, and it pains me to think that Nobutora might be suffering from want. It is for this reason that I ask you to waste no time in informing me in detail the number of women I shall need to accommodate. Once I have this information, I shall explain its details to Nobutora in a manner that he will understand.

Further details will be provided by Sōinken. 

Respectfully,

Yoshimoto (signature)” (16-17)

“Sōinken” refers to the priest Yui Ansei, who was an acolyte of the aristocratic scholar Reizei Tamekazu. To explain a little in relation to Sōinken, two years before this letter was sent (i.e., Tenmon 8), Sōinken had been invited by Shingen (then known as Harunobu) to visit Kōfu and participate in a poetry recital. In the 16th year of Tenmon Sōinken had travelled down to Suruga, and thereafter took the tonsure. While serving as both a teacher and acolyte, Sōinken acted as a go-between for the Takeda and Imagawa families. It was this “Sōinken” who arrived in Kōfu late in the 9th month carrying a letter from Imagawa Yoshimoto.  The content of the letter was simply that Yoshimoto wished to know how many of Nobutora’s female companions he would have to play host to in Suruga.(17)

One particular interesting thing about this letter is its referral to the visit by Taigen Sessai, an important councillor of the Imagawa family. Sessai visited Kōfu during the 6th month, the same month in which Nobutora was concurrently on his way to Suruga. While in Kōfu, Sessai had gained Shingen’s approval for payments aimed at keeping Nobutora in comfort during his retirement. What this means is that the Imagawa already knew (from the 6th month onwards) that the then head of the Takeda household would not be returning to Kai. Hence it is plainly obvious that the plot to expel Nobutora from Kai was one hatched between Shingen and Imagawa Yoshimoto. (18)

When one examines the power relationships in place at the time, clearly it was Yoshimoto, together with Taigen Sessai, who raised the possibility of Shingen assuming the role of ruler over Kai.  Yoshimoto had been instrumental in arranging Shingen’s marriage to a daughter of the Sanjō aristocratic family, while Shingen’s elder sister had been married off to Yoshimoto. It was Yoshimoto’s scheming that had allowed Shingen to assume the mantle of leader. In reality, Shingen got his start along the road to national unification under the auspices of the Imagawa family. The scenario often depicted in historical novels, in which “Nobutora, in deference to Shingen’s will, arrived in the territory of the Imagawa” is simply implausible and does not reflect the historical truth.(18)

Shingen was, in a sense, tied via an alliance to the Imagawa. In Tenmon 14 (1545), Shingen dispatched troops to assist Imagawa Yoshimoto, and in Tenmon 21 had his eldest son, Yoshinobu, married off to the daughter of Yoshimoto. At the very least, Shingen was in no position to betray Yoshimoto. If Yoshimoto hadn’t been killed at the hands of the Oda army during the Battle of Okehazama, the territorial map of the Kantō region would have looked very different to what it eventually became.(18)

If the situation had remained as it was, the Takeda would eventually have been swallowed up by the Imagawa. Shingen, well aware of this possibility, harboured very strong ambitions to increase the Takeda’s land holdings by whatever means he could. As such, Shingen’s first act upon becoming head of the household was to arrange an invasion of nearby Shinano province. The reason for doing so was simple – there were no powerful daimyo present in Shinano.(18)

At the time, the Suwa region of Shinano province was controlled by Suwa Yorishige, who was also the guardian of Suwa shrine. Shingen’s younger sister had been sent to Yorishige as a bride during the rule of Nobutora, who maintained an alliance with the Suwa. This had allowed the Suwa to become complacent. After declaring Yorishige to be an enemy of the Takeda, Shingen launched an attack on the Suwa territory, forced Yorishige to surrender, and then sent him under guard to Kōfu where he eventually committed suicide. Shingen then invaded the territory of Saku and attacked Shiga castle. After wiping out reinforcements sent to aid the castle, Shingen used some psychological warfare on the defenders, lining up some 3,000 heads of slain enemies around the perimeter of the castle to place pressure on those inside. Any defenders who tried to escape during this time were caught and killed, which eventually led to the castle’s surrender.(19)

Any men and women still left alive inside the castle were transported to Kōfu where they were sold off as slaves . A record of this time, the “Diary of Katsuyama (Katsuyama Ki)” describes the scene as thus;

