Yoshida Yutaka, “Nippon Gunpeishi – Ajia Taiheiyõ Sensõ no Genjitsu” (Soldiers of Japan – the Reality of the Asia – Pacific War), Chuõkõron, 2018 (page numbers are in parenthesis)
 
The deaths of Kamikaze pilots – Excessive expectations versus reality
 
One of the more unique forms of death in battle that occurred during the desperate final stages of the Pacific War was, of course, those of the well-known Tokkõtai (‘special attack squad or group’).  The Tokkõtai (the abbreviated version of Tokubetsu Kõgeki Tai) were primarily involved in attacks (‘special air attacks’) against ships, whereby aircraft loaded with explosives would crash into the said ships.  There were other forms of such attacks, such as the so-called ‘Unyõ’, which involved crashing a motor boat known as a ‘Marule’ into the side of ships (‘special above-water attacks’), and attacks by single-seat, modified torpedos known as ‘Kaiten’ (‘special under-water attacks’).  However it was the attacks carried out by aircraft that led to the greatest number of casualties for Japan, and so it is upon these that I will focus my attention. (52)
 
The Tokkõtai made its first appearance in October 1944 as part of the defence plan for The Philippines. Its formal name was the Shinpû Tokubetsu Kõgeki Tai (although the reading of the characters for Shinpû was later modified to the more common Kamikaze). The original purpose of the Tokkõtai was to provide support to the fleet of Admiral Kurita in its attempt to break through to Leyte Gulf. Pilots would crash their aircraft into the flight decks of the US Navy’s main aircraft carriers, thereby rendering the carriers temporarily inoperable. They were not attempting to actually sink the carriers, and so their initial mission was limited in its scope.  However as the war progressed, the role of the Tokkõtai escalated. By the start of the Okinawan campaign towards the end of March 1945, the Tokkõtai had become both the army and navy’s principle strategy for resisting the US. Yet this meant that the expectations placed upon the Tokkõtai began to grow ever more excessive. (52)
 
For example, on the 26th of January 1945, Admiral Oikawa Koshirõ, Chief of the Naval Staff, wrote in relation to the distribution of 250 ‘Õka’ (‘cherry blossom’) flying bombs:
 
“At present, there are a variety of opinions regarding the state of the war, and while I recognize that the situation is grave, I do not regard it as critical.  A large number (250) of special weapons (human piloted Õka bombs) have been gathered together, and right now we have large numbers of recruits undergoing training at Kanoya (base). (Abridged) We had planned to deploy these pilots to Hitõjima (The Philippines’ front) by November of last year, but were not able to make it in time. However if these pilots can be used in the next (engagement), our military will reverse the situation, and we will be able to recapture territory extending as far as the Marianas”. (source: Takagi Sõkichi, Diary and Papers, Vol.2). (52, 53)
 
One of the former colleagues of Chief of Navy Admiral Oikawa, Admiral Okada Keisuke, had plenty of experience listening to Admiral Oikawa’s conversations, and had the following blunt remarks to say about Admiral Oikawa’s plan:
 
“I have to say, the idea of manufacturing 200 odd such weapons a month and then using them to retake territory from Hitõjima to Saipan was something a little akin to a dream.” (source: cited above). 
 
In truth, the expectations placed on the ‘Õka’ were no more than a dream.  The ‘Õka’ was a small, glider type aircraft packed with advanced rocketry and explosives and steered by a single human pilot.  Although many resources refer to it as a ‘rocket’, it was not officially regarded as one.  It would be suspended underneath a conventional ‘mother’ Mitsubishi G4M (‘Betty’) bomber aircraft and taken up into the air.  Upon approaching an enemy ship, it would be released from the mother aircraft.  The Õka pilot, locked into his cockpit, would then steer the aircraft using the air current.  Just before making contact with the enemy ship, the pilot would ignite the rocket, boosting the speed of the aircraft which then slam into the ship.  However because the over 2-ton ‘Õka’ had to be suspended beneath the 'mother' bomber aircraft, that significantly slowed the bomber down and impeded its manoeuvrability. Many bombers were attacked by enemy aircraft before they could launch their Õka, and thereby failed to contribute in any way to boosting Japan’s wartime successes. 
 
Furthermore, the maximum weight load that Japan’s Mitsubishi G4M bombers could carry in relation to torpedos or bombs and still be manoeuvrable was 800 kg.  The 21st of March 1945 marked the start of the use of Õka bombs. On that day, all 18 G4M bombers belonging to the “Shinrai Butai” (‘Thunder God Squadron’) took off on their mission, but none returned. (54)
 
The losses attributable to air attacks by the Tokkõtai by the end of the war were as follows:
 
Main aircraft carriers = 0 sunk, 26 damaged
Light aircraft carriers (smaller carriers modified from commercial vessels) = 3 sunk, 18 damaged 
Battleships = 0 sunk, 15 damaged
Cruisers = 0 sunk, 22 damaged
Destroyers = 13 sunk, 109 damaged
Other vessels (transport ships, amphibious ships etc.) = 31 sunk, 219 damaged
 
Hence for all the air attacks on naval shipping, no more than 47 ships in total were sunk.  On the other hand, the IJN lost 2,431 personnel in Tokkõtai based attacks, while the army lost 1,417, making a total of 3,848 lives. (source: Tokkõ – War and the Japanese People). 
 
The lack of success in sinking major ships meant that most of those sunk were smaller vessels.
 
Another reason why the Tokkõtai were not able to achieve much success was because in the aftermath of the Battle for The Philippines, the US strengthened its defences against suicide attacks. The US Navy deployed a number of destroyers equipped with powerful radar in front of its task force to act as a radar picket and to provide early warning of any incoming attacks and direct any fighter aircraft in response.  The Tokkõtai were not able to so easily break through this sort of forward defence line. (54, 55)

Furthermore, many of the planes used by the Tokkõtai were older models, flying laden down with the weight of explosives and so became easy prey for American fighter aircraft. The US Navy’s success in the development of variable time fuses (which used an electromagnetic wave pulse, thereby causing ammunition to automatically explode when it came within proximity to a target) led to the development from 1943 onwards of anti-aircraft shells installed with VT fuses, which in turn led to great success in anti-aircraft defence. (55)
 
The destructive power of the Tokkõtai
 
There are already a large range of sources about the Tokkõtai, so what I would like to focus on is the issue of the destructive power that the Tokkõtai were able to wield. 
 
When an aircraft undertakes a conventional attack against a surface target, the bomb that it drops is able to increase both its destructive power and its penetrating power through additional speed created by gravity. However in an attack committed by crashing into a target, an aircraft that undertakes a sudden dive in order to crash into a target creates lift, and so the aircraft itself begins to act as an airbrake (and slows down).  Hence when compared to bombs dropped from aircraft in accordance with conventional methods of attack, the damage caused by crashing an aircraft itself into a ship is much less extensive.  This is why Tokkõtai attacks on major US Navy vessels were unable to sink them. (56)
 
One piece of evidence that illustrates the lack of destructive and attacking power created by crashing an aircraft into a target is the tale of the US Navy destroyer, the USS Laffey (DD-724).  On the 16th of April 1945, the Laffey was acting as part of an advance radar warning picket line in the seas off Okinawa.  Over the course of 80 minutes, she was attacked 22 times by Tokkõtai aircraft and suffered extensive damage after being hit six times by aircraft and four times by bombs.  She was also strafed by Japanese aircraft, leading to a casualty list of 31 sailors dead or missing and 72 wounded.  Yet the Laffey did not sink, and was towed by other destroyers and tugboats back to a safe harbour where she underwent emergency repairs.  She was later able to sail to Guam under her own power. (source: Victory in the Pacific 1945). (56)
 
This example illustrates the high level of damage control capabilities possessed by the Americans (damage control being those measures taken onboard a vessel, such as firefighting, in order to minimise the amount of damage suffered). It also shows is that despite crashing six times into the Laffey, no Tokkõ aircraft were able to sink a comparatively small warship like a destroyer. (56).  
 
Tokkõ pilots themselves were aware of the limits of the effectiveness of flying a plane into a ship with a bomb still attached.  Hashimoto Yoshio, a pilot of a Zero-class fighter aircraft, examined the most effective way of crashing a plane into an enemy’s ship with his fellow pilots.  He wrote the following about those discussions:
 
“It was about this time that we started to consider dropping your bomb immediately before you yourself collided with the target (at a low altitude), as opposed to having the bomb skip and hit the ship while you performed a sudden evasive manoeuvre, or else hitting the ship yourself or trying to launch the bomb from a higher altitude.  The origins of this line of thinking came from the fact that if you could exploit the penetrating power of a 250 kg or 500 kg bomb then you could create a much larger explosion.  This emphasised using the weight of the bomb rather than simply hitting the target with the aircraft itself to increase the penetrating power and armour-piercing capability of the attack.  It was a very logical way of thinking.” (source: Student Kamikaze – Life and Death, Memoirs of a student pilot of the IJN 14th Naval Air Corps). (57) 
 
 ‘Skip bombing’ is understood to refer to releasing a bomb first before hitting a target with an airplane.  In truth, Tokkõ pilots themselves shifted to hitting targets using just their aircraft.  
 
In May 1945, two Zero-class Tokkõ aircraft crashed into the USS Bunker Hill, an Essex-class major aircraft carrier in the seas off Okinawa. While the carrier itself didn’t sink, it suffered extensive damage including the loss of close to 400 personnel.  Both of these aircraft managed to release their bomb payload immediately before crashing into the carrier.  (source: M.T Kennedy, Tokkõ). 
 
The reason the pilots Ogawa Kiyoshi and Yasunori Morimitsu, both Kamikaze pilots, chose this form of attack was because they shared a desire with fighter pilots to inflict the greatest amount of damage on the enemy.  It was the ultimate form of silent protest at the otherwise illogical, reckless attack strategy of the Tokkõtai. (58)
 
Among the various Tokkõ aircraft, there are examples of planes that had explosives placed in the cockpit, and others which had their bombs fixed to the aircraft body so that they would be unable to drop them. (58)

Yoshida Yutaka, “Nippon Gunpeishi – Ajia Taiheiyõ Sensõ no Genjitsu” (Soldiers of Japan – the Reality of the Asia – Pacific War), Chuõkõron, 2018 (page numbers in parenthesis)
 
Chapter 2. Deaths at sea 
 
Over 250,000 deaths at sea 
 
Among the narrow definitions of casualties that occur during conflict, a number of particular manners of death stood out during the war.  One of these was the large number of deaths that occurred at sea.  
 
Attacks by aircraft belonging to allied fleets and submarines during the Asia-Pacific War resulted in a considerable number of ships being sunk, although it should be noted that deaths at sea here refers to those who died when their ships were sunk.  Detailed estimates on the number of deaths that occurred in this manner are included in my previous work “The ecology of the former Japanese Imperial Army and Navy”, so here I will only use round numbers. (42) 
 
According to the “Compendium of research on fatalities resulting from the sinking of vessels during the Pacific War”, the number of deaths at sea came to 182,000 in the case of the navy and navy-affiliated personnel, while the army and army-affiliated personnel deaths came to 176,000, making an overall total death toll of 358,000.  By way of contrast, the total number of casualties for both the Japanese navy and army during the entire Russo-Japanese War was 88,133 (source: A military historical study of the Russo-Japanese War). This reveals the scale of the loss of so many personnel.  Furthermore, the Army Medical Service for Transport Vessels, in its own report, pointed out that “Almost half of all deaths that occurred during combat aboard transport vessels should be ascribed to drowning” (source: Transport Ship Hygiene). (43)
 
The leading cause for so many deaths at sea was the great success that US Navy submarines had in sinking ships.  During the course of the Second World War, the US Navy lost 52 submarines, yet it managed to sink 1,314 vessels, making a combined commercial tonnage of 5.2 million tons. What this meant is that for every US submarine sunk, it managed to sink 25 commercial Japanese ships.  The German Kriegsmarine lost 781 U-boats during the war but sank 2,828 commercial vessels, for a combined tonnage of 15.5 million tons.  This resulted in a U-boat loss to vessel sunk ratio of 1:3.6, thereby giving the US a comfortable lead. However in the case of the Japanese Imperial Navy, it lost 127 I-class submarines but only sank 184 commercial ships, for a combined tonnage of 500,000 tons. This resulted in a loss to sunk ratio of little more than 1:1.4. (43)
 
The US Navy’s submarine campaign against Japan underwent a dramatic shift from around the middle of 1943.  The US Navy not only managed to reduce the number of defects in its torpedos, which up until this time had suffered from either premature detonation or failure to explode, it also successfully broke Japan’s commercial shipping codes.  This made it possible for US submarines to lie in wait for transport ships and ambush them (source: Research notes concerning the campaign to destroy Japan’s commercial shipping). (43)

Another reason for why so many Japanese troops died at sea was because most of the commercial vessels used to transport troops by the Imperial Japanese Army were requisitioned cargo ships. The interior compartments of these ships were narrow and cramped, despite being renovated, and hosted large numbers of troops.  As a result, when these ships began to sink, it became impossible for all of the personnel on board to escape.  In time, the loss of so many commercial vessels led to a shortage in ships, which meant that many of those ships still available were then overloaded with men and materials. This then exacerbated the amount of losses in personnel suffered when these ships were sunk. (source: Battlefields and Soldiers of the Asia-Pacific War). (44)
 