去程二男女イケトリ被成候而、悉甲府へ引越申候、去程二、二貫・三貫・五貫・一貫ニテモ身類アル人ハ承ケ申候

“And so, both men and women were taken prisoner, whereupon they were hauled back to Kai province. Once there, relatives were sold off for two, three, five, nay sometimes not even for one kan in money.” (19)

 One can imagine the situation at the time, with money being exchanged time and again for the merchandise on display. This was not an unusual scene, but was part of Shingen’s basic strategy. It was the end result of a world ruled by real politik and war. (20)

When one examines the “Kōshū Hattō no Shidai”, Shingen appears to be very much a realist when it came to financial matters. For example, the Hattō itself originally consisted of 26 laws, which were then expanded to 55, and then expanded again to 57. At first, priests were forbidden from having wives, yet this law was erased from later versions, and any priests who possessed wives had merely to pay a “wives’ tax” whereupon they would be permitted to continue their secular living arrangements. (20)

It was this realism combined with a desire for profit that led Shingen to wage war against neighbouring territories. Shingen was one of the first daimyō to introduce firearms into his armies. At the 2nd Battle of Kawanakajima (held in the 1st year of Kōji, or 1555), Shingen made use of a musket troop consisting of 300 soldiers. In strategy, as in many things, Shingen was at the forefront of his peers, and was no imitator of Oda Nobunaga.(20)

However, there was one major obstacle to his plan for territorial expansion. As you will have no doubt guessed, this was the arrival on the scene of Uesugi Kenshin. While Shingen was engaged in contests against Kenshin over the narrow plain of Kawanakajima, to the west Oda Nobunaga of Owari province made his presence known.(20) In the midst of this maelstrom, the Takeda household itself was shaken by a major incident. Shingen’s eldest son, Yoshinobu (who at the time was 28 years old), together with some of his close retainers Obu Toramasa, Sone Suō, and Nagasaka Gengorō, became involved in a conspiracy to assassinate Shingen (who was 45 at the time). (20)

Why had they chosen to do this? It appears that the Imagawa were once again involved. Ever since Tenbun 5 (1536), the Takeda had kept their pledge to the Imagawa not to invade the other’s lands. However Yoshimoto was dead, and his successor Ujizane appeared to be a plain, boring individual with few interests other than the game of Kemari (or kick ball).   Given this state of affairs, Shingen planned to break his pledge to the Imagawa and invade their lands. However Shingen’s son, Yoshinobu, was married to the daughter of Imagawa Yoshimoto and was opposed to his father’s scheme.  Yoshinobu then began to approach other like-minded retainers.(21)

In the background to Yoshinobu’s plan may have been an awareness of the fact that “Shingen himself only succeeded (in becoming head of the household) through the assistance of the Imagawa “. At any rate, the conspiracy was uncovered before it could be hatched. Toramasa was executed, while Yoshinobu was made to take the tonsure and enter the temple of Tōkōji in Kōfu. On the 19th day of the 10th month of Eiroku 10 (1567), he committed suicide at the temple.(21)

 The death of Shingen’s eldest son allowed him to overcome the most serious threat to his position since coming to power. While he himself had conspired to exile his father, his son had conspired against him and lost. Shingen was nothing if not looking after number one – himself. As Shingen had come to power through a conspiracy launched with his retainers, it was inevitable that he would be concerned about the degree of loyalty his retainers had towards him. (21)       

Just before Yoshinobu committed suicide, each retainer of the Takeda household submitted a “blood pledge” (or Keppan Tsuki Kishōmon) to the executive of the household. These were then gathered together and lodged at Ikushimataru Shrine in Chisagata gun, Kai province. The content of those blood pledges were as follows;

Shingen’s paranoia writ large

Letter Sender: Takeda Nobutoyo (retainer of the Takeda household)

Receiver: Yoshida Nobunari – Asari Nobutada (executive members of the Takeda household)

Date: 7th day of the 8th month of Eiroku 10 (1567)

“To all I respectfully wish to announce the following

Pledge

Item, I hereby submit that the oaths I am to take do not in any way differ to those I have made previously.

Item, I hereby pledge that I will harbour no plans of betrayal, conspiracy, nor revolt against Lord Shingen.