The Transport Ship Hygiene of the Army Medical Service for Transport Vessels, quoted earlier, pointed out that one of the particular characteristics of transport ships was the narrowness of the living spaces. Military transport ships had, on average, between 3 to 4 soldiers occupying a space of 1 tsubo (around 3.3 metres squared).  If 5 fully laden soldiers occupied a space of 1 tsubo, it would have been impossible for any of them to freely move about. In September 1944, Fukuoka Yoshio, a trainee medic on board a transport ship heading for The Philippines, wrote the following about his experience on the ship (44):
 
“Like slaves on board a slave ship, soldiers were crammed into the hold of transport ships over and above the prescribed number of crew.  Those who couldn’t get up on deck suffered from a debilitating fever (heatstroke) because of the dramatic increase in temperature and humidity in the hold. This led an increase in body temperature and the onset of shock. Over time, soldiers lost complete control over regulation of their central nervous system and many died.  Whenever this happened, I would accompany the body for burial at sea. I witnessed many a sad, tragic end, as the body of the soldier, with no relatives to farewell it, disappeared beneath the waves.” (source: A Doctor’s Greater East Asian War) (44)
 
According to Dr. Fukuoka, one reason that many of the younger soldiers who had just joined the army couldn’t go up on deck was because many of the veterans had parked themselves and their equipment near the exits to the deck in order to make use of the fresh air for themselves. (44)
 
“The 8-knot convoy” – Applying the spurs to a worn-out fleet of cargo ships
 
Another problem that the military faced was the lack of capability in Japan’s transport fleet.  During the Pacific War, in order to meet the military’s demand for transport vessels, a large number of ships were constructed that met wartime specifications.  Simplicity in design and construction, a shortened construction schedule, and savings on material and labour meant that speed of construction was prioritized to the detriment of the vessel’s capability. (45)
 
A variety of wartime-regulation ship types were constructed during the war. If we examine the speed at which such cargo ships travelled, a 1st generation cargo ship had a top speed, in the fastest class, of 12.3 knots, while the slowest type had a top speed of 10 knots.  A 2nd generation vessel could move, at the fastest, at 10 knots, while the slowest moved at 7 knots.  A 3rd generation vessel could move at 14 knots at the fastest, and 7.5 knots at the slowest.  A 4th generation vessel, which prioritised speed, could move at a top speed of 18 knots (source: A History of Wartime Ship Construction). (45)

Transport ships and tankers would make up part of a naval convoy where they would grouped together to protect them from attacks from submarines and aircraft.  Some ships within these convoys travelled at the comparatively low speed of 8 knots (around 15 kilometres an hour), which forced the remaining ships to modify their speed to match that of the slowest vessels.  Such convoys were referred to as “8 knot convoys”. These became the norm in time, which caused considerable problems for those vessels ordered to escort them.  (46)
 
To protect these “8 knot convoys” from submarine attack, the convoy would engage in zig-zag manoeuvres known as “noji manoeuvres” (because of the resemblance the movements had to the character no, or 之).  This often resulted in convoys having to drop their speed to 6 knots in order to successfully complete such manoeuvres (source: A Record of conversations with the Commander of the Combined Fleet).  (46)
 
Let’s have a look in more detail at what happened to transport ships after they had been attacked.  Both fatalities and injuries would result from explosions caused by either torpedos or bombs.  Within the ship this could provoke different reactions - from those who froze out of fear, to those who lost all sense of reason. Even though you might successfully escape from inside the ship, there would be a scramble to get hold of floating equipment like boats and rafts.  According to the “Military Regulations - No.49 - Lessons for use during difficulties at sea” (dated 18th January 1945) 
 
“Either seize a flotation device or get hold of one and use it exclusively. Do not worry about others but save your own life. There are many examples of sailors losing their lives trying to save both themselves and others.” (46)
 
One example of this ‘survival at all costs’ mentality was the tragedy that struck the ‘Taiseimaru’.  In April 1945, the Taiseimaru (1,948 tons) was making its way to Hakodate as part of the 3rd Amphibious Brigade. After being attacked by a submarine, she sank in the seas off Niikappu Seppuchõ in Hokkaido. (source: A History of Wartime Shipping).  One crew member of the Amphibious Brigade, Õyashiki Kiyoshi, provided an eyewitness account of what happened next:
 
“Soldiers floating around in the sea called out for help from the “Taihatsu” (an amphibious boat) and attempted to cling onto its side. I then saw an officer draw his sword and cut the arms off a number of soldiers (armless corpses later washed up on nearby beaches).” (source: Survey materials concerning records of wartime experiences and conversations, Vol.1). (47)
 
The writer Yoshimura Akira would cover this incident and use it for the basis for his story “The Sea Casket”. However he would supress the name of the ship, the unit involved, and the name of the place where the incident occurred. (47)
 
Pressure injuries and injuries from underwater explosions
 
Other forms of injury that occurred when a vessel sunk, but which were not widely recognised as war injuries, were pressure injuries and injuries that resulted from underwater explosions.  Pressure injuries usually refers to injuries that occur from the shock that the body (such as the legs) has to absorb after landing on the ground or a hard surface following a fall from a great height.   However Lieutenant Yamada Junichi, of the former Imperial Army Medical Corps, had a particular fascination with the problem of pressure injuries caused as a result of military action, and made the following observation about this phenomenon:
 
“During the recent war, ship explosions resulting from hits from individual mines (underwater mines or torpedos) created the opposite effect to what would ordinarily happen. An explosion would create such a shockwave that personnel on either the deck of a ship or in the water would be sent flying through the air. In addition to severe pressure injuries, there were other forms of injury including wounds from the explosion itself, contusions, bruising, fractures, burns, perforated eardrums, and internal injuries which ranged from simple to severe. It was common for multiple injuries to temporarily combine to form one major injury.” (source: War diary of a medical officer sent to The Philippines) (47, 48)
 
According to Yamada, among the recorded fatalities that occurred after being sunk, “44% had pressure injuries that accompanied (their other injuries).” (48)
 
But what about injuries that resulted from underwater explosions? Another medical officer who served during the Asia-Pacific War, Kunimi Hisahiko, knew of the type of wounds that could result from underwater explosions as a result of his studies at the naval medical school.   In his memoirs, he wrote:
 