Item, I hereby pledge that even if I am tempted by enemy forces led by Nagao Kagetora (Uesugi Kenshin) or others, I shall not give in to such temptation.

Item, I hereby pledge that even if generals of the three provinces of Kai, Shinano, and western Kōzuke plan to betray their lord, I myself shall not waver in my loyalty to Lord Shingen, and will remain devoted in my duty to him.

Item, I hereby pledge that on the occasion of the invasion of Suruga and the mobilisation of forces to that end, I shall not harbour any doubts about our purpose, and am resolved to fulfil my military duties.

Item, even if other members of the household speak ill of the Lord of Kai and reveal themselves to be cowards, I hereby pledge that I shall never agree with them. 

As above.

If I violate those pledges on the right, may I be subject to the divine punishment of the Brahman, of Sakra-Devanam-Indra, of the Four Protective Deities, of Enma the Lord of Hell, of the Demons of the Five Paths, together with the 132 gods of Kai Province, the gods of the land and bridges, the various manifestations of the Bodhisattva of the Mountains, of the Bodhisattva of Fuji Asama, of the gods of Upper and Lower Suwa, of Iizuna and Togakushi, of the Bodhisattva of the Three Temples of Kumano, Izu, and Hakone, of the gods of Mishima, the Bodhisattva of Hachiman, and the Great Deity of Tenman.

While I live may I contract leprosy, and in the next life may I be plunged into the bottomless pits of hell.

This, I hereby pledge.

7th day of the 8th month of Eiroku 10

                                       Rokurō Jirō (Nobutoyo) (signature & blood thumbprint)

To Lord (Yoshida) Sakon no Suke

      Lord Asari Uma no Suke” (22-23)

According to the “History of Kōfu City”, there are currently 83 such pledges in existence, which gives us some idea as to the substantial number of vows that Shingen collected from his retainers. It also reveals just how serious the “Heir’s revolt” was treated and how it shook the foundations of the household.  In the aftermath of the attempted coup, it appears that the pledges were written in haste, as much to dispel any lingering doubt about the loyalties of retainers as it was to expedite the dispatch of troops for the invasion of Suruga.  However it is difficult to conceive of these blood pledges having any effect on events that occurred during the reign of Shingen’s successor, Katsuyori.(24)

The final item of the pledge, which states that… “even if other members of the household speak ill of the Lord of Kai and reveal themselves to be cowards, I hereby pledge that I shall never agree with them” refers to the fact that when the lord of the household had decided upon war, there was nothing that the retainers could do to prevent this from occurring. It is also possible that any who insisted on a protracted struggle would be accused of cowardice. This may be one reason why the retainers of the Takeda at the Battle of Nagashino were unable to persuade Katsuyori to refrain from brazenly attacking the Oda-Tokugawa lines (which resulted in the total defeat of the Takeda army).(24)

After Yoshinobu’s death, Shingen quickly moved to break his alliances with both the Hōjō and the Imagawa, and in the 12th month of Eiroku 11 (1568) launched his invasion of Suruga.(25)

There have been a number of theories put forward as to why Shingen suddenly decided to invade Suruga. One is that he wanted access to the sea. Another states that he wanted to acquire Suruga’s supplies of salt. Yet another claims that Shingen sought control over the gold mines at Fuji Kaneyama and Umegashima. He may also have wanted to pacify the Tokaidō region in preparation for his march on the capital. Yet the main reason for the invasion was, in my opinion, the involvement of Oda Nobunaga.  The evidence for this lies within the “Record of Time Spent At Hamamatsu Castle” (Hamamatsu Gozaijō Ki), which is as follows (25);

一、                    同年、信玄ト大井川ヲ爲境、駿州ハ武田、遠州ハ權現様御切取被成候様ニト、國キリノ御約信御座候。

此取持ハ、信長公、甲州ヨリ、此使ニ山縣三郎兵衛賴實來ト申説御座候。

“In the same year (Eiroku 11), Takeda Shingen, placing the border at the river Ōi, made a pledge to divide up the (former Imagawa) territories with Tokugawa Ieyasu, with Suruga going to the Takeda, while Tōtōmi would go to the Tokugawa.

The intermediary in these negotiations was Oda Nobunaga, and I have heard that Yamagata Saburō Hyōe Yorizane was sent from Kai to Hamamatsu carrying the message of the pledge.”  (25)

If one takes this diary entry at face value, it appears that Shingen expedited his invasion of Suruga on the advice of Nobunaga. Of course, Shingen was no fool, and he would have known that Nobunaga was planning to increase his own authority. By this time Nobunaga had finally succeeded in overthrowing Saitō Tatsuoki of Inabayama and gained control of Mino province. He had also given his support to the shōgun Ashikaga Yoshiaki and was in the process of planning to take the capital. In the meantime, having Shingen invade Suruga would ensure that he would not attack Oda’s territories while he concentrated on the capital.(26)

Eventually Shingen found himself in conflict against the Odawara Hōjō (who were allied to the Imagawa) and fought a series of small engagements against them. (26)

In the meantime there are some who believe that “Yoshinobu’s revolt” was a deliberate plot launched by Oda Nobunaga.  Nobunaga, via Ieyasu, offered up the Imagawa lands of Suruga as an enticement to Shingen. Once Shingen had taken the bait, Nobunaga planned to provoke those retainers in the Takeda household who were friendly towards the Imagawa and thereby bring about discord within the Takeda.  In the meantime Nobunaga himself would support the shōgun and acquire the authority of the highest offices in the land.(26)

As far as Shingen was concerned, it was very difficult for him to accept the successes of a rival that he considered to be his social inferior. Thereafter Shingen would find himself pressured by the combined forces of the Oda and Tokugawa, and so began searching around for possible alliances with the court, the religious complex of Ishiyama Honganji, Asakura Yoshikage, and the shōgun Ashikaga Yoshiaki in order to create an audacious strategy to contain Nobunaga. It certainly appears that an already aging Shingen and his strategy to expand his land holdings collided with those of Nobunaga, thus ending in a competition between the two for overall control. (27)

Yet by this time Shingen was already too late.

While possessing the will to destroy his eldest son and quash any internal dissent, inflict a devastating defeat on Tokugawa Ieyasu at the Battle of Mikatagahara, and finally face off against Oda Nobunaga, other daimyō began to act in ways that Shingen could not predict. The decision by Asakura Yoshikage to withdraw his forces from Ōmi province broke the ring of encirclement that Shingen had been building around Nobunaga’s territories. The day after Shingen forced Noda castle to capitulate (the 16th day of the 2nd month of Ganki 4, or 1573), he wrote a letter addressed to a retainer of the shōgun Ashikaga Yoshiaki.  In the letter, Shingen’s annoyance at the Asakura’s behaviour is palpable.(27)

Shingen’s fury at the Asakura’s retreat

Letter Sender: Takeda Shingen

Letter Receiver: Tōkōken (a retainer of shōgun Ashikaga Yoshiaki)

Date: 16th day of the 2nd month of Ganki 4 (1573)

“I have received the letter that you sent to me, and fully comprehend its content.

However, I embarked on my journey from Tōtōmi after receiving encouragement from both Honganji and Asakura Yoshikage to do so. The fact that Honganji has been attacked by the forces of Nobunaga cannot, it seems, be helped. In spite of entering into an alliance with Yoshikage in order to attack Nobunaga, once Yoshikage withdrew from Ōmi and returned to his lands we lost any chance of victory.

Nevertheless, we still had some successes in the field, particularly the fall of Noda castle in Mikawa province. Thereafter we took the lord of the castle (Suganuma Sadamitsu) hostage, and sent him to Shinano. As for what happened thereafter I have heard a number of things from messengers, and do not have enough space on this paper to detail them all.

Do you think that fool Yoshikage should take to the field again? If anything, now is the time for him to accompany our armies.

Further details will be provided by Itasaka Kō Sessai (Shingen’s messenger).

Respectfully,

2nd month, 16th day                                                                                                               
Shingen

To Tōkōken (28)

In the end, Yoshikage did not meet up with Shingen again.  Shingen thereafter set off once again for the west.  It was while he was on his way to the capital that he died at Komaba in Shinano province in the 4th month of the same year. Without a doubt, Shingen would have regretted not living longer.