“If an explosion happened to occur near someone floating in the sea, the organs of the victim would begin to rupture one after another despite the absence of any visible wounds to the outside of the body. They would suffer severe abdominal pain, which would gradually lead to emaciation and then death.  It was a horrible way to die.  At first, we didn’t know what the cause of death was, but soon learnt that it accompanied anyone who had been in the vicinity of an underwater explosion caused by a depth charge.” (source: Diary “Onkõ Chishin”) (48) 
 
Depth charges were the most common form of anti-submarine weapon. They were carried by destroyers and submarine chasers for use against enemy submarines in order to protect convoys. They would either be dropped or launched from an anti-submarine vessel and would explode underwater.  (48)
 
One record of the type of casualties that resulted from underwater explosions was documented by naval medical officer Hatano Katsumi. In January 1944, Hatano was stationed at Rabaul where he was responsible for providing medical assistance.  In his memoir of the war, he wrote:
 
“I had never treated so many suffering patients before.  Patients would complain about the terrible pains in their stomachs, which were so painful that it would make them cry.  They would be vomiting up blood.” (source: The Cave Hospital of Rabaul)
 
Hatano would later recognize what the cause of these injuries was.  In June 1942, Lieutenant Satõ Mamoru graduated from the naval medical school. In July 1944, Satõ found himself on Cerebus Island and responsible for operating on patients suffering from injuries caused by underwater explosions.   In his memoirs, he wrote:
 
“The crew of a cargo ship that had been torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine found themselves floating in the sea.  The shockwaves caused by depth charges dropped by friendly submarine chasers carrying out attacks on enemy submarines would cause ruptures in the intestines of these sailors. Soon there were around ten patients who had contracted peritonitis all at once.  (Abridged) When we opened their intestines up, we were astonished to find that the intestines of all of the patients had suffered ruptures in various places. There was a peculiar trait to that part of the body, (Abridged) and so from that we were able to discern that the injuries were not a result of the shockwave passing through the wall of the intestine, but rather explosive pressure had forced its way into the intestine via the anus, and damage to the intestine wall had thus occurred from within the intestine itself.” (source: Clouds over the sea) (49)
 
Hence although we might think of only one type of death at sea, in truth death came in many different forms. (49)
 
“There were a sudden series of incidents of men going mad”
 
One further issue regarding deaths at sea that can’t be ignored was the psychological trauma that accompanied any experience of being sunk.  As losses in shipping began to dramatically escalate, a sense of dread would spread among the troops onboard a transport ship making its way out of port.  From February to March 1943, a campaign was waged to increase the amount of supplies reaching New Guinea.  During the ‘81st campaign’, aerial attacks by US and Australian aircraft resulted in the loss of 8 cargo transport ships and 4 destroyers, thereby annihilating an entire convoy.  This was referred to as the ‘Battle of the Bismarck Sea’ (in English, or the ‘Dampier Strait Tragedy’ in Japanese). (50)
 
Tsuchii Zenjirõ wrote the following words in his memoir, based on his notes taken in relation to the state of the soldiers and crew scheduled for embarkation:
 
“Many of those marked for embarkation would gradually fall ‘silent’ and begin to feel ill.  In the afternoon of the day before embarkation, when tension had reached its maximum point, there were a sudden series of incidents of men going mad among the soldiers making their way into the holds of the transport ships.  This became a serious problem.  What is more, these men were so affected (by their madness) that they clearly weren’t faking it.” (source: Records of crews from sunken vessels) (50)
 
The state of mind of troops who had been rescued after their ships were sunk was also a serious issue.  In a number of military reports, personnel who had been rescued after “being in a perilous situation”:
 
 “would ordinarily display a more sensitive mental state for some time afterwards, particularly a heightened sense of fear” which, it was noted, would interfere in the performance of the soldier’s military duties (source: “Lessons for use during difficulties at sea” quoted earlier) (51)
 
There were also regiments who, along with losses in men and materials, also lost their battle flags.  Battle flags were flags presented to small infantry and cavalry units by the Emperor at the time of their formation. Along with the psychological, almost mythical, importance attached to objects received directly from the Emperor, it symbolised the unity, or the cohesiveness of the particular regiment. These were the flags that sank together with their regiments. (51) 
 
A specific example of this occurred in November 1942, when a ship carrying the 170th Infantry Regiment was torpedoed by a submarine in the seas off Palau, resulting in the loss of the regiment’s battle flag.   In April 1944, the 210th Infantry Regiment suffered the loss of its battle flag when their transport ship was sunk in the Bashi Channel. And again, in August 1944, the 13th Infantry Division suffered the loss of its battle flags when their transport ships were also sunk in the Bashi Channel by submarine-launched torpedoes. (source: Infantry and Cavalry Units and their Battle Flags). (51) 
 
One could say that this was a fitting symbol for the destruction of “the Emperor’s Army”. (51)

This translation is of a chapter from a book by Majima Mitsuru, which details his time as a soldier within the 30th Army Engineer Regiment sent to fight on the New Guinea front from February 1943 through to around October 1944. As you will see, Majima pulls no punches in his criticisms of what he believed was the gross negligence of the Imperial Japanese military in sending troops into an environment without adequate supplies, reinforcements, or even a definitive plan.  While Majima’s style of writing tends to be stream of conscious, which is why it is given to suddenly veering off on a completely different tangent, it does provide some insight in the mindset of at least one Japanese soldier sent to fight in New Guinea and the reality of what that meant for him and others like him.  As per usual, numbers in parenthesis refer to page numbers.
 
Majima Mitsuru, “A War Diary of New Guinea:  The ill-fated army that vanished among mountain peaks and jungles”, Kõjinsha, Reprinted 2003
 
Chapter One.  Defence to the death, and self-sacrifice
 
An island of coral
 
Rabaul – an island whose exposure to the heat of the sun makes it seem as though it sits directly beneath the Equator; an island of coral surrounded by a crystal blue sea common to islands in the south and covered by jungle.  It was an island that would be familiar to any Japanese who had heard the song titled “the air unit of Rabaul”.  It is an island tempting enough to convince anybody to visit it at least once. 
 
And yet it was a battlefield.  There was no gaiety that you would find at any tourist resort.  Beneath an unfamiliar sky, the entire base was surrounded by jungle.  It was here that General Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the 8th Area Army, decided to place himself as the pivot for Japan’s southern strategy along with Lieutenant General Hyakutake Harukichi, commander of the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army, who was subordinate to General Imamura.  As for the Imperial Japanese Navy, Rabaul would serve as headquarters for Rear Admiral Kusaka Jinichi, commander of the Southeast Area Fleet, and under whose command fell the 8thFleet.  
 