Nonetheless, Shingen was an audacious leader and parent. The fact that he had his eldest son and those retainers close to him die, that he provoked the Hōjō, who were allied to the Imagawa, and that he made a temporary alliance with Oda Nobunaga only to turn around and declare Nobunaga to be his enemy after the destruction of the Imagawa, shows that he was nothing if not capable of adapting to circumstance.(29)

In order to seize the advantage, Shingen was prepared to sacrifice both his eldest son and future retainers (of course, the Kōyō Gunkan and other historical records portray this as occurring…“with tears in his eyes”).  Incidentally, Shingen’s eldest daughter was married to Hōjō Ujimasa, however the breaking of the alliance between both families and the invasion of Suruga (since the Hōjō and Imagawa were also allies) meant that she was returned to Kōfu in Eiroku 11 (1568). In the following year, Shingen’s daughter, having lost consciousness, died at the relatively early age of 27. As a consequence of invading Suruga, Shingen lost both his eldest son and daughter.(29)

It is plainly evident that Shingen loved his children, particularly his eldest daughter, and wrote a prayer dedicated to her asking for the safe delivery of the child. The fact that Shingen could cause his daughter so much distress and harry his eldest son to kill himself for the sake of Shingen’s own territorial ambitions reveals just how typical his behaviour was as a general during the Sengoku era.(30)  

However Shingen’s ambitions caused his successor, Katsuyori, an enormous amount of difficulties. Shingen, possible aware that life itself was short, began to become more desperate as time passed, and it does seem that this led in turn to the downfall of the Takeda household. It is for this reason that I think it is important to regard Shingen’s reputation as a “brilliant general” with a degree of scepticism.(30)

As is obvious by now, the LDP, together with their compatriots the New Komeito have been swept back into government under Abe Shinzo, ending a three year experiment by Japan with alternative rule and heralding the return of bureaucratic, faction driven politics. As Rikki Kersten mentioned on ABC Radio on Monday morning, the voters of Japan let the DPJ know in no uncertain terms how dissatisfied they were with the government of Noda Yoshihiko and the legacy that he had inherited from Kan Naoto and the perennial whipping boy of Japanese politics, Hatoyama Yukio. It was, as Professor Kersten noted, an act of revenge by the Japanese populace against a party that had promised much and then delivered very little, backing down from base relocation, leaving the bureaucracy intact, acting indecisively following the Great East Japan Earthquake, and then finally agreeing with the LDP and New Komeito to increase the consumption tax rate despite an election pledge not to do so. Given the fact that the DPJ have been left with 57 seats in the Lower House, they are unlikely to exert much influence on the policy direction of the new Abe Cabinet, which, as has been reported widely this morning, is bent on constitutional reform, economic stimulus measures (by encroaching on the independence of the BOJ),   and which seems prepared to ignore popular discontent over nuclear energy in order to reinvigorate Japan’s manufacturing sector.

The Abe government is wasting no time, with expectations that it will formally be sworn in on Wednesday of next week. As to the speed at which Abe embarks on his pattern of reforms, that is more difficult to predict at this stage, although given the size of the LDP and New Komeito’s victory (325 seats in total) (J) he should have no problem having bills passed through the Lower House. The problem, as far as the LDP are concerned, is the Upper House, in which the DPJ and minority parties still wield considerable influence and which could delay the passage of bills until they return to the Lower House (in which case they will be ratified, as no bill can be rejected by the Upper House twice when the Lower House is dominated by a party or coalition with a 2/3rds majority).  Another question having over the result of this election is how is will be perceived internationally, particularly by Japan’s neighbours. Abe has made no secret of his desire for a more forceful, more activist foreign policy founded on a new title for the SDF and the implementation of the right to collective self-defence. He may still exercise discretion on sensitive matters (i.e., Yasukuni Shrine, which he did not formally visit during his previous term as PM, instead reverting to the status of an individual citizen in a nicety which did not placate Chinese concern but which at least did not overtly provoke either China or South Korea), although since Ishihara Shintaro will also be a figure on the floor of the Lower House he may find it difficult to negotiate on territorial issues without being branded weak by his more rightist counterparts.

What will be interesting to see is how Abe of 2013 differs from that of 2007. Abe Shinzo is no intellectual, preferring instead to choose colleagues that will operate in accordance with his wishes but over which he will not exercise tight control. His pedigree and the size of his election victory will be the keys to overcoming any factional opposition to LDP policies, however the LDP’s inability to function in a coherent manner under anything other than a dynamic personality (re: Koizumi Junichiro) should give pause to any expectations of a suddenly revamped, energised LDP. Abe does not have the same charisma as Koizumi, neither does he have the work ethic of either the Reform Party members or other minor party members (being born into a political family tends to do that to a candidate, especially under the old LDP. This is not necessarily true of current generational politicians, re: Koizumi Shinjiro (J).