Rabaul was an important strategic point vital to the control of both the Solomon Islands and New Guinea itself.  With its gentle waves, deep water and with an almost spherical, broad coastline, it formed a good, natural harbour.  Small numbers of destroyers and submarines were able to weigh anchor there while awaiting their next mission.  At first glance this arrangement looked peaceful and orderly, yet these vessels represented the remnants from various sea battles.  The Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942, the Battle of Midway in June the same year, and then the First to Third Battles of the Solomon Islands that took place between August and November had resulted in the loss of IJN superiority to the allied fleet.  These destroyers and submarines had evacuated to Rabaul with what was left of various units from Guadalcanal, and were mainly being used to ferry men and supplies to the front in New Guinea. (16-17)
 
At the entrance to the harbour lies a dormant volcano covered in grey volcanic ash. On the shoreline around the base of the volcano are shoals made of coral, from which steam escapes through fissures in the coral and form natural hot springs. As the island had no fresh water source of its own apart from rainwater, various units poured the hot spring water into cans and then used this for their baths. The flat plain from which steam rose up to cover the harbour was used as a base for air units. (17)
 
Along one section of the shoreline, the atmosphere was similar to that of small fishing villages that one could find in Japan.  The unfinished houses that made up the village were made of flat, simple plywood, lined up one after another.  A sober grocery store sold simple woven goods of earthen colours made by local people, or else metal goods. And everywhere one could see flowers that resembled weeds that grow virtually everywhere throughout the world, and which sprang back to life no matter how many times you stamped on them. (17) The company houses that the Caucasians had abandoned were used as lodgings for the command staff and naval officers.  The army expeditionary units, out of their element on the sea, made do by dividing themselves up among the fields in the vicinity of the bay near the mountains or else on the red-capped peaks.  (17-18) The narrow, flat plain areas located between the mountains were used to construct log cabins, with enough room in them for one company.  
 
Nonetheless, it was a long trip from Hiroshima Bay (then known by its former name of Ujina Bay), which lasted around a month.  Although cramped and smelly, when I think back of my time spent on those hot transport ships it seemed like heaven. The convoy that made its way south from Hiroshima would pass by way of Palau before finally arriving at Rabaul. The area just outside of Palau’s harbour had already become perilous to Japanese shipping.  The convoy that set out at the start of 1943 and which managed to arrive safely at Rabaul was described as ‘lucky’, such was the danger of being sunk in the southern seas.  
 
Once the convoy had made its way safely into Rabaul harbour, the harbour itself sprang back to life as the new units made landfall one after another.   Black skinned natives, employed as dock workers in order to unload supplies, were crammed into army trucks in great numbers such was the amount of work for them to do. (18)  
 
If you walked in front of the Kempeitai (security police) headquarters near the harbour, from the open windows you would hear the sound of angry voices within yelling “Are you a spy?” or “Are you trying to sabotage the military?”, accompanied by the sound of a whip landing with a ‘thwack’ on some black skin, followed in turn by an anguished scream.  (18)
 
Sad news of the destruction of our combined fleet and the withdrawal from Guadalcanal soon reached us.  In the midst of our consternation and loss of morale, we began to be ruled by fatalism.  All of the news that made it to Rabaul spoke of defeat, with no room for any other news (other than that) concerning the worsening situation.  After the failure of the attack on Port Moresby, we then learned of the sacrifice of the base at Buna, itself an important location.  What it meant was that one corner of the defensive line in eastern New Guinea had collapsed. (18)  While the military had declared that Rabaul alone would never be surrendered to the enemy, the general opinion was that given our isolation and lack of support, it was only a matter of time (before this happened).  As a consequence, most of the labour was used to turn the entire island into a fortress, with a start made on creating a self-sufficient food supply. (19)
 
The first step towards destruction
 
The Solomon Islands is an archipelago running in a long line from north to south in the southern Pacific Ocean.  It was also the scene of the last major battle for the Imperial Japanese Navy.  Bougainville, the most important of islands in the chain, was maintained as the headquarters for the 17th Army and the 8th Fleet. However the losses at Midway and the Battles of the Solomon Islands, followed by the loss of Guadalcanal, completely changed the war’s dynamic in the South Pacific. (19)
 
Guadalcanal, a small island lying at the southern end of the archipelago, was virtually unknown to most Japanese who had no idea where it was located.  Yet the defence of the South Pacific that began on this island, and which involved every military unit sent to the south, would become the first step in the disintegration of the Greater Japanese Empire. This scenario was something that neither the General Staff, nor their regional military subordinates, had ever even dreamed was possible. (19)
 
The successful extraction of the 13,000 troops of the 2nd Sendai Division (led by Lieutenant General Maruyama Masao) from Guadalcanal was regarded with pride as a triumph.  And yet, the reality of the retreat and the failure of the reckless campaign could not be denied. The confusion and consternation of the central command and the regional armies was something equivalent to recklessness.  The failure of the defence of Guadalcanal meant that every effort was put into the extraction plan, which ultimately succeeded.  Yet what it also meant was that the shift to the defence of New Guinea would only be a matter of time. (20)
 
The decision to retreat from Guadalcanal ignored the threat to New Guinea posed by General Douglas MacArthur.  It also spoke of the failure of the overly optimistic plan to transfer one section of the 17th Army to New Guinea once Guadalcanal was secured.  It was a mistake to think that such a reactive strategy could proceed according to plan. (20)  
 
The withdrawal from Guadalcanal meant those destroyers sent to extricate the troops ended up depositing them on the shores of Rabaul. Oh my, what a bunch of malnourished men they were, reduced to little more than skin and bones.  These defeated, sick troops of the 2nd Division could not be sent to the front in New Guinea.   
 
There existed a complacency in the belief of the Emperor’s army and its invincibility, and a distorted education system that taught that Japan was the ‘land of the gods’ and divinely blessed. This education, since it began in childhood, seeped its way into the very marrow of our being, starting with the military and then spreading throughout the nation.  
 
There were, however, neither benevolent gods nor miracles present in the various battles of the South Pacific. (20)
 
We believed that a one-in-a-million chance fluke was the work of some divine presence.  But there was no way that such events would or could continue.  Worst case scenarios, in which a drowning man will clutch at straws and where prayers will go unanswered, showed the folly of such thinking.  This came as a great shock to us all.  It would in turn shatter the ambitions of the Japanese High Command and their southern fleet.  
 