If, during his time away from the limelight, Abe re-invented his persona and came across as much more “sincere” in his beliefs, then he might exercise greater influence over Japan’s political scene (Abe was virtually MIA for the entire DPJ period in office). But Abe’s press performances, along with his open-air spruiking did nothing to dispel his image as staid and devoid of passion (apart from constitutional revision, the pillar upon which Abe intends to build his political legacy).  In electing Abe as PM, the Japanese populace have chosen to revert to a tried-and-tried method, the efficacy of which died in 2007 with the retirement of Koizumi Junichiro.

There are no certainties in democratic politics, and Abe might still emerge as a leader ready to take risks where necessary (de-regulation of domestic markets and removal of tariffs would be a good start), but as the head of a party of conservatives tied to past glories, Abe is indeed "Lazarus with a triple bypass" most likely to pursue retrogressive economic and social policies for want of the courage to battle entrenched interests. For that reason, the manner in which the Reform Party behaves in the Lower House will be interesting to watch, for the future belongs to the minority parties and their ability to influence public opinion over the next few years. That is where the real change from this election lies.

*This post was modified to more accurately reflect parliamentary practices.

This particular post will address some of the points recently brought up by ANU Professor Hugh White in his Centre of Gravity essay on whether it truly is in Australia’s interests to form a strategic defence alliance with Japan. This may be no more than my own somewhat myopic observation, yet for some particular reason defence analysts in Canberra become quite fascinated with Japan as the year draws to an end and so start to address issues that were not raised during the year as a whole – namely, what role will Japan play in the future regional security apparatus of the Asia-Pacific/Indian Ocean region, will Japan adopt collective self-defence, and what does this mean for Australia (I am, of course, merely thinking back to the release in December last year of Rod Lyon’s ASPI strategy paper on Japan in the Asia Pacific, so this is by no means a scientific observation, but one perhaps worth pursuing in a future post).

To summarise Professor White’s thesis in a few sentences; Japan fears a resurgent China and a weakened US presence in Asia, and is casting around for other allies to counteract this strategic shift. Australia, as it has similarities in values to Japan, seems a natural partner, and has been willing to explore closer defence ties with Japan. Yet this is not really in Australia’s interests, as Australia would gain nothing by being dragged into a conflict with China to protect Japan’s sovereignty. Japan’s interests and Australia’s are not close enough to justify a defensive alliance.

On this particular issue I must say that I don’t really agree with Professor White, and I would be interested to know whether any of Japan’s own strategic analysts see things in quite the same way (more research necessary on my part).  While there may be no need for an alliance, that does not rule out the possibility for more agreements for greater levels of intelligence sharing, or joint exercises, or weapons development, or a whole range of co-ordinated initiatives for improving defence ties between both nations. One might call this providing the foundations for any future defence alliance (which White himself acknowledges might become necessary should the US withdraw from Asia and China become more belligerent) while keeping things on a more benign footing vis-à-vis China.

The US would certainly welcome such a development, and may in fact encourage both sides to explore their strategic options with a mind to boosting their bilateral capabilities (technologically from the Australian standpoint, operationally from that of Japan).  While not an alliance, the fact that both sides would be co-ordinating their military responses to regional crises (be they humanitarian or strategic) would ultimately prove beneficial to the region as a whole.

If Australia did not see any benefit from having ties with Japan, then the approaches made by the Howard government would never have occurred, no agreements or memorandums would have been signed by both Coalition and Labor governments, indeed we would not now be discussing the potential for Australia to benefit from Japanese submarine technology. To their credit, Australian governments have recognised that Japan represents a stable partner in a region fraught with uncertainties. While its political classes are not exactly progressive, politically it is stable, with a modern, highly capable military force, considerable economic power, and a willingness to embrace international laws and regulations in pursuit of its interests.  

Ultimately both Australia and Japan have an interest in preserving regional stability. China is threatening to destabilise that stability through its refusal to participate in multilateral discussions with its neighbours on security issues.  We are already aligned with Japan in our realisation that to ignore or placate China’s position will ultimately invite further provocation from China. Furthermore, given the opaque nature of Chinese politics and the possibility for instability within China, trying to create a consensus on regional security with such a nation may ultimately prove futile.  As such, Australia needs the assurances of its neighbours in order to guarantee its security, neighbours that share Australia’s own ambitions for the region and is stable and capable enough of achieving them. Japan is such a nation, and so the more we cooperate with them the more we will benefit from them as partners, if not as allies.   

The candidate rolls are in for the Japanese House of Reps election on December 16, and what a motley bunch they do make. This particular election is marked by the appearance of 12, count ‘em 12, parties all vying for seats in the Lower House. Originally it was supposed to be 15, however either because of a meeting of minds or the realisation that there is safety in numbers (or the prospect of holding the balance of power), the People’s Lives Come First Party (the party of Ozawa Ichiro) amalgamated with the Party for the Realisation of Lower Taxes, Anti-TPP and Anti-Nuclear Party on the 28th of November, only to be joined shortly afterwards by members of the “Green Wind” Party and the latent appeal of Shiga Prefecture Governor Kada Yukiko to form the “Party of the Future”.  Needless to say, all agreed on three core principles – no tax increases, keep Japan out of TPP negotiations, and dismantle all nuclear reactors (thus putting them in the same camp as the Socialists and Communist Party, although no word yet on whether the Party of the Future will want to associate with the “ideology of the past”).

Speaking of the past, Abe Shinzo and the LDP have been talking up their security credentials yet again, vowing to place public servants (i.e, SDF personnel) on the Senkaku Islands to reinforce Japan’s territorial integrity, put even greater pressure on North Korea (with what is unclear, but one assumes that more sanctions are in mind), revamp the alliance with the US (no-one else? Have you forgotten your neighbours already?),   have the BoJ pay for stimulus measures (and thereby increase the national debt), continue to use nuclear power (after all, those power plants were built under LDP rule, so why break with tradition now?) - in sum, try to keep everything as similar to what it was in 2009 before the LDP lost power (bar constitutional revision and renaming the SDF the “National Defence Army” despite public opposition to any such change).  

The large number of candidates standing for this election has also surprised some (mainly the media) – 1,504 according to the Yomiuri Shimbun, the most there has ever been since the single-seat and proportional representation system was introduced in 1996 (J). Of those candidates, the Communist Party fields the largest number in the single seat electoral districts – 299, compared to 288 for the LDP and 264 for the DPJ. These numbers may indicate two things; either public sentiment with the current state of Japanese politics is so poor that it’s spurred greater levels of political participation in the hope of gaining a seat from that discontent, or the major parties are terrified that their support base is about to be eroded by “third party” candidates and so are trying to plug the gaps by swamping districts with their own candidates. Expectations are that the LDP will emerge the victors, but they may not hold a majority in either the Upper or Lower House and will have to make deals to function as a government (that is, bar the Supreme Court ruling the election result unconstitutional – not likely, but always a possibility - J). If the LDP do decide to join up with another party (outside of New Komeito), that will probably be the Reformist Party of Ishihara Shintaro and Hashimoto Toru.  Yet here lies another dilemma – three political personalities; one, a former governor and novelist, and a bona-fide rightist; two, former TV personality and lawyer, good with slogans, rightist but also liberal in regard to economics; three, former PM, a political “blue-blood”, determined to create a legacy of constitutional reform, not a dynamic speaker and liable to be overshadowed by his more gregarious “partners”.

Even if the LDP do form government, with a triumvirate of the above characters there’s no telling how long it would last before disagreements begin to emerge. Given the force of personalities at work, one thinks that compromise will be the last thing on their minds (although Ishihara has given ground to Hashimoto on economic issues and nuclear energy). Whatever alliances do emerge out of the election, given the nature of Japanese politics and the tendency for “zero-sum” arguments, there will be a considerable amount of discord between and within the major parties on complex issues such as economic stimulus packages, taxation, energy and national security. If they actually do resolve their issues, there is still the matter of the Upper House to contend with. In other words, if political reform and social progress was obstructed before, it’s about to get a whole lot worse. And without a leader with either charisma or leadership ability, no party is likely to transcend this situation.  Oh happy days....