Yet for those of us born and raised in a militaristic country, there was no choice but to dutifully advance along the road to war.  
 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of it were, once the war began, no matter how great your desire to win at all costs was or how ferocious your sense of duty to your country, the poor, antiquated capabilities of the Japanese military and civilian transport ships they relied on, which had been used since the time of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, were no match for the modern weaponry, the speed of the landings, and the air transport capabilities of the US military. (21)
 
The High Command, by making light of the transport situation, effectively sent one part of their army into a starvation-ridden hell, which robbed soldiers of their vitality and fighting abilities and sent them headlong along the road to self-destruction.  
 
One after another, the leaders of Japan taught the people to invoke the name of the Emperor as they went to a glorious death in battle, or else punish themselves by committing suicide to wipe away their shame, and impressed upon them their duty to fulfil these maxims.  This was why to the Japanese mind, the evacuation of General MacArthur to Australia following his defeat at the Battle of Corregidor in The Philippines, abandoning his subordinates when he should have taken responsibility by committing ritual suicide, made him a figure for ridicule, and led to the sin of negligence to take hold of us out of our contempt for him. (22)
 
Yet no matter how many defeats or collapses occurred, the High Command, in their desire to preserve their honour, continued to report on the superiority of Japanese forces while those same forces were undergoing rapid disintegration.  The transformation of the war situation led to desperation, which forced units on the frontline to participate in pointless campaigns, the end result of which was their death amid the hell of starvation. (22)
 
Meanwhile a certain nation, with its overwhelming economic power and manufacturing capability compared to Japan, was turning its automobile industries towards the mass production of aircraft.  Air raids would soon be carried out against the Japanese mainland, with the Boeing B-29, the so-called “Superfortress”, the principal instrument for such attacks. It was said that in America, it was possible to turn out 50 such airplanes a day. The lack of research on the modern weapons manufacturing capabilities of the US was a huge error given the need to know one’s enemy. (22)  
 
Speaking of the evils of the Japanese military, we were told that sending subordinates and commanders to their deaths (!) if the nation so demanded was in keeping with the traditional ethos of the warrior.  We paid little heed to actual concepts of Bushidõ taught by social anthropologists or else ignored them completely.  

The symbiosis of naked militarism with dogmatic thought laid the seeds for disaster.  It was often said that “a samurai pretends he has eaten well when he has no food” (i.e., keeps a stiff upper lip), so even if we were forced to stoop to eating grass, we all believed that we would win in a stand-up fight. (22)
 
While mouthing platitudes about the need for minutely detailed preparations for campaigning, delays in sending incomplete supply runs to various battlefields became the norm. In China, one meaningless expression that got a lot of use was “local arrangements”. As those at the front line couldn’t halt their advance to receive food supplies, they requisitioned any cows, pigs or chickens that were close at hand. Hence anything that could be put to use for the sake of the campaign would be done so to the maximum extent possible. For the High Command, who put a lot of emphasis on this sort of thinking, their negligence in logistics would become the norm by the time of the Pacific War. (23)
 
In New Guinea, where there simply wasn’t enough material available to engage in “local arrangements”, fighting progressed from being one with weapons to the struggle to stave off the hell of starvation. (23)
 
By this time, Douglas MacArthur, the man the Japanese High Command regarded as utterly toothless, had arrived at Port Moresby with 3 full US divisions and had Boeing B-17 “Flying Fortress” heavy bombers at his disposal. The speed at which the Americans were able to deploy these forces completely transcended the expectations of the Japanese High Command.   The first time we saw the bombers was in the sky over Rabaul.  They passed over at night in the stratosphere. (23)
 
A number of gigantic shapes floated in the searchlights beaming from the various warships in the harbour.  One after another they passed overhead, accompanied by a metallic whirring sound.  Just the mere presence of these enormous shapes was enough to intimidate the Japanese forces on the ground. (23)
 
Speaking of MacArthur, he had been humiliated in The Philippines.  For the sake of his honour, he had to recapture those islands.  After his evacuation from Corregidor, he made his famous declaration “I shall return”.  MacArthur, out of his sense of pride and destiny, and rather than brooding over his defeat, slowly but steadily built up the forces necessary for him to launch a counter-attack. It was a matter of course that he would have also included America’s overwhelming industrial and advanced military power in his calculations. By contrast, the Japanese High Command, when considering when the Americans might attack, believed that it would occur sometime after the summer of 1943. It was a miscalculation, an illusion born out of over-optimistic analysis of the results of the attack on Pearl Harbour. (24) 
 
At the Battle of Midway, and then during the three battles for the Solomon Islands, the Imperial Japanese Navy had engaged in these conflicts with the full expectation that it would win.  Yet what was the result?!  Utter defeat, leading to the downfall of the IJN.  An irreversible event.  And it would serve as a catalyst for the misfortune and deprivation regarding the amount of supplies in eastern New Guinea, as well as their transport and distribution, that the New Guinea expeditionary force would be forced to suffer until the bitter end. (24)   

This particular translation comes from Yoshida Yutaka’s study of the principle forms of combat casualties suffered by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy both during the Japan-China War and the Pacific War. Yoshida’s purpose in writing the study stemmed from his belief that post-war generations had either never learned about the reality of life in the Imperial Japanese armed forces, or else had a distorted view of the wars that ignored their brutality in exchange for a more palatable version of history. The book has gone on to become a best-seller in Japan, although obviously has faced its critics from among the revisionist sector of Japan’s historical societies and right-wing advocacy groups.  
 
Yoshida Yutaka, “Nippon Gunpeishi – Ajia Taiheiyõ Sensõ no Genjitsu” (Soldiers of Japan – the Reality of the Asia – Pacific War), Chuõkõron, 2018 (Numbers in parenthesis indicate page numbers)
 
Chapter One
 
The soldiers who went to their deaths
 
The truth of the forlorn defence campaign
 
1.The exponential growth in deaths from disease and starvation
 
The rapid growth in casualties stemming from disease
 
Given the various developments that took place during the course of the war, how and in what way did Japanese soldiers die?  It is commonplace to think of deaths that occurred as a result of fighting when examining casualties on the battlefield.  However this logic cannot be applied to the Asia-Pacific War, in particular the reality of the defence campaign, or from 1944 onwards. Hereafter I intend to examine the type of deaths that were experienced during that phase and earlier phases of the war. (28). 
 
The first thing to point out is that there were an extraordinary number of deaths from disease.  When examining deaths in battle and deaths from disease, they are generally placed under the combined heading of ‘casualties’.  However I shall divide them up so that I can refer to those who died in battle as “battle casualties”, while those who died of illness will be “casualties from disease”.  
 
Wars of the early modern era were marked by a considerably greater number of casualties from disease than from actual fighting.  As a result of advancements in military medicine and nursing, as well as developments in logistics, the number of casualties from disease fell.  During the Russo-Japanese War, for example, the percentage of casualties from disease dropped to 26.3% of the total number of casualties suffered by the Japanese army. (28-29) The Russo-Japanese War thus marked the first time in the history of conflict that the number of battle casualties actually surpassed those who succumbed to illness (source: Soldiers and Battles of the Asia-Pacific War).
 
However during the Japan-China War, according to documents compiled by the 1st Department of Veterans’ Affairs in November 1945, the longer that conflict dragged on, the greater the increase in casualties from disease.  By 1941, the number of battle casualties from fighting in China had reached 12,498, while the number of casualties from disease totalled 12,713 (not including those involved in the Mukden Incident).  The percentage of those who died of illness, when compared to the total number of casualties, came to 50.4% (source: An Examination of Modern Warfare). While no comprehensive statistics survive from the Asia-Pacific War, as we shall soon see, when one considers the ferocity with which the Asia-Pacific War was fought, surpassing that of the Japan-China War, it is inconceivable to think that the number of casualties from illness in that war were less than those suffered in China. (28-29)
 
In order to narrow down on the number of casualties from illness, we must first examine unit histories.  Amid these histories, there are often lists of total casualties compiled using the unit’s own records. However these lists very rarely make the distinction between those who died in combat and those who died from illness. Let us therefore examine, for example, the unit history of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the China Occupational Army.  From the outset of the Japan-China War, the overall casualties from this regiment, which was at the forefront of fighting throughout the war, and according to its own “casualty lists”, came to 2,625. (29-30)
 
Thereafter, the number of battle casualties that took place during the so-called “defence campaign” period from 1944 onwards, and when combined with post-war deaths, came to 533, while deaths from illness came to 1,475, making a total of 2,008 (not including 14 whose date of death was uncertain, and 2 who died by accident).  The percentage of those who died from illness, compared to the total number of deaths from 1944 onwards, thus came to 73.5% of the casualties suffered by the 1st Regiment (source: Unit History of the 1stRegiment of the China Occupational Army). (30)
 
However one cannot rule out the possibility that the number of those who died of illness was greater than that quoted in the source above. This is because there was a tendency to “re-classify” deaths from illness as battle casualties at the front.  The reason stemmed from the fact that in both the military and society, a death in battle was regarded as a more meaningful then that from disease and was certainly considered more honourable. Torizawa Yoshio, who was sent as a reservist to the China front in June, 1942 as part of the 3rd Regiment of the China Occupational Army, wrote the following note about his experience. The 3rd Regiment, like the 1stRegiment, was affiliated with the 27th Division. (30)
 
“Members of the company fell ill, and as it was not easy to nurse people under field conditions, some of those men died.  Given the situation at the time, those who died from illness under such cruel conditions were looked on with pity, and so as their deaths were regarded as no different to those who died in combat. Thereafter, despite the absence of fighting, they would be recorded as having died in combat. What is more, as in the case of “T”, those who committed suicide while in the field would also be treated as combat casualties.” (source: 8000km Across the Continent). (30)
 
Unparalleled casualties rates from starvation
 
In order to complete the examination of casualties from disease, one must also examine its close relationship with deaths stemming from starvation.  This is because there were huge numbers of such deaths during the Asia-Pacific War.  As noted earlier, the total number of battle casualties among military and military affiliated personnel following on from the Japan-China War came to around 2.3 million. (31) According to the ground-breaking research conducted by Fujiwara Akira, this figure can be further divided up into soldiers who died from malnutrition and those who contracted diseases like malaria as a result of their malnutrition and subsequently died. When such casualties are totalled up, they constitute around 1.4 million deaths (or 61% of the total number of deaths) (source: The Starved Heroes).  (31) These statistics have been criticised by Hata Ikuhiko as excessively high, and that deaths from starvation constituted more like 37% of the total number of casualties. However Hata himself has admitted that “There is no escaping the fact that this was an absolutely unprecedented level (of deaths from starvation) in the annals of both domestic and foreign military history” (source: The Ecology of the former Imperial Japanese Army and Navy). (31) 
 
The reality of this tragedy is seen in what occurred during the defensive war in The Philippines that commenced in October, 1944.  According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in 1964, around 518,000 army, navy and associated personnel perished during that conflict.  It also mentioned the following in relation to those members of the Imperial Army who died (not counting those who drowned at sea, details on which will be revealed later):
 
“While there is a scarcity of resources from which accurate data can be obtained concerning the breakdown of casualty rates, in general around 35 – 40% of casualties came as a result of direct fighting (including operations against guerrillas), which meant that the remaining 60-65% of deaths were a result of disease.  Furthermore, among these casualties, those who actually died after contracting a malady of some form constituted less than half of the death rate from disease, which meant that a majority of those who died did so as a result of illness made worse because of starvation.”  (source: A History of Army Sanitation during the Great East Asian War) (The Philippines Conflict) (32)
 
The main reason for this increase in deaths from starvation was the loss of both sea and air superiority, which cut off supply lines for the Japanese military and led to severe shortages of food.  The percentage of war material that arrived at the front undamaged (also known as the rate of stability) stood at 96% in 1942. By 1943 it had dropped to 83%, and then 67% in 1944, and then finally 51% in 1945.  This meant that from one-third to half of all foodstuffs transported by sea were lost.  The drop in the rate of stability led to accumulated war material falling far below levels necessary to sustain an army in the field (source: The Pacific War – A record of Japan’s lost transport ships). (33)
 
The Japanese High Command was certainly aware of just how serious the shortage in supplies was and the problem of starvation among the troops. Kanbayashi Hiroshi, director of the Imperial Army Medical Corps within the Department of the Army, and who had recently returned to Japan from the southern front, issued the following warning about the state of health within the army in both the Solomon Islands and New Guinea at a meeting of the Medical Corps on the 23rd of August, 1943:
 
“Again, while local self-sufficiency can be sustained in Rabaul, it most certainly cannot at the front.  At the front, soldiers lack the strength to be able to bear the weight of their weapons because of their malnutrition (abridged) Furthermore, the leading cause of death at Wau (a New Guinea battlefield) is starvation.  (Abridged) Malnutrition robs soldiers of their will to fight.” (source: Daily Record of Duties within the Department of the Army, Vol.2, Chapter 8). (33)
 
Even the Shõwa Emperor (Emperor Hirohito) was aware of what the true state of affairs was. On the 7th of September 1943, the Emperor, when speaking to Lieutenant General Hasunuma Shigeru, the Emperor’s Aide de Camp, about the halt in supplies to the front, stated “(I cannot bear) the fact that the officers and soldiers have been plunged into something resembling starvation”, and then addressing the Chief of the General Staff, dictated that “I order you to convey my outrage about the supply situation (to the General Staff)” (source: Private Record of the Prime Minister within the Tõjõ Cabinet) (33)
 
War-related trophopathy (malnutrition)  - “like a living corpse”
 
It is important to note that in relation to issues surrounding malnutrition, there is a link between war-related malnutrition and war-related mental illnesses.  This malady was first noticed during the early stages of the Japan-China War.  During the Xuzhou campaign of April to June, 1938, many of the soldiers taking part in that conflict began to fall ill primarily a result of dramatic losses in weight, a lack of appetite, anaemia, and chronic diarrhea.   As treatment for such ailments was difficult, there were many cases which ended in death.  To address this problem, Lieutenant General Nagino Itsuki of the Army Medical Corps wrote a thesis titled “War-related Trophopathy”. The date of publication is unclear, however the cover contains the heading “Army Medical School (Northern China Army Edition)” written in typeset.  Within the thesis, General Nagino addressed the “three main symptoms” of high levels of atrophy, loss of appetite, and diarrhea.  (36)
 
In relation to his patients, General Nagino wrote “The ceaseless diarrhea brings on a decrease in the overall corporeal condition.  In addition to dramatic atrophy, patients lose subcutaneous fat, thus leading to shrunken muscles.  Patients’ bodies begin to appear mummified, vessels begin to constrict, and the patient is unable to maintain a constant body temperature. The limbs turn clammy, while the face turns expressionless and all desire to speak is lost.  Patients fall into a stupor, with glassy eyes, unable to communicate, and for all purposes appear to be ‘living corpses’.  Some fade away like ‘a slowly extinguishing candle’, while others who don’t appear to have such serious symptoms suddenly ‘collapse, and suffer cardiac arrest or pulmonary arrest and die’”. This paints a very vivid picture. (36)
 
Tanaka Hidetoshi, a medic assigned to the 4th Field Hospital of the 27th Division during the continental campaign of 1944, also portrayed the state of patients suffering from war-related malnutrition in a field hospital in the following manner:
 
“(Because of the large number of patients) In the case of the army, long periods of time spent at the front, with its lack of supplies and excessive mental strain, led to high incidences of acute malnutrition.  While this was generally described as “war-related malnutrition”, many of those who suffered from this illness also had amoebic dysentery, bacterial diarrhea, or malaria. Opinions regarding the malady varied when it first began to be researched, with the predominant theory being that it was by nature infectious.” (source: Materials concerning War-Related Malnutrition). (37)
 
However in the preface to his thesis, General Nagino noted that “From around 1942 onwards, and as a result in the spread of education regarding this condition, identical cases were detected in inland areas that had not experienced any fighting. What is more, in the following year there was an increase in such cases, which was a completely unforeseen development.” What this demonstrated was that it was impossible to simply conclude that harsh fighting conditions led to outbreaks of infectious disease cases. (37)  
 
One person acutely aware of this situation was army medic Colonel Namba Mitsushige.  In the preface to his thesis written after the war, he stated that “In relation to the state of health (within the army), long conflicts led to a drop in nutrition, or to put this another way, it led to a condition known as war-related malnutrition syndrome. Its primary symptoms are malnutrition leading to a loss in weight and motivation, and exhaustion brought on by the nature of the war. I intend to argue that there were in fact two separate kinds of war-related malnutrition syndrome.  The first I have dubbed “chronic war-related malnutrition syndrome”, as it included infectious diseases like amoebic dysentery, malaria, or tuberculosis, which would repeatedly re-occur.  The other was not an infectious disease, but rather something that appeared in conjunction with any serious pre-existing ailment, and had no known infection source. This I refer to as “primary war-related malnutrition syndrome” (Source: A pathological anatomical study of 51 strains of so called ‘war-related malnutrition syndrome’). (38-39)
 
What is important to note here is that army physicians had already established the existence of “primary war-related malnutrition syndrome”, which had no relation to any infectious disease. (39)
 
When compared to the army, naval studies into war-related malnutrition syndrome were both late and appeared to favour the infectious-disease theory.  Naval medic Commander Abe Isao, along with five other physicians, examined the possibility that Gartner’s bacillus (a form of salmonella) had led to food poisoning among 11 sailors who were part of a group of 18 suspected of having war-related malnutrition syndrome. In the chapter of their report titled “In relation to the so-called war-related malnutrition syndrome”, they surmised their belief that the principle cause of this condition lay in malaria, dysentery, amoebic conditions, as well as Gartner’s bacillus (source: Self-instruction manual for local conditions in the southern theatre). (39) 
 
As we shall see, one of the characteristics of the Imperial navy was its disregard for psychiatric illness.  Yet this factor repeatedly made an appearance in issues related to war-related malnutrition syndrome.  (39)
 
The strong link to neuropsychiatric symptoms
 
Ultimately the army collapsed without ever establishing the origins of war-related malnutrition syndrome. However thereafter a new theory emerged to explain its prevalence. Aoki Tõru, himself a physician during the war and who engaged in the study of war-related malnutrition syndrome, noted that “There is a tendency to believe that a majority of the army medical corps considered amoebic dysentery the cause of war-related malnutrition syndrome”.  He himself, by concentrating on the pituitary gland, below which lay the part of the brain controlling appetite, posited the following:
 
“In relation to war-related malnutrition syndrome, its early symptoms were a passivity exacerbated by monomaniacal strategists (i.e., commanders that ignored the lack of supplies). The loss of physical strength derived from this passivity would progress, with latter symptoms fatally affecting those areas of the brain located under the pituitary gland. This would result in the loss of regulatory functionality, which then led to the collapse of homeostasis in the patient, which would eventually result in death.” (source: A secret record of war-related malnutrition syndrome). (40). 
 
In other words, a shortage of supplies including food, physical and mental exhaustion brought on by the constant fighting, and the cruelties of war, together with stress, nervousness, tension and fear, brought about changes to the equilibrium within the body known as homeostasis. This led to a loss of appetite and the appearance of eating disorders.  More recently, Dr Noda Masaaki, a psychiatrist, has written about war-related malnutrition syndrome. In his study, Dr Noda wrote that “In truth, soldiers began to refuse to eat. They would vomit up anything they did eat, which made their condition worse.  At the front, where one had to maintain one’s health, this amounted to a decision by the body to quit living”. (41)
 
Nevertheless, war-related malnutrition syndrome was not a result of simple malnutrition, but one inexorably linked to war-related neuropsychological conditions.  
 
We have examined this issue from a variety of angles during this chapter, so we can conclude that the largest number of deaths among the soldiery were not battle casualties, but rather casualties from disease, among which starvation ranked as the principal culprit. (41)